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Abstract 
By tracing the history of Badagry, from its reconstruction after 1784 until its annexation in 1863, it is 
possible to trace a number of themes which have implications for the history of the whole 'Slave 
Coast' and beyond. The enormous impact of the environment in shaping this community and indeed 
its relations with other communities, plays a vital part in any understanding of the Badagry story. 
As a place of refuge, Badagry's foundation and subsequent history was shaped by a series of 
immigrant groups and individuals from Africa and Europe. Its position as an Atlantic and 
lagoonside port enabled this community to emerge as an important commercial and political force in 
coastal affairs. However, its very attractions also made it a desirable prize for African and 
European groups. Badagry's internal situation was equally paradoxical. The fragmented, 
competitive nature of its population resulted in a weakness of political authority, but also a 
remarkable flexibility which enabled the town to function politically and commercially in the face 
of intense internal and external pressures. It was ultimately the erosion of this tenuous balance 
which caused Badagry to fall into civil war. 
Conversely, a study of Badagry is vital for any understanding of these influential groups and states. 
The town's role as host to political refugees such as Adele, an exiled King of Lagos, and commercial 
refugees, such as the Dutch trader Hendrik Hertogh, had enormous repercussions for the whole 
area. Badagry's role as an initial point of contact for both the Sierra Leone community and 
Christianity in Nigeria has, until now, been almost wholly neglected. Furthermore, the port's 
relations with its latterly more famous neighbours, Lagos, Porto-Novo, Oyo, Dahomey and 
Abeokuta, sheds further light on the nature of these powers, notably the interdependence of these 
communities both politically and economically. Badagry's long-standing relationship with Europe 
and ultimate annexation by Britain is also an area which has been submerged within the Lagos 
story. But it is evident that the, annexation of Badagry in 1863 was a separate development, which 
provides further evidence on the nature of nineteenth century British imperialism on the West 
Coast of Africa. 
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Introduction 
The town of Badagry lies on the South-West coast of Nigeria, about thirty five 
miles west of metropolitan Lagos 1. Badagry is now a small,, peripheral town 
along the road to the border between Nigeria and the Republic of Benin. But 
from its foundation in 1736 until the second half of the nineteenth century it was 
an important city state which played a vital role in shaping both the commercial 
and political character of the whole area. 
Hitherto, the role of Badagry in the history of the 'Slave Coast' has been largely 
neglected, and attention has been focused on its latterly more dominant 
neighbours Lagos and Porto-Novo. But during the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, Badagry played a crucially important role as an Atlantic port and 
independent city state in the region. The rise and fall of the town as a trading 
community sheds light on the nature of the coastal economy, notably in the 
crucial period of transition from slave to palm oil exports. At the same time, 
Badagry's complex relations with her coastal and interior neighbours, as well as 
her European contacts, offers a further insight into the intricate pattern of West 
African coastal politics. The town itself also provides a fascinating example of a 
settler community. Created by a succession of immigrant groups, the fragmented 
nature of the town's structure ultimately challenges the notion that pre-colonial 
1The origin of the name Badagry or Badagri has been explained in a number of ways. Richard 
Lander during a visit to the town in 1825-27, suggested that the name came from the word 'Badag' 
meaning woman [R Lander, Records of Captain Clapperton's Last Expedition to Africa. Vol 2, 
(London, Frank Cass 1967), p. 2491. Revd CA Gollmer of the Church Missionary Society (CMS) 
suggested in the 1840s however, that the name came from the word 'Adgadgi' meaning 'the roaring 
of the great gun' [Church Missionary Intelligencer (_Qjj) August 1849, p. 93 1. But Badagry 
tradition, as recorded by T Ola Avoseh in the 1930s, suggests that the name arose from a man called 
'Agbede' who was 'head of the farmers'. The area thus came to be known as 'Agbethegreme' in the 
Gun language (Gle ='farm'in Gun) or'Agbadarigi' (presumably a misspelling /misprinting of the 
word 'Agbadagiri') in Yoruba. This name was later corrupted to Badagry by European traders [T 
Ola Avoseh, A Short HistoEy of Badagly, (Lagos, Olu Printing Works 1938), p. 111. In 1928 the 
spelling of this name was officially laid down as 'Badagri', in accordance with the rulings of the 
Royal Geographical Society and the Colonial Office [Nigerian National Archive, lbadan (NNAI) 
BADADIV 6/1 District Officers Intelligence Report 1928]. However, the current spelling used in 
Nigeria is evidently 'Badagry'. It is this spelling that I have adopted. 
1 
Badagry can in fact be called a 'state' at all. Why Badagry was unable to maintain 
its position as an Atlantic port and independent coastal power has not yet been 
sufficiently established. The neglect of the town's history reflects its present 
position on the periphery rather than its very central role in the past. 
****** ************ **** * 
Themes in Badagrian History 
The town of Badagry is situated on the South-West Coast of Nigeria, almost 
halfway between Lagos to the east and Porto-Novo, now in the Republic of 
Benin, to the West. Like both Lagos and Porto-Novo, Badagry not only enjoys a 
position close to the seashore, but is also situated on the bank of the inland 
lagoon. This natural waterway stretches almost three hundred miles parallel 
with the coast from Cape St Paul to the old Kingdom of Benin, and provides an 
almost uninterrupted water route which avoids the violence of the sea's surf and 
is joined along its length by other waterways from the interior. 
Badagry was founded in the first half of the eighteenth century when the Dutch 
trading agent Hendrik Hertogh, finding himself threatened by the King of 
Dahomey, fled east, from his base at Jakin [Godomey]. First settling at Apa, the 
King of that place soon gave Hertogh an area of land on which to establish 
himself in trade. The area, said to be a small farming hamlet until- that time, ' 
flourished immediately as a commercial centre of both domestic and Atlantic 
trade, due notably to its advantageous position on the lagoon. The port's 
commercial success attracted a large number of other refugees, mainly from 
Whydah, Weme and Wharaba [jakin]. So rapid was its growth that Badagry 
quickly came to dominate its parent state of Apa and emerged as an influential 
force in coastal affairs 2. Indeed, Badagry's stormy saga of external relations is the 
2 It was claimed in 1854 that the 'Alapa' or King of Apa, was still the 'proprietor' of the country 
[PRO F084/951 25 May 1854 Revd S Crowther, Abeokutaj. However, the same Alapa was described 
by Louis Fraser, Vice Consul at Whydah in a letter to Commander Heseltine, as 'an impostor' [PRO 
F084 / 920 27 December 1852 Fraser, Lagos] and in turn by Heseltine as a 'nonentity' [PRO F084 / 924 
2 
most obvious feature of the town's history. For as it grew in prominence as a 
commercial centre, so it came to be increasingly in competition with its 
neighbours who sought to both curb and control the town. 
It was Badagry's potential as an Atlantic port which had attracted its initial 
founders and many later settlers. Badagry was not a significant producer itself of 
either slaves or more 'legitimate' articles of trade for Atlantic or domestic 
markets. Evidence would seem to suggest that on the whole the population of 
Badagry acted as middlemen between the traders of the interior, lagoon and 
Europe, and the town was dependent upon a vast hinterland for both its Atlantic 
and domestic trade items. Since Hopkins published his revolutionary work on 
the economic history of West Africa, subsequent analyses of the coastal situation 
have frequently been dominated by evaluation of the impact of the Atlantic trade 
and the change from slave to 'legitimate' commerce3. A Study of Ba-dagry, 
essentially a trading community, presents the opportunity for an illuminating 
case-study in this field. Badagry's history, across both eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, would seem to comprise a series of crises. The period of transition 
from slaves to palm oil exports on the 'Slave Coast' during the middle years of 
the nineteenth century would appear to have devastated Badagry as the town 
collapsed into civil war between 1851 and 1854. But I would suggest that to 
evaluate these critical years purely in terms of economic crisis is to distort the 
true picture. Indeed, from a close examination it is clear that despite the town's 
declining fortunes, Badagry continued, until the 1860s, to adapt surprisingly well 
to the changing market forces at work on the coast. In the face of civil war and 
the emergence of Lagos as the dominant port within its sphere, Badagry was able 
Report of the Proceedings of an Expedition to Porto Novo ... between 28 
December 1852 and 7 January 
18531. Indeed it is clear that attempts to bolster and legitimise the supremacy of the Alapa during 
the early 1850s were contrived to lend credibility to the Anti Slave Trading Treaty between Britain 
and Badagry 18 March 1852, on which he was a co-signatory with the usurper chief Mewu- See 
chapter 9, p. 318-319 & Appendix A. 
3AG Hopkins An Economic HistoEy of West Africa, (London 1973). For an examination of Badagry's 
commercial organisation, see chapter 2. 
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to redefine the pattern of its trade due to its lagoonside position. Forced to forsake 
its role as an Atlantic port, the town reinforced its role as middleman on the 
trade, both Atlantic and domestic, moving along the lagoon. Ultimately, then, 
Badagry adapted to changes in the commercial pattern of the coast despite its 
direct Atlantic role being lost. But the very factors which enabled Badagry to 
adapt also magnified the pressures on the town. 
As an outlet and an inlet for the interior trade routes, notably those through the 
Egbado country to the north, Badagry was, in the 1780s, second only to Porto- 
Novo as the port of Oyo, the dominant Yoruba power. Indeed, Badagry's 
relationship with the Oyo Empire during the latter part of the eighteenth century 
would seem to suggest the role of vassal4. However, the town's co-existing 
relationship with the westerly power of Dahomey implies that its status as 
tributary to Oyo was either more transient, or was actually more ambiguous, for 
Badagry maintained close links with more than one power, and often with 
powers in opposition to each other. This dangerous and haphazard balance of 
alliances was the crux of Badagry's foreign relations, and became even more 
apparent during the course of the town's nineteenth century affairs. 
By the early decades of the new century the town had become the sole coastal 
outlet for the Egba capital Abeokuta, which had emerged as the dominant Yoruba 
power in the wake of Oyo collapse. Abeokuta was at odds with Dahomey and 
Porto-Novo to the west and also with its most convenient port at Lagos, which 
under the rule of Kosoko, until its bombardment by the British in 1851, proved 
hostile to Egba needs 5. In the mid-1840s when the exiled King of Lagos, Akitoye, 
was attempting to settle at Badagry, the Egba of Abeokuta played a decisive part in 
4According to Law, by 1777, Oyo was 'protecting both Porto-Novo and Badagri' against Dahomean 
aggression [R Law, 'The Gun Communities in the Eighteenth Century', African Studies Association 
of the USA, St Louis, November 1991, p. 211. See thesis chapter 5, pp. 152-153. 
5 PRO F084 / 616 3 May 1845 Revd TB Freeman, London. See chapter 8, pp. 260-266. 
4 
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negotiating this position. According to a missionary source, the Egba overruled 
any opposition from the Badagry chiefs and claimed that the town was under 
their control 6. However, only the preceding year, Governor Hill of the Gold 
Coast had noted that Badagry was actually the tributary of Dahomey, arch rival of 
Abeokuta7. 
In this way Badagry was strengthened by the support and commerce of this 
powerful interior traffic, but was also embroiled in interior affairs. The 1840s was 
a period of increased Dahomean antagonism due largely to the wealth brought to 
the coast by the Egba trade route. By 1851, after an unsuccessful attack by 
Dahomey on Abeokuta itself, the invading army appeared set to attack its port, 
Badagry, in retaliation for their humiliating defeat, and also clearly as a measure 
to disrupt Egba trade as much as possible. Furthermore, as Abeokuta's sole 
opening to the sea, Badagry was sensitive to the needs and wishes of its Powerful 
Egba benefactor. After the outbreak of civil war in Badagry, an Egba force of 
virtual occupation arrived to 1protect' the town under their ally the Mewu, from 
attacks by the expelled chiefs and their Lagos and Porto-Novo allies. 
The key to these opposing alliances was the uncohesive nature of Badagry's 
political structure which comprised eight virtually autonomous chieftaincies. 
These allowed a multiplicity of often conflicting relationships to exist and gave 
the town the flexibility to survive in the face of stormy coastal opposition. 
The lack of a discernible central authority at Badagry was, I would suggest, both 
the town's weakness and its strength. Lacking political direction or cohesion 
clearly left it open to factional infighting, the most obvious example being the 
civil war of the 1850s. However, Badagry's lack of cohesion also led to a certain 
6 CMSA CA2 / 085 / 230 24 December 1845 Townsend's journal, Badagry. 
7 PRO C096 /4 16 May 1846 Hill, Cape Coast. 
5 
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flexibility which enabled the town, in the face of the enormous pressures and 
influences of coastal politics, to weather the storm. As a result of inter-ward 
competition and also differing loyalties based on origin, the various wards were 
able to maintain allegiances to different foreign powers. In this way, Badagry was 
usually able to maintain at least a part of its crucial commercial and political 
network. 
As an example of a political structure, eighteenth and nineteenth century 
Badagry is of great interest. As a town of refugees the early groups of immigrants 
established themselves in eight districts or wards corresponding basically with 
their origins. Thus Ijegba, Posuko, and Ganho wards were made up of those 
largely from Weme; the populations of Ahoviko, Boeko, Awhanjigo and Asago 
shared Whydah origins, and those of Wharako ward were on the whole from 
Wharaba. Each of these wards was headed by its own chief8. 
The Akran, chief of Ijegba ward, has been identified as the paramount chief or 
even King of Badagry, for example by the local historian Chief Avoseh and also 
by Colin Newbury who has suggested that the Akran was the supreme figure in a 
council of chiefs 9. However, further research suggests that kingship at Badagry 
was illusory. The ward chieftaincies were autonomous, but the fortunes of 
particular wards and their chiefs would appear to have risen and waned as their 
ability to harness manpower and resources fluctuated. Their success or failure in 
doing so was evidently based on their commercial performance. The divided 
nature of the town's political structure was both moulded and sustained by its 
commercial economy. As production at Badagry was limited, so control of 
trading networks was vital, not only in establishing a successful position in the 
Atlantic market, but also to ensure the town's very survival by access to domestic 
8 See Chapter 3, p. p 80-88. 
9 Avoseh A Short HistoQý of Badagj: y, p. 39; CW Newbury The Western Slave Coast and Its Rulers, 
(London 1966), p. 32. 
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trade. There was clearly intense competition not oniv between various ward 
chiefs, who acted as economically as well as politically autonomous figures, but 
also within the wards themselves. Attempts to balance these internal and 
external pressures did not always succeed. Indeed in 1784 the town was almost 
wholly destroved by the combined forces of Dahomey, Porto-Novo and Lagos.. an 
attack sanctioned bV Ovo, in an attempt to curb Badagry's success in Atlantic 
tradelO. 
It is at this point that I have chosen to begin my study. 1784 is a convenient point 
for purely logistical reasons. A history of Badagry from foundation to cession 
would exceed the possible scope of a doctoral thesis. Furthermore, the relative 
inaccessibilitv of earlier written material, a great deal of which is stored in Paris 
and the Hague, makes such a studv, within present financial constraints, 
impracticable. 1784 provides a date from which the practical problems of the 
studv are reduced, with much of the written data being available in Britain, but it 
is also a point from which a comprehensive analysis can be made. What is 
interesting about 1784 is that whilst Badagry's destruction obviously marked a 
break in the town's history, it was not ultimateIV a watershed. The following 
years certainly were a period of rebuilding for the town, but it was reconstruction 
in a similar style, wherebv familiar patterns were re-established. Badagry was not 
reborn in the years after 1784 but merely picked itself up and carried on. In this 
way then, by beginning my studv at this point, I do not feel that I am distorting 
the nature of the town's historiography by making only a cursory examination of 
earlier events. Furthermore, it is this later period which demonstrates most 
clearly the town's structure, nature and character, as it was exposed to a series of 
relatively well documented influences, notably for example, the shift from slave 
to legitimate trade, the rise and revolution of Lagos and the gradual 
encroachment of Europe into the coastal societies of West Africa. 
I See Chapter 5, pp. 163-165. 
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One of the most striking aspects of Badagry's history is its role as a place of refuge. 
Although not strategically as secure as it had appeared, Badagry's lagoon position 
did necessitate special strategies of attack 11. Much of the history of the town then 
can be seen as a chronicle of arrivals, both in groups and as individuals either 
fleeing for their own safety or looking for new opportunities in a seemingly 
more secure environment. Badagry's origins as a commercial centre arose from 
the arrival of Hendrick Hertogh and other victims of Dahomean aggression in 
the west. Other groups came to trade or as a result of trade. For example, the 
Muslim population, mainly formed by the arrival of groups from the interior, 
largely of Yoruba origin, who came as traders or as slaves and settled or formed 
close links with Badagry12. Another important group of new arrivals in the late 
1830s and 1840s were the large numbers of freed slaves. Having been deposited 
initially at Sierra Leone by the British Anti-Slave Trade Squadron, small groups, 
mainly of Yoruba origin, became determined to return to their homelands or to 
find friends and family in the interior. Much to the initial chagrin of their British 
benefactors a succession of emigrants chartered ships and headed back to the 
'Slave Coast'. Finding their most direct route via Lagos blocked, they turned to 
Badagry, which evidently welcomed the returnees 13. Although a large number 
of these arrivals continued their journies on into the interior to Abeokuta, for 
11 Newbury fThe Western Slave Coast.... p. 30] notes that Badagry's position was ultimately 
difficult to defend. However, it would appear from a number of contemporary accounts that 
Badagry's geographical setting did cause considerable difficulties at least for a number of invaders. 
For example the Methodist missionary Annear noted in 1844 that a few years previously, the land 
based Dahomean army had been routed at Idale (about 4 miles east of Badagry) due to their 
inability to cross the lagoon. [WMMSA 2 June 1844 Revd Annear, Badagry]. It would appear that 
mercenaries, expert in the methods of canoe warfare, were subsequently used in many assaults on the 
town. See chapter 3, p. 106 & chapter 9, pp. 294-295. 
12 In 1830 John Lander estimated that there were about one hundred and fifty Muslims assembled at 
the celebrations for the end of Ramadan [John and Richard Lander, Tournal of an Expedition to 
Explore the Course and Termination of the Niger, Vol 1, (London 1832), p. 331. Also see Chapter 6, 
pp. 188-191. 13 PRO F084/663 Extract of a Memorial sent to a ship of war and the Governor of Cape Coast Castle 
by the British residents at Badagri. An enclosure in 7 January 1846 Mr Coates (Secretary of CMS), 
London. 
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many their links with Badagry were cemented as they returned to settle and trade 
at the coast 14. 
But Badagry was not merely shaped by large population movements on the West 
African coast. It was further influenced by its role as a haven for various 
powerful individuals. For Badagry saw the arrival of a series of political refugees, 
who in each case helped to mould the town's internal structure whilst at the 
same time embroiling it in neighbouring political affairs. The first of these 
refugees, Zinsu, who later took the name jiwa, an exile from Porto-Novo, seized 
control of what remained after the town's destruction in 1784 15. Indeed it would 
appear that this infiltrator was so successfully absorbed into Badagry's political 
structure that his descendants emerged as a dominant force in one of Badagry's 
most prominent ruling houseS16. The next influential individual to arrive was 
Adele. Deposed as King of Lagos in the early 1820s, Adele took shelter at Badagry, 
until c. 1835 when he finally managed to retake his Lagos throne. According to 
the accounts of Richard Lander, who initially visited Badagry in the period 1825- 
27 as part of Captain Clapperton's ill-fated expedition to discover the course of 
the Niger, 'Adoolee'was indeed supreme and in factKing' at Badagry during 
this period17. Adele was joined at the town by the Mewu, an exiled chief minister 
from Porto-Novo, who in turn welcomed another deposed King of Lagos, 
Akitoye, in 1845. It was this Mewu and Akitoye who came to play a crucial role in 
the increasingly unstable political situation of the town in the 1840s and early 
14 TB Freeman, Journal of Various Visits to the Kingdoms of Ashanti Aku and Dahomi in West 
Africa. (London, Frank Cass, 1968), p. 201. Also see Chapter 7 pp. 203-204. 
15 Akinjogbin, calling him 'Sessu', claimed that he was in fact a Badagry exile living first at Porto- 
Novo and then at Abomey from where he attempted to encourage attacks on his home town 
[Akinjogbin, Dahomcy and its Neighbours 1708-1801 (Cambridge, 1967), p. 1561. See chapter 5, pp. 
158-164. 
16 Badagry tradition, as recorded by Avoseh, suggests that Akran jiwa's descendants emerged as 
the dominant force in Jigbeko House, one of the ruling groups of the Ijegba ward. It is believed that 
jigbeko was actually established by Gbafoe, one of the founding fathers of Badagry. A powerful 
exile from Weme, Gbafoe was Hertogh's trading agent at Badagry. After the Dutchman's death, 
the agent became head or Akran of the Ijegba section and probably the leading figure in Badagry at 
the time [Avoseh, A Short HistojZý of BadaUy, p. 15]. Also see Chapter 3, p. 83-84. 
17 R Lander, Captain Clapperton's Last Expedition to Africa, Vol 1, p. 46. 
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1850s, which eventually culminated in the eruption of civil war in 1851. 
Although initially it was the Mewu who assumed control in the wake of the war, 
he himself was overthrown three years later as the indigenous chiefs recaptured 
the town18. 
The civil war period in Badagry was also illustrative of the pervasive influence 
of a further series of visitors and settlers. Initially as traders and then also as 
missionaries and government agents, European involvement in Badagry 
throughout the course of its history was often influential and at times critical. 
After Dutch influence, personified by Hertogh at Badagry, had waned, Portugal, 
France and Britain constituted the active European traders on the 'Slave Coast'. 
The early activities of these European traders at Badagry are uncertain. Records of 
British slaving ships before 1807 would seem to suggest that the port was not the 
usual destination of slavers collecting cargoes for the British West Indies and 
there is little evidence of French activity there19. Indeed it would appear from 
the account by Richard Lander, that by the 1820s the majority of European traders 
resident at Badagry were Portuguese20. The relationship between these resident 
traders and their English visitor sheds an interesting light on the nature of 
trading relations as a whole at the crucial point when the sanctions of Britain's 
anti-slave trading crusade were beginning to bite. From Lander's account, the 
Portuguese slave dealers were frightened of the traveller's ability to inform his 
naval compatriots of their presence in the town, but at the same time clearly 
possessed influence enough in local affairs to level charges of spying which 
resulted in Lander's trial by ordeal 21. 
18 See Chapter 9. 
19 Evidence collected by Gomer Williams [History of the Livel: 12ool Privateer (Liver-pool 1897), 
pp. 675-677 & 681-6851, would seem to suggest that very few or-no British ships called at Badagry. 
That there was some level of French commercial activity at Badagry is indicated by the existence 
of a French Chief in the town, first noted by the Landers in 1830 U&R Lander Tournal of an 
Expedition ..., Vol 1, pp. 17 & 53-541. Also see Chapter 2, pp. 56-57. 26 JR Lander, Cal2tain Clapperton's Last Expedition to Africa. Vol 2, p. 240. 
21 Ibid Vol 2, p. 254. See chapter 6, pp. 187--188. 
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The establishment of a factory at Badagry in 1838 by the Gold Coast trader 
Thomas Hutton, a member of the influential London trading family of William 
Hutton, was clearly an indication of Badagry's potential as a centre of 'legitimate' 
commerce. Within a few years a number of other trading houses had established 
themselves in the town and ultimately heralded the loosening and final 
severing of Portuguese ties and the forging of much closer links with Britain. 
However, the link between Badagry and Britain was not left merely to the 
inclination of pragmatic traders but was bonded inextricably to the arrival of 
missionaries in the 1840s. 
Badagry's role as the point of arrival of the first Christian missions in what is 
now Nigeria, has been noted by many historians. The missions followed in the 
wake of the returning Sierra Leonians, some of whom were already Christians. 
Representatives of the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society first arrived at 
Badagry in 1842. Furthermore, after the failure of the Niger Expedition of 1841, 
the Anglicans were eager to find a new route into the African interior. Resolving 
also to follow the Sierra Leone emigrants, they arrived at Badagry to establish a 
mission in 1845. The failure of both denominations in their evangelical aims 
amongst the 'intransigent' people of Badagry has undoubtedly received more 
attention from contemporary observers and historians than any other feature of 
the Badagry story 22. It is ultimately this which has led scholars of missionary 
22 Although initially optimistic about the mission at Badagry, both Wesleyan and CMS missions 
became disillusioned with the place. In 1847, CMS catechist William Marsh was complaining that 
the people'are dead to anything like God'[CMSA CA2/067/10 28 March 1847 Marsh's journal, 
Badagry]. By 1852 Revd Gollmer of the CMS abandoned the mission for Lagos leaving only a token 
staff. Attempts to revive activities in the later 1850s were equally unproductive. The literary view 
of Badagry as a desert for Christian spirituality was presented in several published missionary 
accounts, for example that by Revd Freeman [Tournal of Various Visits..... ]. However, the most 
vehement vilification of Badagry came from Miss Tucker in Abeokuta. or Sunrise Within the 
Tropic (London 1853). Without visiting the coast, she described the depravity, drunkenness and 
idol-worship of the Badagry people, in stark contrast with the Yoruba at Abeokuta. More recent 
writings on West African history, even those examining the history of Christianity such as JFA 
Ajayi's Christian Missions in Nigeria 1841-1891, (London 1965), have all alluded to the lack of 
evangelical success at Badagry. Although undoubtedly not adhering to the vehement views of Miss 
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history then to turn their attention rapidly, just as the missionaries themselves 
did, towards the interior and Abeokuta. However, I once again this is an example 
of history selecting more positive examples in hindsight. Just as Badagry 
warrants attention as an Atlantic port not merely despite, but because of its 
ultimate failure, it also demands attention in the history of West African 
Christianity because of its imperviousness to it. An examination of Christianity 
at Badagry reveals that the stark contrast drawn between the cynical coastal 
traders and the noble Egba in the interior was the result of missionary tunnel 
vision and a deliberate attempt to establish Abeokutan credentials by 
impassioned and fervent men, determined to find a Zion in the wilderness. At 
the same time the undoubted resistance of the Badagry people towards 
Christianity was bound up with their diverse origins and the fragmented nature 
of the state which created a vital and active role for indigenous religious practice 
and belief. 
With the Badagry chieftaincies based so soundly on market forces some difficult 
questions are raised over the categorization of Badagry as a 'state'. A supra-ward 
authority to co-ordinate, for example, defence, law and order and inter-ward 
relations must have been necessary. In his examination of the Delta trading state 
of Old Calabar, Latham has traced the rise of the politico-religious Ekpe society 
which crossed ward lines and: 
formed a common organisation which made and implemented the 
law... Not only did it unite them in a common organisation, through 
which they might meet each other socially, as well as binding 
them together by the force of friendship, it also provided the 
machinery to solve disputes which might arise between them23 
With its diverse origin base, the search for a similarly pervasive politico- 
religious society at Badagry is fruitless. However, the use of religion at least to 
some extent as a supra-ward authority does seem to have been important and the 
Tucker and Co, these later examinations have made surprisingly few attempts to establish the 
reasons behind the lack of evangelical success at Badagry. 
23 AjH Latham, Old Calabar 1600-1891, (London 1973), p. 40. 
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position of religious institutions at Badagry poses some interesting questions 
about the relationship between religious and secular authority in coastal West 
Africa. A cursory look at the religious practices of the town reveals a spectrum of 
beliefs as diverse as the origins of the inhabitants. But what is clear from a 
number of nineteenth-century accounts is the strength of religious feeling and 
practice in the town. Furthermore, whilst some cults remained exclusive to the 
groups that brought them and therefore limited in their influence, others, such 
as the Dangbe cult of Whydah, would appear to have become influential 
throughout the town24. The role of religious orders in government, although as 
yet still requiring further investigation, would appear to have been critical. The 
use of ceremonial oaths to cement a unity of purpose between ward chiefs and 
the role of religious practices in the administration of justice has been clearly 
documented 25. The role of religious ceremony and ritual in maintaining a sense 
of linity and identity amongst this diverse grouping of people was, I would 
suggest, a possible reason for the rejection of Christianity and also Islam. Badagry 
was notable for its religious tolerance. There is no evidence of religious 
persecution comparable with, for example, Abeokuta. However, within this 
settlement of largely displaced persons, shared religious beliefs and practices, 
either at ward or town level, were ultimately the only uniting force. Therefore 
Christianity, which demanded the rejection of existing practices was wholly 
unacceptable. Islam, which could exist more easily alongside traditional local 
beliefs, was adopted piecemeal. 
The sphere where the Christian missionary presence did have great effect within 
the town was in the political arena. The very presence of the missions ultimately 
provoked the removal of most of the foreign slave-traders to Lagos, thus almost 
completely suppressing direct slave shipments from Badagry beach26. The 
24 CMSA CA2 / 076 / 42 5 October 1861 Pearse's Journal, Badagry. 
25 See Chapter 4. 
26 PRO F084 / 616 3 May 1845 Freeman, London. 
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movement was aided by the short-term establishment of the British flag over the 
_ 
town and the garrisoning of a Sergeant of the Gold Coast Corps there as a result 
of Revd Freeman's initial security worries in 1843 27. As the period progressed 
missionary aims regarding Abeokuta led to an often bitter split between British 
secular and spiritual aims culminating in various heated accusations of political 
intrigue on the part of the missionaries 28. 
However it was continued spiritual frustration with Badagry, in the wake of the 
civil war, which resulted in the virtual abandonment of the town as a mission 
station as soon as Lagos was opened to British influence after 1851. Furthermore, 
as commercial attention similarly shifted to the east, Badagry's role as an Atlantic 
port declined dramatically. But, it was only at this point that Badagry's role in the 
commerce of the lagoon was fully realised by the British. 
Badagry's external relations were always closely involved with those of its 
lagoonside neighbours. The relationship between these states was more subtle 
than merely that of three Atlantic outlets, vying against each other for foreign 
trade. The existence of the coastal lagoon created a link between the states and 
towns along its course which ultimately made them largely dependent upon 
each other for the successful operation of their commercial traffic. ýt was by - 
lagoon that the slave dealers of the 1800s shifted their'illegal' booty up and down 
the length of the coast in an attempt to avoid detection by the British squadron. A 
clear lagoon was vital for such covert operations. However, it was not merely 
'illegal' traffic which required swift passage along the waterways. Articles of 
'legitimate' trade, both domestic and Atlantic, were transported by water. 
27 PRO C096 /2 16 September 1843 Governor Maclean, Cape Coast. 
28 The man at the heart of much of these accusations was more often than not Revd CA Gollmer of 
the CMS mission. Gollmer's reputation for political intrigue was notorious at both Badagry and 
later Lagos. Indeed the outbreak of civil war in Badagry was blamed on his political manoeuvering. 
Gollmer also came into bitter conflict with a number of the British Government agents operating on 
the coast, most notably, Vice Consul Fraser and then Consul Campbell [PRO F084/950 1 May 1854 
Campbell, Lagos]. See Chapter 9, pp. 330-331. 
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Badagry's role in this traffic was crucial, not only as the recipient of goods; but 
also as part of a chain of lagoonside states. For example, it was Badagry under the 
Mewu whose difficult relations with Porto-Novo in the early 1850s resulted in a 
blockade of the lagoon between the two towns. This resulted in immense 
problems for the British merchants trying to establish themselves at the recently 
opened port of Lagos. It was in an attempt to establish 'good' lagoon relations 
that Campbell, British Consul at Lagos, became increasingly embroiled in local 
affairs far beyond the remit of his official instructions. Shuttling along the lagoon 
between Porto-Novo and Badagry, Campbell discredited the Mewu with 
allegations of slave-trading 29. He then encouraged the exiled Badagry chiefs to 
launch an attack on the town 30. 
The realisation that affairs along the lagoon were of vital importance at Lagos 
was reinforced almost ten years later after the annexation of that place by Britain 
in 1861. The post-civil war period in Badagry has been presented in contemporary 
accounts as one of decline. Pointed criticisms were made of the inability of the 
chiefs to reassert their authority over the much depleted town and allegations of 
a revival in slave-trading and misrule were levelled by the British Consul 31. It 
would appear from a cursory examination of the documentation that the cession 
of a much weakened and corrupt Badagry was inevitable once Lagos had been 
taken in the early 1860s, and that the Treaty signed in 1863 was merely the 
formalisation of a situation which had existed in practice since 186132. However, 
the cession of Badagry was a more complicated process than this and provides an 
interesting case study in early British imperialism on the West African coast. 
Indeed there is evidence to suggest that Badagry was only annexed to the colony 
of Lagos when it became clear that the island state required a buffer zone around 
29 PRO F084/920 28 October 1853 Campbell, Lagos. 
30 PRO F084 / 976 4 October 1855 Campbell, Lagos. 
31 PRO F084/1061 20 April 1858 Campbell, Lagos. 
32 Newbury The Western Slave Coast and Its Rulers,, p. 70. 
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it to ward off the encroachments of the French at Porto-Novo, who were 
threatening Badagry itself. Furthermore, it became increasingly clear that to 
operate as a viable commercial concern, Lagos required control of at least a 
proportion of the lagoon. Thus arguments that Badagry had been part of Lagos' 
territory for generations were used by Governors Freeman and Glover to justify 
their rapid spate of land acquisitions to the reluctant Foreign and Colonial Offices 
in London only once it had become apparent that Lagos could not function 
alone33. 
It is clear then that Badagry's history, shaped so dramatically by its environment 
both natural and man-made, has a vital position in any understanding of coastal 
/lagoon affairs in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as well as shedding 
new light on the subject of Afro/European relations during that period. 
Sources of Badagrian History 
Despite the relative profusion of written sources of Badagrian history due to the 
port's longstanding relationship with Europe there has been a dearth of historical 
study on the subject. For any examination of the pre-colonial Slave Coast there 
are a number of definitive secondary accounts. Law's recent study of the Slave 
Coast from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries and Akinjogbin's study of 
Dahomey over the course of the eighteenth century are the most useful analyses 
of the early modern period 34. No examination of the nineteenth century has yet 
surpassed Newbury's The Western Slave Coast and Its Rulers although localised 
studies, most notably Biobaku's The Egba and Their Neighbours and Smith's The 
Lagos Consulate are useful supplementary works 35. Such studies establish an 
33 PRO F084/1201 10 June 1863 Sir John Hawley Glover (Acting Lieutenant Governor of Lagos), 
Lagos; PRO C0147/3 10 July 1863, Glover, Lagos. 
34 Law, The Slave Coast of West Africa 1550-1750, (Oxford 1991); Akinjogbin, Dahome3ý and Its 
Neighbour5-,. 
35 Newbury, The Western Slave Coast... S0 Biobaku, The Egba and Their Neighboula (Oxford 
1957 repr. Ibadan 1991); Robert S Smith, The Lagos Consulate 1851-1861 (London 1978). 
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excellent framework from which a basic chronicle of Badagry's history can be 
constructed36. In the same way a number of particularly illuminating thematic 
studies have been made of the coastal area. Most notably of course are Ajayi and 
Ayandele's works on Christian missions in Nigeria, and Kopytoff's examination 
of Sierra Leone immigration37. These studies of the impact of outsiders on their 
adopted communities have particular relevance for Badagry, not merely as the 
initial point of contact but, as noted above, as a case study in the immigrant's role 
in economic, political and social change. But what also clearly emerges from 
these studies is very much a coastal perspective, which presents the history of 
Badagry only as it impinges upon the panorama. For a state so influenced by and 
influential in shaping its environment, this 'coastal perspective' must always be 
maintained. However, I would argue that without more detailed analysis the 
view is incomplete. 
Sources of comparative history have also proved useful. Hopkins and Matheson 
on Lagos, and Geay, Pineau-jamous, Senkomago and Akindele and Aguessy on 
Porto-Novo provide interesting parallels with my own work38. Further afield, 
Dike, Latham and Cookey on the Niger Delta, have all raised interesting 
questions relevant to the Badagry situation 39. The political structure of states so 
completely based in commercial competition is evidently one area in which- 
36 It should be noted here however, that in the course of these more general works there has been 
disagreement over details of Badagry's history. For example, Law [The Slave Coast of West 
Africa. p. 3101 and Akinjogbin [Dahomey and Its Neighbours..., p. 2131 give different dates for 
Badagry's foundation. 
37 Ajayi, Christian Missions in Nigeria; EA Ayandele, The Missionaly Impact on Modem Ni 
1842-191 (London 1966); Jean H Kopytoff, A Preface to Modem Nigeria: The Sierra Leonians in 
Yoruba. 1830-18 (Wisconsin 1965). 
38 AG Hopkins, 'An Economic History of Lagos 1880-1914', PhD Thesis London 1964; JD Matheson, 
'Lagoon Relations in the Era of Kosoko 1845-1862', PhD Thesis Boston 1974; J Geay, 'Origine, 
Formation et Histoire Du Royaume de Porto-Novo', Bulletin du Comite D'Etudes Historiques et 
Scientifigues de I'Afrique Occidentale Francaise 7/4 1924, pp. 619-634; MJ Pineau-jamous, 'Porto- 
Novo: Royaute, Localite et Parente', ý. -EA. 104 1986, pp. 547-575; NS Senkomago, 'The Kingdom of 
Porto-Novo with Special Reference to its External Relations 1872-1908', Phd Thesis Aberdeen 1976; 
A Akindele and C Aguessy, Contribution a ]'etude de Mistoire de I' aume de Porto- 
Novo (Dakar 1953). 
ýO K0 Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta, (London 1956); Latham, Old Calabar... SJS 
Cookey, King faia of the Niger Delta: His Life and Times 1821-1891, (New York 1974). 
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parallels can be found. However, comparative history demands a firm basis of 
empirical evidence from which conclusions can be drawn, otherwise there is a 
danger of too much assumption and speculation. In the Badagry case such firm 
foundations were lacking and thereforeit has been the foremost aim of this 
thesis to construct a coherent narrative history. 
Some historical studies of Badagry have been made. The esteemed local historian. 
Chief Theophilus Olabode Avoseh, Gbesiewu of Badagry, has published a series 
of local studies of Badagry and its environs, the most of notable being A Short 
HistojZý of Badagry in 1938 40. A book initially intended for schoolchildren, 
Avoseh's work is invaluable as a study of the area based largely on local 
tradition. Although sometimes confusing, particularly in its chronological 
framework, Avoseh does proved a useful insight into the way in which 
Badagry's history may be interpreted. For example, the author identifies the 
Akran, chief of Ijegba Ward, as 'King' of Badagry throughout the town's history. 
This conclusion is evidently based less on historical evidence than on more 
recent events and the subsequent emergence of the Akran during the course of 
the twentieth century as a dominant local political figure in the Yoruba mould4l. 
However, the historian does evoke the important role of commerce within the 
power structure of the ward system. Indeed, Avoseh lists the relative power of 
40 Chief Avoseh, born in 1908 and now living in retirement at Badagry, has been active in the 
secular and religious life of the town for many years. He has, amongst other roles, acted as teacher, 
civil servant, local politician, and church official. As an historian Chief Avoseh has published a 
number of short studies of the Badagry area in both Yoruba and English: A Short Histox: y of 
Badagly, (1938); Iwe li ede Egun Pelu Itumo ni ede Yoruba ati Gesi J1959 repr 1962 and 1982); Iwe 
Ikomo lad Oruku Awori! 2jo Adura Qjojumo Ojo ati Osu Ibirno _QýQ 
Lati Dawole Nkan ati Iwe Eri 
Ijo Ibi 0 (1960); A Sliort HistojX of-Ep&, (1960); Isin Imale ni Ilu Agbadarigi. (1964) translated as 
'Islam in Badagry' by T Falola in 'The Minor Works of T0 Avoseh', HistolzE in Africa. 19, (1992), 
pp. 237-262; A Short Histay of St Thomas's Church. Badaga 1842-1970, (1970 revised edition 
1986); Uwe Utan Kukuru Egh?. Ajumogbadura, (1973); the Historical Tree of Badag=,, (1984); Fir t 
Storev Building in Ni"Lia, (1984); The First Christmas Day in Badagl: y. (1984); Important 
Historical Places to be Visited in Badagqýz by the Tourist, (? )-. In recognition of his contribution to 
Badagry, Avoseh was given the chieftancy title of Gbewiesu in 1974. See Falola, 'The Minor Works 
of T0 Avoseh'. 
41 After publication of his history in 1938, Avoseh found himself much criticised by the other local 
chiefs for his support of the Akran's 'traditional' ascendancy. See Falola 'The Minor Works of T0 
Avoseh', p. 238. 
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the chiefs with particular reference to their slave-trading success 42. Avoseh's 
influential role in recording Badagry's historiography is evident from the few 
more recent local publications on the town, which have based their historical 
analyses on this source43. In his retirement Chief Avoseh has himself become an 
informant for other historians and students of history working on that locality. 
His knowledge, continuing interest and willingness to discuss local issues and 
history has enabled him to assist the work of these younger scholars. 
Furthermore, Chief Avoseh has amassed a private collection of unpublished 
undergraduate dissertations on the Badagry area. The most interesting of these, 
when attempting to construct a narrative history, is Charles Okon Akpan's 
ambitious examination of the 'Economic and Political Effects of Slave Trade and 
Slavery up to 1914'44. Akpan's study, like Kuti's undergraduate dissertation 
'Badagry and Its Neighbours up to 1864', is evidently based firmly on the 
foundations of Avoseh and the historians of the Slave Coast 45. The only two 
historians to have made studies of Badagry using primary as well as secondary 
sources are Robin Law and KM Okaro K'Ojwang. As well as his work on the 
lagoon area as a whole, Law, through his meticulous examination of written 
sources, has reconstructed the early history of Badagry 46. In his forthcoming 
article, Law has produced the most skillful synthesis so far of eighteenth century 
42 Unfortunately Avoseh compares the slave-trading chiefs, almost exclusively the Akrans, only 
with their predecessors rather than the other contemporary ward chiefs. However, one can see, for 
example, in his description of the seizure of power by the Posu in the latter part'of the eighteenth 
century, which he misleadingly calls the usurpation of the title Akran, that it was in fact the Posu 
chieftaincy which was dominant during this period fAvoseh, A Short History of Badaga.. pp. 18- 
211. 
43 See for example Focus on Badagly, Public Information Department, Lagos State Ministry of 
Information and Culture, (Ikeja 1991); T Ibrahim, BadagU Past and Present Aholu-Menu-Toyi 1 
Akran of Badagl: y Reign of Ppace. (Ikeja 1992). 
44 C0 Akpan, 'Economic and Political Effects of Slave Trade and Slavery up to 1914', BA Hons 
Dissertation Lagos 1985. 
45 A0 Kuti, 'Badagry and Its Neighbours up to 1864', BA Hons Dissertation Ibadan 1970. 
46 Law has produced a number of articles on the lagoon area as a whole, for example'Between the 
Sea and the Lagoons: The Interaction of Maritime and Inland Navigation on the Pre-Colonial Slave 
Coast', CEA 114 xxix-2 (1989), pp. 209-237 and 'Trade and Politics Behind the Slave Coast: the 
Lagoon Traffic and the Rise of Lagos' Tournal of African Histol: y, UAH) xxiv (1983), pp. 321-348. 
Latterly Law has concentrated on the early history of Badagry itself, notably in 'The Gun 
Communities of the eighteenth century' and 'A Lagoonside Port on the Eighteenth Century Slave 
Coast: The Early History of Badagry' Forthcoming in the Canadian Journal of African Studies. 
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Badagry, but has also raised a number of issues on which further research is 
required. It is this which has provided a starting point and framework for my 
own research. KM Okaro K'Ojwang's unpublished thesis on nineteenth-century 
Badagry has also proved useful, although his purpose has been very different 
from my own47. His 'Case Study of African Resistance to British Penetration in 
South West Nigeria' is a study of 'relations between the people of Badagry and 
the British during the period 1841 to 1891'. This relationship he characterises as 
one of rivalry, struggle and 'persistent resistance' over 'fifty years of social, 
economic and political conflicts, 48. Okaro K'Ojwang's analysis quite clearly has 
important parallels with my own research. Most obviously my thesis, which 
culminates with the annexation of Badagry by the British in 1863, traces the 
development of the Euro/Badagry relationship over the course of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. In this way then, Okaro K'Ojwang's work has 
provided a focus for comparison as indicated during the course of my narrative. 
However, working very much within the confines of his chosen theme, Okaro 
K'Cýwang has ultimately weakened his analysis. Despite acknowledging the 
difficulty of defining the complex Badagry situation in terms of 'collaborators and 
resisters' to British imperialism, he has ultimately tended to view all events over 
the course of the nineteenth century in this light. His thesis is also weakened by a 
number of areas which have been, somewhat surprisingly, neglected. For - 
example, despite being an analysis of Anglo/African relations, he fails to 
examine the implications of the British 'garrison' at Badagry form 1843-44 49. 
There is also some difficulty in his definition of Badagry itself which, I would 
suggest, leads to confusion. Despite briefly d istinguishing between Badagry town 
and the diverse origins and history of the surrounding areas, it would seem that 
he too quickly submerges this distinction to present an examination of a 
47 KM Okaro K'Ojwang, 'Society, Trade and Politics in Badagri 1841-91: A Case Study of African 
Resistance to British Penetration in South West Nigeria, MPhil Thesis lbadan 1979. 
48 Okaro K'Ojwang 'Society, Trade and Politics in Badagri... ', pp. ii-iii. 
49 See Chapter 7, pp. 222-232. 
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'Badagri' in which he includes a number of neighbouring areas for which there 
is no evidence of any pre-colonial affiliation or loyalty. I would suggest that this 
is the result of using many early twentieth-century sources which were produced 
during the process of evolving a definition of the 'Badagry Region' under 
colonial government 50. The uncritical application of these twentieth century 
sources has also to some extent marred Okaro K'Ojwang's use of local oral 
information. He has used data from fieldwork conducted over the course of two 
years, collected largely from local chiefs, most notably in his description of the 
foundations of the town. The difficulties and dangers as well as the undoubted 
rewards involved in the use of oral sources have been highlighted by several 
leading historians 51. Okaro K'Ojwang has evidently been skillful and 
painstaking in his collection of material but has been less discerning in his use of 
this data. Just as he appears to have used early twentieth-century written sources 
as evidence for earlier periods, so his oral informants have been used as such, 
rather than as fellow historians. Furthermore, much of his analysis of this oral 
history would appear to have been influenced by the use of these later written 
sources 52. Therefore much of his representation of, for example, the pre-colonial 
political structure of Badagry, is constructed from African and British colonial 
and post-colonial interpretations and reinterpretations, which more often then 
not were attempting to rationalise and legitimise their contemporary situation. 
Thus for example, his references to the 'All Town Councils' of pre-colonial 
Badagry actually reflect more recent developments. 
50 See Chapter 1, pp. 45-49. 
51 For example J Vansina, Oral Tradition as HistoLy, Games Currey, London 1985); D Henige, Oral 
Historiography, (London, Longman, 1982); jC Miller, (ed), T'he African Pa5t Speaks: Essays on Oral 
Tradition and Llistony (Folkestone, Dawson 1980). 
52 Nigerian National Archive, lbadan (NNAI) CS026/4 30030/Sl 'A Report on the reorganisation 
of the Badagri District', RjM Curwen 1937; NNAI CS026/4 3003OS2 'Intelligence Report on the 
Awori Area Badagri District'R jM Curwen 1937; NNAI CS026/4 29979 'Intelligence Report on the 
Central Awori Group in Ikeja and Badagri District of the Colony' 1935. 
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Yet Okaro K'Ojwang's oral sources remain an admirable, valid and extremely 
useful undertaking, especially since I myself was unable to pursue this course. 
Being British-based and finding a surprising profusion of written primary and 
secondary sources available to me, I decided to base my research on these 
foundations. With a period of research in West Africa itself being limited by both 
time and my own skill in the collection of oral data, I concluded that my 
Nigerian research would involve written data to be supplemented by some oral 
but more particularly visual sources 53. 
In this way then the bulk of my own research has involved the use of written 
published and unpublished primary sources. Published collections of material 
relating to eighteenth and nineteenth century West Africa have yielded some 
important information with relation to the port 54. However, due largely to its 
position, there are relatively large numbers of published and unpublished 
journals and papers directly associated with the history of Badagry. The most 
obvious of these are the journals and writings of Richard Lander who, as 
mentioned above, visited Badagry as servant to Captain Clapperton in the period 
1825-27 and again in 1830 with his younger brother John, once again in an 
attempt to discover the course of the Niger River. Both Landers' journals, 
although descriptive of relatively short stays in Badagry, and far more 
informative, for example, on the interior government of Sultan Bello, do 
provide information on the operation of the slave trade and the domestic 
market, the dominance of King Adele, several of Badagry's religious cults as well 
53 Badagry itself is rich in visual sources of history. As well as seeing the beach and lagoon, it is 
still possible to visit, for example, the CMS mission house and the first Christian cemetery. 
54 PF Verger, Trade Relations between the Bight of Benin and Bahia from the Seventeenth Century 
to the Nineteenth CentuIZ:, (lbadan 1976); A Van Dantzig, The Dutch and the Guinea Coast 1674- 
1742 A Collection of Documents from the General State Archive at the Hagl= (Accra 1978); Robin 
Law, (ed), Further Correspondence of the Royal African Company of England Relating to the 
'Slave Coast' 1681-1699 (Wisconsin 1992); Robin Law, Contempora Source Material for the 
2yo Empire 1627-182-4, (lbadan 1992). 
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as a limited insight into the position of the town's foreign affairs during the 
period 55 
Another, very useful account is that published by Revd TB Freeman who 
arrived in Badagry in 1842 before moving on to Abeokuta as leader of the 
Wesleyan Methodist mission 56. Although dominated understandably by his 
attempts to establish a mission station, his account provides some useful insights 
into the various inter-ward and Euro/Badagry relationships as well as a sense of 
the ever present danger from outside attack with which the town contended. The 
American Baptist Missionary TJ Bowen also visited Badagry in the course of his 
'adventures' in West Africa and the published account of his travels offers 
some interesting information as to the town's economy as well as a somewhat 
vague sense of the tumultuous events, which threatened to and eventually did 
erupt during the time of his visit to the area in the early 1850S 57. 
The advent of missionary activity at Badagry with both Methodist and Anglican 
missions establishing premises in the town during the 1840s has produced a 
substantial amount of papers, notably in the form of letters and journals. 
Furthermore, until the subjugation of Lagos in 1851 Badagry was the point of 
contact between the 'Yoruba Mission' and the outside world of the Gold Coast, 
Sierra Leone and beyond to London. Therefore, an examination of the Badagry 
mission papers provides evidence of a much wider scope, with news passing 
from the interior to the coast and vice versa. Extracts from some of these 
missionary sources have been published in forms other than personal journals 
or memoirs. The Church Missionary Society produced a number of periodicals 
55 R Lander, Captain Clapperton's Last Expedition to Africa ... ;R and 
j Lander, Tournal of an 
ExpeditiM. 
-.. 
PRO C02 /18 Lander Papers relating to Badagry 1829-31; H Clapperton, Journal of 
edition into the Interior of Africa, (London 1829); PRO C02 / 15,16 & 17 Clapperton 
Papers relating to Badagry 1825-26; PRO C02/15 Captain Pearse papers relating to Badagry. 
56 Freeman 
" 
lournal of Various Visits... 
57 Tj Bowen, Central Africa: Adventures and Missionajý: Labours in Several Countries in the 
m 1849 to 1856, (London, Frank Cass 1968). 
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such as the Record Intelligencer, and Gleaner. But one must always bear in 
mind that these selective accounts are often more illuminating on the 'official 
mind' of the Church Missionary Society than about affairs on the coast 58. The 
bulk of these papers however remain unpublished and available only in the 
respective archives of the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society stored at the 
School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London and the Church 
Missionary Society now in the Main Library, University of Birmingham. 
These missionary accounts, like other contemporary writings, are extremely 
subjective. However, whilst the descriptive accounts of the earlier visitors such 
as the Landers were both interpretative and less obviously biased than the often 
impassioned descriptions of the missionaries, both, again, may document more 
clearly the subject of European or rather Eurocentric thought and preconceptions 
than the nature of Badagry itself. lt is in conjunction with these accounts that one 
must attempt to examine Badagry sources 59. However, I would also suggest that 
58 The Church Missionary Paper (CY-U, for the use of weekly and monthly contributors arose out of 
the Quarterly Papers of the CMS and was published from 1849-1851. The Church MissionaLy Record 
(CMR), detailing the proceedings of the CMS ran from January 1830 to December 1890. The Church 
Missionary Intelligencer (CMI), a monthly journal of missionary information was published from 
May 1849 to December 1864. New series of the Record were published between 1865-1875 and 1876 to 
1906 when it became the Church Missionaj3L Review,. The Church Missional3L Gleaner 
(CMG), appeared from 1841-1870. 
59 Primary written sources of eighteenth and nineteenth century African history cannot be limited 
to Europeans. There were a number of Africans or Anglo /Africans for example, who produced written 
accounts. Most notable in the Badagry case was the missionary TB Freeman, a man of mixed 
parentage. Similarly was Thomas Hutton, the Gold Coast trader, whose correspondence with his 
London-based 'uncle'William is invaluable [PRO F084 series]. Others of full African parentage 
were the missionaries William Annear (WMMS) and Samuel Pearse (CMS), who have produced an 
enormous amount of information on nineteenth century Badagry. 
But clearly these individuals must be viewed in their European context. An Englishman by 
birth, Freeman's writings give little insight into his perception of any personal relationship with 
either Europe or Africa. The same is true of the Fanti Annear and the Gun Pearse. 
Although more often than not these men were 'foreigners' anyway (the Yoruba Samuel 
Crowther, active at Abeokuta, was a great exception), ultimately their 'Europeaness' set them 
apart. This would appear to have been the case not merely in their own minds but in those of the 
local people who evidently saw these new immigrants, along with the Sierra Leone population, as 
English. 'Europeanness' or 'Britishnness' would appear to have been based firmly in commerce and 
trading connections. Evidently language, dress, education and Christianity were instrumental in 
setting these groups apart to some extent, but it is important to note that at Badagry for example, 
non. -Christian Sierra Leone immigrants were perceived by themselves and by their hosts as being 
British. 
24 
a distinction should be drawn between two types of Eurocentric sources. The first. 
like the Landers, can be termed 'observers'. Although clearly playing an 
important role in the history of British exploration, their bearing upon events in 
the places they visited was limited; they were subjective but passive observers. 
However, commentators such as the missionary and merchant residents were 
not only partial observers of the period, but were clearly deeply involved in the 
making and moulding of events themselves. If the Landers were attempting to 
present facts as they saw them, subjective or not, the missionaries, traders and all 
with vested interests in the area were clearly themselves a motivating force. 
Perhaps one of the most obvious examples of this at work was the missionary 
presentation of events leading up to the outbreak of civil war in 1851. From these 
accounts the struggle emerges as a dispute between slave-trader and legitimate 
trader. Even a cursory examination of other sources immediately refutes this 
oversimplified interpretation. However, these clearly defined 'sides' ultimately 
proved to have been more than a merely inaccurate description of events. For 
indeed the missionary demarcation of 'sides' had the effect within Badagry of 
polarising various conflicting factions into two opposing camps. The 
contemporary missionary account was not merely descriptive but prescriptive. In 
this way then I would conclude that whilst the actual interpretations of such 
subjective material should be treated with caution and careful analysis, the 
potential value of such accounts, actually as part of the 'history' they describe, is 
enormous. 
A further series of such records are those British government papers held at the 
Public Record Office in London. Badagry's early history receives limited attention 
from the eighteenth century British coastal presence although there is occasional 
information to be found in the papers of the Royal African Company (after 1752, 
the Company of Merchants Trading to Africa), found in the T70 Treasury Series. 
it is in the nineteenth century with British activity at Sierra Leone (C0967) and 
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the Gold Coast (CO147) that Badagry receives more attention. However, it was the 
abolition of the slave trade in 1807 which led to more comprehensive coverage of 
the situation on the Slave Coast. The F084 series of papers relating to the Slave 
Trade has proved to be the most comprehensive source of information regarding 
the movements of consuls, government agents and naval officers on the coast, as 
well as providing a fragmented commentary on nineteenth century Badagry. 
Their sporadic nature is clearly due to the fact that despite the appointment of a 
Consul for the region in 1849, the Consular district with its base at Fernando Po, 
reached right along the Bights of Benin and Biafra. Even after the reduction of 
Lagos and the establishment of a Consul for the Bight of Benin in 1852, affairs at 
Badagry warranted only periodic attention, usually when events were at crisis 
point. The slave trade papers are supplemented to a limited extent by the F02 
Series of papers relating to Africa whilst the period from 1861 onwards receives 
attention in the C096 series from the newly established Lagos Colony. 
British papers collected in London are usefully supplemented by those held in 
the Nigerian National Archive at the University of Ibadan. As well as holding a 
number of duplicate documents, the Archive also houses papers relating to the 
pre-colonial and colonial period not available in Britain. There is for example the 
local letter book of Campbell, Consul at Lagos during the 1850s (CS08 /1/ 2); and 
also contained in the Chief Secretary's Office and BADADIV series of Badagry 
Division papers of the colonial period, a number of unpublished Intelligence 
Reports and town council minutes. It is these sources which have enabled me to 
place Badagry in its pre-colonial context and construct a coherent narrative 
history. 
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Chapter One 
Badagry and its Environment 
Badagry's Geographical Setting 
Badagry's history has been dominated by its environment both natural and man- 
made. The town is set on the eastern section of what was known as the 'Slave 
Coast' of West Africa. This notorious coast, which runs from the River Volta in 
the west to Lagos in the east has been characterised by several geographical 
features, each of which has played a part in shaping the history of the whole 
areal. 
The sea along the coast of the Bight of Benin has a long-standing reputation for 
its violence. This is due mainly to the presence of a sand-bar and heavy surf 
alorig its length, which coupled with strong easterly currents makes landing 
particularly treacherous. A visitor to the coast in 1853 commented that the surf at 
Badagry beach was less dangerous than at Whydah; but a naval visitor in the 
same year reported to the Admiralty that 'Badagry is nearly inaccessible from the 
sea, the surf being heavier there than at almost any part of the coast 2. It would 
appear that the ability to land safely was governed largely by time of day, time of 
year, some degree of luck and the skill of the canoe-men 3. Indeed. the use of 
Gold Coast canoe-men along the length of this coast was due to the fact that the 
indigenous populations did not venture onto the surf 4. The use of canoes was 
1 See Figure 1. 
2C 
, 
M1 June 1853, p. 130, 'A Visit to the Interior of Africa, Dr Irving; PRO F084 / 925 3 March 1853 
Commodore Bruce, Whydah enclosed in 14 April 1853 Captain Hamilton (Admiralty), London. 
3 In 1842 Revd Freeman noted that conditions for landing on the beach were best during the morning 
[Freeman, Tournal of Various Visitý.., , p. 205]. 
Two years later Governor Hill at Cape Coast pointed 
out that for 'four months of the year' the landing at Badagry was 'impracticable'. He illustrated 
his point by saying that in May of that year an officer of a British sloop had been drowned when 
his canoe capsized [PRO C096/4 16 May 1844 Hill, Cape Coast]. 
4 Arthur Wendover, a seventeenth-century source, stated that the people of Badagry's parent state, 
Apa, did not need to venture onto the sea due to their ability to fish the lagoon [17 July 1682 
Wendover, Apa in Law, Further Correspondence- p. 151. More recently Robert Smith has pointed 
out that the population of Apa, were Yoruba and therefore, essentially an interior people, and 
unused to the sea [ Robert S. Smith, Kingdoms of the Yoruba. (James Currey, London, 3rd ed. 1988), p. 
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necessary due to the lack of any safe, natural harbour along the coast. Even the 
Lagos inlet, during the nineteenth century, had its entrance obstructed by a 
dangerous sand bar5. Therefore, landing had to be attempted by canoes or surf 
boats from ships lying half a mile from shore 6. 
The lack of any suitable harbour along the remarkably straight coastline of what 
is now the coasts of Togo, the Republic of Benin and South West Nigeria is the 
result of continued sand deposits. Laid down by the east flowing current, these 
reshaped the scarred and indented post-glacial coastline by forming a series of 
offshore bars which ultimately created new land and a much smoother coastline. 
But the evolution of sand bar into land was not a wholly regular process and 
some areas were not completely silted up. This resulted in the enclosure of 
stretches of water and the creation of a series of inshore lagoons running parallel 
with the coast behind a spit of land7. The lagoons' distance from the sea varies 
from between one half to ten miles. At Badagry however, according to a number 
of diverse nineteenth and twentieth century sources, it lies from between one 
half to one mile away 8. The lagoon's width itself was also open to varying 
611. Robin Law has suggested that tl-ds might also be applied to the Aja-Ewe peoples, ancestors of 
the Badagry Gun people, who originated in Tado [Law 'Between the Sea and the Lagoons ... 1, p. 2171. 
The use of Gold Coast men, expert in the use of sea-going canoes was common right along the Bight of 
Benin. 
5 Law has pointed out that although inlets such as Lagos, may have attracted certain Europeans, 
the treacherous nature of the surf and sand bar across the mouth made them very dangerous indeed. 
At Lagos itself, Bowdich and Adams have both pointed out that although the English traders 
entered the channel across the bar, the Portuguese and French preferred to land their goods at the 
beach and have them portered to the town [Law, 'Between the Sea and the Lagoons... ', p. 2161. 
6A War Office report of 1888 noted that Badagry had an open roadstead and anchorage of 8 
fathoms about half a mile from shore [PRO F0881/5622X Precis of Information concerning the 
Colony of Lagos together with notes on the neighbouring territories 1888]. 
7jC Pugh, The Porto Novo - Badagri Sand Ridge Complex', Research Notes No 3 (Department of 
Geography, University College, Ibadan 1953); JE Webb, The Erosion of Victoria Beach. Its Cause 
and Cure. ( lbadan 1960). 
8 In August 1849 Revd Gollmer noted that the land spit at Badagry was not above three quarters of a 
mile broad JCMI August 1849, pp. 92-931. This is supported by Bowen's account of the following year 
[Ad fentures and Missionary Labours p. 931. However, William Hutton in the 1840s and AB Ellis 
in the 1880s both noted that the land spit was half a mile broad [PRO F084/710 19 July 1847 W 
Hutton, London; AB Ellis, Land of Fetish ( London 1883), p. 1011. But according to EH Duckworth in 
the 1950s this piece of land was a mile wide JE H Duckworth, 'Badagry Its Place in the Pages of the 
History of Nigeria', Nigeria Magazine, No 38 (1952), p. 1451. 
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estimates. Whilst most sources agree that the waterway as a whole varied from 
one half to ten miles wide, at Badagry estimates varied from a quarter to three 
quarters of a mile 9. These differing estimates are not the result of rapid and 
rather irregular land formation and erosion, but rather the result of seasonal 
variations. 
Although the effects of deposition and silting are a continuous process and the 
coastline is continually evolving, for the purposes of this thesis it is adequate to 
examine the physical shape of the lagoons, much as they are today. This is a point 
which has been discussed by Law who has investigated claims that the lagoons 
shape has been changed during the course of the nineteenth century 10. It has 
been alleged for example that whilst the lagoons had been wholly uninterrupted 
from Cape St Paul to Cape Formosa, the effects of silting during the last century 
had created interruptions between Ketu Lagoon and Lake Togo in the west and at 
Jakin. Law suggests however, that such interruptions were the result of seasonal 
changes causing falls in water level. This would appear to be the most reasonable 
conclusion as illustrated by a number of nineteenth century sources. For example 
the Wesleyan missionary Annear, complained at Badagry in 1844 of the 
unhealthy exhalations that arose from rotting vegetation, revealed as the waters 
receded in the dry season 11. The wide reaching effects of such seasonal variation 
are apparent from a description given by Vice-Consul Fraser who, in 1851, 
described how between Whydah and Arguay, during the dry season, the lagoon 
was reduced to no more than six inches of water. 'Consequently you must get 
out, while the canoe is hauled over the shallows' 12. Less clear are the effects of 
9 At Badagry, Revd Freeman noted that the lagoon was from a half to three quarters of a mile 
across [Freeman, lourrial of Various Visits.... P. 2051. Revd Gollmer during the same period also 
noted that HM Surveyors had reported the 
'width of the lagoon at Badagry as nearly half a mile 
wide August 1849, pp. 92-931 Pugh however, described the lagoon in this area as being only one 
uarter of a mile in width [The Porto Novo - Badagri Sand Ridge Complex', p. 81. 
1q0I Law, 'Between the Sea and the Lagoons', p. 213. 
11 WMMSA 2 December 1844 Annear's Journal, Badagry. 
12 PRO F084/886 Fraser's Journal of his arrival at Whydah and mission to Abomey 1851-52. 
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seasonal changes on outlets from lagoon to sea. There are three permanent 
outlets now in existence, at the River Volta, at Great Popo and at Lagos. 
However, there have been references to other connecting waterways which are 
no longer in existence. Law has cited references to a temporary outlet at Lake 
Nokue, east of the kingdom of Allada [Porto-Novo] in about 1804, which he 
suggests again was due to heavy rainfall 13. However, the regularity with which 
such an opening occurred may require it to be looked on as a seasonal outlet 
rather than a temporary one. For in 1851 Fraser, at Whydah, noted the existence 
of such an outlet at Porto-Novo 14. 
More importantly for the purposes of this thesis is the suggestion by Pugh that in 
centuries past there was an opening to the sea opposite the Yewa River, just west 
of Badagry15. Furthermore, according to an Admiralty Chart based on surveys 
during 1846, there was a further boat channel five and a half miles east of the 
Yewa, and thus just west of Badagry itself. The existence of this channel, 
according to Pugh, is substantiated by the examination of sand ridge formations 
and aerial photographs 16. Unfortunately, a comprehensive study of the lagoon's 
course was not made during this period. A survey ordered to examine the lagoon 
system by the Admiralty in 1847, was dogged by allegations of disorganisation and 
misfortune and it ultimately ended with the death of Commander Middleton, 
the officer in charge of the expedition only ten months after it had begun17. 
13 Law, 'Between the Sea and the Lagoons', p. 215. 
14 PRO F084/886 Fraser's journal of his arrival at Whydah and mission to Abomey 1851-52. 
15 Pugh, 'The Porto Novo - Badagri Sand Ridge Complex', p. 13. 
16 jbid, pp. 6-7. 
17 At the end of 1847 a comprehensive survey of the lagoon area to be undertaken by the British 
Navy was sanctioned by the Treasury [PRO C096 /12 22 November 1847 Admiralty (ADM), London], 
or more specifically the lagoon area between Whydah and Badagry [PRO C096/12 29 November 
1847 ADM, London]. Governor Winniett of the Gold Coast doubted that the mission would meet 
with success. He argued that the naval officer in charge of the survey team was inexperienced and 
unused to the African climate. Furthermore, he stressed that the detailed examination required to 
accurately survey the lagoon would be impossible without the, as yet unsought, permission of the 
King of Dahomey [PRO C096 /13 7 February 1848 Winniett, Cape Coast]. Winniett's ominous 
warnings came too late. Commander Middleton arrived at Badagry on 24 February 1848 [PRO 
C096 /14 1 March 1848 Middleton, Badagry in 4 July 1848 ADM, London]. However, hampered by 
the 'disturbed' state of the country and his own ill health the surveyors were unable to undertake 
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However, the existence of such a channel as late as the mid-nineteenth century is 
contrary to all other available information. In 1847 a British trading agent wrote 
to his employer, after a visit to the coast, describing the possibilities of dragging a 
canoe over the sand spit at Badagry for trading purposes. No mention was made 
of a boat channel in the area, either temporary or otherwise, although it should 
be noted that his visit was made during the dry season18. Indeed it was during 
this period, the latter half of the 1840s, when Badagry, as a new centre of 
missionary activities, became, for a short period, the African focal point of so 
much European attention. Under so much scrutiny, it would seem extremely 
bizarre for such a convenient channel not to be used by the missionary arrivals, 
or, if not usable, even mentioned 19. 
The lagoon is fed along its length by a number of rivers running from the 
interior. As noted above, the River Yewa, meets the lagoon just west of Badagry, 
whilst the rivers Volta, Weme, Ogun and Benin all provide freshwater inlets 
along its course. Indeed the mixture of salt and freshwater sources would make 
an interesting study for the biologist or ecologist. Where the waters are mostly 
fresh, the banks are abundant with fresh water plants 20. But nearer the outlets to 
the sea, the waters become increasingly salt or brackish, and the usual mangroves 
are found 21. Webb has concluded that this mixture of waters, which is 
exacerbated by seasonal changes in the lagoon level, poses serious problems for 
the animal ecology of the area. How seriously these 'seasonal salinity 
fluctuations' affected the plant and animal life along the Badagry section of the 
the work necessary. Within a year Middleton was dead and the project abandoned [PRO C096/15 
26 January 1849 Winniett, Cape Coast]. 
18 PRO C096 /12 15 June 1847 JW Thompson, London in 25 June 1847 W Hutton, London. 
19 Missionary visitors in the 1840s and 1850s described the land spit as being a 'flat, treeless 
prairie' [Bowen, Adveiltures and MissionaIX Labours ... i p. 961. They also clearly reported their 
joumies across this stretch of land rather than through it by canoe [Freeman, fournal of Various 
Vir2iLt: s 
6ý p. 
2051 
20 Duckworth, 'Badagri its place in the pages of the History of Nigeria', p. 144. 
21 CA Moloney, 'Notes on Yoruba and the Colony and Protectorate of Lagos', Proceedings of the 
Royal Geographical Socij: ý Series 2.12 (10) October 1890, p. 598. 
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lagoon and whether, for example the area's indigenous fishing industry was 
seriously affected by such changes requires further research22. But it is clear that 
the history of the whole coastal area has been shaped by the nature of these 
waterways. Law has noted the role of the physical environment on the whole 
region stressing the compensatory nature of the navigable lagoons on a coast 
where the sea was extremely treacherous 23. For the existence of an inland water 
route allowed the transport of goods over long distances with relative ease. This 
is especially important to note in an area with little potential for production of 
domestic foods and goods. Badagry's situation on the lagoon evidently makes 
fishing a staple industry and the seashore presents the opportunity of salt 
production 24. But a number of nineteenth century visitors mistakenly saw the 
abundance of forest in the area as an indication of huge agricultural potential 
neglected by the 'lazy and indolent African', a myth which continued well into 
the twentieth century 25. However, as early as 1850 more perceptive observers 
such as Bowen could recognise that 'No intelligent farmer could be deceived by 
the barren sandy soil at Badagry' 26. Furthermore, as Okaro K'Ojwang has 
pointed out, where there is no sand on the shores of the lagoon the soil is too 
marshy and muddy to be arable particularly during the rainy season between 
April and October, whilst the humid climate does not 'support the growth of 
edible crops' and 'discourages pastoral industry'. It is only further north in the 
22 Webb, 'The Porto Novo - Badagri Sand Ridge Complex', pp. 7-8. 
23 Law, 'Between the Sea and the Lagoons', pp. 210-211. 
24 See chapter 2, pp. 50-52. 
25 In 1830 John Lander stated that at Badagry: 
the land is excessively fertile and if the inhabitants 
could only be induced to lay aside their habitual indolence, 
and the sluggishness of their characters, and devote a little 
more attention to the improvement of the soil, the country 
might soon be brought to an extraordinary pitch of 
perfection 
[R &J Lander, Journal of an Expedition. -Nol 1, p. 46]. 26 Bowen, Missionary, Travels and Labours p. 96. 
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Egbado country that lighter rainfall and less sandy soil provide the conditions for 
_. 
successful arable pastoral farming 27. 
But it was not only articles of domestic consumption which required to be 
moved by water. The operation of the Atlantic trade both in slaves and later in 
palm oil also relied heavily on this route. Therefore, at a point where the lagoon 
ran as close to the sea, as at Badagry, there was clearly an ideal situation to 
develop a crossroads, where Atlantic and interior traders met. In this way then 
the lagoon system played a major role in enabling those in the Badagry area to 
overcome limited agricultural productivity, but also to profit from an abundance 
of commerce. It would appear that it was the commercial attractions combined 
with the area's defensive possibilities which initially attracted settlement. 
The Origins of Badagry 
According to the local historian T0 Avoseh, the area was initially settled by 
Yoruba people from the Ife area. He mentions two early groups of Yoruba, who, 
it is claimed, settled near Badagry but eventually left the area in two movements, 
to Iworo and then Iyafin 28. These groups would appear to differ from later 
Yoruba arrivals, who, Avoseh says, came again from Ife, and followed an 
unsuccessful claimant to that throne. They first settled at a place called Thran 
[unidentified], but due to a river full of crocodiles and the dangers they posed to 
their children, the group again moved. This time they settled near an Apara tree, 
after which they named their settlement. This title was later shortened to Apa 29. 
The period in which this migration occurred is difficult to identify. Law, again 
citing Avoseh, states that Apa was originally of Yoruba origin and that these 
27 Okaro K'Ojwang 'Society Trade and Politics in Badagri', pp. 1-5. Also see A Mabogunje 'The 
Land and People of West Africa' in jFA Ajayi and M Crowder, (eds), Histojýý of West Africa Vol 1, 
(Longman 1971). 
28 Avoseh, A Short HistoLy of Badagl: y, p. 8. 
29 lbid, p. 9. 
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people were able to dominate the whole area until Apa itself came under the 
domination of Allada some time during the seventeenth century 30. But he is 
unable to date its foundation although he does cite a fifteenth century Portuguese 
source, which refers to a town roughly corresponding in location with Apa. How 
long the town had been in existence prior to that period is impossible to tell from 
the sources available 31. 
According to Avoseh, there was a further group of settlers on the southern shore, 
opposite the site of what is now Badagry and further east of Apa, at Gberefu. 
Avoseh says that no-one knew where these settlers came from and that they 
themselves could not say, but that they were salt-makers until Portuguese traders 
advised them that in future salt should be imported32. The archaeological 
remains of salt making at Badagry beach have recently been excavated and Apa 
was identified as an important market for salt during the seventeenth century, 
although it is unclear whether this salt was being produced at GberefU 33. 
Another movement of Yoruba migrants is said to have settled in the area over 
the course of the later seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. According to 
an Intelligence Report of the 1930s a group of people identified as Awori/Yoruba 
had pushed westward from the north and east until the mid-eighteenth 
century34. Okaro K'Ojwang has concluded that these movements were largely 
the result of pressure from Oyo which, at the height of its powers, was expanding 
throughout the Egbado heartland 35. But in the early eighteenth century the 
westward progress of these settlers was checked by the establishment of an 
enclave of non-Yoruba people. It was these refugees from the Aja, or Ewe 
30 Law, 'The Gun Communities in the Eighteenth Century', pp. 3-5. 
31 Law, 'Between the Sea and the Lagoons', p. 217. 
32 Avoseh, A Short Histojý: of Badagry p. 8. 
33 See chapter 2, p. 50, footnote 2. 
34 NNAI CS026 /4 30030 / S1 A Report on the Re-organisation of the Badagri District by RjM 
Curwen 1937. 
35 Okaro K'Ojwang, 'Society, Trade and Politics in Badagri', pp. 16-19. 
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speaking areas to the west, who formed a number of settlements in the region. 
The most prominent of these was Badagry 36. 
Along the western part of the Slave Coast, in what is now Togo and the Republic 
of Benin, the coastal populations between Anlo and Allada [Porto-Novo] were 
Aja or Ewe speaking peoples 37. It was easterly migrations of these people, as a 
result of Dahomean aggression, that led to large numbers settling in the Badagry 
area in the first half of the eighteenth century. It was these migrants inhabiting 
the area from Grand Popo and Porto-Novo along the coast to Badagry and inland 
to Weme and Epe who formed a recognisable enclave between the Fort to the 
west and the Yoruba to the north and east. In the 1890s Governor Moloney of the 
Gold Coast noted that these people were 'known and commonly referred to in 
English as Popos and Whemians' but that they were 'known amongst 
themselves and the Yorubas as Egun, 38. More recently the name 'Gun' or 
'Gunu'/'Gunnu' (literally Gun people) has been used locally 39. 
The rise of Dahomean power and aggression during the early eighteenth century, 
as the inland Kingdom sought to secure its own Atlantic ports, led to the 
displacement of large numbers of people 40. The independent coastal states of 
Whydah and Allada became the main focus for initial Dahomean aggression and 
36 See Figures 2&3. 
37 Law, 'Between the Sea and the Lagoons', p. 210. 
38 Moloney, 'Notes on the Yoruba and the Colony and Protectorate of Lagos', p. 600. 
39 Law has produced the earliest reference so far to an 'Igou' people in the 1840s [Law, 'The Gun 
Communities in the Eighteenth Century', p. 2 citing A d'Avezac-Macaya, 'Notice sur le pays et le 
peuple des Yebous en Afrique, (Paris 1845). But clearly by this period the usage of the word Topo' in 
English language accounts was prevalent. By the early twentieth century the term Popo had almost 
disappeared and the British colonial administration were referring to the 'Egun' people and 
country. It was noted however that the locals called themselves and their language'Gunu' fNNAI 
CS026 /4 30030 / S1 A Report on the Re-organisation of the Badagri District' RjM Curwen 1937]. It is 
therefore the term 'Gun' which I shall use to describe this people. 
40 In his account of the period, which is largely based on the work of Snelgrave, Dalzel says that it 
was the desire of King Agaja (whom he calls Trudo) to have direct access to the Atlantic slave 
trade by controlling the port of Whydah fA Dalzel, The HistojZý of Dahomy, (new imp, F. Cass & 
Co, 1967)]. Akinjogbin has subsequently, although not entirely convincingly refuted this. He states 
that it was only later that Dahomey sought a share in the slave trade [ Akinjogbin, Dahomey and 
Its Neighbours, p. 73-771. 
35 
porto4ouo 
q_', 
A 
- I'll 
/ II 
/ I, 
// 
/ I, 
/ II 
// 
/ 
/ 
// 
// 
I/ 
I 
N \Lc 
I7. 
I 
wt Jaron 
\\-, 
-, .. 
Zý ---- 
-. 
C> rn 
F-- 4S 
cn 
. cp 
n 
C3 
-r-: ) O)mk 
-1-1 
r'n -6- CD W 
9 (Y* 
. . 
.......... 
LL. j 
CL) 
C-) 
M- 
C) 
U 
Cý 
Cl- 
according to a contemporary account the city of Whydah was besieged from 2 
March to 9 March 1727, when the Dahomeans seized control and many ruling 
Whydahs, including the King, were put to flight 41. 
Dahomey, however, was fighting wars on several fronts during this period and 
aggression was directed also towards Weme. Events and motivations behind this 
campaign are less clear than for that directed against Whydah. Sometime prior to 
1726, King Agaja of Dahomey defeated and killed King Yahaze of jigbe, west of 
the Weme River. After that war, some of Yahaze's princes migrated to re-found 
the kingdom of Weme at Dangbo, east of the river. However, it is likely that 
refugees from jigbe also moved further east into the Badagry area42. Further 
Weme refugees may have fled from Dangbo in later decades. Dalzel says that the 
Dahomean attacks on Mahi, an interior power to the north, during the 1720s and 
1730s, were not successful initially. This caused Agaja to upbraid and kill several 
of his officers which led to discontent and ultimately revolution among a section 
of his army. This group, led by Agaja's own son, Zingay, fled to the King of 
Weme. On Agaja's death c. 1740, the succession was disputed by a son of Agaja, 
possible Zingay at Weme, but he and his allies were defeated. This confrontation 
may have produced a further wave of easterly moving refugees 43. 
41 According to the Dutch trader Hendrik Hertogh, now based at Jakin, Dahomey had been 
threatening Whydah for a long time. He noted that : 
on 2nd March this became reality: the Dahomeans came 
down to besiege Fida [Whydahl and on 9th March they took 
it 
[Hertogh 18 March 1727 in Van Dantzig, The Dutch and the Guinea Coast.... p. 2211. This account is 
supported by the work of Snelgrave who also places the destruction in March [W Snelgrave, A New 
-Account 
of SO-Me Parts of Guinea and the Slave Trade, (new imp. F Cass & Co, 1971), p. 191. 
According to the account by William Smith, a surveyor with the Royal Africa Company; the city 
was overpowered within a few hours and the King was carried away in a hammock [W Smith, A 
, _UMgL 
(London 1744), p. 1901. New Voyaga tQ C 
42 Law, Nest Afric2i, pp. 265-266. 
43 Dalzel, The History of Dahomy, pp. 60 & 67; Akinjogbin, Dahomey iaad its Neighbours-'-R. 91 
footnote 
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The people of Jakin were also known as Wharas [Hula is the local spelling], a 
group subdivided again into the Whara jakin and the Whara Ba 44. According to 
Dalzel, despite the efforts of European traders to re-establish a thriving trade at 
Whydah under the state's new rulers and Agaja's outward willingness to 
encourage such conditions, the Dahomeans continued to be preoccupied with 
further conquest 45. jakin had been a port under the control of Allada and had 
hoped to continue trading under the protection of the Dahomean King. It became 
clear however, that this was not to be the case and the jakins became increasingly 
nervous of their position. Snelgrave recorded that the population prepared for a 
confrontation by sending their wives and possessions eastward to an island 
under the protection of the King of Apa46. According to Dalzel, war finally broke 
out when jakin decided to throw off the yoke of Dahomean control. But in 
response to their plotting the Dahomeans attacked by surprise and destroyed 
jakin in early 1732. Badagry tradition recounts that the population escaped to the 
east, the Whara Jakin establishing themselves at Ketonu, on the south-eastern 
corner of Denham Water, whilst the Whara Ba proceeded further east to Apa, 
where they were welcomed by King Weze47. 
From a number of contemporary sources however, the destruction of Jakin takes 
on a far more personalized aspect; notably the hatred of the Dahomean King for 
Hendrik Hertogh. According to Dutch records, Hertogh had arrived in Whydah 
44 According to Chief Finhento of Badagry in 1887: 
The Popo nation was divided into the Whedas and 
Whras of whom the latter community called Fras, 
had their own King and their own capital, Whra. 
The Whras, again were sub-divided into the Whra Jinkin, 
so called after their capital, and the Whra Ba... 
f PRO C0879/27 statements from the Badagry chiefs made at Lagos on the 22nd and 23rd August 1887 
before the Queen's Advocate, Lagos]. 
45 Dalzel, The Histou of Dahomy p. 54. 
46 Snelgrave, -A 
New Account..., p. 82. 
47 PRO C0879 / 27 Statements from the Badagry chiefs made at Lagos on 22nd and 23rd August 1887 
before the Queen's Advocate, Lagos. 
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in 1726 to man the Dutch trading factory 48. it would appear from the letters of 
the Director of the Portuguese factory at Ajuda, that Hertogh became the object of 
Dahomean hostility when he 'provoked wars of the Minas and the Ayos against 
himself' 49. Hertogh's role in such aggression is impossible to substantiate, but 
whatever his part Dahomey was attacked by Oyo in 1726, and indeed the capital 
Abomey was burnt 50. What is clear, however, is that Hertogh left Whydah prior 
51 to its destruction in March 1727 and established himself at Jakin 
Although initially impressed with the commercial possibilities at Jakin, by as 
early as May 1727 Hertogh was writing that 'here we live constantly in fear' and 
by 1728 that 'trade is languishing, 52. Whether it was the Dahomean threat which 
affected trade so adversely or the restrictive Dutch trading practices, of which 
Hertogh later complained, is unclear. According to Dalzel, it was with the advice 
and assistance of Hertogh that jakin sought to throw off Dahomean control, and 
when Agaja attacked it was with the aim of capturing him 53. 
Hertogh escaped further east again. First he went to Lebee [unidentified] and then 
on to Apa where, according to Snelgrave, he and the King of jakin were 
welcomed on account of Apa's aversion to Dahomey 54. Furthermore, in a period 
when trade had been severely weakened by Dahomean aggression, Apa, was. 
48 Provisional Agreement for approbation, made in the King's lodgings at Sabee by Commies 
[Factor] H. Hertogh... with the King and Grandes of Fida [Whydahl on 12 November 1726 in Van 
Dantzig, The Dutch and the Guinea Coast.... pp. 220-221. 
49 8 September 1732 Director of Portuguese Factory, Ajuda in Verger, Trade Relations.... p. 130. 
50 Akinjogbin, Dahomey and its Neighbours, pp. 82 & 90. 
51 Hertogh's presence at Jakin at the time of Whydah's destruction is evident from his letters of 
the period [ 18 & 23 March 1727, Hertogh, Jakin in Van Dantzig, The Dutch and the Guinea 
Coast.... p. 2211. 
52 26 April 1727 &9 January 1728 Hertogh, Jakin in [bid, pp. 223 & 231. 
53 According to Dalzel, Hertogh: 
Stirred up the King of Weemy and other neighbouring 
princes, to join them, by representing his great design as 
equally important to them all, promising them, at the 
same time the necessary supplies of arms and ammunition 
[Dalzel, The Histol: y of Dahomy, p. 611. 
54 Snelgrave, A New Account.... p 151. 
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reported to be thriving, sheltered as it was from Dahomey 'by a morass and a 
river'55. The security of Apa as well as its trading prospects must have seemed 
ideal to Hertogh of whom 'the Dahommese had sworn great oaths never to 
leave ... unprosecuted and unmolested ... whenever he may be within their reach56. 
Settlement at Badagry 
I 
The arrival of Hertogh at Apa and his subsequent removal to the site now called. 
Badagry is noted in local traditions. In Badagry tradition he is known as 
Freemingo, George, or most commonly Huntokonu and mistakenly given a 
Brazilian nationality 57. But his identity as Hertogh is clear and it is he who has 
been commonly termed the founder of Badagry 58. 
Initially it would appear that Hertogh settled at Apa, but at some point in about 
17361/ 7 the King of Apa gave him some land on which to trade. Several accounts 
note that this land was already a farm or 'gle' [in Gun] belonging to 'Agbada' or 
'Agbade', a slave or court messenger of the King of Apa. It was a corruption of 
this term which gave the new settlement its name 59. 
55 Thid, p. 156. 
56 Minutes of the Elmina Council 30 June 1733 in Van Dantzig, The Dutch and the Guinea Coast... P. 
186. 
57 Avoseh says that the trader was a Brazilian slave trader who was known by various names 
including Freemingo and George but was called Huntokonu by the local people [Avoseh, A Short 
Histojý: of BadagjZý., pp. 12 & 10]. Vice Consul Fraser noted in 1853 that the name 'Oo-toc-co-noo' 
[Huntokonul was translated as 'the man that has a ship upon the sea' fPRO F084/920 11 January 
1853 Fraser, Lagos). However, according to Okaro K'Ojwang'Huntokonu'is the Gun term for'the 
sailor laughs' [Okaro K'Ojwang, 'Society, Trade and Politics in Badagri', p. 101. 
Huntokonu can clearly be identified as the Dutch trader Hendrik Hertogh. Indeed, as Law 
has pointed out, the name 'Freemingo' is clearly a corruption of the Portuguese word'Flamingo' 
meaning Dutchman. Law also suggests that Huntokonu may also merely be a deformation of the 
name Hertogh [Law, '... The Early History of Badagry', p. 131. 
58 Recent local accounts have mistakenly placed the foundation of the town much earlier than the 
eighteenth century, sometimes as as early as the fifteenth century, whilst the arrival of Hertogh is 
dated around 1600 [Lagos State, Focus on Bada=; Ibrahim, Badagry Past and Present pp. 12 & 421. 
59 According to Avoseh the settlement dates back to the seventeenth century: 
when the site now known as Badagry Town was 
a deep forest Agbade, the founder, built a hut under 
the Agia tree for rest and relaxation after farming. 
fAvoseh, 'The Historical Tree of Badagry Under Which the Early Missionaries Preached the 
Gospel of Christ' reproduced in Falola, 'The Minor Works of T0 Avoseh', p. 2491. 
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There has also been some dispute over the original position of Hertogh's 
settlement. According to the nineteenth century accounts of the explorer 
Clapperton, Vice-Consul Fraser and the missionary Revd Gollmer, the 
settlement was initially established on the southern bank of the lagoon. Here 
Hertogh was joined by refugees from Whydah, Weme and Jakin. However the 
King of Dahomey attacked the settlement and drove the inhabitants across the 
lagoon to the town's present site 60. The existence of this original southern 
position is questionable. It would appear more likely that evidence of sparse 
populations on the southern bank of the lagoon, for example at Gberefu, have 
caused some confusion over the origins of Badagry itself, for there is no evidence 
of such a Dahomean attack at this time. Interestingly Fraser, who wrote an 
account of this attack in 1853 claimed that it had occurred about eighty years 
previously. He was therefore dating the establishment of Badagry proper in the 
early 1770s. It is possible then that this mythical attack on Badagry and its re- 
establishment on the north bank of the lagoon has been confused with the very 
real attack of 1784. The virtual destruction of Badagry in that year may have led 
to the idea of it being re-founded after this date. But it is clear from accounts such 
as Dalzel that the situation of the besieged settlement was north of the lagoon, 
indeed Akinjogbin has suggested that up to 1784 Badagry was in fact some way 
north of the present town, although there is no evidence to support this 61. 
Despite the failure of the town's defences in 1784 the establishment of a 
settlement on the north bank of the lagoon would also clearly have offered 
greater defensive possibilities than one on the southern bank, a factor which 
must have been uppermost in the 'early settlers" minds. On the southern bank, 
any dwellings could be easily reached by an army from east or west marching 
60 PRO C02 / 15 Clapperton's Journal 6 December 1825; PRO F084 / 920 11 January 1853 Fraser, Lagos; 
f, Ul August 1849 pp. 93 Gollmer's description of the Badagry station. 
61 Dalzel, Th-e Histay of Dahomy p. 179; Akinjogbin, Dahomey and its Neighbours, p. 213. 
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along the sand spit, whereas, on the north bank, the position was more easily 
defensible. In the late 1840s Gollmer noted that: 
the river Ossa protects the south, a branch of that river [the Yewal 
protects the west, and morasses the north and part of the east, so 
that, from its peculiarity of situation it is rendered almost a 
natural fortification 62 
Indeed at certain seasons in the year, according to another missionary source, 
Badagry was 'an island during the rains' and that for : 
one half of the year, it is impossible for persons coming from more 
than six miles in any direction, to enter the place without the use of 
canoes, and even during the other season, the best perhaps is a 
perfect swamp and contains some water 63 
These watery defences would seem to augur well for a settlement that, was 
threatened by Dahomey, an inland power unused to the techniques of naval 
warfare. Newbury has argued, however, that Badagry's geographical position was 
less than secure due to its vulnerability to blockade 64. Furthermore it is clear that 
due to the emergence of competition amongst Badagry's neighbours, more used 
to maritime conflict, Dahomey was able to secure both 'friendship and 
assistance' in threatening the town65. However, the fact that Badagry was failed 
ultimately to defend itself, should not obscure the initial hopes of security. 
Badagry Town 
The settlement on the north bank of the lagoon grew rapidly into. a flourishing 
town as groups of refugees and traders arrived to take advantage of its situation. 
Population estimates only began to appear towards the middle of the nineteenth 
century when, prior to the town's almost complete destruction in 1851, numbers 
were estimated at between eight and twelve thousand 66. Therefore, Badagry at 
62 CMI August 1849, p. 93 Gollmer's description... 
63WMMSA 24 December 1844 Annear's journal. 
64 Newbury, The Western Slave Coast.... p. 30. 
65 Dalzel, The HistoEy of Dahomy, pp. 166-167. 
66 Accurate population figures for Badagry are difficult to find. In 1850 Revd Bowen gave a figure of 
ten thousand [Bowen, Adventures and Missionaly Labours, pp. 931. Vice Consul Fraser suggested 
that during the same period the number could be as high as twelve thousand [PRO F084/920 11 
January 1853 Fraser, Lagos], whilst Revd Gollmer, an inhabitant of the town for almost seven years, 
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this time was a much smaller town than for example the interior Egba city of 
Abeokuta, which was estimated as having a population of between sixty and one 
hundred thousand inhabitants during the same period67. It would also appear 
that Badagry had a smaller population than its nearest lagoonside neighbours. 
Although the population of Lagos was estimated at just five thousand at the end 
of the eighteenth century, by the early nineteenth century the figure was put at 
twenty thousand. Bowen also estimated that the population of Ajasheh [Porto- 
Novo] was fifteen thousand68. 
Descriptions of the town's appearance often seem to contradict one another. 
Clearly the bamboo palm, growing abundantly in the area, was the main building 
material used. A missionary visitor in 1851 noted that : 
with the exception of those belonging to a few persons of note, and 
some fetish houses that have mud walls, the whole town is of 
bamboo construction 69. 
Another missionary, Charles Gollmer, explained that, due to the sandy nature of 
the soil, clay or mud suitable for building was rare70. According to the Landers' 
description of 1830 these bamboo houses were thatched with palm leaves. Some 
were oblong and some were round and had several rooms, but all were single 
storey, except one house which, Richard Lander noted on his previous visit, 
belonged to the King 71. The practicalities of building in this way became 
apparent to the first missionaries in the area who learnt that not only could they 
find no local stone with which to build a mission house, but that they would 
suggested the more modest figure of eight thousand [CMI August 1849, p- 93, Gollmer's 
description ... 1. Figures prior to the mid-nineteenth century are yet undiscovered. 67 Bowen, Adventures and Missionmy-labours.... p. 93. 
68 j Adams, Remarks on the CQualix extending, from Cape Palmas to the River Congo (London 1823), 
p. 100; GA Robertson, Notes on Africa (Londo n 1819), p. 287; Bowen, Adventures and Missionary 
Labours..., p. 218. 
69 CMR october 1851, p. 218, Thomas King (catechist), Badagry. 
70 CMI August 1849, p. 93, Gollmer's description... 
71 R&j Lander, journal of an Expedition. Vol 1, p. 45; R Lander, Captain Clapperton's Last 
ExI2 -d 0 ti )n to A rica, Vol 2, p. 236. 
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have to travel four miles up the lagoon in order to find suitable timber for a 
wooden frame house 72. 
In an account published in 1883 AB Ellis stated that: 
I should imagine that Badagry is not a healthy place of residence, 
it is low lying and swampy and sanitary conditions have evidently 
never been taken into account 73. 
This rather unpleasant aspect was also emphasised by the missionary visitor 
Bowen in 1850 who stressed the swampy and unhealthy nature of the area, 
exacerbated by the narrow streets and lanes running between the houses 74. The 
sandy nature of these paths clearly caused some inconvenience to missionary 
workers eager to spread the Word about town as rapidly as possible75. The closely 
knit nature of the buildings was also featured in the descriptions of other visitors 
during the nineteenth century 76. However, these other travellers frequently 
present a far more pleasant picture of the town as a whole. The Revd Townsend 
for example, commented in 1845 that: 
The highest spot in Badagry is but a few feet above the common 
level of the lagoon; but it does not appear that this is a more 
unhealthy spot than any other on the leeward coast, even those in 
more elevated and drier situations 77 
Furthermore, the impression of a bamboo ghetto was dispelled by the Landers' 
description, which said of the habitations that: 
all have excellent yards attached to them, wherein lime trees and 
others are planted in rows, and it gives one pleasure to look at the 
cleanliness and taste which prevails in these courts 78 
72 Freeman, Tournal of Various Visits.... p. 206. 
73 Ellis, The Land of Fetish. p. 101. 
74 Bowen, Adventures and MissionaLy Labours.... p. 94. 
75 Dr Irving noted in 1854 that 'Progression is not rapid over the sandy streets of Badagry' [PRO 
F084 / 95130 May 1854 Dr Irving, Abeokuta in 14 August 1854 Lord Chichester (CMS) London]. 
76 In 1847 Revd Gollmer noted that Porto-Novo seemed larger than Badagry but that: 
it is, however, difficult to say, the houses not being built 
close together as at Badagry, but having parcels of 
unoccupied ground, and many large and beautiful trees 
interspersed 
LCM&October 1847, p. 225, Revd Gollmer, Badagry]. 
77 CNE March 1846, p. 61, Townsend, Badagry. 
78 R&j Lander, Tournal of an Expedition_, Vol 1, p. 46. 
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The more unfavourable descriptions of the town may be attributed to the periods 
in which they were written. Bowen was writing in 1850, a period when Badagry 
was on the brink of civil war and when social unrest, political intrigue and the 
fear of violence may, for a time, have taken precedence over town planning. 
Avoseh says that after 1914 the town of Badagry, once full of life, went to sleep. 
Ellis's description of the town in 1883 suggests that this sleep may have begun 
slightly earlier, perhaps after attentions had focused on Lagos from the 1860s 
onwards. 
The extent to which Badagry's territory extended beyond the bounds of the town 
itself during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is difficult to ascertain and 
would appear to have caused some confusion in recent attempts to study its 
history. The issue is clouded by the fact that territorial control was clearly of a 
transitory nature. The shifting balance of West African coastal politics resulted in 
almost continuous changes in territorial authority, as well as co-existing claims 
and counter-claims over particular areas. The changing relationship between 
Badagry itself and other coastal states is a case in point. Indeed the town was 
claimed as tributary, at various points during the period, by Dahomey, Oyo, 
Abeokuta and Lagos. The limited number and narrow range of sources on this 
issue highlights the problem, which is further complicated by a number of claims 
to various areas of land, during the colonial period, which were 'legitimised' 
with references to 'traditional' land-holdings. 
After the decline of Badagry as an Atlantic port in the latter part of the 
nineteenth century, and the area's absorption into the British colony of Lagos, 
Badagry town became the capital of the 'Badagri' or 'Western' District of that 
colony. During the 1930s the 'Badagri District' stretched from the boundary with 
French Dahomey to the Oluge Waters and contained a population of twenty 
seven and a half thousand. Sixteen thousand of these people were of Topo' 
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[Gun] origin and almost ten and a half thousand of Yoruba79. The 1930s saw a 
period of almost unprecedented interest in this western region by the colonial 
authorities who sought to rationalise and reorganise their existing 
administration of the area. In a series of reports during the 1930s a number of 
District Officers attempted to establish a system of administration through local 
institutions. This was made difficult by the inability to find any 'large native 
organisation of any great age' and recognition of the fact that the region was 
clearly divided between 'Egun or Popo' in and around the locality of Badagry 
town and Awori/Yoruba largely to the north east of IworO80. The difficulties 
faced by the colonial authorities clearly reflect the disunity of the District. Not 
only was the region clearly divided along Gun - Awori/Yoruba lines, but also 
between villages of similar origin. Evidently, 'Badagri District' had no basis in 
pre-colonial administration. 
The extent to which pre-colonial Badagry exerted influence beyond the 
metropolitan area is difficult to assess although there are evidently a number of 
areas which were clearly under its sway at some point. Mowo, to the north east of 
Badagry, was known as a frontier town in 1846 81. The missionary Martin in that 
year described how, situated on the edge of Badagry's encircling morass, Mowo 
was highly defended against all enemies from the interior by a ten foot barricade 
of wood with holes through which muskets could be fired. These defences 
stretched for 'some miles' and met the swamp at both ends 82. A year earlier, 
Revd Annear had described how expected hostilities from the Dahomeans at the 
Ado encampment were guarded against by sending all available men to MOWO 83. 
A much later investigation into Badagry's eastern holdings, by the British War 
79 NNAI BADADIV 6/1 1931 Census of Badagri District. 
80 CS026 /4 30030 / S2 Intelligence Report on Awori Area Badagri District by RJM Curwen 1937. 
Also see figure 3. 
81 CMSA CA2 / 085 / 227 30 January 1845 Townsend's journal, B adagry. 
82 WMMSA 28 May 1846 Martin's journal In 5 September 1.846 Martin, Badagry. 
83 WMMSA 26 February 1845 Annear's journal, Badagry. 
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Office, however, claimed that the town's territory stretched as far east as Oluge 
Waters 'and a line thence to Okobo' 84. This would seem a rather ambitious 
assessment. Confusion may have arisen when the colonial administration 
attempted to extend the territory as far east inland as Badagry's influence 
extended along the coast. From mid-nineteenth century sources it is clear that 
along the seashore, Badagry chiefs were influential and indeed 'owned' a 
number of villages stretching at least as far east as Idale85. Furthermore, close 
contact was maintained with independent Awori/Yoruba settlement at Iworo, at 
the southern tip of the Oluge Waters. This was a sacred place for the spirit Legba 
[also called Elegbara and Esu]. Richard Lander witnessed the result of sacrifices to 
this spirit there in 1826 and mistakenly attributed them solely to the Badagry 
people 86. 
Westwards, the issue of land tenure became embroiled in British and French 
colonial claims. According to the Treaty of Cession in 1863, Badagry territory 
extended westward along the beach : 
to the village of Witcheree [Wesherej on the sea shore, the half of 
the town of Quameh [Kweme], the Eastern side or shore of the 
Quameh Creek on the lagoon 87 
However, in a later document signed by Chief 'Fiotoh' [Finhento] of Badagry and 
several other chiefs of the town, authority over this territory was disputed. They 
claimed that in fact this territory had always belonged to Apa, and that confusion 
had arisen in 1863 because the chiefs had thought they were discussing the 
'western limits of the abodes of our people, not of the limits of our territory, 88. 
The Finhento explained that, on arriving in the Badagry area during the 
84 PRO F0881 / 5622X Precis of information concerning the Colony of Lagos together with notes on 
the neighbouring territories 1888. 
85 CNIR October 1846, pp. 229,12 July 1845 Revd Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
86 R Lander, Captain Clapperton's Last Expedition to Africa, I 
Vol 2, pp. 251 & 264-265. Also see 
chapter 4, pp. 114-115. 
87 PRO F0879 /1201 Treaty of Cession of Badagry in 7 July 1863 T Tickel, Badagry. See Appendix C. 
88 PRO C0879 / 27 Statements by the Badagry chiefs made at Lagos on 22nd and 23rd August 1887 
before the Queen's Advocate, Lagos. 
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eighteenth century, when the main body of the Whydah and Whra Ba people 
crossed the lagoon, some stayed at Kweme, Ahoko, Agonrin, Gbele and Weshere, 
under the authority of Apa. The extent to which Apa itself can, at least during 
part of the period, be looked on as being under the authority of Badagry is 
interesting. Although Apa was initially the dominant state, it would appear that 
Badagry quickly overtook its guardian in both economic and political 
importance. The decline of Apa as a commercial centre in its own right is amply 
illustrated by the position of the kingship in the mid-nineteenth century. One of 
the signatories on Badagry's 1852 Anti Slave Trading Treaty was the Alapa, or 
King of Apa, who, was called by one contemporary source, the 'guardian of the 
whole area'89. However, this Alapa, had in fact been periodically resident in 
Badagry itself, from the latter part of the 1840s and his presence, when rarely 
mentioned, is associated not with any real political authority he had but with 
occasional attendance at church services 90. But, the outbreak of civil war in 
Badagry during the period 1851-54, and the emergence of a new political 
authority within the town, backed by this Alapa, led to accusations that this 
'King' was an impostor. The real Alapa, it was alleged, was in exile at Porto- 
Novo 91. Apa, was perhaps then an issue of dispute between Badagry and Porto- 
Novo during this period. Although the matter remains unresolved through lack 
of evidence, it is interesting to note that Apa continued to be a bone of 
contention between the squabbling British and French agents at Lagos and Porto- 
Novo during the early 1860s 92. 
89 In his journal Revd Gollmer implied that, on occasion, even the ruling chief Mewu at Badagry 
deferred to the superiority of the King of Apa. This, however, may, have been a ruse which 
enabled the Mewu to avoid taking responsibility for certain grievances raised by the missionaries. 
It was also a way of legitimising his own position in the town; the Mewu had originally come from 
Porto-Novo and used the political disintegration at Badagry during the early 1850s to seize power 
for a short period. See Chapter 9 and Appendix A. 
90 Both the Mewu and the King of Apa would appear to have curried missionary favour by 
attending the Anglican church in Badagry during their period of 'rule' [CMSA CA2 /043 /12 7 
September 1851 Gollmer's Journal, Badagry]. 
91 PRO F084 / 920 27 December 1852 Fraser, Lagos. See chapter 9, pp. 324-325. 
92 See chapter 11, p. 366. 
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To the north of the lagoon, the 1863 Treaty of Cession clearly stated that Badagry's 
territory extended as far west as the Ado or Yewa River 93. However, by the 1880s 
this assertion was being challenged not only by the British authorities, but also 
the chiefs of Badagry and indeed those of 1pokia, west of the Ado. Claims that 
Badagry's territory ended at the Ado, as stated in the 1863 Treaty, were disputed 
by the Badagry chiefs in 1888 when they claimed that ancestors of Chief Finhento 
were granted land west of that river for farming purposes by the Kingdom of 
Ipokia 94. The amount of land so given is difficult to quantify. One source 
claimed that the territory was that which occupied 'the angle formed by the Addo 
River with the Victoria Lagoon' and consisted of the towns of Vawehgbo, Turu, 
Geshi, Vawehpeve, Zigi, Lassa, Akere, Gbagodo Weke and possibly Greta and 
Mawun, only some of which places are now identifiable on the map 95. The 
nature of Badagrian authority within this area, it was claimed, was maintained 
largely by the goodwill of Ipokia. Governor Moloney stated that although the 
territory was still considered part of the kingdom of Ipokia, 'it was allowed to be 
excluded from the jurisdiction exercised by the authorities of Pokra'96. 
Furthermore, Chief Ganfoji, the Finhento of Badagry, was said to act as chief, 
mediator in disputes and the controller of immigration to the area 97. In 1888, 
Badagrian claims to authority here were supported by the messengers of the King 
and elders of 1pokia 98. However, the possible motivations behind this 
declaration are unclear and it may be that this was an attempt by a region 
dominated by France, to forge closer links with Britain, during a period when 
Europe was attempting to enforce unnatural boundaries in Africa. 
93 It is important to note that the French also claimed the territory of Ipokia west of the Ado as 
belonging to Porto-Novo [PRO F084 /1201 Treaty of Cession of Badagry in 7 July 1863 Tickel, 
Badagry]. 
94 PRO C0879 / 27 19 September 1887 Moloney, Lagos. 
95 PRO C0879 / 27 16 August 1887 Commissioner Rowland, Lagos. 
96 PRO C0879 27 19 September 1887 Moloney, Lagos. 
97 PRO C0879 27 16 August 1887 Commissioner Rowland, Lagos. 
98 PRO C0879 / 27 a declaration by the messengers of sent by the King and elders of Pokra [Ipokial, 
Lagos. 
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The extent to which any part of these claims can be substantiated is limited. 
However the circumstantial nature of some information may aid further 
research. For example, the chiefs of Badagry asserted that their relationship with 
Ipokia had been in existence for three generations 99. Furthermore, when Captain 
Clapperton left Badagry for the interior in 1825, he travelled by water, up the 
Gazie Creek [Ado River] as far as Bawie [Ibawe], where he continued on foot 
through the area under discussion. It was only after he reached the town of Puka. 
[Ipokial itself that he learnt that 'we were not now in the king of Badagry's 
territory' 100. This may imply that Clapperton's informants were slow reporting 
a change in territorial authority, or it may perhaps suggest that such a change 
took place much further north west of Badagry than is now believed. 
I would conclude however, that using the evidence available Badagry was 
ultimately very much a 'city state'. With an economy based firmly on commerce, 
the population did not require control over extensive agricultural land whilst 
the lagoon, river and sea maintained a series of natural defensive boundaries. 
However, these 'borders' were also the key to the town's commercial links. 
Whatever the exact limits of Badagry's territory during the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, it is clear that the city state was dominated by its ability to 
take advantage of these water connections, which gave it the potential to become 
a new commercial focus on the Slave Coast of West Africa. 
99 PRO C0879 / 27 Statements of the Badagry chiefs made at Lagos on 22nd and 23rd August 1887 
before the Queen's Advocate, Lagos. 
100 Clapperton,. Tournal of a Second Expedition.... p. 4. 
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Chapter Two 
Badagry as an Atlantic Port 
The commercial nature of Badagry is evident from any examination of its 
history. Founded as an Atlantic port in the 1730s, Badagry's existence was based 
on international commerce, a factor which shaped and moulded the town more 
than any other, as it sought to establish, maintain and modify its links with the 
rest of the world. Furthermore, the very establishment of a significant 
commercial centre, in a coastal area largely devoid of sufficient natural resources, 
resulted in the emergence of a further layer of local commercial activity in staple 
products. The separation of international and domestic economies is misleading 
in the context of Badagry, as both became interdependent. International 
commerce not only required a solid domestic economy in order to maintain the 
trading community and also to a lesser extent supply the provision needs of 
Atlantic ships, crews and in the case of the slave trade; cargoes. It also used the 
local market to stimulate both demand for foreign items and production of 
Atlantic trade goods. In the same way the domestic economy was able to expand 
along the trade routes of Atlantic commerce and supply a greater variety of 
products to the local market place. 
Badagry as a Commercial Centre 
Local historian T Ola Avoseh states that the occupations of the original 
inhabitants of the sea shore area of Badagry were salt-making and trading, but 
that this was ended by the arrival of traders from Brazil 1. Recent archaeological 
excavations in the area have unearthed evidence of such early salt works 2. 
1 Avoseh, 
-A 
Short Histay of Bad=W, pp. 8-9. 
2 For a brief resume of the archaeological excavations at Ganyingbo beach undertaken by Professor 
Allsworth-jones see :B Agbaje-Williams, 'Archeology and Yoruba Studies' in T Falola, (ed), 
yor ba listoriogjaphy, (Wisconsin-Madison 1991), pp. 5-29. Law has also made an examination of 
early salt production in the area. 
Apa, an important salt market, was supplied from an unidentified 
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These were based on the evaporation of salt water from the lagoon trapped in 
pots or pits 3. The production of salt in coastal areas was not merely for local 
consumption, but was part of an important commercial network. The value 
placed on the product was noted in the latter part of the eighteenth century by 
William Snelgrave who reported that Jakin, as the sea port of Ardrah [Old 
Alladal paid its tribute in loaves of salt 4. That this stretch of coast between Porto- 
Novo and Lagos was a salt-producing area is supported by several sources. 
Robertson in the later years of the eighteenth century described how salt 
produced at Porto-Novo was sent into the interior for sale 5. As late as the 1860s 
at least some vestiges of salt production remained at Lagos, although competition 
from imported salt was intense 6. But it would appear that at Ajido, about ten 
miles east of Badagry, there was, during the middle years of the nineteenth 
source called Jojo. The Apa market in turn supplied Yorubaland to the east [Law, 'Between the Sea 
and the Lagoons... ', pp. 220-222. 
3 Revd Gollmer gave a description of the salt works at the neighbouring town of Ajido during the 
1840s. He noted that: 
There are on a nicely swept sand plain close to the surf 
several hundred [ .... ja kind of wicker basket, about 2 
1/2 
feet in diameter, 3 1/2 feet high above the ground and 
about 2 feet deep in the ground which are filled with sand 
about 3 feet distant. There is a pot (containing about from 3-5 
gallons) buried up to the neck in the ground into which the 
salt water, after having passed through the sand in the basket 
runs, by means of a pipe, or hollow piece of wood - from these 
pots the strained salt water is conveyed to ponds, under sheds 
close by. When the ponds are full the oven is kindled and the 
water sufficiently boiled in small pots containing about 2 
gallons. The oven is a circular hole in the ground, about 6 
feet in diameter and about 4 feet in depth, over which there 
are nicely constructed arches built of clay which admit 
about 10 of those smaller pots, two holes in the centre of 
the hearth, serve as a chimney. There are other ovens on 
a larger scale. In order to expedite the business, many people 
pour salt water on the nicely kept sand, which leaves after 
being dried up, some salt behind, which is then swept up and 
put in the baskets 
[CMSA CA2 043 / 98 31 January 1846 Gollmer's Journal, Badagry. 
4 Snelgrave, A New Account ... s p. 20. 
5 Robertson, Notes on Africa. p. 280. 
6 During the early colonial period at Lagos, Governor Glover noted that many of the Lagos salt 
manufacturers had been put out of business due to imported salt [PRO C0147/14 18 January 1868 
Glover, Lagos in 30 January 1868 Blackall (CO), London]. 
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century, 'an extensive salt manufactury, 7. Whether Ajido was the jojo' 
identified by Law as the supplier to the great salt market at Apa during the 
seventeenth century is unknown. However, this trade was virtually destroyed by 
the advent of importations by Europeans 8. It would appear that only limited salt 
production, probably to meet local needs, was continued in the Badagry area 
during the nineteenth century. In the 1840s Revd Annear noted that there were 
'salt pits a short distance up the beach' from Badagry itself 9. Furthermore, in the. 
mid-1860s, when attempting to establish a boundary between the British and 
French territories, it was agreed that the frontier would be indicated by a post 
between the salt works belonging to 'Gaimbo' [Ganyingbol and 'Appa' [Apal 10. 
However, is clear that at least by the early years of the nineteenth century and 
probably much earlier, the Badagry area was no longer a significant salt- 
producing or marketing area. But, it was still the local waterways which were the 
key to its commercial success. 
The geographical position of Badagry on the Slave Coast was not ideal for a port. 
It does not lie within a natural harbour, indeed the easterly nature of the currents 
in that area have caused erosion of the whole coast into a smooth and thus much 
exposed line 11. However, the problematic situation of Badagry was, during 
much of its eighteenth and nineteenth century history, outweighed by more. 
favourable factors. The desire for a port further east than Whydah, at least 
partially out of range of Dahomey's demanding and often difficult influence, was 
paramount amongst many groups of traders. These included not only the 
displaced Whydahs and later Hula people of Jakin, but also Dutch and then 
Portuguese trading agents working on the coast. As Law has noted, after Hendrik 
Hertogh's removal to Badagry in the 1730s the port emerged as the principal 
7 WMMSA 18 May 1846 Martin's journal in 5 September 1846 Martin, Badagry. 
8 Law, 'The Gun Communities in the Eighteenth Century', p. 6. 
9 WMMSA 14 September 1845 Annear's journal, Badagry. 
10 PRO C01 47 /5 29 December 1864 Glover, Lagos. 
11 See chapter 1 pp. 27-28. 
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centre of European trade east of Whydah. Furthermore, due to its convenient 
connections with the interior, slaves could be purchased at Badagry more cheaply 
than they had been at Jakin 12. The attractions of Lagos, notably its position close 
to an opening between lagoon and sea and its direct water link with the interior 
via the Ogun River, went unrecognised until the city itself became more 
populous during the first half of the nineteenth century. 
But Badagry's paramountcy was short-lived. The port soon experienced 
competition from Ekpe, established by Hertogh himself in 1737, and from Porto- 
Novo. By 1765 Badagry had been overtaken by trade at the more westerly port. 
But the drift from Whydah continued and transportation along the lagoon was 
vital 13. In this way Badagry maintained a prominent role in the Atlantic trade, 
so much so that during the 1770s the French Director on the coast noted that both 
Porto-Novo and Badagry were the most important ports, because of their links 
with Oyo in the interior 14. Ultimately however, Badagry's success as an Atlantic 
centre provoked hostility from neighbouring states to the extent that in 1784 the 
town was destroyed by the combined forces of Dahomey and Porto-Novo 15. 
Struggling to rebuild, Badagry's fortunes as a slave-trading port had a brief 
resurgence during the 1820s, but it was as the initial key to British 'legitimate' 
commerce in the area that Badagry came to the fore during the middle years. of 
the nineteenth century. 
Links with the interior, highlighted by Sierra Leonian immigrants eager to find 
their way to the homelands from which they had been snatched, attracted both 
British missionaries and traders to the town. Having abolished the slave trade in 
1807 both groups of Britons were eager to score both a moral and commercial 
12 Law, '... The Early History of Badagry', p. 24. 
13 Jbid, pp. 23-24. 
14 Verger, Trade Relations.... p. 183. 
15 See chapter 5, pp. 156-158. 
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victory on the coast through the promotion of more 'legitimate' products, 
especially palm oil. Displaced by British anti-slave trading attentions at Badagry, 
Portuguese traders moved further east again, to Lagos. This migration resulted, at 
least in British eyes, in a distinct divide along the coast between slaving and non 
slaving ports. Until the reduction of Lagos and the deposition of Kosoko, the 
'slave trading' king of Lagos, in 1851, Badagry remained the focus of legitimate 
trade and point of contact with the interior along that part of the coast. It was 
only after Kosoko's expulsion, which firmly established British influence and a 
'legitimate' faction at Lagos,, that conditions in Badagry became 'impracticable' 
and the town was virtually abandoned by missionaries and traders alike 16. 
The Slave Trade at Badagry 
Despite its ominous title, the 'Slave Coast', notably the area from Whydah to 
Benin, was not the major source of slaves for the Atlantic trade during the 
eighteenth century. This area, and most obviously Whydah, had been the major 
supplier of slaves during the 1690s to 1720s, but its relative importance had 
declined thereafter. Newbury and Hodder have stated that by 1789 the area 
furnished only about eleven thousand five hundred slaves annually of the total 
estimated seventy four thousand for the whole west coast from the Gambia to 
the Congo 17. Indeed sources of British supplies clearly indicate a majority being 
shipped from Angola, Bonny, New and Old Calabar 18. It was only in the early 
nineteenth century, after the abolition of the slave trade by Britain and the 
outbreak of the Yoruba wars that the area became the chief supplier of slaves 
from the West African coast 19. In 1845 the Methodist missionary Revd Freeman 
16 PRO C096/4 16 May 1844 Hill, Cape Coast. 
17 BW Hodder and CW Newbury, 'Some Geographical Changes along the Slave Coast of West 
Africa', Tijdschrift Voor Econonomishe en Sociale Geogi: afie Vol 52 (March 1961), p. 78. 
18 According to figures compiled between 1796 and 1801; of the five hundred and thirty two ships 
arriving in the British West Indies from the West Coast of Africa, only two had come from 
Badagry, two from Lagos and one from Porto-Novo, whilst one hundred and seven had come form 
Angola, ninety four from bonny, and twenty one and eighteen from New and Old Calabar 
respectively [Parliamentary Papers Slave Trade Session 1801-1815, No 611. 
19 Hodder and Newbury 'Some Geographical_ Changes... ', p. 78. 
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stated that there was no place in Africa where more slaves were transported than 
the Bight of Benin20. Indeed far from the efforts of the anti-slave trading 
squadron proving successful, accounts of the period from missionaries such as 
Revd Martin and traders such as William Hutton would seem to indicate that 
the slave trade was actually increasing during this period2l. 
A belief that the trade in palm oil would ultimately oust the grip of the slave 
trade was widespread. Vice-Consul Duncan at Whydah optimistically stated that 
a sure sign of the decreasing slave trade was the number of slave traders who had 
become engaged in palm oil trading 22. However, the theory proved false. Slave 
traders did engage in more 'legitimate' trade, but not at the expense,, and often to 
the advantage of their slave trading activities. The two products were not 
mutually exclusive. Traders would often engage in legitimate commerce in order 
to gain access to the trade goods required to pursue their slave-trading aims. After 
initial optimism the end of the 1850s and early 1860s saw a revival in slave 
trading along the Bight 23. The history of slave trading at Badagry however,, 
presents a rather different picture. It was in the eighteenth century, during the 
period when the Slave Coast was not the prominent exporting area, that Badagry 
reached the peak of its slave-trading powers. But as the coast became increasingly 
important for slave exports during the nineteenth century, Badagry's links with 
the British hindered her progress in the trade. 
20 PRO F084/616 3 May 1845 Freeman, Cape Coast. 
21 In 1847 Martin pointed to increases in slave trading notably due to the activities of trader 
Domingo Martinez who had recently established a slave factory at Ajido [WMMSA May 1847 
Martin's journal, Badagryl. William Hutton in the same year noted that the slave trade was not 
decreasing and complained that it was disrupting the activities of legitimate traders. Hutton gave 
the example of a force of Dahomean soldiers, reputedly under the instructions of Martinez, who had 
arrived at Badagry beach and destroyed the goods landed there from an American brig [PRO 
C096 / 11 An undated letter from an unidentified trader at Badagry in 3 September 1847 W Hutton, 
London]. 
22 PRO F02 /4 24 August 1849 Duncan (Vice Consul at Whydah), Whydah. 
23 This was supported by both Commander Edmonstone of the Squadron and Governor Freeman of 
Lagos who indicated that the number of vessels leaving the Bights signalled an increase rather 
than a decrease in slaves exported from the area. [PRO F084/1183 7 November 1861 Edmonstone's 
Report; F084/1175 1 July 1862 Governor Freeman, Lagos]. 
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During the town's early years, there were high hopes for the commercial 
possibilities at Badagry. The Dutch agent there in 1738 noted that the 
opportunities were favourable 'because there were plenty of slaves, and the 
surrounding countries are friendly towardsUS' 24. Furthermore, at the end of the 
eighteenth century Archibald Dalzel was warning that the King of Dahomey had 
been regarding Badagry along with 'Appe' [Ekpel with jealousy due to the 'great 
number of ships which resorted to these ports, while Whydah was almost totally 
abandoned' 25. Unfortunately sources during the eighteenth century reporting 
the extent of slave trading at Badagry are limited. Law has collected data to 
suggest that in 1765 Badagry exported eight hundred slaves in comparison to one 
thousand two hundred from Porto-Novo, six hundred from Ekpe, four hundred 
from Lagos, and five thousand from Whydah 26. But without comparable figures 
from other years this can only indicate that Badagry exported two thirds the 
number of its main rival, Porto-Novo, in that particular year. 
It is interesting to note that, of the 'great number of ships' resorting to Badagry 
during this period, very few were British. As noted above, British ships 
concentrated on other areas. But Badagry did reflect that the Bight of Benin was a 
focus for Dutch and then Portuguese or Brazilian traders. Badagry was in effect 
founded by the Dutch trader Hendrik Hertogh, who was replaced after his 
assassination, at least for a short period by his deputy Bronssema27. As indicated 
by the allegiances of certain chiefs at Badagry, it is likely that at some point during 
this period French and British slavers did some business in the town. However, 
by the end of the eighteenth century and early years of the nineteenth century, 
the Portuguese /Brazilian traders were the major force, although at what Point 
24 28 May 1738 Bronssema, Badagry in Van Dantzig, The Dutch and the Guinea Coast... p. 341. 
25 Dalzel, The HistoLy of Dahomy, p. 166. 
26 Law, 'The Gun Communities in the Eighteenth Century', pp - 23-24. 
27 28 May 1738 Bronssema, Badagry in Van Dantzig, The Dutch and the Guinea Coast... page 341. 
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they became the dominant foreign element is unclear. In an example cited by 
Verger in his examination of the slave trade between Bahia and the West Coast 
during the early years of the nineteenth century, thirteen ships were said to have 
left Brazil for Badagry at about the same time, a considerable number indeed28. 
The attractions of Badagry to Brazilians during this period is corroborated by the 
fact that c-1807 the Brazilian Felix De Souza settled in the town after the 
Portuguese fort at Whydah was abandoned. He returned to Whydah a few years 
later where he ultimately achieved unparalleled success as a slave trader 29. By 
the 1820s there were five slave factories established at Badagry belonging to the 
Portuguese 30. 
As Badagry became, from the 1840s until the early 1850s, the focus of British 
attention along the Bight of Benin as a result of missionary, trader and therefore 
naval efforts, it is understandable that its role as a prominent slave port was 
significantly reduced. However, the effects were not immediate. In 1844, Revd 
Annear noted that 'Slavery is the sole traffic of the town' and that since his 
arrival in 1842 'the Palm Oil factory here has barely received oil enough to pay its 
own expenses, 31. A year later there was more optimism from fellow missionary 
Revd Freeman, who felt that at Badagry 'British influence is now more 
powerfully felt than at any other point along the shores of the Bight' 32. 
However, as it became increasingly difficult to ship slaves directly, slave-dealers 
resident in all the towns along the coast, including Badagry, successfully operated 
a chain of commerce, carried by canoe along the lagoon, out of range and out of 
sight of the British Squadron. This situation continued until the end of the 1840s 
when Revd Gollmer admitted in a tract, largely dedicated to the success and 
28 Verger, Trade Relations.... p. 481. 
29 ibid, p. 209. 
30 R Lander, Captain Clapperton's L"t ExPeditiOn to Africa., Vol 2, p. 250. 
31 WMMSA 30 October 1844 Annear's Journal, Badagry. 
32 PRO F084/616 3 May 1845 Freeman, Cape Coast. 
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increase in 'legitimate' commerce, that at Badagry there were no longer any 
public slave marts and yet: 
this does not so much prove the non-existence of the trade as that 
the transactions are carried on in secret, principally by night, and 
that the natives study to keep us i gnorant of what is going on33 
As late as 1861, in a surely exaggerated report for the African Times the 
correspondent from Badagry stated that no vessels left Porto-Novo or Badagry 
vwithout a cargo of slaves, 34. 
The Rise of the Atlantic Palm Oil Trade 
As early as 1825 Captain Clapperton remarked that the inhabitants of Badagry 
acted as both slave raiders and traders but also as traders in ivory, cloth and palm 
oil 35. Ryder has also pointed out that during the eighteenth century the Dutch 
agent at Benin did a fair amount of trade in ivory via the lagoon and Badagry 36 
However, he also notes that at the beginning of the nineteenth century the 
Portuguese at San Tome had admitted that the cloths of Benin, Warri, Onim 
[Lagos], and Badagry were 'an important commodity' but that 'it is not possible to 
sell a large number of them, and we have no means of exporting the ivory which 
these places could supply in large quantities, 37. Exports of products such as ivory 
remained small throughout the nineteenth century. In 1857 only E4220 worth of 
ivory was exported from the Bight in comparison to E222390 worth of palm. oil38. 
Increasingly widespread interest in the palm oil trade was the result of British 
attempts to find an acceptable export to replace slaves. Its suitability for domestic 
and industrial use, for example cooking and soap-making, coupled with its ready 
availability, ease of collection and preparation, made it, of all possible products, 
33 
' 
CMR August 1849, p. 93 Gollmer's description... 
34 PRO F084/1192 23 May 1861 African Times (journal of the African Aid Society). 
35 PRO C02/15 6 December 1825 Clapperton's Journal, Badagry. 
36 AFC Ryder, Benin and the Europeans 1485-1897. (London 1966), p. 188. 
37 Ibid, p. 234. 
38 PRO F084 / 10612 February 1858 Campbell, Lagos. 
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the most obvious for large-scale export. Moreover, the development of a 
cultivable commodity to replace slaves conjured up images of a new agricultural 
class rising to replace the despotic slave raiding kings of the area. This vision was 
held very dear by the arriving missionaries. Having found little spiritual 
encouragement amongst the peoples they encountered, the Christian arrivals 
became increasingly determined that the way towards successful evangelisation 
and conversion would ultimately involve changing the very nature and 
structure of those societies. Palm oil became the key. 
The palm oil trade of the nineteenth century initially operated on a small scale 
on the Bight of Benin. William Hutton, whose company was one of the most 
prominent palm oil traders on the coast, proudly claimed to have been exporting 
since 1835, although initially he admitted the trade was very small39. Figures for 
that year put export from the whole of the west coast of Africa only at about one 
hundred tons 40. However., Hutton noted that from the early 1840s the trade grew 
rapidly and his 'nephew' Thomas had expanded his operations from two 
factories between Cape St Paul and Lagos to eight or ten 41. by 1846 palm oil 
exports from the west coast as a whole had increased to between two and a half to 
three thousand tonS42. Even traders notorious for their slave dealing activities 
were said to be doing a roaring trade in oil by 1849. Indeed so successful was the 
trader Domingo Martinez that a number of other European merchants begged 
the British Vice Consul at Whydah, to persuade the King of Dahomey to not sell 
oil to him 43. 
A palm oil factory had been in operation at Badagry as early as the 1820s. Mr 
Houtson, one of those engaged in Captain Clapperton's 1825 expedition had 
39 PRO F084 / 699 25 March 1847 W Hutton, London. 
40 PRO F084 / 710 19 July 1847 W Hutton, London. 
41 PRO F084 / 699 7 December 1846 T Hutton, Cape Coast in 25 March 1847 W Hutton, London. 
42 PRO F084 710 19 July 1847 W Hutton, London. 
43 PRO F084 775 21 August 1849 Duncan, Whydah. 
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evidently established a factory there the previous year. But this experiment 
would appear to have been short-lived. Houtson died on the way back from Oyo 
and there is every reason to believe that the Badagry factory died with him. 
Richard Lander's subsequent visits to the town make no mention of a palm oil 
factory". But by 1847 William Hutton was able to note that so well placed was 
Badagry for both 'inland, as well as water communication' that palm oil traders 
had chosen it six years previously 45. One of these unidentified traders may have. 
been Captain Marmon, an agent of Thomas Hutton, who was said to have 
established a factory there as early as 183846. Certainly by 1841 Thomas Hutton's 
factory was fully operational at Badagry. 
A number of European traders and trading companies subsequently settled at 
Badagry. Between 1848 and 1851, among others, Randolphe Brothers of Accra, the 
Forster and Smith Company, the Bristol firm of King's, Messrs O'swald of 
Hamburg and Banner Brothers of Cape Coast were established in the town47. By 
1850 it would appear that competition amongst the British traders at Badagry was 
becoming so intense that antagonism erupted. At the beginning of that year 
Thomas Hutton was accused of attempting to have all other traders expelled 
from the town48. 
44 PRO C02/15 29 November 1825 Clapperton, off Badagry; R Lander, Cal2tain ClaJ212erton'S Last 
Expedition to Africa. Vol 1, page 46. 
45 PRO F084 / 710 19 July 1847 W Hutton, London. 
46 Parliamentary Papers, Slave Trade 1842, evidence of Capt. H. Seward 10 May 1842. 
47 It is clear that by 1851 Forster and Smith had an agent operating at Badagry [PRO F084/860 11 
October 1851 Forster and Smith, London]. J Sandeman arrived during that year, and although due to 
local and personal difficulties he moved to Lagos the following year his establishment remained in 
the town under a skeleton staff [PRO F084 / 89120 February 1852 Cmdr Heath, off Appi in 19 April 
1852, Adm, London] Although Newbury says that Sandeman was acting for the firm Stewart and 
Douglas [Newbury, The Western Slave Coast-, p. 421, from the correspondence between London and 
the coast it would appear that he was in fact acting for Forster and Smith as Ajayi has suggested 
[CMSA CA2 / 082 /13 Isaac Smith's journal (catechist), Badagry; CMSA CA2 / 043 /19 5 July 1851 
Gollmer's journal, Badagry; Ajayi, Christian Missions-, p. 591. 
48 Thomas Hutton's attempts to establish a monopoly at Badagry were ultimately unsuccessful. But 
competition between British merchants remained intense, sometimes erupting into violence 
throughout the 1850s and 1860s [CMSA CA2/043/5a I May 1850 Gollmer, Badagry]. Also see 
chapter 9, p. 299. 
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The Operation of Atlantic Trade 
In his illuminating study of slavery and the slave trade, Lovejoy draws attention 
to the irony that whilst commerce required order, slavery demanded chaos. He 
suggests that this contradiction was resolved 'through a separation of the 
commercial infrastructure from the institutions of enslavement'49. An 
examination of the Badagry case would certainly seem to suggest that this port 
sought primarily to maintain the commercial infrastructure required to market 
slaves and was actively engaged in the process of enslavement only on a limited 
scale. 
There is certainly limited evidence of Badagry acting as a slave-raiding power. 
Avoseh states that the town was very war like and would raid other countries for 
slaves-50. During the 1840s, missionaries Gollmer, Annear, Martin and Smith 
described in some detail the process of raiding parties leaving Badagry to attack 
Lagos, Porto-Novo and other neighbouring towns to gather slaves 51. In his 
description Annear noted that the people, in order to 'cover their guilt' said they 
were at war with Porto-Novo, 'But the war is nothing more than trifling 
disturbances got up between the chiefs... for the purpose of stealing men from 
each other, 52. The numbers captured in this fashion appear to have varied, with 
water-borne raiding parties of sometimes eight or ten canoes returning with- 
twelve, thirty, and thirty nine slaves a time 53. It is clear is that such parties were 
under the control of a chief or at least a prominent man from the town. Smith 
gives the example of Akitoye, a King of Lagos in exile at Badagry during the latter 
49PE Lovejoy, Transformations in Slavery: A Hi sto1y of Slavery in Africa, (Cambridge 1983), p. 66. 
50 Avoseh, A Short H sto! y of Badagry, p. 10. 
51 Parliamentary Papers First report from the Select Committee on Slave Trade, Slav-e Trade 
Session 1847-48 No 4 paragraph 8054 4 July 1848 Gollmer's evidence; WMMSA 18 June 1846 Martin's 
journal in 5 September 1846 Martin, Badagry. 
52 WMMSA 12 December 1844 Annear's journal, Badagry. 
53 CMSA CA2/082/12 29 June 1848 Srruth's Journal, Badagry; PRO C096/14 1 March 1848 
Nfiddleton, Badagry in 4 July 1848 ADM, London; WMMSA 12 December 1844 Annear's Journal, 
Badagry. 
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1840s, sending parties out slaving 54. What is interesting is that Akitoye was, 
understandably, carrying out his raids against the Lagos area and possibly sending 
his captives to Porto-Novo beach, where the notorious Martinez was reportedly 
furnishing Badagry warriors with ammunition 55. During the same period 
however, other Badagry chiefs were launching raids against Porto-Novo and its 
satellites and sending their captives to Lagos for shipment 56. Evidently it would 
appear that the Badagry inhabitants were equally keen and able to maintain their, 
commercial links with both neighbours. 
Throughout the period the town also gained a further supply of slaves from 
individual kidnappings 57. There were a number of cases, reported by 
missionaries, of individuals, often children, disappearing from within the town 
itself 58. Although clearly not an uncommon occurrence, the numbers of slaves 
acquired through slave raiding and kidnapping was not sufficient to maintain 
Badagry's position as an Atlantic port. Indeed in 1825 Lander recorded that 
Portuguese and Spanish ships had been waiting near Badagry for slaves, and that 
the King of jannah' [Ijanna] had sent a slaving party to the Essas [near Engwa] to 
supply these ships 59. It is in this way then that Badagry's position as the 
crossroads of trading routes from both the interior and from along the coast 
enabled it to flourish 60. 
54 CMSA CA2 / 082 / 12 29 June 1848 Smith's journal, Badagry. 
55 Parliamentary Papers First Report from the Select Committee on the Slave Trade, Slave Trade 
Session 1847-48 No 4 Paragraph 8054 4 July 1848 Gollmer's evidence. 
56 WMMSA 12 December 1844 Annear's journal, Badagry. 
57 In 1843 Revd De Graft noted that at Badagry 'the evil practice of kidnapping' was 'still 
revalent' [WMMSA 21 March 1843 De Graft, Badagry]. 
8 Members of the Sierra Leone population were sometimes victims of kidnapping in Badagry. 
However, individual members of this group also acted as perpetrators. For example in 1844 Annear 
described how a Sierra Leone emigrant had been accused of kidnapping a fellow returnee and selling 
him at Lagos [WMMSA 24 September 1844 Annear's journal in 21 October 1844 Annear, Badagry]. 
59 R Lander, Cair)tain Clapperton's Last Expedition to Africa. Vol 1, page 83. 
60 See Figure 4. 
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Ogbomoso 
When Captain Clapperton and Richard Lander journeyed into the interior from 
Badagry in 1825 they noted that the route they travelled was an old trading road. 
The route, which linked Oyo, Kano and the Sokoto Caliphate with the coast, was 
joined along its length by other routes from east and west so that at 'Wowo' 
[Wawa] roads from Gonja, Dahomey, Ahsanti, Nyfee [Nupe], Hausa and Bornu 
joined the road to the coast 61. Folayan in his work on the interior trade routes of 
the Egbado country, states that these roads linking Badagry with the interior 
enabled the coastal town to become, during the middle years of the eighteenth 
century, the prominent slave exporting centre on the coast, a position which was 
quickly surpassed by Porto-Novo once the Alafin of Oyo had decided to make 
that place his major outlet 62. However, even during the early years of the 
nineteenth century the roads to Badagry supplied the town with a large number 
of slaves. Lander noted several slave caravans, each made up of several hundred 
individuals, making their way to the coast 63. Indeed Captain Pearce, another 
member of the Clapperton expedition commented that: 
Badagry is rising in importance and promises to become in a short 
time what Ardrah [Porto-Novo) hitherto has been, the outlet to 
the trade from Oyo 64 
That such slave caravans may have continued to travel to Badagry during the 
1850s is supported by the American Baptist missionary Thomas Bowen who 
reported meeting with one consisting of 'several hundred men and women' at 
Imowo [Mowo] on the outskirts of Badagry territory 65. Whether these particular 
slaves were being taken to Badagry for shipment was not specified. But it is 
important to note that their presence at Mowo, the frontier town of Badagry, 
61 R Lander, Captain Clapperton's Last Expedition to Africa. Vol 1, page 134. 
62 K Folayan, 'Trade Routes in Egbado in the Nineteenth Century' in JA Akinjogbin and S0 Osoba, 
(eds), Topics on Nigerian Economic and Social Histol3:,, (Ile Ife, University of Ife Press, 1980), pp. 
83-95; 'Egbado to 1832: the Birth of a Dilemma' lournal of the Historical Society of Nigeria iv /1 
(1967), pp. 15-33. See also p. 53. 
63 R Lander, Captain Clapperton's Last Expedition to Africa, Vol 1, pp. 100-101. 
64 PRO C02/15 28 November 1825 Captain Pearce, Badagry. 
65 Bowen, Adventures and Missiona[y Labours ... I P. 101. 
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would undoubtedly have involved that place in the caravan's movement, 
sheltering, provisioning and possibly taxing. 
Slave supplies did not come solely from the interior however. The traveller and 
member of the 1854 Niger Expedition Tj Hutchinson, writing in the 1850s, stated 
that in the past Badagry had been chiefly supplied from 'Dahomey and Issoo' 
[ISO]66. It would seem likely that these supplies from the west were brought along 
the lagoon. Dahomean difficulties operating directly out of the newly acquired 
port of Whydah would have made shipment via easterly ports attractive. The 
Isso or Iso country, north of Lake Nokue, was the domain of a water based 
community often used, notably by Porto-Novo, as mercenaries due to their skill 
in canoe warfare 67. 
The operation of the palm oil trade at Badagry, like the slave trade was, to a great 
extent, reliant on importation from elsewhere. The Badagry area was not rich in 
agriculture, and the oil palm did not flourish to the extent required by 
substantial Atlantic trade. According to Sandeman in 1852 'three-fourths' of the 
palm oil that arrived at Badagry market, came from the dominions of Porto- 
NoV068. With the town's long established chains of communication by both land 
and water, Badagry had great potential as a suitable collection point and indeed 
took on this role during the early years of the trade. 
66 TJ Hutchinson, Impressions of Western Africa, (1858, new imp. F. Cass & Co., 1967) p. 72. 
67 According to Thomas Tickel, Civil Commandant for the Badagry District until the 1880s, the 
term Iso was a more generally applied one and referred to a number of lakeside groups with shared 
origins: 
The people of Katanu, or as they are commonly called the 
Isos, were originally refugees from the mainland, some of 
whom, for greater security against the aggression of the 
Dahomians, established themselves on the Denham Waters 
by building huts on piles, and forming in the course of 
time the towns of Afoktonu, Awansori, and Gavi; while others 
settled at Katanue, Agausa, Jeko, Goho, Tori, Yeura, Epe, Chouvi, 
Potah and at Ajido, where their kings have ever since 
resided 
fPRO C0147/32 Undated letter from Tickel, Badagry in 30 September 1876 Lees (CO), London]. 
68 PRO F084/887 28 January 1852 Sandeman, Badagry in 19 April 1852 Capt Hamilton, London. 
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But these routes were not only an important source of supply for the Atlantic 
trade of Badagry. They also played an important role in the domestic economy of 
the area. In his description of a caravan of slaves, Lander noted that each 
member; men, women and children carried a heavy load69. Indeed these 
caravans were also used as a means of supplying other goods, possibly to the 
domestic market place. This is supported by the routes that they took and 
Ikorodu, for example, was seen as both an important centre for transactions in 
slaves bound for the Atlantic market and domestic articles. 
The Domestic Economy 
On visiting Badagry in the 1820s Richard Lander stated that the people there 
provided themselves with all the 'necessaries of life' by fishing and the 
cultivation of crops such as yam, Indian corn, some citrus fruits, and the keeping 
of some livestock'70. However, this picture of virtual self-sufficiency is 
challenged by a number of other accounts. Badagry's waterside position would 
seem to indicate that fish was an obvious and important staple. Putting to sea by 
the indigenous people, whether for transportation or fishing purposes, was 
unheard of along that part of the coast, but the inshore lagoon afforded a more 
easily accessible source 71. There are many references to lagoon fishing along the 
whole length of the waterway and in the Badagry area. Prior to the town's . 
foundation this was clearly a useful resource. Arthur Wendover who visited the 
Kingdom of Apa in the seventeenth century, sampled and enjoyed the 
'plentiful' fish of the lagoon, which he compared to 'mullitts' and 'sturgeon' 72. 
During the Badagry period, Lander also witnessed fishing practices using both 
nets, spears and earthen pots baited with palm nut OiJ73. But more interestingly 
still Avoseh states that in 1882, when two of the Badagry chiefs expressed an 
69 R&J Lander, Toumal of an Exi2edition..., Vol I p. 70. 
70 R Lander, Captain Clappertm's Last Expedition to Africa, Vol 1, p. 36. 
71 See chapter 1 pp. 27-28. 
72 17 July 1682 Wendover in Law, Further Correspondence p. 15. 
73 R&J Lander, Journal of an Expedition.... Vol I- p. 45. 
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interest in farming at Gberefu, on the spit of land between lagoon and sea, other 
chiefs accounted for their lack of interest in the project by saying that 'they were 
traditionally fishermen and saw no need for change' 74. Another division of 
labour with regards to fishing is that suggested by Richard Lander during the 
course of his first visit to Badagry in 1825. He clearly did not share the tastes of 
Arthur Wendover and commented that although the lagoon was full of fish, 
they were not in general 'very delicious eating' and that their consumption was. 
'confined chiefly to the lower orders of the community' a point also made by 
Governor Moloney of Lagos in the 1890s with regards to oyster collection75. 
Further evidence is needed to shed light on this apparent division in both 
labour and consumption. If, as indicated by Avoseh, fishing was the occupation 
of certain wards, it would seem unlikely that consumption ran along similar 
lines. Yet, there is no evidence of fish being sold in the Badagry market place. 
This may possibly indicate that its easy availability made it an unvalued product 
existing below or outside the local market economy 76. 
Bowen accounted for the reluctance of the Badagry fisherman by citing the 
laziness of the people, an argument which was more usually put forward by 
Europeans to explain the lack of local agriculture 77. Early missionary settlers also 
looked to the commercial ethos of Badagry, pointing specifically to the slave. 
trade, as an explanation of the town's lack of agricultural production. In this way 
74 Avoseh, A Short Histojý: of Badagry, p. 38. 
75 R Lander. Captain Clapperton's Last Expedition to Africa. Vol 2. p. 17; Moloney 'Notes on Yoruba 
and the Colony and Protectorate of Lagos', p. 609. 
76 By the early twentieth century it was noted that there were two groups of immigrant fishermen 
who worked the Badagry lagoon. The first group, described as 'Kitas' [Ketas], inhabited 'numerous 
settlements' in the area. Initially from the Gold Coast, these people were said to spend the greater 
part of the year in the Badagry area, only returning home permanently when thev were to retire. it 
is likely that these Gold Coast people were descendants of those employed, at 1ýast initially, to 
operate the sea going canoes required by European merchants. The second group mentioned were 
seasonal migrants from the 'Ilaje 
district of the Okitipupa Division', in the far east beyond Lagos. 
However, no mention is made of these immigrants during the pre-colonial period [NNAI CS026/4 
30030SI A Report on the Reorganisation of the Badagn District RjM Curwen 19371. 
77 See Chapter 1, p. 32-33. 
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then, missionary efforts to introduce both the 'bible and the plough' to the town 
took the form of a mission garden and local agricultural shows 78. Hopkins has 
dispelled the myth of the 'natural richness of the tropical environment', by 
noting the low mineral content of forest and savannah regions and the limited 
agricultural potential of such areaS79. But I would suggest that the image of 
Badagry as an almost wholly non-producing area is misleading, and the 
townspeople were involved, at least to some extent, in agricultural production. 
According to local tradition, Badagry was founded on the site of 'Agbethe's farm' 
which, as recounted by Avoseh, had a history and reputation for cassava and 
corn production 80. It would also appear from Avoseh's account that agriculture 
continued at Badagry throughout its history. He mentions that in an area of the 
town known as Athanpoji, the land was tilled by Balogun Apansu, a deserter 
from the Dahomean army who fled first to Gberefu and then to Badagry where 
he worked the land alongside the farm of the influential priest Boe 81. Evidence 
for the types of crops produced in and around Badagry during this early period is 
scarce, the earliest accounts coming from Clapperton and Lander in the 1820s. 
However, from their descriptions it is possible to suggest that some cultivation of 
yam, cassava, citrus fruits, onions, palm products, beans, and corn was 
undertaken in the locality of Badagry. At the same time, sweet potatoes and 
plantain were being grown in the area, that is, near enough for that cultivation to 
be undertaken by Badagry residents 82. Although not specifically located by 
contemporary observers, such local cultivation may have taken place on outlying 
farms such as that identified by Bowen in 1851 as Adele's farm, about two to 
three and a half miles outside the town. This should not be confused with the 
village described, also by Bowen, as Adele's birthplace which lay beyond Mowo. 
78 
-Ull 
August 1849, p. 93 Gollmer's description... 
79 Hopkins, An Economic Histoly of West Africa. p. 13. 
80 Avoseh, A Short HistoQý of Badagry.. p. 11. 
81 fbid, p. 29. 
82 See Figure 5. 
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The farm he mentions had presumably belonged to that exiled King of Lagos 
whilst resident at Badagry c. 1821-1835 83. 
Such evidence of cultivation would appear to contradict later missionary 
accounts which claimed alternately that there was 'no vestige of cultivation to be 
seen at Badagry' on arrival and that as a result'The people of Badagry are almost 
depending upon the people of Abbeokuta in everything' and 'considered it an 
insult to be told to make farms' 84. These opposing views do appear to suggest 
that cultivation in the Badagry area may have occurred in cycles, possibly as a 
result of changing political, economic and demographic conditions. Without 
further evidence it is possible only to surmise. But one can suggest that during 
the relatively stable Adele (c. 1821-1835) period, for example, Clapperton was able 
to describe the countryside around Badagry as 'populous and well cultivated, 85. 
However, during the following years, local agriculture was neglected as the town 
struggled with a rising tide of factionalism within its political structure and its 
increasingly tenuous grip on Atlantic trade. Varying levels of agricultural 
production may also have been indicative of Badagry's shifting fortunes. During 
the period of relative strength and prosperity the state may have been able to 
control a wider area of outlying land and therefore engage to a greater degree in 
farming. However, during periods of insecurity and relative weakness such as 
the 1840s and 1850s, Badagry's ability to harness suitable land would have 
declined. It is also possible that the extent of agriculture around Badagry shifted 
as a result of the waning Atlantic slave trade. During the earlier period when 
both ships and slaves required provision, the demand for foodstuffs may have 
resulted in some attempts at agriculture. However, as a result of the trade's 
decline, demand went down and efforts were abandoned. 
83 Bowen, Adventures and-MissionaQý Labours.... P. 101. 
84 CMSA CA2 / 067 /73 May 1846 Marsh's journal, Badagry. 
85 PRO C02/15 6 December 1825 Clapperton's Journal, Badagry. 
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The evidence should not be wholly distorted by missionary accounts of the mid- 
nineteenth century which almost completely dismiss local production prior to 
their arrival. These tend to suggest, through descriptions of their own efforts at 
agricultural production, that it was this period which saw the beginnings of very 
limited local cultivation. Revd Gollmer described in 1846 how, on planting a 
piece of ground near the mission premises, 'Many of the people came to gaze at 
us and our work, and others have followed our example, 86. In this way he 
suggests a practice which was completely alien to the Badagry people. However, 
an examination of production over the whole period indicates that this was an 
exaggeration of the European impact on local agriculture. Of the twenty named 
articles which appeared in Badagry market during the whole period (including 
no n-agri cultural articles), eleven of these; pepper, yam, sweet potatoes, corn (eg 
Indian corn) , beans (eg calavances), plantain, citrus fruits, firewood, tobacco, 
palm wine and palm oil were named prior to missionary arrival in 1842. Eleven 
articles were also identified during the missionary period. These were 
gunpowder, cloth, rum, salt, livestock, fowls, cola, indigo and shea butter. Yam 
and corn continued to appear during this period. This does not, therefore, suggest 
a marked increase in the number of articles available in later years. Furthermore, 
of the articles named in the post-missionary period, there were in fact fewer 
agricultural items listed 87. From an examination of the Badagry market place, 
there is little evidence to suggest that the mission acted as a stimulus to local 
agricultural production. Furthermore, in the few accounts of local cultivation, 
rice, maize and groundnuts, which seem to have been produced in the area only 
after 1842, did not appear in the market place, and were possibly grown on too 
small a scale to become a commercial product. Other crops which were produced 
locally, some of which appeared in the market place, such as beans, some of 
86 C October 1846, p. 233,27 February 1846 Gollmer's Journal, Badagry. 
87 See Figure 5. 
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which did not, such as cassava, all seem to have been produced during both 
periods. 
There would appear then to be no significant change in local production patterns 
between the early nineteenth century and the later post-missionary period. 
However, what is still more surprising is, taking the period as a whole, the 
amount of staples which were in fact produced in the locality of Badagry. Of the 
forty one named items which I have found being used, consumed, produced, or 
marketed in the area, going as far afield as Abeokuta, twenty appeared at Badagry 
market. Seven of these (beans, corn, palm wine, palm oil, citrus fruit, salt and 
yam) were produced in the locality of Badagry. A further two crops (sweet 
potatoes and plantain) were produced in the neighbourhood, possibly by 
residents of Badagry. Of the further nine articles, two were produced by the 
Atlantic trade (tobacco and rum) and six were of unspecified origin. Certainly one 
and possibly two were Atlantic imports (gunpowder and cloth), a further two 
(livestock and firewood) were possibly local products and only three or possibly 
four (pepper, indigo, cola and perhaps cloth) were brought from elsewhere in the 
interior. Of the items which did not appear in the Badagry market place, five 
were produced in the locality of the town (cassava, onions, maize, and later rice 
and groundnuts). There were a further fifteen products (coral, cocoanut, beads, 
trona, glass, ginger, rope, bowls, knives, iron-ware, cola, millet, cotton, ivory and 
cocoa) which it would seem were produced outside the Badagry area. Their 
absence from the Badagry market place could well be a shortcoming of the 
descriptive evidence rather than indicative of their absence from the town. 
However, many of these latter items could be termed 'luxury goods' and it is 
interesting to note the number of staple items produced, at least to some extent, 
in or around Badagry itself. 
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Domestic commerce 
Local production at Badagry would therefore appear to have been able to supply 
the town with at least a proportion of its staples. But the extent to which the 
town was self-sufficient is difficult to ascertain. Revd Gollmer noted in 1847 that 
the people of Badagry: 
prefer getting money, some by lawful, and many by unlawful, trade 
and plunder, with which they purchase their victuals from their 
neighbours, which makes them necessarily dependent on them, the 
inconvenience of which they now and then experience88 
But clear evidence to suggest the degree to which Badagry relied on alternative 
outlets for its subsistence as well as for its Atlantic trade goods is lacking. One 
account does suggest that food was not only more plentiful in the interior town 
of Abeokuta, but that it was 'perhaps more than four times cheaper than at 
Badagry'89. This then indicates that, even during the pre-civil war period, the 
coast depended on a more complex supply system than that provisioning the 
agriculturally based Egba capital. By the early twentieth century it was estimated 
that four fifths of Badagry's food was purchased from outside the local area 90. 
Although it is difficult to ascertain to what extent pre-colonial Badagry was 
dependent upon such outside supplies, it is certainly clear that the population 
did use these alternative outlets which came to form a complex local network of 
trade and connections with suppliers from far outside the neighbouring areas. 
Markets such as the one at'Bawie' [Ibawe], mentioned by Clapperton along the 
Ado River, were regular marketplaces for the people of Badagry and the 
neighbouring areas 91. Richard Lander, describing presumably the same place in 
1830, stated that as well as locally produced items the market stocked articles 
brought from the 'borders of the desert of Zaarha, through the medium of the 
wandering Arabs' 92. According to Kola Folayan, Badagry was dependent on areas 
88 CMR May 1848, p. 85,25 May 1847 Gollmer's Journal, Badagry. 
89 C March 1846, p. 62,9 June 1845 Marsh's Journal, Badagry. 
90 NNAI CSO 26 /4 30030 / SI A Report of the Reorganisation of the Badagri District RJM Curwen 
1937. 
91 Clapperton, , 
Tournal of a Second Expedition-, p. 4. 
92 R&J Lander,. Toumal of an Expedition- Vol 1, p. 59. 
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such as Ipokia and Okeodan to the north west for foodstuff supplies 93. Folayan's 
conclusions are supported by contemporary evidence. In 1845 Revd Gollmer 
noted that Badagry people travelled to 1pokia in order to trade 94. Furthermore, 
the importance of Okeodan, thirty miles from Badagry, as a supplier was verified 
by the Anglican catechist William Marsh, who reported at the end of the 1840s 
that the destruction of that place by the Dahomeans had not only raised fears for 
the security of the coastal town, but also for its provision supplies. The fertility of 
the Okeodan area was, according to Marsh, the result of a 'kind of quagmire' of 
which the southern part was 'solid ground and fruitful'. Indeed, the inhabitants 
of Okeodan cultivated this area to such an extent that 'the inhabitants of Badagry 
were indebted to them for the greater part of our supplies and necessaries' 95 
However, by the late 1850s, whether due to the temporary interruption of 
supplies from the Okeodan area or, what is more likely, due to increasingly close 
commercial links and political ties with the area north east of Badagry, The Egba 
capital at Abeokuta was now recognised as the major supplier to Badagry, Lagos 
and other towns along the sea coast 96. However, only a couple of months later, 
Consul Campbell had shifted the emphasis of Badagry's staple supplies west 
again, this time to Porto-Novo. Indeed Campbell reported that Badagryis 
entirely depended on Porto Novo for its trade, the inhabitants for the necessaries 
of life' 97. It is important to note however, particularly during this later period, 
the Badagry population was still greatly reduced as a result of the 1851-54 civil 
war, indeed Campbell estimated the population as being only six hundred98. 
Therefore, Badagry's complete dependence on Abeokuta and Porto-Novo during 
this period may not be representative of a continuous trend throughout its 
history. 
93 Folayan, 'Trade Routes in Egbado in the Nineteenth Century', pp. 85-89. 
94 CMSA CA2 / 043 / 96 25 August 1845 Gollmer's journal, B adagry. 
95 PRO F084/777 25 March 1849 Extract from the journal of William Marsh included in Documents 
relating to the deputation 
by the CMS to Palmerston in 1849. 
96 PRO F084/1061 6 February 1858 Campbell, Lagos. 
97 PRO F084/1061 20 April 1858 Campbell, Lagos. 
98 PRO F084/1061 20 April 1858 Campbell, Lagos. 
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This network of local markets enabled the movement of at least non perishable 
goods across long distances and was closely linked with those routes used to carry 
Atlantic trade goods. As Folayan has identified the routes between Badagry and 
Oyo during the early eighteenth and nineteenth century as important roads to 
the Atlantic, so were they important for domestic trade. The road travelled by 
Clapperton and Lander in 1825 for example, was linked by a series of local 
markets at Bawie [Ibawe], Alowagu, Wowo [Wawa], Coulfo etc, stretching into 
the Yoruba interior towards Katunga [Old Oyol and beyond. Such routes were 
replaced by those from Abeokuta after the decline of the Oyo empire 99. 
As well as land links with the interior the lagoon provided a further important 
commercial chain with neighbouring states. Clearly Porto-Novo and Lagos, 
Badagry's most prominent lagoon neighbours were directly linked. However, the 
waterway gave rise to contact much further afield. The trader Thomas Hutton 
travelled from Whydah to Badagry in 1846, firstly to Godomey by hammock and 
then by lagoon via Porto-Novo, the journey as a whole taking about two 
nightsIOO. Ryder has also highlighted a route pursued east by Dutch traders at 
Benin who sent ivory via the lagoon to Badagry 101. Ryder's conclusion is 
supported by a letter from Hendrik Hertogh at Badagry only a year or so after its 
foundation, when he mentions that he had sent two assistants to Agathon 
[Ughoton], near Benin, via canoe 102. As this last example would seem to suggest, 
and as Law has concluded, it was the arrival of Europeans in force which 
stimulated lagoon traffic during the eighteenth century in the pursuit, initially of 
slaves 103. As noted by Wendover in the seventeenth century, produce for 
99 See Figure 4. 
100 PRO F084/ 699 20 December 1846 T Hutton, Whydah in 25 March 1847 W Hutton, London. 
101 Ryder, Benin and the Europeans, p. 188. 
102 20 April 1738 Hertogh, Badagry in Van Dantzig, The Dutch and the Guinea Coast... p. 338. 
103 Law 'Trade and Politics Behind the Slave Coast', p. 338. 
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domestic use was also frequently brought by water into the Badagry area. Indeed 
he noted that all the goods brought to Apa came by water and: 
once in 15 or 20 days you shall see the river full of canoes and like 
unto the River Thames, some with slaves others with clouts, others 
with sheep, goats, henns, others with come etc 104 
A description of the lagoon from the 1880s creates a remarkably similar picture of 
'numerous canoes ... with native produce ... paddled or poled along' 105. 
Badagry Market 
The medium of currency for all sales at Badagry was the Cowrie shell 106. 
Although Clapperton and others referred to commercial transactions at 'the 
market place, there was certainly more than one area of sale in the town107. 
Indeed it was said that almost every street was used as a market place. In 1830 
Richard and John Lander noted, on crossing the town, that 'people were found 
vending a variety of articles at every step of the way' 108. Richard Lander 
described Badagry market in 1825 as only 'tolerably supplied', but Thomas 
Bowen twenty five years later stated that it was 'crowded every evening with 
104 17 July 1682 Wendover, Apa in Law, Further Correspondence of t 
f615. 
5 Ellis, The Land of Fetish, p. 99. 
106 In 1850 Bowen noted that: 
silver and gold are not current here, because the merchants 
on the coast, who import the cowries will take nothing but 
shells or palm oil for the cloth, guns, tobacco, rum etc, which 
they sell to the natives. Neither is it possible to pay for 
provisions and labor in goods of any kind, barter being 
unknown and cowries demanded for everything. 
[Bowen, Adventures and Missionary Labours..., p. 981. The low denomination of cowries led to 
difficulties when attempting to purchase anything but the cheapest of articles. During the 1860s 
the Lagos Consul's wife Mrs HG Foote stated that when attempting to change a sovereign into the 
local currency 'I saw a man return, accompanied by two others, each bearing a heavy sack on his 
shoulder. This was my change' [Mrs HG Foote, Recollections of Central America and the West 
Coast of Afric (London 1869), p. 197]. This problem became acute after the 1850s when inflation 
caused increasing difficulties all along the coast. In 1844 one Head [2000 cowries] was equal to five 
shillings at Badagry [WMMSA 21 November 1844 Annear's Journal, Badagry]. By 1860 however, 
two heads [4000 cowries] were said to equal only three shillings in the Lagos area [PRO F02/35 12 
January 1860 Brand, Lagos. For further details about the operation of the cowrie currency see M 
Johnson 'The Cowrie Currencies of West Africa', 2 parts, LAU XI 2 (1970, pp. 17-49 & XI 3 (1970), pp. 
331-3531. But despite these difficulties, it was only after annexation that Governor Glover noted 
that silver coins were being accepted in the area [PRO C0147 /97 June 1865 Glover, Lagos]. 
107 PRO C02/15 1 December 1825 Clapperton's journal, Badagry. 
108 R&i Landerlournal of an Expedition. . 14. 
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thousands of people including many from interior towns'109. These rather 
different images may be accounted for by the regularity with which the market 
was held. Clapperton noted on the same visit as Lander that on going through 
the market place when it was not market day, there were few articles on sale 110. 
Clapperton also noted that the market was supplied only every five days, a 
routine maintained at least until the late 1840s 111. In 1843 Revd De Graft 
identified Wednesday, Friday and Sunday as market days, but in turn stated that. 
great numbers of people from Abeokuta came to Badagry 'every week' 112. It 
would certainly appear that during this period the Egba capital was acting as a 
crucial link between Badagry and the interior, as traders from Abeokuta were in 
turn supplied by traders from Ijaye, lbadan, Aggo [Oyol, Ogbomoshe [Ogbomosol, 
and Morin [Ilorin] at their market every ninth day 113. 
Local traders would seem to have operated freely between markets. In 1846 Revd 
Gollmer described an Egba man, who was the 'domestic slave of an inhabitant of 
this town'. It is clear from Gollmer's description that this slave had been able to 
trade from town to town in 'various articles'. However, the missionary does not 
make clear whether the man was trading on his own account or on behalf of his 
master 114. In the previous year, Revd Crowther had noted that a kidnapped 
woman was redeemed by a fellow trader, who in order to meet the cost had 
'requested the favour of another person' 115. This episode certainly implies 
individual speculation and entrepreneurship on a small scale. That many of 
these traders were also women is interesting. It would seem likely that within 
the confines of the local market place, it was usual for women to act as vendors. 
109 R Lander, Car)tain Clapperton'S Last Expedition to Africa, Vol 1, p. 50; Bowen, Adventures and 
Missionary Labours... p. 97. 
110 PRO C02/15 I December 1825 Clapperton's journal, Badagry. 
Ill In 1847 Revd Crowther noted that 'Badagry market-is attended by hundreds every five days' 
[CMR November 1847, p. 243, Crowther's journal, Badagry]. 
112 WMMSA 21 March 1843 De Graft, Badagry. 
113 CMR November 1847, p. 243, Crowther's journal, Badagry. 
114 CMSA CA2 / 043 / 98 27 February 1846 Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
115 PRO F084 / 663 2 June 1845 Crowther's journal, Badagry in 7 January 1846 Coates, London. 
75 
Townsend noted in 1849 at Abeokuta that it was in this way that 'Many women 
and girls obtain a livelihood' 116. This would also appear to have been the case at 
Badagry where Crowther noted that in one of the town's smaller market areas he 
found 'twelve to fifteen women, sitting under their sheds, with their few articles 
exposed for sale' 117. But if the market place was the preserve of women, the 
transport of saleable goods across the country involved women, men and 
children as noted by the Lander brothers in 1830 and by Revd Annear in 1844 118.. 
Furthermore, Badagry's waterside position evidently gave men an important 
role in the transport of goods by canoe. Although there were occasional examples 
of female traders on the West Coast transporting their own goods by water these 
would appear to be very much the exception 119. It would seem that at least 
during the latter part of the nineteenth century traders and their goods were 
transported along the lagoons in shared, presumably hired canoes operated by 
men 120. 
Due to its lagoonside position then, Badagry's trading network would relied on 
the labour of both men and women. There is no indication of a central 
organisation in the local market, although it seems likely that market practices 
116 CMR October 1849 pp. 189-190 Townsend, Abeokuta. 
117 CMR March 1846, p. 57 25 May 1845 Crowther's Journal, Badagry. 
118 The Landers described caravans of people carrying heavy loads to the coast [see p. 661, whilst 
Revd Annear noted groups of men and women travelling between Badagry and the besieging forces at 
Ado to supply the army with provisions [WMMSA August 1844 Annear's Journal in 23 August 1844 
Annear, Badagry]. 
119 Tenkorang has come across one eighteenth century example of a woman trader known amongst 
the British traders of Winneba as 'Her Grace the Duchess of Mumford'. The lady was a very 
successful trader during the latter part of the century and was notable for having 'paddled her own 
canoe when travelling from town to town' [S Tenkorang, 'British Slave Trading Activities on the 
Gold Coast and Slave Coasts in the Eighteenth Century... ' p. 54]. 
120 Whitford travelling along the lagoon from the east during the latter half of the nineteenth 
century noted that: 
canoes bound for Lagos deeply laden with palm-oil in jars 
kernals in bulk covered with mats, bullocks, goats, sheep, 
corn and various other products from the interior. In addition 
to cargo they are crowded with passengers, chiefly women 
traders, who seem to be comfortably reposing on top of the 
cargo 
WI-dtford Trading Life in Westem and Central Africa, p. 1051. 
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were restricted to some extent by an authority based on religious beliefl2l. 
However, the operation of Atlantic trade would appear to have taken place on a 
different level. Avoseh notes that the early slave market at Badagry was in the 
Posuko area of the town122. There are however, no contemporary descriptions of 
a central slave market in operation. It is possible therefore that, as at Abeokuta, 
the buying and selling of slaves occurred out of the public eye when meetings 
between interested parties would take place privately. This would also appear to. 
have been the case for the Atlantic palm oil trade. As a non-producing area, oil 
was brought from the interior and along the lagoon and collected in bulk at 
Badagry. The ability to engage in both Atlantic trade here, both slave and palm 
oil, therefore required access to finance and credit, premises and control over 
labour. In this way then all Atlantic commerce at Badagry demanded wealth and 
power. As Hopkins has pointed out, these commercial requirements meant that 
amongst non producing coastal communities, such as Badagry, Atlantic 
commerce remained in the hands of the social elite even after the transition 
from slaves to palm oil exports 123. 
If Atlantic commerce at Badagry required both wealth and power, it was also a 
way of acquiring them not only through direct profits but from the collection of 
tolls and taxes 124. It would appear that all loads carried into the town and . 
throughout the territory were subject to some levy. According to the Landers in 
1830 turnpikes, taxing individuals with their loads, were 'more common' 
121 See Chapter 4, p. 114-115. 
122 Avoseh, 'Important Historical Places to be visited by the tourist', p 251. 
123 Hopkins has noted that: 
As a general proposition it can be said that the traditional unit of 
trade was less affected by the structural changes brought about by 
legitimate commerce than was the traditional unit of production 
fHopkins, An EcQnomic History of West Africa. p. 145-1461. Similarly, Latham in his, examination 
of the easterly Delta states has concluded that they too: 
switched over smoothly from the slave trade to the oil trade, 
utilizing the trading mechanisms and know how they had built up 
in the slave trade to export palm oil 
[Latham, Old Calabar p. 89-90. ] 
124 Adams, Remarks on the CountQý Extending from C. i; 2e Palmas to the River Congo. p. 95. 
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between Badagry and Old Oyo 'as on any road in England 1125. It would also 
appear that goods carried along the lagoon or lagoonside were also open to such 
tolls. Vice-Consul Fraser in the middle years of the nineteenth century 
complained of being stopped on the lagoon at 'Plar' (a place belonging to the 
Hula people of jakin), where payment was demanded before he was allowed to 
pass 126. Furthermore, Dr Irving, a missionary visitor to the area in the 1850s, 
stated that despite rumours to the contrary, the toll house on Badagry beach had 
been set up in order to exact duty from all goods being carried along the land spit 
and that this was a 'very common way by which the revenues of the chiefs are 
raised' 127. 
Dr Irving's conclusion that it was the chiefs of Badagry who sought to raise 
revenue from these duties is a vital clue towards any understanding of the 
Badagry situation. In states such as Oyo and Dahomey, the ability of the monarch 
to harness commercial wealth was evidently both a source and product of his 
power as King. But Badagry the traditional authority of a monarchy was a 
misnomer. With its diverse origins, Badagry lacked a well established source of 
authority. Political authority was based not in any traditional power but on an 
immediate ability to harness and maintain loyalty through the control of wealth. 
At Badagry therefore, power, both the source and product of wealth, was firmly 
based in trade. To gain any understanding of Badagry's operation as a commercial 
centre it is necessary then to make a thorough examination of the town's 
political structure. 
125 R&J Lander, , 
Tournal of an Expedition,, Vol 1, page 2. 
126 PRO F084/886 7 November 1-852 Fraser's Journal, Whydah. 
127 PRO F084/951 30 May 1854 Irving, Abeokuta in 14 August 1854 Chichester, London. 
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Chapter Three 
Badagry's Political Structure 
When attempting an analysis of Badagry's political structure one must firstly 
establish exactly what is meant by the term 'political structure'. Even a cursory 
examination of this state reveals that the system of government, as in other pre- 
colonial West African societies, consisted of several layers of authority. These can 
be divided broadly into those of secular authority, represented notably by chiefs; 
and those of religious authority, represented by priests. However, as soon as such 
a division is made, one is immediately faced with problems, as the boundaries 
between secular and religious become blurred, and the interdependence of both 
becomes apparent. This makes such a rigid line of division at best meaningless 
and at worst a distortion. However, to attempt a detailed analysis of such a 
complex subject as pre-colonial Badagry's political structure, I have ultimately 
chosen to make a division and to analyse first the authority of the chiefs and 
then the authority of the priests. I have chosen to do this firstly because, from a 
purely organisational point of view, the arrangement of such a quantity of 
information demands two digestible chapters. However, more importantly, I 
would suggest that in the Badagry case, as yet, the exact nature of these 
relationships is still very much an unknown quantity. For example the close 
relationship between the Alafin of Oyo or the Alake of Abeokuta and the Ogboni 
Cult, is, without further information, impossible to parallel at Badagry 1. The use 
of two chapters should not be seen as a division of the subject matter, but as an 
analysis of the subject from two different angles. 
When attempting to understand these political institutions it is also necessary to 
recognise their fluidity over time. This is particularly important when one takes 
1 For example see P Morton-Williams, The Yoruba Ogboni Cult in Oyo', Africa 30 No. 4 (1960), pp. 
362-374. 
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into account the long period under examination. The nature of my research has 
yielded snapshots of Badagry's political structure over the latter part of the 
eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries. This therefore results in a photofit 
picture of the whole. Although this must be used with care, it is at least an 
indication that such structures were not stable, and were open to change and 
influence from both internal and external factors. There are also problems in the 
very nature of the sources. In this case the contemporary written sources were 
overwhelmingly based on European perceptions. Those very few that were not, 
were for European consumption and gathered from local informants in order to 
settle territorial disputes after annexation2. Contemporary European 
misconceptions and distortions in the field of African historiography has 
frequently been identified. In the case of Badagry, I would suggest that European 
failures to understand the systems in existence, led not only to a series of often 
conflicting accounts but possibly, in the attempt to discern a model they could 
recognise, a distortion of the system itself in the second half of the nineteenth 
century3. 
The Chiefs of Badagry 
The local historian T0 Avoseh has written that during the pre-colonial period 
the government of Badagry was: 
a perfect and unlimited despotism, the Kings exercising absolute 
power over the lives and belongings of their subjects, as well as the 
privilege of enacting laws 4 
Avoseh's words clearly have their source in Richard Lander and his visit to 
Badagry in 1825 5. Similarly, in 1859 Revd West described visiting Badagry and 
2 For example PRO C0879 / 27 Further Correspondence respecting the Territorial Questions in the 
Neighbourhood of Lagos 20 June 1888 and NNAI CSO 26 /4 30030 / S1 Report on the Reorganisation of 
Badagri District by RJM Curwen (1937). 
3 The formation and constitution of the Badagry town council during the colonial period is one such 
institution which has given rise to much confusion. There is no evidence for the existence of such a 
regular forum during the pre-colonial period. 
4 Avoseh, A Short H 5tory of Badagly p. 39. 
5R Lander, ! ý: aptain Cl a-D 12gr ton's Last Expedition to Africa, Vol 1, p. 285. 
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meeting the 'King' there 6. But on more careful examination of the state, the 
notion of Badagry as an autocracy emerges as a complete misconception. These 
three examples are carefully chosen as illustrative of important themes running 
through the history of Badagry's government. Revd West's conclusion was the 
mistake of a man unacquainted with the area making a judgment from the 
impression of a days visit, along lines he could easily comprehend. Lander on the 
other hand was making his judgment at a time when Badagry was in fact under' 
the sway of a man able to assert absolute control. Whether such a figure was an 
aberration or symptomatic of Badagry's political system will be discussed below. It 
is merely important to recognise here the possibility of such an occurrence. 
Avoseh's assertion is perhaps that which requires most consideration at present. 
I would suggest that behind it lies the more recent ambitions of a particular 
group. Avoseh has presented the case for one group's Kingship, and with no-one 
else present at the hustings he has carried the day. However, Avoseh's 
representation of a Yoruba-style monarchy is merely one in a series of similar 
political creations spanning the previous century and a half of both African and 
European concoction. Despite having little basis in political fact, the notion of a 
Badagrian 'monarchy' does have several historical precedents 7. 
A more satisfactory interpretation of Badagry's secular political authority is not 
the notion of a single despotic leader, but rather of a number of figures 
functioning alongside one another. In 1830 when Richard Landeý returned to 
Badagry, his dour brother John accompanied him. Although Adele, Richard 
6 WMMSA 6 June 1859 Revd West, Cape Coast. 
7 In 1937 local District Officer RJM Curwen concluded that: 
The Egun country has for so long been under the commercial or 
political control of Europeans and the people are of so many such 
remote origins that it is impossible to give accurate details of 
ancient government 
[NNAI CSO 26/4 30030/Sl A Report on the Reorganisation of the Badagri District by RJM Curwen 
19371. However, difficulties in interpreting Badagry's pre-colonial history are not solely due to the 
distortions forced by European rule but are also the result of local political aspirations. 'Kingship' 
at Badagry has historically been of a transitory nature. Although Avoseh received criticism in 
1938 for his neglect of the other chieftancies in the town, and his concentration on the Akran, it 
would appear that he was merely responding to events within 
Badagry. Due to a variety of factors 
the Akran, one of eight Badagry chiefs, was able to emerge by the mid twentieth century as the 
accepted 'King' or 
'Oba' of the town. This is a position the current holder of the title retains. 
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Lander's despot of 1825 was still supreme, this more astute observer claimed that 
the situation was more complex than a mere despotism. Indeed John Lander 
noted that: 
every one styles himself a great and powerful man... There is 
hardly any knowing who is monarch here, or even what form of 
government prevails 8 
He added that as well as 'King' Adele, 'four fellows assume the title of royalty 
The notion of there being more than one political figure in Badagry emerges 
from other sources recorded before and after the Landers' visit. A Dutch source of 
the 1730s recorded the presence of three caboceers [trading chiefs] named jingin, 
Gyngyn and Akra', although it would seem likely that jingin' and 'Gyngyn' 
were one and the same 10. In the mid-nineteenth century Governor Maclean at 
the Gold Coast clearly referred to the 'chiefs' of Badagry 11. Although he did not 
specify how many, in 1858 a report clearly listed eight Badagry chiefs 12. 
The plurality of Badagry 'chiefs' has its origins in the extreme heterogeneity of 
the city itself. As noted, Badagry's founders were groups of refugees from 
Whydah, Weme and Wharaba in the first half of the eighteenth century. As Law 
has pointed out, although other states along the coast, such as Porto-Novo, were 
founded by similarly diverse immigrant groups,, it was only at Badagry that these 
differences were maintained13. Badagry was then more comparable with 
Abeokuta, the interior state, which had been established by various different 
groups of Egba in the early nineteenth century 14. 
8R&J Lander, Tournal of an Expedition-- Vol 1, pp. 45-46. 
9 Ibid, pp. 45-46. 
10 14 May 1738 'Ondercommies' [Sub Factor] Chevallier, Badagry in Van Dantzig, The Dutch and 
the Guinea Zoast.. p. 341. 
11 PRO C096/2 16 September 1843 Maclean, Cape Coast. 
12 PRO F084/1061 20 April 1858 Campbell, Lagos. 
13 Law, '... The Early History of Badagry', pp. 2-3. 
14 In 1861 it was noted that the peoples of Abeokuta retained their various 'Institutions, customs 
and superstitions' 
[PRO F084/1155, Capt Jones' "Report on the Constitution and Military Capability 
of the Abeokutan Army 
for Carrying on Offensive War" 10 June 1861 in 29 August 1861 Lugard (CO), 
London. 
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As at Abeokuta there is ample evidence to suggest that each immigrant group at 
Badagry settled under the authority of its own chief. Avoseh, whilst emphasising 
the dominance of a group from Weme Jigbe who established themselves in the 
area now known as Ijegba, clearly recognises the existence of seven other distinct 
groups who formed identifiable districts or wards of the town15. Law in his 
detailed examination of the early history of Badagry has taken this analysis 
further and documented, where possible, the emergence of these wards and their 
chiefs. He notes that from contemporary sources only four such chiefs were 
identified in the eighteenth century. The chiefs of Ijegba and Ahwanjigo in the 
1730s (the Accra and jingin as above) and the chiefs of Ahoviko and Posuko 
wards in the 1770s and 1780s respectively. Of the wards not documented before 
the nineteenth century Law, on the basis of Avoseh's work, states that whilst the 
chiefs of Asago and Boeko may have been present in the town, although not 
identified, from the 1730s onwards, Ganho and Wharako Ward were founded 
later 16. 
Avoseh writes that the "Brazilian trader". who has been identified as Hendrik 
Hertogh, appointed a Weme prince as his agent. According to Avoseh this prince 
was already resident at Badagry, but it was Hertogh who established him at 1jegba 
ward, an area on the far west of the town17. Vice-Consul Fraser stated in his very 
short 'History of Badagry' that in fact this man was a slave-born child of Hertogh, 
but this is likely to be an exaggeration of their close relationship 18. It was this 
agent who became known as the Akran, a version or corrupted form of which 
was used throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to describe all 
chiefs of Ijegba Ward. The etymology of the term Akran is unknown. Avoseh, 
15 Avoseh, A Short Histoj: y of Badagry, p. 15. Also see Figure 6. 
,Z of 
Badagry'. pp. 13-14. 16 Law . 
..... The Early Histor 
17 Avoseh, A Short History of Badagry p. 15. See Figure 6. 
18 PRO F084/920 11 January 1853 Fraser, Lagos. 
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from: Government Survey Map 1941 reproduced in Okaro K'Ojwang (1979) p. 15 A 
suggests that it was the name of the Prince who first settled in the area 19. 
However, in 1887 it was suggested that the term 'Akanran' was a Fanti word of 
unknown meaning 20. It is interesting to note that some recent local sources 
have given the original Akran Fanti rather than Weme originS 21 
Vice-Consul Fraser suggested that Hertogh, whom he referred to as Ootoc-co-noo 
[Huntokonu], had another slave-born child, Jengen 22. This again would appear. 
to be an exaggeration of the close relationship between Hertogh and a close 
business partner or possibly slave. Avoseh states that jengen was from a chiefs 
family of Whydah, and had been given to Hertogh by the King of that place. It is 
claimed that this man was placed in charge of tobacco stores in an area close to 
the lagoon and the name jengen' was derived from an instrument used to test 
this product. The area in which jengen was placed came to be called Awhanjigo, 
after the name of a fetish worshipped there although it would seem that more 
directly the name was brought from the Awhanjigo quarter of Whydah, 
specifically the French quarter of the town23. 
Vice-Consul Fraser stated that 'Wowoo, Possoo and Ballar' were also 
contemporaries of Badagry's founder Hertogh 24. Again, this is compatible with 
Avoseh's account. This 'Wowoo', more commonly called the Wawu, which 
Fraser mistakenly translated as 'prince', was said to have come also from 
Whydah. However, according to the Avoseh account there were actually two 
princes, Kotugbosu and Kuton, both sons of 'King' Heru of Whydah. Having 
been attacked by the Dahomeans in 1727, these Whydahs fled, but, on their way 
to take refuge at the new settlement, Heru himself died at Seme, the seaside 
19 Avoseh, A Short HistoEy of BadagjZý, p. 13. 
20 PRO C0879 / 27 24 August 1887 The Queen's Advocate to the Governor of Lagos. 
21 Okaro K'Ojwang 'Society, Trade and Politics in Badagri... ', p. 11; Lagos State, Focus Qn Badagýy. 
22 PRO F084/920 11 January 1853 Fraser, Lagos. 
23 Avoseh, A Short HistoEy of Badagry p. 25. 
24 PRO F084/920 11 January 1853 Fraser, Lagos. 
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settlement of Porto-Novo 25. However, at least a portion of these Whydah 
refugees ultimately made their way to Badagry, among them a man who has 
been called Davi [Davi or Ahovi = prince] 26. According to Avoseh, a succession 
dispute arose between the two Whydah princes at Badagry 27. As head of state, 
Hertogh named the younger Kuton as successor to Heru, Avoseh's implication 
being that he was the more conscientious in performing his filial duty. However, 
angered by this decision, Kotugbosu murdered Hertogh. The assassination of the, 
Dutchman by a Whydah prince is documented in the correspondence of the 
Dutch traders along the coast 28. Avoseh goes on to say that after Hertogh's 
murder civil war ensued and Kotugobosu and Kuton, along with their followers 
were expelled from the town, the two princes soon after, meeting an untimely 
death. The account says that it was not until the time of Akran Soba, during the 
final decade of the eighteenth century, that the followers of these princes were 
able to return and establish themselves in the east of the city at Ahoviko under 
chief Sotu Agojo 29. However, placing the chieftancy of Soba and thus the return 
of the disgraced Whydahs to Badagry in the last decade of the eighteenth century 
is inconsistent with other evidence 30. Law, for example identifies the prominent 
figure of 'Davi' in the 1770s as a chief of Ahoviko3l. Furthermore, the Badagry 
chiefs in 1887 cited a further Wawu - Heresu, as appearing between the time of 
25 Law has pointed out that the King of Whydah, called Huffon in Whydah traditions, fled *west 
rather than east but died at Guezin in the territory of Great Popo. The eastward-fleeing Heru was 
not then King of Whydah, but a more junior member of the royal family [ Avoseh, A Short Histojýý 
CR-4no-1 p. ; Law, 'The Gun Communities in the Eighteenth Century', p. 111. 
26 ibid, p. 11. 
27 Avoseh, A Short History of Badagry p. 27. 
28 31 July 1738 Bronssema, Badagry in Van Dantzig, The Dutch and the Guinea Coast... p. 337. Also 
see chapter 5, pp. 145-146. 
29 Avoseh, A Short HistoIy of BadagW, pp. 27-28. 
30 Although it is impossible to date exactly the period of Akran Soba's chieftancy, it is clear from 
Avoseh's account that Soba took control of Ijegba Ward after Zinsu's decline [Avoseh, A Short 
Histoly of Badaga-, P. 181. Zinsu (later Akran Jiwa) was a Porto-Novan who had been able to seize 
control of Ijegba after the destruction of the town by the combined forces of Dahomey and Porto- 
Novo in 1784. There is no indication of how long Jiwa survived after 1784, but it would seem that by 
the i7gos he had been succeeded by Soba. Avoseh claims that due to poverty and the jealousy 
towards other members of his Ward, Soba invited the Dahomeans to attack Badagry once again. 
Soba's treacherous involvement in this attack is questionable, but it is clear that a series of 
Dahomean assaults did take place between 1791 and 1793. See chapter 5, pp. 165-167. 
31 Law, '... The Early History of Badagry', p. 15. 
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the rebellious brothers flight and Avoseh's first Wawu - Sotu Agojo 32. it would 
seem then that the return of this Whydah group either took place earlier than 
suggested by Avoseh's account, or that it was not the whole group that left and 
that a portion remained to establish themselves at Ahoviko after the flight of the 
princes. 
Fraser's identification of another Whydah Chief, 'Ballar', more commonly called 
Bala, as a contemporary of Hertogh has not been verified by Avoseh but is not 
contradicted by him. The local historian gives very little information about this 
ward chief except to say that the first was a King of Whydah Savi called Bala who 
abdicated his throne and came to Badagry after the death of his son 33. This group 
established itself in the middle of the town at Asago between their fellow 
Whydahs at Ahoviko and Awanjigo 34. 
The other chief whom Fraser claims as a contemporary of Hertogh, the Posu, is 
in fact inconsistent with Avoseh's analysis. The local historian states that the 
'Possoo', was a war captain of Weme and came to Badagry as the 'stranger' of the 
Akran35. This would seem to place his arrival after the death of Hertogh and the 
emergence of his agent as Akran. This war captain was placed at Posuko, in an 
area which stretched to the northern frontier of the town where his role was to 
be defensive against incursions from the interior 36. 
The arrival of the final three chiefs of Badagry occurred later. The founders of 
Ganho quarter, according to Avoseh arrived during the chieftancy of Akran 
Yeku, the second of the Akrans, from Weme 37. They were placed on the 
32 pRO C0879 / 27 Statements of the Badagrian chiefs made at Lagos on 22 and 23 August 1887 before 
the Queen's Advocate. 
33 Avoseh, A Short Histojy of BadagLry p. 16. 
34 See Figure 6. 
35 Avoseh, A Short HistoEy of Badagry, p. 30. Also see Figure 7. 
36 Ibid, p. 30. Also see Figure 6. 
37 lbid, pp. 30-31. Also see Figure 7. 
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lagoonside as warders to guard prisoners and slaves. The name Ganho, according 
to Avoseh, is a corruption of the terms Ganwhe and Oganhoho [gan =, ironlf 
meaning prison and old prison respectively 38. The final chief of this quarter in 
the 1880s was known as Chief Afope. Although in a late nineteenth century 
source the name Afope was used as a chieftancy title, according to Avoseh this 
was a personal name 39. The Chief of Ganho more usually had the title of the 
Agoloto 40. 
Likewise the arrival of the founders of the Wharako area of the town was, 
according to Avoseh, a later phenomenon, during the chieftancy of Akran 
Pojeagonwo, the third Akran. Avoseh states that this group were placed at 
Wharako by the Akran, but, this may exaggerate that chief's role in their 
settlement 41. This group of later arrivals were from Whara-ba [jakin], a coastal 
state destroyed by the Dahomeans during the early 1730S 42. The chief of this 
group was called the Finhento by Avoseh, or 'Fiotoh', 'Pheowh', or 'Pheortoh' 
in other sources 43. This was explained in 1887 as meaning 'the man who holds 
the pillars of the world'44. 
The final district of the town under the control of its own chief was Boeko. 
Originally however, this district was established by a priest from Whydah, and 
remained under priestly authority until possibly as late as the 1840s when control 
of the area was taken over by a secular chieftancy under Podowu or 'Pardoor' 45. 
38 Ibid, p. 31. 
39 PRO C0879 / 27 24 August 1887 The Queen's Advocate, Lagos. 
40 See Lagos State Focus on Badagly and NNAI CSO 26/4 3003OS1 Report on the Reorganisation of 
the Badagri District by RJM Curwen 1937. 
41 Avoseh, A Short History of Badagry, p. 31. Also see Figure 7. 
42 See chapter 1, pp. 38-39. 
43 For example PRO C0879/2724 August 1887 The Queen's Advocate, Lagos; PRO F084/1141 
Mercantile Treaty with Badagry June 1861, see Appendix B; PRO F084/1201 7 July 1863 Treaty of 
Cession of Badagri and its territories in 10 July 1863 Glover, Lagos, See Appendix C. 
44 PRO C0879 / 27 24 August 1887 The Queen's Advocate, Lagos. 
45 it is interesting to note that Okaro K'Ojwang says that the original founder of Boeko Ward was 
one of the attendants of Kotogbosu, a founding prince of Ahoviko [Okaro K'Ojwang''Society, Trade 
and politics in Badagri... ', p. 12. See Figure 6]. 
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According to Avoseh, Podowu was nicknamed Mobee by the Brazilians at 
Badagry, and this was continued as a title thereafter 46. 
The failure of a ninth ward or district to emerge in the town sheds some light on 
the nature of chieftaincy at Badagry. According to Avoseh a deserter from the 
Dahomean army, named Apanus and originally from Zinvie, established 
himself first at Gberefu, on the spit of land opposite Badagry. He then moved; to, 
the town itself where he settled at Athanpoji, which was presumably named after 
the Adankpoji suburb of Abomey. Exactly when this war lord or Balogun arrived 
is unclear from Avoseh's account. However, the local historian goes on to say 
that after Apansu's death, areas of his land were put under the control of new 
arrivals until the outbreak of civil war in the mid-nineteenth century which 
devastated the section completely. According to Avoseh, this destruction coupled 
with the lack its own chief meant that Athanpoji was not considered a quarter in 
its own right and ultimately 'by common consent' it was absorbed into Boeko 
Ward47. 
Authority and Power 
The identification of eight distinct districts or wards at Badagry, each with its own 
chief, is comparable then with the situation, for example, at Abeokuta. However, 
at the Egba capital a single figure, the Alake, did emerge as representative of the 
whole community 48. As noted, Avoseh has claimed that the Akran was a 
similarly dominant figure at Badagry. The supremacy of this chief has been 
accepted by other historians, at least in theory, although for example both 
Newbury and Smith have qualified this assertion by suggesting that although 
nominally the leading chief, the Akran, in reality, held little authority over the 
46 Avoseh, A Short HistoI3ý of BadagI3: p. 23. 
47 Ibid, p. 29. 
48 Northrup also discuses the process of increased centralisation and the emergence of a series of 
dominant figures in the more easterly Delta states as a result of the areas rising Atlantic trade 
[Northrup, Trade Without Rulers Pre-Colonial Economic Development in South Eastern Nigeria, 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford 1978) p. 88.1. 
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other chiefS 49. 
This claim of the Akran to acknowledged authority has been challenged by Law. 
He has suggested that in theory all eight chiefs were equal in status, but that 
power in Badagry fluctuated as a the fortunes, notably economic, of each ward 
rose and fell. He gives examples during the latter part of the eighteenth century 
when first the jengen and then 'Davi' [the Wawu] were clearly dominant forces. 
in the town50. It is interesting to note that in the nineteenth century mention of 
the Akran in British sources only became marked in the post-annexation period 
of the 1870s, when a particularly forceful personality in that position threatened 
to upset the peace of the town over the issue of installing a fellow chief5l. 
To establish the real nature of authority at Badagry it is necessary then to 
establish exactly how these wards operated, both internally and in relation to 
each other. A picture of the internal workings of the Badagry wards is extremely 
difficult to piece together from written sources. Ward sizes are hard to evaluate. 
just as the population of Badagry fluctuated from eight to ten thousand at its 
height to as low as about one thousand after destruction in 1851, so the wards' 
fortunes must have fluctuated too 52. However there is little indication of the 
proportions of the population who lived in each ward, and whether the overall 
population was more or less evenly spread throughout, or whether particular 
wards were much larger than others. Clearly each ward was made up of a 
number of compounds or houses, each of which had its own head53. In the case 
of Ijegba Ward, for example, Avoseh states that the headship of each of six ruling 
49 Okaro K'Ojwang also adheres to the idea of the dominant Akran, although he explains that 
despite the eight wards being theoretically equal 'In practice ... the other seven chiefs owed limited 
allegiance to the Akran' [Newbury, The Western Slave Coast ..... p. 30; RS Smith, Kingdoms of the 
Yoruba p. 72; Okaro K'Ojwang, 'Society, Trade and Politics at Badagry..., p. 291. 
50 Law, 'The Gun Communities in the Eighteenth Century', pp. 20-21. 
51 PRO C0147/30 24 July 1874 Thomas Tickel (Civil Commandant at Badagry), Badagry. 
52 See chapter 1, pp. 41-42. 
53 In 1850 the missionary Eugene Van Cooten described the three hundred and eight compounds of 
Badagry, each of which contained about thirty five persons [CMSA CA2/086/4 27 November 1850 
Van Cooten, Badagry) 
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houses was 'hereditary in the same family, but not necessarily from father to 
son54. It was from these six ruling houses, he continues, that the Akran was 
chosen 'more or less by rotation, 55. However, when Avoseh's list of Akrans 
spanning the period from foundation to publication of his history in 1938 is 
examined, his system of 'rotation' is difficult to substantiate. Of the six houses, 
three produced only one Akran. Of the other three, two produced only two 
Akrans, thus leaving Jigbeko House, with five Akrans, as the most dominant 
house 56. It seems more acceptable to conclude then as does Law, that the system 
of selection was based less on a systematic procedure than on the ability of the 
various houses to bid for the succession 'on the basis of their wealth and 
following rather than of hereditary right, 57. 
That ward chief election involved other wards is clearly recorded by Avoseh. He 
states that the Akran 'always made' the chiefs of Posuko and Ganho, whilst the 
Chief of Ahoviko installed the jengen of Awhanjigo and the Chief of Boeko 58. 
There is no information about the Bala of Asago. Therefore one can only assume 
that installation was an internal matter. But the Wharako ward chief, Avoseh 
states, looked further afield for confirmation and went to Porto- NOVO 59. The 
extent to which a role in installing a chief conferred any influence over his ward 
is a question which requires further examination. However,, there is the potential 
implication of a two-tier ward structure. The key, I would suggest can be found in 
54 Avoseh, A Short Histojý: of Badagry, p. 39. 
55 Ibid, p. 15. 
56 Ijegba Ward currently has three ruling houses. The title of Akran is passed from one house to the 
most suitable male heir of the next house [Oral interview 26 January 1994 with the Assistant of the 
Oba [Akran], Ijegba Ward]. 
57 [Law, '.... The Early History of Badagri', p. 231. There are a number of examples of the tenuous 
and competitive nature of chieftaincy at Badagry. For example in an account from 1860, Consul 
Foote described the situtation in an unidentified, and as yet unidentifiable, ward of Badagry. On 
the death of a chief, who was called 'Juiza', competition was intense be-t-ween two aspiring 
successors. Foote noted that there was a danger of violence erupting over the issue [PRO F084 / 1141 
28 December 1860 Badagry merchants in 8 January 1861 Foote, Lagos]. What is also interesting about 
this example is that Foote referred to the involvement of 'chiefs'. The use of the plural would seem 
to suggest that the election of a ward chief involved, at least in this case, a wider electorate than 
the individual ward itself. 
58 Avoseh, A Short Histojý: of Badagjy pp. 31,26 & 28. 
59 Ibid, p. 32. 
90 
the origins of the inhabitants. Ijegba's role in the making of both the chiefs of 
Posuko and Ganho can clearly be tied to their shared Weme origins. Ahoviko 
ward shared Whydah origins with both Awhanjigo and Boeko, and indeed in 
1887 the Wawu was referred to by the title 'Omo Oba Wheda' or head of the 
Whydas [Omo-Oba = 'prince'in Yoruba] 60. The text of the Treaty of Cession also 
implied such a division by referring to both the Akran and the Wawu as 'Head 
Chief' 61. This division therefore leaves Asago and Wharako operating between. 
or on the fringes of these two groupings. However, in a state as competitive as 
Badagry there was little time or inclination for origin allegiances generations old 
and although in theory these groupings remained in place, they were adhered to 
as convenient and ignored when necessary. An indication of this attitude is 
demonstrated during the 1870s when the Akran attempted to increase his control 
over Posuko by not only installing the ward chief but also nominating the 
candidate. This pressure was however, vehemently resisted by the inhabitants of 
Posuko itself 62. 
Newbury suggests that ultimately, although the Akran was politically weak, he 
was 'president' of a court of ward elders, the word 'court' presumably carrying 
connotations of both monarchy and judiciary 63. This then establishes a formal 
political forum and point of contact between the wards. As yet however, no. 
evidence has been found to support Newbury's claim that the Akran was at least 
the nominal head of such a forum in the pre-colonial period. Indeed it would 
appear that the Badagry ward chiefs acted not only independently but frequently 
60 PRO C0879 / 27 24 August 1887 The Queen's Advocate, Lagos. 
61 See Appendix C. 
62 In this particularly case: 
The elder of the Posu family ... stated that 
he had no wish himself 
to be installed as chief, but considered it only fair that the election 
of the chief should be left, as usual, to the whole family instead of 
a nomination being made by the Ankranh [Akran], who had 
selected a young man of the family who has been, nearly all his 
life, resident in Porto-Novo 
[PRO C0147/30 2 August 1874 Burton (Governor of Lagos), Lagos. 
63 Newbury, The Western Slave Coast.... p. 30. 
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in opposition to one another. With little in the way of traditional authority or 
allegiance to either state or even ward, it would appear then that the basis of 
chieftancy was ultimately the ability to maintain control over both resources and 
followers through wealth. As noted previously, the control of wealth at Badagry 
was based mainly in Atlantic commerce. 
The Atlantic slave trade had its roots in violence and warfare, occupations which 
required the ability to harness manpower. Once gathered the trade needed 
similarly large outlays in order to secure provisions, guards, holding areas, credit 
and collateral. In the Badagry case it would appear, not surprisingly, that the ward 
chiefs were key slave traders within the town and that the trade was organised 
along ward lines. Each chief's desire to retain control of their own economic 
interests is clear. In 1844 Annear recounted an episode when a man of Ahoviko 
had requested his slave to be sold at Posuko. This action had provoked the 
Wawu of Ahoviko to anger at the loss of his 'privilege, 64. But exactly what this 
'privilege' entailed and the true nature of the chief's role in commerce requires 
further examination. 
During his visit to Badagry in 1825 Richard Lander noted that any slaves who 
remained unsold in the town were drowned in the lagoon due to the expense 
that their maintenance would cause the King. This implies that, at least in the 
eyes of a visiting European, 'slaves' (all slaves being the implication), were the 
responsibility of 'the King' 65. However, the concept of a trading monopoly 
under the control of a single figure in the Badagry context is doubtful for various 
reasons. Firstly, because 'the King' in question, Adele, was dominant in Badagrv 
for a relatively short period (c. 1821-1835), and was ultimately an aberration. But it 
is also deceptive in that, during the course of Richard Lander's time in Badagry 
and on a subsequent second visit in 1830, it emerged that there were actually 
64 WMMSA 21 October 1844 Annear's Journal, Badagry. 
65 R Lander, Captain Clapperton's Last Expedition to Africa, Vol 2, pp. 250-251. 
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others engaged in slave trading activities. In 1830 John Lander noted another 
ward chief, who although living in retirement was actively engaged in 
purchasing and reselling slaves to the foreign traders 66. A group of resident 
slave traders, by this period mostly of Portuguese/ Brazilian extraction, had 
evidently formed a close commercial relationship with this ward chief. From 
other accounts it becomes clear that this 'special relationship' between ward chief 
and foreign trader was not new to Badagry. Indeed, from an examination of the 
evidence it emerges that the nature of this relationship is vital for any 
understanding of pre-colonial Badagry. 
As noted, Badagry was not a great slave-raiding state. It was by acting as 
middlemen, engaged in 'purchasing slaves and reselling them', that economic 
wealth was generated. Hopkins in his analysis of the operation of the pre- 
colonial economies of West Africa outlined the role of 'middlemen' in the 
coastal entrepots who 'helped to synchronise exchanges between slave gatherers, 
shippers and employers, 67. He states that the trading environment created a 
necessity for landlords, whose role it was to provide storage, provision and 
accommodation and brokers who acted as intermediaries, commission agents 
interpreters, bankers, money lenders and traders. It is in these roles that Badagry 
was able to excel. 
That the Badagry chiefs or Badagrians more generally were acting as both traders 
and brokers between their Atlantic and interior partners is supported by Captain 
Adams who visited the area at the end of the eighteenth century. Although he 
made the distinction that it was the policy of the Lagos people to be 'themselves 
the traders and not the brokers' he later added that Hausa slaves were brought by 
Oyo merchants to Porto-Novo where they were sold to traders from both Lagos 
66 R&j Lander,. Ioumal of an Expedition... Vol 1, p. 46. 
67 Hopkins, An Economic Histo Lry of West Africa p. 106-107. 
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and Badagry 68. The identity of these agents, at least in the nineteenth century, 
was illustrated by Revd Annear when he noted that 'black traders' from Badagry 
were operating along the lagoons under the auspices of various ward chiefs 69. 
It is evident then that the operation of Atlantic slave commerce required control 
over manpower. Firstly in the capacity of slave raiding parties and more 
importantly in the Badagry context, as agents, guards, carriers, porters and water- 
rollerS70. That the ability to harness manpower rested largely with ward chiefs is 
understandable. It was the ward chiefs who were able to provide the goods and 
services which the Atlantic and interior traders required to operate successfully. 
The importance of these commercial relationships was reflected, at least from a 
European perspective, in the fact that a number of the Badagry wards came to be 
identified, and certainly to some extent came to identify themselves with their 
respective European trading partners. For example the Wawu was known as the 
English Chief, as was Mobi 71. The Jengen was the French chief, the Akran was 
68 Capt. J. Adams Remarks on the Counjiýý extending from Cape Palmas to the River Congo (London 
1823), p. 96. 
69 WMMSA 30 October 1844 Annear's Journal, Badagry. 
70 Badagry's position required large-scale transportation of trade goods between sea, city and 
interior. Clapperton reported on arrival on the beach that they were carried in hammocks across 
the strip of land until they reached the lagoon where 'canoes were ready' to take them across to the 
town [PRO C02/15 30 November 1825 Clapperton's Journal, Badagry]. The status of those people 
involved in the landing and carrying of both goods and people is difficult to determine. At the end 
of the eighteenth century Dalzel stated that at Badagry those people who inhabited seashore 
were there for the convenience of the Atlantic ships and acted as porters and water rollers. 
Furthermore he noted that these persons were 'in the pay of the captains', presumably meaning the 
ships' captains [Dalzel, The HistoLy of Dahomy, p. 1791. This may well have been the case for the 
visiting Gold Coast canoe crews communicating between ship and shore. But it is necessary to 
determine whether this was also the case for the indigenous porters and water rollers of Badagry. 
The concept of an indigenous employed working class would seem to be contradicted by Dalzel 
himself when he goes on to note that the porters and water rollers 'belonged' to a chief, on this 
occasion 'prince Davee' [Davi or the Wawu of Ahoviko ward]. However, 'belonged' could allude to 
both slave and free man within a ward. I would suggest that in this case those inhabitants of 
Ahoviko were not slaves but merely came under the umbrella of the Wawu's control. Thus they 
required his sanction to work. The evidence to support this view comes from Clapperton's account of 
the porters he employed for his journey into the interior. He noted that they required thirty five 
men at five strings of cowries per day and a further forty two hammockmen at the same cost. The 
implication here is that each person was paid as an individual. Clapperton added that they would 
be required to give one hundred ounces trade to Adele for his permission and safe conduct to Ijanna, 
presumably then an acknowledgment of his ability to mobilise such numbers [PRO C027/15 30 
November 1825 Clapperton's journal, Badagryl. 
71, PRO C096/2 11 May 1853 Freeman, Cape Coast in 20 May 1843 Maclean, Cape Coast; CMR March 
1846 26 may 1845 Townsend's Journal, Badagry; WMMSA 11 September 1844 Annear's Journal in 21 
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known as the Portuguese Chief, whilst the Posu was at times also referred to as a 
Portuguese Chief and at others as a Dutch Chief72. Understandably a number of 
European sources have overemphasised the impact of this phenomenon. 
Governor Hill for example in 1844 clearly felt that it was the number of European 
competitors on the coast who had initially shaped Badagry's ward structure 73. 
This conclusion is clearly putting the cart before the horse, however, the extent to 
which these commercial relationships with European, and possibly also African. 
trading partners, served to maintain the polarisation between the resident groups 
within Badagry is central in any understanding of the town's operation. In the 
mid-nineteenth century, when only British traders remained in the town, Revd 
De Graft noted that the division between English, French, Portuguese and Dutch 
Towns was 'kept up with zeal which breeds jealousies and animosities among 
the chiefs sometimes, 74. Furthermore, the extent to which these trading 
partnerships had become engrained into the very fabric of Badagry's political life 
can be examined most prominently in the case of Ahoviko Ward. As the English 
ward of the Town, Ahoviko came under close scrutiny from the British 
missionaries working on the coast. Revd Townsend for example commented of 
that ward and its chief that: 
According to the laws of Badagry ... the English chief has a right to 
receive Englishmen here; if the other chiefs interfere with this 
right, they break the established laws of the place 75. 
The key then was that political power was interdependent with economic 
succeSS76. The individuals able to harness the means to facilitate trade were 
October 1844 Annear, Badagry. 
72 NNAI CSO 5/2 Agreement Between Ghingy Uengenj Cabacier of Badagry and Thomas Hutton of 
London for the sale of a plot of land in the centre of Badagry 22 May 1842 (NB. It is interesting to 
note that during the course of this agreement Mobbe [Mobil was named as another French chief); 
PRO F084/920 11 January 1853 Fraser, Lagos; WMMSA 26 April 1845 Annear's Journal, Badagry. 
73 In a long description of Badagry, Hill noted that: 
A British slave factory was established there as also a French and 
Portuguese, from which the town is still divided into three 
divisions, each assuming the name of the factory they were under 
[PRO C096 /4 14 May 1844 Hill, Cape Coast]. 
74 WMMSA 21 March 1843 De Graft to London. 
75 PRO F084/663 20 August 1845 Revd Townsend, Badagry in 7 January 1846 Coates, London. 
76 In his examination of 'stateless' or 'non-centralised' societies, Horton noted that it was trade 
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overwhelmingly the ward chiefs. Conversely it would also appear that in order 
to maintain their positions of political authority, they were in turn required to be 
economically successful 77. In Avoseh's list of Akrans, it is interesting to note 
that those he reports as being successful and popular were all notable slave 
traders. For example the seventh Akran Prince Yede, who probably held his 
chieftancy in the early years of the nineteenth century, is described as having 'a 
successful slave trade and a good reign, 78. On the other hand, Akran Soba, 
during whose time 'there was no slave trade', was ultimately overthrown as a 
result of internal tensions within the ward 79. That a chieftaincy did not 
guarantee political and economic success is further illustrated by the example of 
the usurper Zinsu who assumed control of the town after its destruction in 1784 
and became 'exceedingly wealthy' 80. Ultimately then it was possible to break into 
Badagrian political life and, in the case of Zinsu, take it over with huge economic 
backing. The implication is then that once installed at the forefront of Badagrian 
political life, sustained economic success became of paramount importance. In 
Badagry, during the era of the slave trade, economic success rested on political 
power, and in turn political power rested on economic success. 
After the decline of the slave trade at Badagry from the early 1840s onwards the 
town attempted to fashion a role in the newly established and very different 
palm oil trade. As noted previously, in a largely non-producing area it was still 
which was one of the 'root causes' of state formation, leading ultimately to the emergence of 
leadership through wealth. He concludes that 'non centralised societies: 
are mostly found away from the great long-distance trade routes 
and trade junctions. Indeed this fact... has probably been a condition 
of their survival in stateless form 
[R Horton, 'Stateless Societies in the History of West Africa'in Ajayi and Crowder HistoEy of West 
Africa Vol 1 (3rd Ed 1985), p. 901. This would appear to be contradicted by the Badagry case 
whereby although commerce was the key to leadership, that leadership was ultimately 
compromised by its commercial base. 
77 Latham has made the connection between political and economic strength in the case of Old 
Calabar. He concludes that it was the wards most successful in trade who were able to absorb more 
retainers and gain more credit from the European trading partners. Thus the ward was able to grow 
more quickly than the others fLatham, Old Calabar.... p. 511. 
78 Avoseh, A Short History of Badagry p. 22. 
79 Tbid, pp. 18-19. 
80 Ibid, p. 18. 
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necessary for Badagry to import its trade goods from the interior. However, 
whilst supplies to the slave market required both wealth and political influence, 
palm oil transportation, like that of domestic articles could be undertaken on a 
much smaller scale and presented possibilities to a wider section of the 
population trading between local markets. However, Badagry's position on the 
coast as a collection point for palm oil meant that once again resources were 
required for speculation, premises and co-ordination on the scale required by'the 
Atlantic traders. Although the palm oil trade may have offered the potential for 
private enterprise by local individuals operating on a very small scale, notably 
through production and transportation to collection points. At the coast, the 
trade remained in the hands of large scale operators. That such Badagrian 
operators were largely chiefs and the organisation of palm oil collection and 
trading ran along ward lines is supported by evidence that it was the Wawu, the 
English chief of Ahoviko who profited most from the new trade. Other chiefs 
complained about the trade, but their arguments remained ward based. The 
object of their bitterness was the Wawu rather than any new indigenous class of 
traders 81. Complaints, however, were also levelled at times against the foreign 
traders, both European and Sierra Leone who were said to have 'a considerable 
amount of property' at Badagry 82. There is also the example of exiled Lagos 
people engaging in commerce with the support of the European trading 
factorieS83. 
Much of the contemporary source material concentrates on the 'petty jealousies' 
which arose from commercial competition. In 1844 for example there were 
reports of a war breaking out between the people of Ahoviko and Ijegba over the 
appointment of an 1jegba chief who had such a close relationship with the 
Portuguese traders at Lagos that Ahoviko's commerce with Britain was 
81 CMSA CA2 / 085 / 229 7 September 1845 Townsend's journal, Badagry. 
82 PRO F084/860 16 June 1851 Badagry merchants to Capt Foote. 
83 PRO F02 / 20 31 December 1857 Campbell, Lagos. 
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threatened with destruction84. Accordingly a fight took place in the centre of 
town with between seven to eight hundred individuals on each side. 
Interestingly though, the following day only one death was reported as a result of 
the conflict and another was to be executed for having 'fought unfairly'. This 
suggests a confrontation which was more of a show of strength than anything 
else and which was 'fought' along ceremonial lines. 
With ward and chieftaincy fortunes largely dependent on commerce and on the 
support they could muster, it is understandable then that various wards emerged 
at different times as more prominent. Gaining an accurate picture of the 
fluctuating fortunes of each of the Badagry wards is difficult. The fragmentary 
nature of the sources available makes it hard to discern any pattern. Very rarely 
are all eight chiefs mentioned. Fraser, for example, in 1853 listed the eight chiefs 
of Badagry, but included the 'Anlakbar' or King of Apa and also an unidentifiable 
Chief 'Oo-noo', perhaps therefore relegating the chiefs of Ganho and Wharako, 
whom he does not name, to being 'minor' chiefs 'the names of whom I have not 
yet ascertained' 85. Furthermore it is very rarely specified in such lists whether 
the order given is in any way indicative of importance. These limited sources 
could also clearly distort the nature of a particular ward's success. In the mid- 
nineteenth century, the Wawu, chief of Ahoviko ward, appeared more 
frequently in written accounts than any other chief. However, this is only to be 
expected. As chief of the 'English Town' the majority of English sources clearly 
focused on him. 
However, from a number of accounts it is possible to gain at least some sense of 
the wards' fluctuating fortunes. Law, using French sources, has identified the 
84 WMMSA 4&5 November 1844 Annear's journal, Badagry. 
85 Dalzel refers to an individual called 'Onum' at Badagry who was the son of 'Prince Davee'. If 
Onum was a title rather than a name, taken by the son of the'Wawu, this may account for the 
mysterious Chief 'Oo-noo' 
[Dalzel The HistoZL of Dahomey p. 182; PRO F084 / 920 11 January 1853 
Fraser, Lagos. 
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Jengen of Awhanjigo as being recognised as the 'King of Badagri' in the 1770s 86. 
By 1793 the Akran of Ijegba was referred to as the 'principal caboceer, 87. 
Similarly by the middle of the nineteenth century, although the extent of the 
Wawu's prominence may have been distorted by a predominance of British 
sources, his period of commercial success in comparison to the other chiefs 
during this period is apparent. As Campbell noted in 1855 'Blower' [Wawu] 'was 
the only chief who derived a direct revenue' from the new trade 88. However, it 
was during this period also that several sources also reported that the Akran was 
a 'headchief, a further indication of the lack of any single authority 89. In this 
way then the ability of a ward chief to dominate was based on the transitory 
nature of his economic successes and ability to harness the loyalty of his ward. 
This meritocracy also enabled other successful figures to emerge. Again, due to 
the vague nature of source material, it is somewhat difficult to distinguish who 
was who, and whether named figures in written accounts were actually ward 
chiefs or 'commoners', there are references to a number of figures throughout 
the period who, it would seem, were not ward chiefs themselves but 
nevertheless achieved prominence in Badagry society as a result of their success 
in other spheres. Robertson at the end of the eighteenth century named a man 
called Agoussa as 'the principal trader at Badaghe' 90. It is possible that Agoussa 
was the 'Agosu' named by Avoseh as one of Akran jiwa's [Zinsul sons, whof 
during the poverty stricken chieftaincy of Akran Soba, achieved immense 
commercial success, to the point where Soba; 'became envious of the houses of 
Pojeagonwu and jiwa' 91. This then demonstrates the ability of an individual to 
develop an extremely successful commercial business without being the head of 
a ward. it could be suggested that Agoussa or Agosu was able to succeed 
1 86 Law 
, 
The Gun Communities in the Eighteenth Century', p. 29, citing Archives Nationale, Paris C 
6/26 Dewarel, Whydah I October 1776; Gourg, Whydah 31. August 1787. 
87 PRO T70/1484 10 October 1793 Richard Miles (Royal African Company), Popo. 
88 PRO F0403/5 28 May 1855 Campbell, Lagos. 
89 CMSA CA2/043/9612 August -1845 Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
90 GA Robertson, Notes on Africa (London 1819), p. 286. 
91 Avoseh, adagQý, p. 18. 
99 
commercially due to his close relationship with a ward chief, for Jiwa was Akran 
of Ijegba. However, it should be noted that Akran jiwa himself had been an 
outsider from Porto-Novo, and therefore his son had little legitimate or 
traditional right to such a position. 
In the nineteenth century there are references to a number of other influential 
figures who are not reconcilable with the list of recognisable Badagry ward chiefs. 
Samuel Pearse in 1863 mentioned a prominent man called Masolowo, whilst 
Ajagbe and Ahamara are also named as principal men during the mid- 
nineteenth century, with no obvious connection to chiefs of the period 92. How 
much political power these individuals were able to wield is difficult to assess, 
but it is clear that on occasions they were taking part in meetings with Europeans, 
not always of a commercial nature, and were of a sufficiently high stature for 
them to be referred to, on occasion perhaps mistakenly, as 'chiefs' themselves 93. 
Influences on the System 
The dangerous weaknesses of such a system, with little semblance of a central 
authority, are evident. Indecision, opposition and competition were clearly 
major features of the uncohesive nature of Badagry's political structure. 
However, such a transient system was ultimately able to absorb changes and. take 
advantage of opportunities far more readily than a more centralised state could 
ever have done. In the dangerously fluctuating politics of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth century Slave Coast, Badagry's decentralised structure gave it a 
flexibility which often allowed it to adapt more readily to these changeable 
conditions. 
92CA2/076/4628 May 1863 Pearse's journal, Badagry; CMR October 1846 10 August 1845Gollmer's 
journal, Badagry; CMSA CA2/043/98 27 February 1846 Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
93 During the early twentieth century a similar 'chief' acquired overall prominence at Badagry. 
Chief Seriki Abasi, a Muslim who had started life as a slave, was able to dominate Badagry 'by 
his own character and ability... 
his wealth, and his good standing with the [colonial] Government' 
fNNAI BADADIV 6/1 District Officers Intelligence Reports 1877-19281. 
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Badagry's ability to adapt to external forces is clearly one of the major themes of 
its history, its very foundation being a crucial example. The continuing process of 
settlement in the town which shaped its internal structure is best demonstrated 
by an examination of the series of influential individuals who, arriving often as 
refugees, were able to achieve a position of extreme influence. The first of these 
was Zinsu, later Akran Jiwa, who although claimed as a son of the first Akran, 
Gbafoe by Avoseh, was in fact from Porto Novo94. Zinsu was able to seize 
control of Badagry after its destruction by the combined forces of Dahomey and 
]Porto-Novo in 1784. What is interesting about Zinsu is that his descendants 
ultimately became a part of the established order of Jigbeko, one of the ruling 
houses of the Ijegba Ward, with three of the following Akrans emerging from 
that family 95. Other arrivals were of a more transitory nature, but equally 
influential during the periods of residence. Adele, the 'King of Kings' at Badagry 
during the 1820s and early 1830s was in exile from his throne at Lagos. Adele's 
ability to take over the running of the town during the period of his residence, 
was, according to Lander, the result of admiration for his filial piety96. However, 
there is evidence that Adele's progress towards domination involved more force 
of character than the Badagry chiefs' natural subservience to a respected foreign 
ruler. As Lander himself reports, the chief of Spanish Town (probably the 
Akran), had been previously the 'sole governor of the country' but since the 
arrival of Adele 'his authority was wrested from him by a more powerful 
hand, 97. The inability of later political exiles, the Mewu, from Porto-Novo and 
Akitoye, another deposed King of Lagos, to maintain a position of influence 
suggests individuals of less 'magisterial' splendour and strength than Adele, but 
also clearly outlines the important role of foreign allegiances and alliances in 
94 Avoseh, A Short History of Badagry, p. 15. 
95 Ibid, p. 18. 
96 Law has concluded that Adele was able to become dominant because the existence of a foreign 
ruler at Badagry was not without precedent and the town was a place where'foreign origin was 
evidently no serious handicap' fR Law, 'The Career of Adele at Lagos and Badagry c. 1807-c. 1837' in 
journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria UHSN) ix/2, (1978), p. 43. Also see chapter 6, pp. 180- 
183. 
97 R&j Lander,. Tournal of an Expedition.... Vol 1, p. 13. 
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Badagry's power structure. 
The influence of neighbouring states on the balance of power within Badagry has 
been crucial throughout its history. Apa, the kingdom from which Badagry's 
immediate territory was carved, held a short-lived dominance over the port. 
Although there are indications that by the nineteenth century the Alapa or King 
of Apa was still, at times, nominally recognised as 'the proprietor of that part of 
the country', it is clear that in reality, Badagry had overtaken its parent state in 
both economic and political importance and the Alapa was a political 
'nonentity'98. Indeed by the 1840s it would appear that the Alapa was himself a 
periodic resident of Badagry itself, thus, by implication placing the territory of 
Apa under the auspices of the port 99. 
More influential in Badagry's political history were the claims of its more 
prominent neighbours. Notable in British eyes, during the period of coastal 
annexations in the early 1860s, were the claims of Lagos over Badagry. 
Understandably Governor Freeman in 1862, eager to establish Badagry as part of 
the Lagos Colony, stressed the political links between some of the town's chiefs 
and the Lagos monarchy. He claimed that during the reign of Adele's predecessor 
at Lagos, Ologun Kutere, Dahomey had threatened to destroy Badagry but the 
Lagos King had paid money for the town to be spared and had therefore 'always 
considered Badagry as their Territory' and on occasions been involved in 
appointing chiefs 100. The influence of Lagos over Badagry was also demonstrated 
by Avoseh who refers to a period of 'cordial relations' between the two powers in 
the late eighteenth century when'the Kings of Badagry used to be crowned in 
Lagos and some chiefs installed there as well' 101. This period of 'cordial 
98PRO F084/951 24 May 1854 Crowther, Abeokuta in 14 August 1854 Chichester, London; PRO 
F084/925 'Report on the proceedings of a expedition to Porto-Novo between December 1852 and 7 
January 1853'by Cmdr Heseltine in 14 April 1853 Hamilton, London. 
99 CM March 1847 7 June 1846 Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
100 PRO C0147/1 9 October 1862 Freeman, Lagos. 
101 Avoseh, A Short HistorýL of Badagry, p. 33. 
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relations' is more appropriately seen as one of domination by Lagos in the post 
destruction period after 1784. But this does not demonstrate an incorporation 
into the territory of Lagos, as Freeman and then Glover asserted, for even during 
the very period when British control at Lagos, increased after 1852, Badagry was 
subject to political influences from the west which were equally strong. 
As noted above, at least one of the Badagry chiefs went to Porto-Novo for 
installation but this was clearly a connecion which went further than that of 
traditional ceremony 102. In 1845 Revd Annear, recounting a thwarted attempt by 
Porto-Novo to overrun the town, stated that whilst most of the town rejoiced at 
their failure there were a number of inhabitants who 'manifested evident 
symptoms of sorrow' due to they're being at 'one with the enemies in their 
hearts' 103. By the 1860s, when Britain was attempting to assert control from 
Lagos, a section of Badagry resisted this encroachment by supporting the Porto- 
Novan claim to the state. Even as late as 1863 Glover recognised that a portion of 
the town believed themselves, or at least claimed to be under the jurisdiction of 
Porto-Novo, and that violence was threatening to break out in the western 
sections of the town over the matter 
104. 
However, Badagry was not only subject to influences from east and west along 
the coast, for there were also interior alliances and loyalties which proved equally 
strong in some quarters. Although founded as a result of Dahomean aggression 
and as a potential safe haven from the aggressive policies of that power, Badagry 
was clearly not a state distant enough to be free from the influence of that 
powerful interior kingdom. Evidence suggests that for much of its early 
history, 
Badagry was caught between the power politics of Dahomey and its interior 
Yoruba neighbour, Oyo. There has been some debate over the issue of Badagry's 
tributary status in relation to Oyo. It has been suggested that from quite early in 
102 Ibid, p. 32. 
103 WMMSA 7 September 1845 Annear's journal, Badagry. 
104 PRO C0147/4 1 August 1863 Glover to Didelot in 8 August 1863 Glover, Lagos. See chapter 11, p. 
367. 
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its history Badagry was tributary to the Yoruba power. However, Law has argued 
that although soon after its establishment, Badagry, along with Porto-Novo, 
became Oyo's main outlet to the Atlantic. It was only in the 1780s, after a period 
of destruction and upheaval, that Badagry formerly became tributary to Oyo 105. 
However, the powers of the Oyo Empire were waning. Far more lasting was 
Badagry's relationship with its westerly neighbour Dahomey. Throughout its 
history, the coastal state was subject to aggression and attack by this power, but 
clearly the influence of Dahomey ran far deeper. As late as 1843 Governor 
Maclean saw Badagry as being a part of Dahomey's coastal territory106. But by 
1848, the King of Dahomey himself was clearly unhappy with the increasing 
wealth of the coastal nations once under his sway who, with their increasing 
wealth, 'set my authority at defiance' 107. 
Whilst certain sections of Badagry continued associations with Dahomey - 
notably Posuko, which was, for example, involved in Dahomean military 
operations - other sections had found a new patron in the shape of Abeokuta, a 
city state formed out of the chaos of the Yoruba wars after the demise of Oyo. The 
strength of this relationship in the 1840s and 1850s, during the period of 
increasing European interest in the area, firstly in the shape of missionary and 
then consular activity, has yielded more written accounts of this relationship 
than any other. The extent to which Badagry was seen to be dominated by the 
Egba power was demonstrated by Revd Gollmer who claimed in 1848 that 
'Badagry is governed in some degree by Abbeokuta' 108. Using a variety of other 
sources it is possible to assess this high degree of influence. Even the Posu, who 
clearly held true allegiances elsewhere, was forced to accept in 1846, when 
105 Law . ..... 
The Early History of Badagry', p. 27. See chapter 5, p. 152-153. 
106 PRO C096 /2 20 May 1843 Maclean, Cape Coast. 
107 PRO C096 / 13 Report of 9 November 1848 in 18 November 1848 Cruickshank, Cape Coast. 
108 Parliamentary Papers 'Slave Trade Session 1847-48 No 4 First Report from the Select 
Committee on Slave Trade' Paragraph 8043 4 July 1848, G011mer's evidence. 
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challenged by Shomoye, the Egba representative at Badagry that the Badagry 
chiefs must do Abeokuta's bidding 109 
This dominance reached its peak in the early 1850s with the expulsion of the 
chiefs from Badagry and the usurpation of the Mewu, a refugee from Porto-Novo 
who relied on the joint support of Abeokuta and the British to maintain his 
position. When that British support was partially removed, Consul Campbell 
and the British traders in the area recognising the impracticalities and damaging 
commercial effects his governorship, Mewu's position crumbled, and with it 
Egba influence over Badagry's affairs. 
In the face of such intense outside pressure, it was Badagry's fragmented political 
structure which enabled the town to maintain crucial and often conflicting 
alliances. The most obvious example of this occurred in 1851 during a Dahomean 
attack on the Egba capital at Abeokuta. According to Annear in the 1840s all the 
chiefs of Badagry professed to be allies of the Egba, and indeed forces from the 
Badagry wards were sent to reinforce the Egba troops besieging the town of Ado, a 
city on the route between Abeokuta and the coast. However, it subsequently 
emerged that two chiefs, whilst outwardly supporting the Egba cause, were 
secretly supplying Ado with both provisions and ammunition 110. This covert 
desire by a section of Badagry to help their 'enemies' was further substantiated in 
the March 1851 attack on Abeokuta by Dahomey. Indeed whilst a section of 
Badagry was concerned with forwarding supplies of arms and ammunition to 
support the Egba capital, it was found later that during the course of the skirmish 
'Possu of Badagry had many of his people in the Dahomean army' 111. 
The ability of Badagry to withstand these successive and sometimes coexisting 
109 CMSA CA2 / 085 / 230 24 December 1845 Townsend's journal, BadagTy. 
110 WMMSA 16 December 1844 Annear's Journal, Badagry. Also see chapter 7, p. 231. 
111 PRO C096 / 24 19 March 1851 Townsend, Abeokuta in 30 March Fanshawe, off River Benin. 
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external pressures is an indication of the success of its flexible political structure. 
Indeed it was ultimately only the attempt by an external power to impose a more 
cohesive political order, in the process removing Badagry's ability to adapt and its 
competitive edge, which ultimately destroyed its statehood. But despite its 
fragmented and indeed competitive system Badagry was required, at least at 
times, to operate institutions or functions of a more coordinated nature. 
The ability of a ward to act as an independent military unit, as noted above, 
clearly had immense repercussions. The Posu, is called by Avoseh 'a war chief' 
and the term Balogun, meaning war lord in Yoruba, was. used to describe his role 
in 1887112. However, there is no written evidence to identify the Posu as the 
commander of a city-wide army, indeed there is no evidence of such a fighting 
force at Badagry. According to Annear the chiefs each had their 'respective 
colours' and were able to summon bodies of men to make military gainsI13. 
However, Badagry was evidently able to mount concerted military operations, 
most notably in defending the city from attack. A detailed example of such a 
defence is given again by Annear in 1845, when in the face of an attack from the 
west by Porto-Novo and their hired naval allies the Isos, frantic preparations 
took place in Badagry, with messengers being sent out of town to Ajido and Idale 
to prepare canoes and send ammunition. Annear reported that the whole town 
was on the look out and the fighting men went to their stations. Tactics were 
carefully planned and an ambush laid for the aggressors 114. 
112 Avoseh, A Short ffistol3: of Badagly, p. 30; PRO C0879/27 24 August 1887 The Queen's 
Advocate, Lagos. 
113 WMMSA 12 June 1845 Anear's Journal, Badagry. 
114 Chief Wawu explained the tactics to Revd Annear, saying that: 
The back of the lagoon on the opposite side, is lined with people in 
the jungle from about half a mile above the town, to the same 
distance below. Those men took their station about an hour since, 
being all armed and ready for action. The canoes are all distributed 
at equal distances at the wharfs on this side, and those who are to 
man them either sitting in them, or lying quietly on the ground 
beside them, with their instruments of death already charged. 
Their intended plan of operation is this - the persons in ambush 
furthest up on the other bank are to remain perfectly silent until the 
last canoe part of the fleet, it is supposed, will be just in front of the 
106 
Other areas which required a level of concerted action were law and order and 
the settlement of inter-ward disputes. There are a number of examples of 
Badagry chiefs gathering to resolve disputes and make joint decisions. In 1846 
Revd Martin described a gathering of chiefs to discuss a series of attacks on Sierra 
Leonian immigrants working in the palm oil factory, and a joint decision was 
taken to punish those guilty 115. Revd Annear, during the 1840s, provided some 
of the most detailed evidence of 'council meetings' and 'private consultations'. 
between chiefs116. There is also evidence of the Badagry chiefs acting in 
conjunction with each other to formulate foreign policy. Annear, again in 1845, 
described how most of the chiefs had travelled to Lagos 'where they are sitting in 
Council with the respective chiefs of Porto-Novo, Addo and Lagos' 117. 
Discovering how these collective forums operated is essential to any 
understanding of the state. From the most striking example of such a gathering 
given by Revd Annear in 1846 however, it is evident that it was religious belief 
and ceremony which enabled the disparate Badagry chiefs to operate, at least on 
occasions, as a community. 
town, they are to fire, which is to be the signal for all to commence. 
The moment the firing thus begins on the other bank, the canoes are 
to go forth and attack the enemy on the water, and thus meet them 
on both sides. One particular request which he had to make was, 
that when the firing commenced and the canoes were engaged in 
action before our door, I would not allow the large guns in the 
mission yard to be fired as the shot would go across and kill their 
people in the bush; nor were our men to fire unless we heard from 
him, as in the dark we could not distinguish what canoes were 
approaching us, whether our own or the enemy's 
fWMMSA 6 September 1845 Annear's Journal, Badagry]. 
115 WMMSA 26 June 1846 Martin's Journal in 5 September 1846 Martin, Badagry. 
116 WMMSA 5&6 September 1845 Annear's Journal, Badagry. 
117 vvW-MMSA 1 June 1845 Annear's Journal, Badagry. 
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Chapter Four 
Religious Belief 
In his analysis of Christianity in Nigeria in the nineteenth century, Ajayi 
concludes that one of the major problems which faced the early missionaries was 
the deep and essential difference between Christianity and the traditional beliefs 
of the African people 1. A number of contemporary Christian observers 
attempted to equate the African philosophy of the Supreme Being with that of 
the Christian God. But the multitude of minor deities or'vodun' [in Gun], 
which encompassed all aspects of the African universe ranging from planets to 
plants, and acted as intermediaries between God and man, was too easily 
misinterpreted and misunderstood by the early missionaries, who saw such 
beliefs as merely idol-worship and ignorance2. However, according to Ajayi, the 
major problem facing the evangelists in their quest for conversion was that 
whilst they merely offered 'a catechism ... for personal salvation, indigenous 
beliefs provided moral guidance but also a structure to all aspects of life and 
death 3. The multi-deity nature of these beliefs, although clearly offering scope 
for personal tastes, choice, profession and family etc, did not, however, detract 
from the all-encompassing nature of a spirituality which pervaded every aspect 
and level of society. Not surprisingly the Christian missionaries, adhering to 
simplistic rubrics, were confused by the complexity of African beliefs and 
mistakenly saw them as so many dead superstitions, clung to in ignorance, rather 
than an active philosophy for life. 
Christianity as espoused by the missionaries was a spiritual framework on which 
to found a 'civilised' Africa, based on the model. of Europe. Although ultimately 
rea-tising that this would necessitate a change in the nature and structure of 
1 Ajayi, Chrj5tian Missions... p. 5. 
2 For an overall analysis of African religious belief and practice see JS Mbiti, Introduction to 
African (London, Heinemann Educational, 1975). 
3 Ajayi, Christian Missions p. 5. 
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African societies themselves, the missionaries both underestimated the sheer 
scale of the task and clearly did not have the resources to facilitate it, resulting 
most dramatically, for example, in the disastrous Niger Expedition of 1841 4. 
African beliefs clearly offered far more than a spiritual framework. They 
provided both answers and direction for life, encompassing all areas of existence 
for individuals and state alike. Understandably then, religious belief and practice 
was often closely linked with the political structure of the state. Indeed 'linked'. is 
too tenuous a word, as religious and political aspects were far from being two 
separate entities. This duality of roles most obviously resulted in the emergence 
of groups or societies with a politico /religious function, such as Ogboni at 
Abeokuta or Ekpe in Calabar. It is therefore not possible to distinguish between 
spiritual and secular when examining the structure of such a society. To gain an 
understanding of the community it is necessary to examine the whole. Although 
the case of Badagry does not lend itself to the concept of wholeness, in a city so 
riven by economic and political separatism religious practice would appear to 
have held a vital place in the operation of the community. 
Religious Belief and Practice at Badagry 
Ajayi has drawn comparisons between Badagry and the more easterly state of 
Calabar on the Oil Rivers. Both states had their origins in the attractions of the 
slave trade, and outwardly both shared a potentially fragmented political 
structure, the eight wards of Badagry being in many ways comparable with the 
three towns of Calabar. However, in Calabar potential factionalism within the 
4 The Niger Expedition of 1841 arose from the desire to civilise West Africa by opening the country 
up to cultivation and commerce. The ideas of Christian evangelists, anti-slave traders and 
merchants were combined in the publication of TF Buxton's The African Slave Trade and Its 
Remedy in 1840. Skillful lobbying of the British Government put the first steps of Buxton's plan into 
operation. A party of missionaries, scientists, commercial and government agents were to travel up 
river from the coast reporting on the possibilities for missionary and commercial operations in the 
area, whilst treaties were to be made with local rulers. Furthermore, a party form the Agricultural 
Society, founded by Buxton, were to acquire land and establish a model farm. However, forty five of 
the one hundred and fifty European members of the expedition died, the model farm was quickly 
abandoned and the 
few treaties made remained unratified [Ajayi, Christian Missions... pp. 12-13; j 
F Schon &S Crowther fournals of the Expedition of 1841 (London 1842). 
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town was largely overcome by the emergence of the Ekpe organisation, a supra- 
town secret society lead by the wealthy freemen of the community which 
exercised judicial, police, and legislative powers 5. Similar in style was the Yoruba 
Ogboni or Oboni society, most prominent in the powerful Yoruba state of 
Abeokuta. Ogboni was a cult based on the worship of the Yoruba earth goddess 
Onile, the secrets of which were kept by oath on pain of death. But the public face 
of Ogboni in areas such as Abeokuta was demonstrably political 
There is little indication of a similarly prominent politico / religious organisation 
such as Ekpe at Badagry. Nor was there - perhaps more surprisingly considering 
the Yoruba influences and then the proximity of Abeokuta - any development of 
a political role for Ogboni. Indeed there is little clear evidence for even the 
existence of Ogboni during the pre-colonial period. Revd Gollmer, after two years 
residence in Badagry, mentioned the existence of 'Aboni' at a place called Idoggo 
[Idogo - about nine miles north of Okeodan], but he clearly identified this as a 
Yoruba town, distinct from the Gun people of Badagry 7. It was not until the 
twentieth century and the rise of the Reformed Ogboni movement that there is 
5 See Alagoa, 'Nineteenth Century Revolutions in the Eastern Delta States and Calabar', IHSN, 
V/4, (1971) pp. 565-574. 
6 In Abeokuta, although after 1854 the Alake was the acknowledged figurehead, the trader 
William McCoskry noted in the early 1860s that: 
We have hitherto attributed to him more influence and power 
than that to which he is entitled. Abeokuta being composed of 
the refugees from numerous independent towns and territories... 
it is only for purposes of general interest that the Alake can be looked 
upon as representing the whole community on all other occasions each 
town considers itself entitled to do as it would have done in its 
independent state 
[PRO F084/1141 2 December 1861 McCoskry, Lagos]. According to Biobaku it was members of the 
secret Ogboni cult who were in effect the real rulers of the town. Acting between the ruler and his 
subjects they prevented the former from becoming despotic and ensured the proper subordination of 
the latter [S 0 Biobaku, The Egba and Their Neighbours. (London OUP, 1957). In 1861 Consul Foote 
discussed the practical implications of the role of Ogboni when he described the negotiations of the 
African Aid Society with the Egba over possible grants of land to African American settlers. Foote 
noted that the allocation of land at Abeokuta was not the work of the Alake, indeed he stated 
that: 
The Alake cannot legally alienate a foot of ground - it can only 
be done by the chiefs and elders of the spot chosen and they must 
submit to the Oboni or Council 
f PRO F084 /11416 /7 April 1861 Foote, Lagos]. 
7C October 1847, p. 225,24 December 1846 Gollmer's Journal, Badagry. 
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firm evidence for the existence of the society within Badagry town8- 
However, nineteenth century Badagry was seen as a markedly religious place 
where a large number of cults were in operation. Avoseh stated in 1938 that the 
Gun gods of Badagry were 'identical with the Yoruba gods' and worshipped in 
the same way 9. Many of the deities had their parallels among both groups, but 
Avoseh's assertion is clearly an oversimplification. Yoruba deities and cults such 
as the worship of Shango, god of thunder, Sopona, god of small-pox, and the 
operation of the Egungun cult were certainly evident at Badagry. However, it is 
clear that these Yoruba imports were operating alongside their Gun equivalents 
brought from the west, for example Hevioso, Sakpata and Aisun respectively. 
Other religious practices co-existing in Badagry were the use of Ifa divination, 
worship of various water deities such as Hu, Legba the divine trickster and the 
cult of Dangbe, the royal python brought from Whydah. Other secret societies, 
such as Zangbeto from Porto-Novo and Oro from Yorubaland also operated 
within Badagry. With such a variety of practice in the town it is initially difficult 
to identify religious belief as a cohesive force. However, a close examination of 
the evidence would suggest that religious practice at Badagry was not only a 
reflection of its diverse structure but also in part transcended that diversity and 
provided a framework of shared beliefs. It would also appear from an 
examination of the evidence that a number of cults did, at various times, achieve 
a wide following. The belief in Ifa or Fa, a divine mediator between god and 
man, is one such example. Implicit in the practices of Ifa was the complex system 
of divination using palm nuts, which gave guidance in all aspects of life . 
Originally a Yoruba belief, by the early years of the eighteenth century Ifa had also 
been introduced into Dahomey 10. Understandably then, from both Yoruba and 
Gun influences, Ifa divination played a prominent role in the affairs of Badagry. 
8 Duckworth, 'Badagry: Its place in the Pages of the History of Nigeria', p. 170. 
9 Avoseh, 
-A 
Short Histojýý of Badagly p. 52. 
10 Law, The Slave Coast... pp. 106-107. 
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Indeed there are several accounts of chiefs consulting the 'god of palm-nuts' to 
determine their course of action although it is important to note that this was 
not the only way by which it was possible to begin 'calculating an affair of 
importance' 11. 
Gollmer accounts for the popularity of Ifa as being a result of its powers and 
success12. However, a still more revealing analysis of its attractions was given to 
Revd Hinderer who was told by two travellers that ffa touched every aspect of 
their lives: 
Part of it we eat, part of it we make a fire of, part of it we bum in 
our lamps, part of it again we build the roofs of our houses with, and 
the rest we bow down unto, saying'Help us! for thou are our 
helperl 3 
In this way the power of ffa was bound up with the huge impact that the palm 
nut had on all aspects of life, and thus its use as a tool of divination was an 
extension of its vital economic role. The position of the palm nut made its use in 
spiritual matters understandable and relevant to the populace. 
The emergence of such 'relevant' cults and beliefs to a position of prominence 
can also be traced to other practices at Badagry and is in fact useful in helping to 
construct a picture of the society's structure. The town's geographical position on 
the inland waterways of the lagoon system and on the Atlantic coast itself clearly 
had a considerable impact on the town, and indeed was the very reason for the 
state's foundation. Not surprisingly then at least some sections of the Badagry 
population were involved in the worship of water deities. Ellis noted in the 
latter part of the nineteenth century that the crocodile was sacred at both Badagry 
11 it is possible that consultation of Ifa may have been the more usual practice of the Yoruba 
inhabitants of Badagry. For example in 1846 Revd Gollmer noted in his journal that he had 
interrupted the chief of Apa consulting Ifa [CN-LR-March 1847, p. 49,7 June 1846, Gollmer's journal, 
Badagry]. On Clapperton's visit twenty years earlier he had also witnessed the divination process, 
but on this occasion it was clearly a different practice involving two mushroom shaped objects, 
representations of houses, humans and animal figures along with iron rods and cowries [PRO C02/15 
1 December 1825 Clapperton's journal, Badagry]. 
12 CMF, March 1847, p. 49,7 June 1846, Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
13 CMI November 1851, p. 249,12 March 1851, Hinderer's journal, Abeokuta. 
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and Porto-Novo 14. Revd Gollmer in the mid 1840s also made reference to 
Oshun the goddess of the river 15. However, evidence is scarce and contrasts with 
the high profile taken by, for example, fishing festivals and sacrifices held on the 
lagoon at Lagos 16. 
The crocodile [Tokpodun] was said to be the daughter of the sea deity Hu17. 
There is evidence of the veneration of the sea god taking place at Badagry. On 
landing there in 1825 Richard Lander described the fetish priests standing in the 
bows of the landing canoes both preying to the water divinity and also giving 
directions to the crew18. However, one should again note that it was not 
Badagrians who manned the canoes but men brought from the Gold Coast. 
Another, later, reference to the sea deity at Badagry was given by Revd Gollmer 
who described an offering of 'a few vegetables, fifteen cowries, not quite a 
halfpenny - one egg, one yam, a little dog, and a black pigeon'which were 
thrown into the sea by two men. He also noted that 'A short time ago Mr Marsh 
also delivered a pigeon, which had been offered in the same manner. 
Unfortunately he concludes by adding that 'I have inquired into the meaning of 
14 It is also interesting to note that the divinity of the crocodile, brought from the old Whydah 
Kingdom of Savi and which forbade the killing of those reptiles, would appear to have been 
venerated only amongst certain sections of the Badagry population. During a power struggle 
between chiefs Jengen and Posu in the latter part of the eighteenth century, Avoseh notes that the 
former chief of Whydah descent attempted to catch the latter in a special trap laid to catch 
crocodiles [A B Ellis, The Ewe Speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast of West Africa, (London, 1890), 
u. 84-85; Avoseh, A Short HistOry of Badagry, p. 191. 
Gollmer's reference to this goddess was all too brief for he merely noted that it was she that 
would not let some of his pupils come to school at that time. Whether he meant that the youngsters 
were required to perform ceremonies on these days or were needed for fishing he does not say [CMSA 
CA2 / 043 / 96 25 July 1845 Gollmer's Journal, Badagry]. 
16 In Robert Smith's analysis of Lagos he has concluded that life 'centred round the yearly cycle of 
festivals ... especially 
important in Lagos was the fishing festival dedicated to the goddess of the 
lagoon' [Smith, The Lagos Consulate... p. 981. The importance of the lagoon deity at Lagos is also 
alluded to by Robertson who noted that'A vestal female is frequently impaled here, as a sacrifice 
to improve the navigation of the river and extend their trade'[Robertson, Notes on Africa p. 2931. 
17 Hu was the national deity of the Hula people of Great Popo. But eastward migration spread the 
cult to Whydah and Allada and also subsequently to the Dahomean kingdom. Law has noted that 
the cult's importance rose as trade with Europe increased since it was through sacrifice to this deity 
that the sea could be calmed to make communications with the trading ships easier [Law, The 
Slave C-O-a-St---, - PP- 110-1111- 18 R Lander Captain Clapperton's Last Expedition to Africa, Vol 1, pp. 42-43. 
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these sacrifices, but have received no satisfactory reply' 19. Gollmer's inability to 
provide further information about these offerings is frustrating. However, what 
is clear is the very private and relatively small-scale nature of the practice. This 
contrasts sharply with the offerings to Hu at Whydah where, as witnessed by 
Revd Bernasko, a man was 'thrown into the sea to join the two porters of the sea 
gate' on behalf of the King, or at Lagos where a human victim was buried alive at 
the sea shore annually and when the bar was particularly bad20. In comparison 
Badagrian offerings to the sea were surprisingly low key. This may be a reflection 
of Badagrian life, in this case Badagrian economic life. As a town largely of 
middlemen, the Badagry concern was not so much the processes of shipment, but 
rather, was dominated by the market place itself. This is not a wholly satisfactory 
explanation as this was also true of both Whydah and Lagos, however it would 
account for the important role of Legba at Badagry. 
Legba [Elegbara or Esu to the Yoruba] was the divine trickster or devil of Gun 
belief. The god of personal misfortune he was also the god which 'presides over 
the market ... and to the dumb idol is dedicated every cowry that accidentally drops 
from the counter' 21. The centre of Legba or Elegbara worship was at Iworo, only 
about 8 miles east of Badagry and under the jurisdiction of an independent 
chief22. It was at this place that Richard Lander stumbled across the numerous 
sacrifices made at the fetish tree in 1827 23. In the 1860s the missionary Samuel 
Pearse noted that sacrifices to this deity were sent annually from as far afield as 
Porto-Novo and Lagos and in former times from Yorubaland and Benin 24. The 
19 CMR October 1847, p. 228,25 October 1846 Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
20 PRO F084/1158 29 November 1860 Bernasko, Whydah in 6 February 1861 Mr Osborn (Secretary of 
the WMMS), London. 
21 CMSA CA2 / 076 / 42 29 July 1861 Pearse's journal, Badagry. 
22 PRO F084/920 11 January 1853 Fraser, Lagos. 
23 R Lander, Captain Clapperton's Last Expedition to Africa, Vol 2, pp. 266-269. 
24 On both visits to Badagry, Lander spoke of the horrors of the Badagry annual customs. But it is 
important to note that these were in no way comparable with the Dahomean customs. At Abomey 
the customs were largely an expression and demonstration of monarchical power. The customs at 
lworo were not politically partisan. They were ultimately, an expression Of the dominance of the 
market place [CMSA CA2 
/ 076 / 42 29 July 1861 Pearse's journal, Badagry; R&J Lander, Tournal of an 
EX12 ýditiojL,. Vol 1, p. 46]. 
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veneration in which the deity was held amongst the peoples along that part of 
the coast was extremely high. In 1879 a Colonial Office Report noted that no 
matter what wars or troubles occurred in that part of the country 'the roads were 
ever open to the messengers of any powerful chief or king who wishes to consult 
Elegbara ... at Iworro'25. At Badagry, worship of Legba also took place within the 
town itself year round. Whitford described the abundance of 'devil-houses' in 
the town and Richard Lander, although he did not name the deity, noted that to 
avert the wrath of a 'malevolent spirit', sacrifices of dogs and sheep were made 
along with human beings 26. 
Religious practice would then appear to have been shaped, at least in part, by the 
situation of the town. Popular diversity was similarly reflected. Shango, the 
Yoruba god of thunder was a clearly identifiable cult. Although its introduction 
cannot be dated, accounts from early missionary arrivals show that this cult was 
very active during the 1840s. Its followers both attracted criticism from the 
missionaries for the licentiousness of their behaviour 'too horrible and shocking 
to describe and also themselves criticised and even threatened the Christian 
arrivals 27. But it is evident that Shango was followed only by Yoruba inhabitants 
of Badagry 28. The parallel god amongst the Gun population, brought from the 
west, was Hevioso or So. Avoseh claims that this deity was introduced by Avutu, 
a daughter of Yede, the seventh Akran at Badagry who had gone to Gbeta 
[unidentified] and was married. On her return she brought with her the Hevioso 
Fetish, probably then towards the end of the eighteenth century 29. 
25 PRO C0879 / 15 Information respecting the Settlement of Lagos 1879. 
26 Whitford, Trading Life, p. 107; R Lander, Captain Clapperton's Last Expedition to Africa, Vol 1, 
271. 
In 1847 the Methodist missionary Martin was threatened by Shango priests. The ward chiefs 
hurriedly apologised to their guest. However, it is important to note that this criticism by the 
Shango priests came at a time of increasing disillusionment with the missionaries and increasing 
instability at Badagry. The use of religious cults as vehicles for expressing political dissatisfaction 
requires further research 
[CMSA CA2/067/19 17 April 1849 Marsh's Journal, Badagry; WMMSA 17 
May 1847 Martin, Badagry]. 
28 CA2/067/19 17 April 1849 Marsh's journal, Badagry. 
29 Avoseh, A Short Histuy of Badagry p. 22. 
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The existence of both Shango and Hevioso at Badagry was a reflection of the 
diverse immigrant groups settling there. Evidently this was the result of a 
process which continued throughout the course of the town's development. In 
1853 Revd Gollmer, on a visit to Badagry after the permanent removal of the 
CMS mission to Lagos referred to Sopona 'A new sort of Orisha [Yoruba 
equivalent of 'Vodun'], the god of smallpox ... paraded the streets today' 30. His'. 
account of Sopona's introduction to Badagry is clearly confused. Gollmer himself 
calls it 'a most strange importation from Porto-Novo'. However, the small-pox 
deity of that area was known as Sakpata [also Sapatan] 31. It was in Yorubaland 
that the god was given the name Sopona. Gollmer may have been confusing his 
own knowledge of the Yoruba small-pox god with the more westerly Sakpata, 
although his seemingly mystified tone would throw doubt on this. What is also 
interesting are the possible factors which affected the introduction of the cult. An 
outbreak or threatened outbreak of small-pox in the town is possible, although 
tellingly not mentioned by Gollmer. But in June 1853 Badagry was in the throes 
of political and commercial upheaval after the expulsion of the traditional chiefs 
and the seizure of control by the Mewu, an exile from Porto-Novo. The 
introduction of this cult from Porto-Novo may have been an attempt by the new 
chief to reinforce his political position by introducing a religious aspect to his 
leadership, a way of attracting and maintaining a following32. Without further 
evidence it is impossible to draw any firm conclusions. But the case of 
Sakpata / Sopona would seem to indicate that the fluctuation of cults at Badagry 
was the result of both immigration and economic or political needs. 
30 CNIR June 1854, p. 127,3 June 1853, Gollmer's Journal, Badagry. 
31 Ellis, The Land of Fetish. p. 84. 
32 It is interesting to note that in Dahomey the cult of Sakpata was a force resisting the despotism 
of the monarchy fLaw, 
The Slave Coast, p. 1111. However, it is unlikely that this was the case at 
Badagry or that Sakpata was a Porto-Novo inspired resistance movement to the pretender the 
Mewu. 
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Politico/Religious societies 
The emergence of cults at Badagry was then a result of immigration patterns, 
along with economic and political needs. Indeed, ultimately a number of cults 
were able to develop a role which not only reflected the diversity of Badagry but 
were in many ways able to offset the resulting lack of centralisation. But 
flexibility remained paramount, and as requirements and situations changed so 
did the political importance of particular cults. The veneration of heads or 
'Aisun', a system of ancestor worship with its roots at Porto-Novo, was also 
practised at Badagry 33. Interestingly however, this form of worship would appear 
to have reached a peak during the period of Adele's residence at Badagry from 
the early 1820s until 1835, when it played a key role in establishing him as 
paramount political authority at Badagry. 
According to the Landers, upon his deposition at Lagos, Adele, 'with a spirit of 
filial piety, took with him the skull of his father 'in order that it might not be 
dishonoured in his absence' 34. Also carrying with him his aged mother, Adele 
arrived at Badagry where he was welcomed by the people who were so edified by 
his behaviour that, according to local historian Losi, they appointed him as their 
paramount chief 35. This explanation of Adele's rapid acceptance as effective 
monarch of Badagry is simplistic. However, it does provide certain clues as to the 
possible roots of his authority there. It would appear from a close reading of the 
Lander account that possibly Adele was able, with the use of his father's head, to 
establish his credentials as a monarch in exile. Furthermore, as Law has 
suggested, by transferring this symbol of the monarchy to Badagry, Adele's 
arrival signified an end to Badagry Is period as tributary to Lagos 
36. Adele, 
however, used this symbol not only as a figurehead of the Lagos monarchy in 
exile, but as a standard for a new Badagrian monarchy. Indeed 
he was able to 
33 Avoseh, A Short Histoa of Badag]Z: p. 55. 
34 R&j Lander, 12umal-Qf an Expedition-, Vol 1, p. 37. 
35 jB Losi Hist: )a of Laggu (Lagos, 1914), p. 20. 
36 Law 'The Career of Adele.... ' pp. 43-44. 
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establish very quickly a supernatural 'tradition' for his ancestor at Badagry. 
According to Lander's account, which may be exaggerated, the skull of Adele is 
father was credited with immense spiritual power. Kept in a private sanctuary 
where it was sprinkled with either animal or human blood, the skull became 
especially important during periods of crisis. In battle, Lander stated, it would act 
in the same way as the banner of Mohammed to the Turks and should it be lost 
then 'the pillars of their monarchy would crumble into dust so that they would 
no longer be a people, 37. This prediction that the disappearance of Ologun 
Kutere's skull would signal the end to the Badagrian 'monarchy' was indeed 
justified. On Adele's return to Lagos, presumably with skull, Badagry once more 
returned to the fragmentary style of politics that it had previously known. 
Without the monarchical figure of Adele, the institution of royalty, symbolised 
by the skull, was meaningless in the Badagry case. As Avoseh suggests, the 
worship of ancestral heads continued at Badagry after the Adele period 38. 
Furthermore, the Yoruba practice of ancestor worship, known as Egungun 
became extremely active in the town although there is no indication that it ever 
again achieved the political dominance that it had done. 
However, there were other religious cults at Badagry, which did achieve a 
prominence that can actually be seen as bringing a sense of identity or perhaps 
more accurately identities to the town as a whole which were more suited to the 
factional nature of Badagry government. The origins of the Dangbe or Royal 
Python cult were from Whydah, where it was concerned with the regulation of 
rainfall in the interests of agriculture. But as the national deity of Whydah it was 
also a guarantor of military success and important in the installation of Kings 39. 
The large scale removal of Whydahs to Badagry and their foundation of three 
37 R Lander, Captain Clapperton's Last EN12edition to Africa. Vol 2, p. 253. 
38 In 1887 two months after the death of long time Badagry resident and colonial official Thomas 
Tickel, his grave was 'violated' and his corpse beheaded. The colonial authorities of the time did 
not however regard this as a sign of respect or religious practice and a man was subsequently 
convicted and punished for the'crime' 
fNNAI BADADIV 6/1 District Officer's Report 18871. 
39 Law, The Slave Coast.... p. 112. 
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wards in the town during the eighteenth century resulted, not surprisingly, in 
the cults introduction there. Clapperton in 1826 noted that: 
a great part of the inhabitants to this day are the descendants of 
the ancient Whidahs and still preserve their national mark and 
Institutions such as their worship of the snake 40 
Dangbe's role as the god of the Whydahs at Badagry had not changed by the 1840s. 
Annear called it the 'Town god' of Ahoviko Ward, whilst Idale, a village about 
four miles east of Badagry and the scene of an annual Dangbe festival, belonged 
to Chief WawU 41. Dangbe was a Whydah-based cult, but it would appear that it 
ultimately came to play an important part in the yearly cycle for Badagry as a 
whole. Indeed during the middle part of the nineteenth century the snake was 
termed the 'national god' of Badagry 42. According to the missionary Samuel 
Pearse the Dangbe festival took place annually and 'every soul, free born and 
slave, young and old, is required to go to Idale' which was 'the seat' of the 
python. Sacrifices were made whilst 'the remaining part of the day was spent in 
fearful drinking and all kinds of vices' 43. Revd Crowther also noted how every 
inhabitant at Badagry went to the festivities, even the Mewu, who seldom left his 
post at MOWO 44. However, it was only the Wawu of Ahoviko who actually had a 
priest consecrated to this god and took part in the ritual aspects of the annual 
ceremonies. For while the populace of Badagry was present and received the 
blessing of Dangbe, an occasion for high spirits and amusement, it was the High 
Priest and Chief Wawu who ceremonially performed the sacrifice of a bullock 
away from the public gaze 45. 
The general celebrations of the whole town at this time would appear to be a 
similar phenomenon, although on a wider scale, to the general celebrations held 
40 PRO C02 /15 1 December 1825 Clapperton's journal, Badagry. 
41 WMMSA 9 December 1844 Annear's journal, Badagry; CUR October 1846, p. 229,12 July 1845 
Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
42 CMSA CA2/082/11 23 April 1848 Smith's journal, Badagry. 
43 CMSA CA2 / 076 / 42 5 October 1861 Pearse's journal, Badagry. 
44 CMSA CA2/031/90 7 April 1845 Crowther's journal, Badagry. 
45 CM March 1847, pp. 50-53,10 April 1846 Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
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at the end of Ramadan as described by the Landers in 1830. All those celebrating 
alongside the Muslim community were not holders of that faith nor potential 
converts, yet such a festival offered the opportunity for Badagry as a whole to 
join together in general celebrations 46. However, although occasions such as the 
Dangbe festival were a time for pure enjoyment and pleasure, there was certainly 
a more serious aspect underlying the proceedings. For it was one of the rare 
occasions when the population of Badagry acted as a group and this annual 
gathering was, if not consciously, an unconscious way of defining themselves as 
such. It is interesting to note that during the latter 1840s and early 1850s when 
Badagry was on the verge of collapse the annual festival became much neglected 
and indeed very few bothered to travel to the celebrations 47. 
The connection between spirituality and community is also present in perhaps 
the most important example of Badagrian political unity. One of the only other 
examples of Badagrians defining themselves as a group with common interests 
and objectives also took the form of a religious experience. This was the occasion 
when the chiefs of the town met either once a year or at times of crisis in the 
presence of their 'fetishes' to take oaths of allegiance. Law has pointed out that 
such oath taking was commonly made between rulers and their communities 
but also in areas of political fragmentation. He cites the example given by Norris, 
of the Mahi, north-east of Dahomey who, divided as they were into numerous 
small states, 'were able to unite for mutual defence ... through the ceremony of 
drinking vodun' 48. The use of a 'fetish' water to seal such an oath was clearly 
mirrored at the Badagry oath taking ceremony where under the auspices of a 
priest the ward chiefs swore their loyalty to one another and the town49. 
46 R&j Lander, lournal of an Expedition... Vol 1, p. 50. 
47 In May 1847 Gollmer noted that the Dangbe festival was disrupted by rain and that many people 
did not bother to attend [CMSA CA2 / 043 /103 3 May 1847 Gollmer's Journal, Badagry] . But in April 
1851 he noted that poor attendance was the result of 'disharmony'in the town [CMSA CA2/043/111 
24 April 1851 Gollmer's journal Badagryl- See chapter 9, p. 300. 
48 Law, The Slave Coast. pp. 114-115. Also see P Hazoume, Le Pacte du Sang au Dahomgy, (Paris 
1938). 
49 Revd Annear witnessed the ceremony and produced a detailed description of the event in his 
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According to Law such oaths were taken at Whydah either by Dangbe or by the 
earth. Similarly at Badagry it would appear that oaths were taken in the name of 
more than one deity. According to Annear's initial comments 'the gods of this 
joumal: 
This morning a celebrated fetish custom took place in one of the 
venerated places set apart for this purpose just outside the mission 
yard. All the chiefs of the town were present. It is their usual practice 
to meet thus once a year or at any other time when danger threatens 
the place or any one of the chiefs is suspected to have entered 
into a conspiracy against the rest. Their object in coming together is 
to take an oath, in the presence of the Priest and their fetishes, that 
they have not and will not betray one another, or, if a charge has 
been brought against them, to maintain their innocence. The gods 
of this fetish are thunder and snakes, which they say, shall kill 
them if they swear falsely... 
All the chiefs sat on one side of the gate, leading to the idol temple 
... Their Head men, and people, sat in groups under the branches of 
the sacred trees. 
In a few moments the priest came out of the temple, bringing with 
him three human skulls ... f? ] which the ground around the yard is strewed, and a pile of which stands on each side of the entrance. 
This venerated personage was a very old man, whose sable skin 
hung in rolls over his piercing bones; and whose hair, was white as snow 
... This striking figure issuing from the temple as he did, laden with 
the relics of death, had a most unearthly appearance. Having bought 
the skulls out, he placed them on the ground in the form of an angle, 
upon these he soon placed a large bundle of gods of various forms, most of 
them being nothing more than a piece of common wood. Many of them 
were dyed black, and others were stained with human blood. A small 
earthen pot filled with water - the poisoned water of their god, was 
placed on the ground close behind the skulls and a short distance from it, 
a calabash containing more water, and three... [? ] stones, (the first I have 
seen in Badagri) which were the gods of thunder. Hundreds of their 
fetishes were brought forth, and unpacked before the gaze of the 
devoted crowd. The priest now consecrated a piece of ground about 
14ft square. This he did by marking it out on the sand first with one 
and then another, of the fetishes, a piece of stick forked at the end. 
This being done all the chiefs came forward, and knelt side by side on 
the front line of the hallowed spot, and the taking of the oaths 
commenced. The purport of their swearing was just the same in every 
case - that they had not done anything in secret to injure any other chief; 
and that they would all unite to defend the town, should danger 
threaten it, each one at the end of his oath declaring that if he spoke 
not the truth this fetish should kill him. Possu accused Wawu of having 
conspired with the white people here to keep away all Portuguese 
vessels, for whatever purpose they may come. Wawu had to take a 
special oath that he had not, at the same time licking the bloodstained 
god, and drinking the poisoned water, which he did blindfold. He 
afterwards knelt erect and delivered an ...... [? ] address to them all, 
showing them the injustice of the accusation. 
fWMMSA 29 September 1844 Annear's Journal in 21 October 1844 Annear, Badagry]. 
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fetish are thunder and snakes'. Although there is clear evidence to suggest that 
Shango, the Yoruba god of thunder was worshipped at Badagry there were no 
Yoruba chiefs of the town. Therefore it would seem more likely that the thunder 
deity referred to here was that of the Whydah area, Hevioso or So. The snake 
deity must surely have been Dangbe. However, it would appear that there were 
other deities also represented at the ceremony. As well as skulls being brought 
forward from the temple by the priest in charge of the proceedings, he also 
brought out pieces of wood, some dyed back and some bloodstained, and 
calabashes of water, some containing stones (identifiable as the sign of Hevioso). 
In fact Annear noted that 'hundreds of their fetishes were brought forth and 
unpacked before the gaze of the devoted crowd'. Although it is difficult to 
positively identify these 'fetishes, it would appear that more than merely 
thunder and snakes were represented. Annear's identification of only these two 
may have been the result of the -missionary's familiarity with the beliefs of 
Ahoviko, the 'English' quarter of Badagry. The representation of at least two, and 
possibly a greater number of fetishes was due to the diversity of the Badagry 
political situation. The power of oaths might have been negated by the use of a 
single deity, not venerated by all the Badagry chiefs. Therefore the incorporation 
of several into the ceremony attempted to bind all the various elements together. 
The fact that Annear described the Wawu taking his oath whilst 'at the same 
time licking the bloodstained god, and drinking the poisoned water' may suggest 
that the chief was obliged to swear by more than one god. 
The need for a supra-ward level of communication within Badagry was met at 
least to some extent then by the development of religious ritual. Therefore the 
involvement of religious beliefs in the. definition of Badagry as a distinct 
community takes on a very important political role and religious cults were able 
to maintain some kind of cohesion between the diverse ruling elites. But this 
political role can also be identified at a lower level whereby the day to day 
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operation of the state both within and across ward lines was closely connected 
with the existence of a number of such cults. Whilst binding each other with 
religious ritual, the Badagry chiefs were able to use similar methods to control 
their followers. 
Religious Belief and the Maintenance of Civil Order 
The Policing Function 
In a state with little or no central authority the maintenance of law and order was 
problematic. At Badagry there is evidence to suggest that such problems were, to 
some extent, overcome by the use of religious beliefs and practices. The most 
easily identifiable example of this is the operation of the Zangbeto cult which, 
according to Avoseh, played a vital role in the policing of the town and indeed 
was 'the only aspect by which the night was guarded' 50. In their study of Porto- 
Novo, Akindele and Aguessy outline this role for Zangbeto in far more detail 51. 
According to their account, at the sounding of a trumpet, Zangbeto members 
would gather in their quarter at night, and at the appearance of Zangbeto himself, 
represented by a costumed cult member, the group would disperse to various 
parts of the quarter to guard against thieves and wrongdoers whilst the Zangbeto 
figure and several other members formed a mobile patrol. The summoning 
trumpet was also a signal for all other members of the quarter to retire to their 
homes and all those who failed to heed the trumpet and were unfortunate 
enough to meet the patrol, were challenged. Those without good reason for 
ignoring the curfew, who were suspected of wrongdoing, faced physical 
punishment. 
50 Avoseh, A Short History of Badagly, pp. 39-40. 
51 A Akindele &C Aguessy, Contribution a Fetude de I'histoire de I'ancien royame de Porto-Novo. 
Memoires de H. F. A. N. No 25 (Dakar 1953: Repr. Amsterdam 1968). Also see BF Houssou, 'Histoire 
et Civilisation: Le Zangbeto a 
Xogbonu (Porto-Novo), des origines a nos jours', Dissertation 
Universite Nationale de Benin (1985). 
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Although they do not lay emphasis on it in their description, it would appear 
from Akindele and Aguessy that the operation of the Zangbeto cult in Porto- 
Novo was carried out at 'quartier' or ward level. However, they do add that it 
was encouraged in its protective role by the monarchs of the CitY52. This then can 
perhaps shed some light on the cult's operation at Badagry. Although there is no 
explicit pre-colonial evidence about the cult, and Avoseh goes no further than 
mentioning it as a protective device, it is interesting to note that, in a description 
of the lawlessness of Badagry, Revd Annear alluded to the dangers of nocturnal 
wandering. Indeed he noted that several attacks had been made on people 
passing through the streets after dark53. Annear equated this fear and danger 
with the prevalence of virulent kidnapping and slave dealing by all members of 
society. However, as well as being 'stolen', he also noted that individuals were in 
danger of being 'beaten', the punishment meted out to Zangbeto curfew breakers. 
It is possible that Annear was confusing random kidnapping with the policing 
role of Zangbeto. It could also be that in Badagry, the punishment for 'offenders' 
by Zangbeto could involve both beating and enslaving. This account would also 
seem to imply that if such punishments were operated by Zangbeto, as in Porto- 
Novo, the cult operated within ward confines. It would appear that one of the 
main functions of Zangbeto at Badagry was to keep persons of other wards out. 
Indeed so successful was this aspect that it was noted by Annear that 'people of 
one part of the town dare not venture into that of the other'. Although, 
according to the missionary, this fear prevented 'any degree of peace, or security' 
it is possible firstly that, during a period of inter-ward tension, which the 1840s 
undoubtedly were, individual ward security was of paramount importance. 
Furthermore, the operation of Zangbeto as a religious cult outside the direct 
remit of the chiefs themselves meant that any subsequent ill will may have been 
directed not against the ward but against the cult. It is notable in Annear's 
52 Indeed Houssou notes that each quarter might have several groups of Zangbeto, dependent on its 
size [Houssou, '... Le Zangbeto a Xogbonu... ', p. 211. 
53 WMMSA 27 September 1844 Annear's journal in 21 October 1844 Annear, Badagry. 
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account for example, that Chief Wawu emphasised that he would not be 
answerable for any beatings which took place in his ward. In this way then 
religious practice was both the focus of communal loyalty but also channelled 
dissatisfaction away from the ward chiefs themselves through the operation of 
unpopular and potentially antagonistic functions 54. 
The operation of such functions on a spiritual level undoubtedly gave them a 
sanctity and legitimacy which they would not have held had they merely been 
operated by the ward chiefs. Revd Gollmer, recounting the use of a priest from 
Porto-Novo tracing some thieves, suggested that religious practices were used 'to 
give authority to the charge, frighten the people and get the matter settled 
sooner, 55. Other similar tools of this process were the Egungun and Oro cults, 
both of which would appear to have been active at Badagry during the pre- 
colonial period. Avoseh's reference to Egungun at Badagry is purely bound up 
with his account of ancestor worship56. He offers no indication as to when the 
Egungun cult was introduced into Badagry. However, like the worship of 'Aisun' 
or heads, the cult did have a link with Adele of Lagos. According to Losi, the 
introduction of the 'Egun' into Lagos, by some of Adele's children, was one of 
the reasons that he lost popularity amongst the elders of the town because it was 
'very unbecoming to the dignity of a king' 57. It is possible then or even likely 
54 During the 1930s the operation of Zangbeto and the ward chiefs had clearly become closely 
allied. For example the head of Asago ward was also said to be head of the night guard [NNAI 
BADADIV 6/1 District Officers Intelligence Report 19311. However, it is impossible to assess 
without further evidence whether this was the case during the pre-colonial period as the operation 
of Zangbeto is an excellent example of a local institution 'developed' by the colonial authorities. In 
1937 RJM Curwen, the local District Officer, noted that the night guard system had been 'adapted 
in 1893 by the District Commissioner Major JH Ewart, from a nocturnal secret society' [NNAI CSO 
26/4 30030/SI A Report on the Reorganisation of the Badagri District'R JM Curwen 19371. 
According to Curwen this system meant that each quarter provided ten night guards and the 
quarters, in pairs, had a sixteen day spell of duty. A similarly cooperative system of ward 
collaboration had been described by the Badagry town council two years earlier [NNAI BADADIV 
4/2 Badagry Council Minute Book 1929-1935 Meeting of 5 October 1935]. This system based on close 
inter-ward cooperation was evidently an adaptation of the original system. 
55 There is no indication as to whether this Porto-Novan was in any way connected with Zangbeto 
[CMSA CA2 / 043 /103 29 May 1847 Gollmer's Journal, Badagry]. 
56 Avoseh, A Short History of BadagLy p. 55. 
57 Losi, _Hist=_Qýýs 
P-'19- 
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that on his expulsion from Lagos, Adele's family brought the cult with them to 
Badagry. Peter Morton-Williams, in his examination of the 0yo roots of 
Egungun, accounts for the cult's unpopularity as being a result of its ability to 
undermine the authority of the monarchy, or at least serve as an alternative 
source of authority in certain areas of government 58. However, in the Badagry 
context this alternative source of authority was a vital option. Morton-Williams 
explains that within the Yoruba context, the Egungun cult served a number of 
political functions. Firstly that of social control, through the celebration of 
particular festivals, which, he suggests, re-defined the normally purely lineage- 
bound social structures of Yoruba society. As well as overriding kin/lineage 
boundaries, much as Dangbe would appear to have done ward boundaries at 
Badagry, Egungun was also a way of projecting the 'discords and tensions 
inherent in compound life' onto the Egungun figure 59. These tensions, 
requiring social control from the subjugation of women through fear to the more 
specific identification and punishment of criminals, most notably witches, were 
dissipated by the mysterious, masked Egungun figure 60. The Oro cult acted in a 
similar way, notably in the process of detecting witches. Heralded, like the 
Egungun by the 'sound of witchcraft', in this case a 'bull roarer', the Oro figure 
was appointed by the gods to find out witches. At Badagry in the 1840s Revd 
Annear described how: 
Often I have heard the doleful sound of the instrument which is 
sounded on his approach, while he has been going his round for this 
purpose. If he or the chiefs suspect any person of being a witch ... he 
proceeds to his house, generally in the night, and having found 
him, commands him to grasp the magic and mysterious instrument, 
58 p Morton-Williams, 'The Egungun Society in South West Yoruba Kingdom', WAISER Conference 
Proceedings (1954), pp. 90-103. Also see P Morton-Williams, 'Yoruba Responses to the Fear of 
Death', Afric 30 No 1, (1960), pp. 34-40. 
59 Morton-Williams, 'The Egungun Society... ', p. 101. 
60 Morton-Williams describes for example how, during the Egungun festival a maskedý figure would 
tour the town 
accompanied by the voice of many animals and birds, and 
the 'sound of witchcraft', made with a variety of voice disguisers. 
It is said also that he can cause the door to fly open and an evil- 
doer to be carried off by the spirits 
[Morton-Williams, 'The Egungun Society... ', p. 95. 
126 
which this much dreaded personage is alone allowed to possess. 
Should the accused person seize hold of it fearlessly, and manifest 
no timidity nor hesitancy, he is free and the Fetishman leaves him. 
But, on the contrary, should he shrink from the test, and manifest a 
fearful spirit, he is at once apprehended, and, being delivered up to 
the Fetish, is soon put to death - often in a mysterious way, that it 
may be said the 'god' killed him 61 
Oro was therefore involved not only in detection but the judgment and 
punishment of criminals. But it would seem that there were another set of 
religious beliefs and practices which also controlled these functions. 
The judicial Function 
In 1844 Revd Annear reported that, far from there being a judicial system at 
Badagry by which criminals were apprehended and tried, the operation of justice 
was in the hands of the aggrieved who sought, if they could, revenge for the 
crimes committed against them. He gave the example of a murderer who was 
spotted, apprehended and executed on the spot. Annear concluded that this 
practice was very common at Badagry and 'they kill him first, and sit in - 
judgment over the case afterwards' 62. This method of personal revenge and 
retribution was also alluded to by Lander who noted that in cases of adultery the 
husband was at liberty to do as he pleased with his unfaithful partner and one 
could easily assume that such personal vengeance may indicate the absence of 
the 'state, 63 . However, it would appear that this was merely one method used to 
administer a complex system of justice in Badagry, which, once again, was very 
much bound up with the operation of religious cults. 
Lander himself, upon his return to Badagry from the interior in 1827 was forced 
to undergo a trial by ordeal over the charge of spying levelled at him by the 
Portuguese inhabitants of the town 64. The trial, involving the drinking of 
poisoned water, was carried out by 'fetish priests, but without further 
61 WMMSA 31 July 1845 Annear's journal in 16 August 1845 Annear, Badagry. 
62 WMMSA 25 December 1844 Annear's journal, Badagry. 
63 R Lander, Captain Clapperton's Last Expedition to Africa Vol 1, p. 282. 
64 lbid, Vol 2, pp. 254-259. 
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information it is unclear to what society or cult they belonged. Much later 
information about this trial from Avoseh states that it took place before the fetish 
priest at Agbalata in Posuko, where Lander was taken under the guard of the 
Akran's soldiers 65. Trial by ordeal was also clearly used on other occasions to 
decide guilt and other methods were employed. On Lander's return to Badagry in 
1830, it was noted that the French Chief had been accused of attempting to poison 
Adele. The chief was tried using a large wooden cap which was placed on the 
head. lf the cap shook, the wearer was guilty, if still he was innocent; according to 
the Lander account 'it is believed the native priests alone are in the secret, 66. 
Presumably as a result of his own experiences, Lander noted that it was the 
priests who were 'the sole judges of the people, 67. But it is interesting to note in 
this case that although it was the priests who carried out the trial of the French 
Chief, it was Adele himself who pardoned the man, indicating an executive role 
on his part. According to other accounts both priests and chiefs seem to have 
played their role in the administration of justice. Avoseh not surprisingly has 
highlighted the role of the Akran, who he says, would sit in judgment on his 
throne surrounded by his chiefs 68. But even Avoseh notes that, as it was an 
unwritten law, the statutes were recorded in the breasts of the priests 69.1 would 
suggest that the administration of justice involved a balance between religious 
and secular, priests and chiefs. Avoseh's concentration on the role of the Akran 
is misleading. Without further evidence it is only possible to surmise that 
criminal judgments were usually carried out at ward level as it would appear 
were sentences. 
65 Avoseh, A Short HistoEy of Badagj]ý p. 34. 
66 R&j Lander, foumal of an Expedition... Vol 1, p. 53. 
67 R Lander, Captain Clapperton's Last Expedition to Africa, Vol 1, p. 281. 
68 Avoseh,. A Short Histoj: ): of Badagry, p. 34. 
69 lbid, p. 39. 
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Punishment 
Once found guilty of a crime, punishment would appear to have become very 
much a matter for religious ceremony. According to Avoseh, execution was the 
punishment for robbing a European, seduction of another's wife, and adultery 
with a sister or first cousin70. However, Lander stated that although murder was 
punishable by death, a thief could be dealt with in a number of ways; execution 
was an option but so was imprisonment, slavery or castration7l. 
According to Avoseh it was the Posu who beheaded those sentenced to death 72 
However, the local historian also notes that it was at the shrine of Ogun, god of 
iron and war, that the punishment took place 73.1 would suggest that the use of 
Ogun may have been restricted to the Weme sections of Badagry, and other 
methods were employed by other sections of the town74. Indeed Avoseh himself 
admits that 'it was the Akran who was in the habit of providing abundant 
human sacrifices for Ogun' 75. Avoseh is the only source who names Ogun. 
Annear, for example, stated only that the execution of a murderer at which the 
Wawu was present was to take place at the 'much dreaded place of skulls, 76. He 
described it as a place in the midst of the market place immediately in front of a 
much venerated fetish house and surrounded by shrubs and a bamboo fence. 
This is perhaps the same place alluded to by Clapperton almost twenty years. 
before 77. According to Annear, the time of execution was announced by the 
70 Ibid, p. 34. 
71 R Lander, Captain Clapperton's Last Expedition to Africa, Vol 2, p. 260. 
72 Avoseh, A Short Histojiy Qf BadagjX, p. 34. 
73 Ibid, p. 34. 
74 That executions were a ward matter is implied by Gollmer, who in 1846 described the public 
execution of a murderer. According to this account almost one thousand people had gathered for the 
spectacle but the only chiefs present were the Akran and the Posu along with some 'secondary 
Headmen and Fetish Priests' [CMSA CA2 / 043 / 98 25 March 1946 Gollmer's Journal, Badagry]. 
75 Avoseh, A Short Histojý: of Badaga p. 32. 
76 WMMSA 10 November 1844 Annear's Journal, Badagry. 
77 Clapperton reported that: 
Near the market is the place of execution which is a bamboo fence of 
about thirty feet... surrounding a large tree - there was the body of a 
criminal stretched up to the fence, his head being taken for fetish... 
He had been a caboceer of Porto-Novo who they had taken by surprise 
[PRO C02/15 1 December 1825 Clapperton's Journal, Badagry]. 
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beating of the 'Death Drum' around the town. The prisoner, in chains, was led to 
the place of execution and dosed with large amounts of rum until out of the 
fetish house came a huge man with a club who performed the execution78. This 
example is similar in method to an account given by Revd King at Abeokuta, of 
an execution by the god 'Polo' who he somewhat confusedly linked with the 
worship of Orishako, god of the field. However, this does tie in with Morton- 
Williams description of Orisha Oko being a god of fertility, and Johnson's 
references to the deity as a hunter who, in old age, became a soothsayer, 
punishing those accused of witchcraft 79. 
Witchcraft at Badagry 
From the contemporary sources available it is clear that witchcraft accusations 
and executions were common at Badagry. In 1845 Revd Annear noted that 
'witchcraft is universally believed by the natives of this place, hence it forms one 
of the principal doctrines of their fetish, 80. Between April 1860 and February 
1861, for example, there were two notable series of witchcraft executions. The first 
of these involved women, whilst the second involved between eight to twelve 
persons of both sexes who had been brought from outlying villages 81. 
The dilemma which faced European observers was whether they could categorize 
such practices as criminal executions or human sacrifice. Consul Brand for 
example in the early 1860s was unsure whether, under the conditions of the 1852 
78 WMMSA 10 November 1844 Annear's Journal, Badagry. 
79 CMR February 1862, p. 50 Revd T. King, Abeokuta; P. Morton-Williams, 'An Outline of the 
Cosmology and Cult Organisation of the Oyo Yoruba', Africa Vol 34 No 3 (1964), pp. 243-261; S 
Johnson the HistoIX of the Yorubas, ( Lagos 1921), p. 37. 
80 INWMSA 31 July 1845 Annear's journal in 16 August 1845 Annear, Badagry. 
81 Okaro K'Ojwang states that those accused of witchcraft were often sent to Porto-Novo for trial. 
However, there is no contemporary evidence to support this in the pre-colonial period and from the 
missionary accounts it is clear that both witchfinding, trials and executions took place in Badagry 
itself. There is one source, mentioned above, which describes the use of a priest from Porto-Novo to 
detect a thief at Badagry [CMR March 1861, pp. 69-70,27 April 1860 Maser's Journal, Badagry; PRO 
F084/1141 6 February 1861 Pearse, Badagry in 9 February 1861 Foote, Lagos; Okaro K'Ojwang 
'Society, Trade and Politics in Badagri... ', pp. 191-192; CMSA CA2/043/103 29 May 1847 Gollmer's 
journal, Badagry]. See also p. 125. 
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Anti Slave Trade Treaty which also forbade human sacrifice, he was able to 
prohibit the execution of those accused of witchcraft 82. The matter remained 
unresolved and presents an interesting example of European attempts to divide 
secular and religious practices in a way wholly inappropriate to the African 
model. Undoubtedly witchcraft accusations did have firm roots in religious 
belief. Bowen highlighted the fears that were held amongst the population of 
Badagry over the issue in his account of 1850 whereby he stated that it was a 
widespread notion that witches would suck the blood of certain people, 
particularly those inclined to be fat, whilst they slept. Bowen limited his 
description of the accused to the European and presumably American norms of 
'an old hag' 83. However, from more detailed accounts it is clear that as well as 
the old and infirm there were witches of all ages and even more importantly, 
both sexes 84. The social standing of those accused is also interesting. According to 
the catechist Marsh it was frequently poor people who were sentenced to death 
for witchcraft 85. This would suggest that it was those with a low social position 
who were perhaps more prone to the lifestyle associated with a witch and that 
they were merely more vulnerable to accusation and more expendable. However, 
from another source only three years later, it is clear that such accusations were 
not wholly dependent on status. In 1849 Revd Smith described how a woman 
had voluntarily confessed to witchcraft, and that she was in fact the sister of a 
chief 86. Latham, in his examination of witchcraft accusations and executions in 
Old Calabar concludes that in the competitive Efik society, such methods were 
not only used as a form of social control amongst the general population, but as a 
82 PRO F084/1115 14 May 1860 Brand, Lagos. See Appendix A. 
83 Bowen, Missionaly Adventures.... p. 97. 
84 In 1845 Annear made clear that the term 'witch' was applied to 'both males and females'. 
Furthermore in 1861 Pearse, despite protests against the execution of a group accused of witchcraft, 
who were not identified only as women but merely persons, concluded that: 
three of them who are worn out and emaciated by old age will not 
escape the inhuman torture 
and death, but the middle aged are to be sold into slavery 
fWMMSA 31 July 1845 Annear's journal in 16 August 1845 Annear, Badagry; PRO F084/1141 6 
February 1861 Pearse, Badagry in 9 February 1861 Foote, Lagos]. 
85 CMSA CA2 / 067 /9 25 October 1846 Marsh's journal, Badagry. 
86 CMSA CA2/082/14 8 March 1849 Smith's Journal, Badagry. 
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method by which to weaken the support of political opponents and thus gain 
positions of authority within the town's ward structure. One example he has 
given is that of Duke Ward in 1834 when at the death of Great Duke Ephraim, 
about fifty people were accused of witchcraft. The accusations were made by 
leaders of a particular faction who were thus able, in the face of a much 
weakened opposition, to take control of the vacant positions they coveted87. 
There is little evidence to suggest such manouevres at Badagry and that evidence 
which exists alludes to Badagry's disputes with neighbouring powers. In 1854 it 
was reported that the sacrifice of captives had been taking place at both Lagos and 
Badagry out of revenge for political quarrels between the two places 88. There is 
however, little evidence pertaining to internal disputes. Although one must 
acknowledge that the most detailed accounts of chieftancy disputes and 
successions took place after Badagry had become part of the Lagos colony; 
witchcraft accusations were not mentioned or rumoured to have played any part 
at any stage. Latham states that in Old Calabar, it was the tensions between 
traditional status and newly created status, through commercial success which 
resulted in such covert action, whereas at Bonny and New Calabar traditional 
descent groups had been wholly replaced by the canoe house and this triumph of 
commerce and competition enabled these states to resolve power struggles 
through more open rivalry and violence. This therefore implies that Badagry 
had more in common with the fiercely competitive states of Bonny and New 
Calabar than with the transitory state of Old Calabar. 
However, that witchcraft accusations and executions sometimes held a more 
limited political function within Badagry is possible. As noted earlier, cults such 
as Egungun were noted for their witchfinding abilities. The actual executions for 
witchcraft were also carried out by priests, although there are no actual 
87 j Latham, 'Witchcraft Accusations and Economic Tension in Calabar', JAU Vol 13 No 2, (1972), 
pp. 249-260. 
88 PRO F084/950 20 December 1854 Campbell, Lagos. 
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eyewitness accounts. Indeed the nearest to such a description was the CMS 
missionary Maser's meeting with the executioner armed with 'a club', prior to 
such an occasion89. Exactly which god or spirit was involved in the execution of 
witches is unclear. Egungun and Oro were sometimes the witchfinders, and 
possibly also the executioners. Revd Smith also mentioned 'Shesho or Seso' 
[possibly Esu] executing witches 90. But although administered by cult followers 
there was evidently a more secular influence within the witchfinding process. 
Revd Annear noted that it was Possible for either the witchfinder or the chiefs to 
suspect an individual of witchcraft, and in both cases the witchfinder would 
proceed to the home of the accused where he or she would undergo an ordeal to 
establish guilt 91. Maser, who attempted to intervene on one occasion to stop an 
execution was told by the chief priest of the executing cult that 'he had no power 
over the prisoner' and that the decision ultimately lay with the 'principal chiefs 
of the town, who had sent this person to him' 92. However, although it was often 
89 On attempting to prevent an execution for witchcraft Maser went to the place where those 
accused were held and, he continued: 
Whilst we were in the place we saw a man walking about armed with a club, 
into which was fixed an iron blade in the shape of a haberd. I asked him 
something, but he seemed as if he was deaf, which is supposed to be done 
by a spirit, who is said to have taken possession of him. Perhaps in order 
to harden him against the effects of the cries of his deplorable victims. I 
never saw such a dreadful place in all the towns of the interior of this 
country, and I verily believe the Popo or Igun nation does surpass the 
Yoruba in cruelty 
KMR March 1861, pp. 69-70,27 April 1860, Maser's Journal, Badagryl. 
90 CMSA CA2/082/14 31 January 1849 Smith's Journal, Badagry. 
91 Annear described vividly how: 
If he or the chiefs suspect any person of being a witch-he proceeds 
to his house, generally in the night, and having found him, 
commands him to grasp the magic and mysterious instrument, which 
this much dreaded personage is alone allowed to possess. Should 
the accused person seize hold of it fearlessly, and manifest no 
timidity nor hesitancy, he is free and the Fetishman leaves him. 
But on the contrary, should he shrink from the test, and manifest a 
fearful spirit, he is at once apprehended, and, being delivered up to 
the Fetish, is soon put to death - often in a mysterious way that it 
may be said that the god killed him ... The instrument used 
by the 
Fetish Priest is nothing more than a rude piece of wood, generally 
stained black, into this the spirit is supposed to enter, hence all 
who are guilty of any crime dread next to death itself being brought 
to the decisive test of touching it 
[WMMSA 31 July 1845 Annear's journal in 16 August 1845 Annear, London]. 
92 
_CMR 
March 1861, pp. 69-70,27 April 1860 Maser's Journal, Badagry. 
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a matter for the chiefs who was accused of witchcraft, Revd Gollmer pointed out 
that the fate of the individual was also in the hands of the priests. Trial by poison 
on such occasions was normal and as Gollmer noted, the amount of poison 
contained in the draught was the responsibility of the adjudicating priests 93. It 
would therefore appear that, at least in some contexts, accusations and executions 
for witchcraft could be used by ward chiefs as a method of social control. 
Religious practice was evidently an important and powerful political tool. 
The Balance of Power 
To many foreign observers Badagry was a place notorious for the strength of 
religious belief. There was a vital role for these beliefs and practices in the 
political functions of the community. Subsequently it would appear that 
religious piety was respected as a political attribute. The Mewu, in exile from 
Porto-Novo from 1835 at Mowo, just outside Badagry, came to be regarded as a 
worthy character whose advise was sought by the ward chiefs. This chief 'was 
celebrated for the number and power of his fetishes, and his devotion to the 
various gods of the country' 94. Similarly it was the respect given to Adele of 
Lagos, due to the piety shown to his dead father, which gave him political 
influence over the town in the 1820s. Revd De Graft interpreted the relationship 
between religious belief and political authority as being not one of support but 
rather as one of complete dominance. In 1843 he stated that the chiefs of Badagry 
were 'immensely burthened' with 'superstitious observances and ceremonies'. 
Indeed he concluded that: 
in fact they bear nominally the name of chiefs for the Fetish priests 
are the right chiefs, for the whole of the chiefs movements are 
entirely regulated by the priests and what they wish the chiefs 
and people to do 95 
93 CMSA CA2 / 043 / 96 22 July 1845 Gollmer's Journal, Badagry. 
94 CMSA CA2 / 085 / 230 25 November 1845 Townsend's Journal, Badagry. 
95 WMMSA 21 March 1843 De Graft, Badagry. 
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De Graft's assessment is clearly an exaggeration and oversimplification of the 
situation. But his general point about the chiefs acting within a framework of 
religious belief is accurate. As noted, the priests and cults of Badagry acted as both 
a unifying force and also in a more specific capacity. their role, notably within the 
administration of justice, gave them a vital and sometimes independent position 
within the authority structure. In a number of ways, such as their supportive 
role, the cults were crucial to the continued functioning of the secular powers. 
They provided a focus which, if not completely separated from ward loyalties, 
was on a higher level. This position within the political structure could lead to 
potential conflict with the secular authorities. In May 1847 for example, the ward 
chiefs offered profuse apologies when the missionary Martin was verbally abused 
by the priests of Shango96. More serious were disturbances in the western part of 
the town during 1870 over land ownership. Although the conflict was quickly 
resolved between the chiefs and their people, the 'fetish priests' of the area 
objected to a settlement which reportedly 'deprived them of gains extorted 
hitherto by fear of the terrors of the Fetish' 97. In this way then it would appear 
that a tenuous balance of authority existed between chiefs and priests, a balance 
which was evidently open to at least some level of conflict and contention, but 
which enabled Badagry, with its excessively fragmented structure,, to maintain 
various governmental functions and ultimately operate as a state. 
96 See p. 115. 
97 PRO C0147/17 31 January 1870 Glover, Lagos. 
135 
Chapter Five 
Destruction and Reconstruction 1784 - 1821 
Badagry as an Atlantic Port c1736-1784 1 
After its foundation in c. 1736 Badagry flourished rapidly as an important 
commercial centre on the Slave Coast. This was largely the result, at least 
initially, of the entrepreneurial skills of Hendrick Hertogh. According to 
traditions recorded by Avoseh, on Hertogh's arrival in the area, trade at Apa 
flourished and he was followed to the area 'by several other European slave 
traders'2. Accordingly, on moving his operations to Badagry, an area which 
belonged to the Kingdom of Apa, and had been used for farming purposes until 
that point, Hertogh's trade continued to flourish. Indeed Avoseh states that 
during that time the European traders preferred it to any other place on the 
coaSt3. 
Hertogh's commercial activities centred round the Ijegba area of the town where 
he appointed an agent to look after his business whilst he was away. He also 
based his Gold Coast canoe crews in this area4. However, the Awhanjigo section 
was also involved at least to some degree, as Hertogh stationed a Whydah prince, 
Jengen, opposite the beach of Gberefu. His role was 'to receive newcomers', 
presumably meaning those arriving by water from both the Atlantic and via the 
lagoon5. 
The immediate success of Hertogh in establishing Badagry as a commercial centre 
is partially explained by the apparent volume of slaves available and the 
1 Robin Law has recently completed work on the early history of Badagry. See Law . ..... The Early 
History of Badagri'. 
2 Avoseh, A Short History of Badag1y, p. 10. 
3 Ibid, p. 10. 
4 fbid, p. 13. 
5 Ibid, p. 13. 
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cooperation of the surrounding countries in supplying the port 6. It would appear 
that Badagry was able rapidly to forge an important trading link with the 
interior, most notably with the Yoruba based at Oyo. Law has noted that the 
turmoil in the west caused by Dahomey's expansionist policies disrupted the 
supplies from the interior to the coast, for example to Whydah, and that 
Hertogh's establishment first at Apa and then Badagry, provided an alternative, 
more secure outlet. Hertogh himself reported that he could get better slaves at 
Apa for five ounces [of gold, or rather goods to the value of five ounces of gold, ie 
about; E 20] than he had been able to at jakin for six ounces [value about E 24]. 
After establishing himself at Badagry, slaves could be bought there in 1738 at 
three and a half ounces [f 14] for men and three ounces [f 12] for women7. 
Hertogh was not specific in naming his source of slaves, merely stating in 1732 
that 'the Negroes of the Interior had now made contact with him' and then in 
1733 that 'trade from far deep in the interior' was now coming to Apa 8. Law 
concludes that the source must surely have been Oyo, recorded during the 1760s 
and 70s as being the main supplier at Badagry and lie states that; 'it is likely that 
this pattern of trade dated back to the 1730s' 9. Avoseh in his description of the 
early commercial organisation of the state also pinpoints this source as the major 
supplier of slaves for the Atlantic trade, stating that slaves were brought from 
'Yoruba and other countries for sale here' 10. However, Avoseh also highlights a 
further commercial role for Badagry during this very early period as well as that 
of middlemen between the Yoruba traders of the interior and the European 
traders on the coast. In his list of Akrans, Avoseh notes that the Weme 'prince' 
who became the first Akran of Badagry known as Gbafoe, on arrival in the area, 
which in his account pre-dates that of Hertogh, became a slave trader'and used 
6 See chapter 2, p. 56. 
7 Law . ..... 
The Early History of Badagry', pp. 21-22. 
8 Ibid, pp. 21-22. 
9 Ibid, pp. 21-22. 
10 Avoseh, _A_ýhQrt 
Histou of Bajagjý: p. 13. 
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to take slaves to Dahomey for sale' 11. It would seem unlikely that Avoseh is 
correct in establishing Gbafoe at Badagry prior to Hertogh's arrival. Even so, it 
does emphasise the area's role in the movement of slaves along the coast, in this 
case a westerly trade, along the lagoon towards Whydah. It would appear that this 
coastal trade may have been established very early on as reported, for example by 
Arthur Wendover in the seventeenth century 12. 
However, it was as a port trading directly with the Atlantic traders that Badagry 
achieved its initial prominence. As noted above, Avoseh claims that the arrival 
of the Dutchman attracted a number of other Europeans to the area. Yet there is 
no mention of these traders in the town during this early period. Indeed, when at 
jakin (c. 1727-1732) Hertogh had been criticized for failing to get along with the 
Portuguese traders there, and it is difficult to imagine him welcoming other 
foreigners to Badagry 13. After the murder of Hertogh in 1738 another Dutch 
agent, Bronssema, was recalled from the factory in the Lagos area (a stopping off 
point between Badagry and Benin) and installed to run the post. The Lagos 
factory was seemingly abandoned at this point and the Ughoton factory [Benin] 
was not reoccupied once it had been vacated. The Dutch West Indian Company 
was losing interest in the area and although Bronssema was reporting from 
Badagry in 1740, that post was probably abandoned shortly after 14. 
However, the continuation of slave trading at Badagry after the death of Hertogh 
and the abandonment of the Dutch factory is attested by Avoseh, who states that 
Akran Yeku, who succeeded Hertogh's agent to become the second Akran, 'was a 
great slave trader and very wealthy'. It would certainly appear that he was selling 
slaves directly to Europeans as, according to Avoseh's recording of tradition, it 
11 lbid, p. 16. 
12 17 July 1682, Wendover, Apa in Law, Further Correspondence- p. 14. 
13 6 January 1731, Hertogh, Badagry in Van Dantzig, The Dutch and the Guinea Coast... pp. 251- 
252. 
14 Law, 'Trade and Politics ...... p. 342. 
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was he who built a prison in the Ganho area of the town where 'He kept all 
prisoners and from here they were taken across the beach and exported' 15. 
Exactly which European powers were involved in that trade during this period is 
not specified. By the 1780s the powers clearly tapping Badagry's Atlantic 
commerce were the Portuguese and French. Lionel Abson, Director of Williams 
Fort the British factory at Whydah, noted the ships and traders of these powers 
operating out of Badagry 16. Whether it is safe then to conclude that after the 
demise of Dutch influence in the area, French and Portuguese traders almost 
immediately took over the reins during the middle years of the eighteenth 
century is speculative. However, it is interesting to note that during this period, 
the Jengen of Awhanjigo and the Akran of Ijegba, respectively known as the 
French and Portuguese chiefs, due to their virtually exclusive links with these 
trading partners, seem to have emerged as the prominent political figures within 
Badagry 17. There is very little evidence of British slave traders frequenting the 
port during this period. They were more likely to remain in more familiar areas 
such as the Gambia, Bonny, Angola and to a lesser extent Whydah. Indeed in 
1776 Governor Mill at Cape Coast Castle complained that Badagry had been, up 
until recently, 'stopped up' to British ships, and that the reprehensible actions of 
a particular Captain Johnson there had 'now again entirely interdicted us the 
trade of that place' 18. 
Events beyond the direct Badagry area had huge repercussions for its commercial 
success. It was the aggressively expansionist policies of Dahomey to the west 
which had led to the initial foundation of the town, and diverted trade from the 
interior further east. Trader Archibald Dalzel wrote that the King of Dahomey, 
Trudo, more usually known as Agaja, and his people 'were equally ignorant of 
the principles on which trade must be conducted' and their warlike demeanor 
15 Avoseh, A Short History of Badag[y, p. 16. 
16 PRO T70/1545 15 March 1783 Abson, Whydah. 
17 See p. 147-148. 
18 PRO T70/32 7 May 1776 Mill, Cape Coast. 
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was 'incompatible with the mild and steady spirit of commerce 19. He later added.. 
that the European Agents along the coast were so discontented with Dahomean 
rule that they wished for the re-establishment of the old Whydah regime despite 
their exorbitant import duties 20. Akinjogbin states that as a result of Dahomey's 
aggressiveness along the coast during the 1720s, Oyo attacked its wayward 
tributary and this resulted in the removal of the capital from Abomey to Allada 
in 1730. This move further disrupted the westerly trade routes, although the 
1740s saw a period of restored relations between Dahomey and Oyo, and a 
consequent resurgence of trade from Whydah2l. However, as a result of 
concessions in Dutch Law, in March 1756, whereby trade along the 'Mina' coast 
was opened to all, ports such as Badagry, Porto-Novo and Lagos were able to take 
advantage of a new freedom which saw Whydah still very much restricted22. As 
late as 1781 the Bahia traders were still complaining that, due to Dutch legalities, 
they could still only trade at certain free ports along the coast such as Badagry and 
Porto-NOVO 23. 
During the 1760s and 1770s the trade of Badagry and Porto-Novo received a boost 
when Oyo, notably under the guidance of Alafin Abiodun in the 1770s, began to 
expand its own trading role. Rather than selling slaves via Dahomey, Oyo began 
to seek a direct trade with the coast. As a contemporary French source noted; the 
Oyo 'hold the key to trade' for it was they who provided the majority of slaves to 
that part of the coast. Furthermore, they chose to trade at Badagry, Epe and Porto- 
Novo because 'at present they are permitted to come themselves to trade as far as 
the sea-side, 24. The ability of Oyo traders to come themselves to the coast and 
trade directly with Europeans held great attractions for them over their more 
westerly route which took them only as far as 'Beaume Clavier' [Abomey Calavi], 
19 Dalzel, The History of Dahomy pp. 26-27. 
20 Ibid, p. 54. 
21 Akinjogbin, Dahomey and Its Neighbours p. 102. 
22 Verger, Tra e Relations- pp. 183-188. 
23 Ibid, p. 26. 
24 De Chenevert & Bullet 1774 in Law, Contemporary Source Material... p. 45. 
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described as 'a neutral place' about sixty miles from Whydah, where they had to , 
sell to Dahomean merchants 25. 
The redirection of commerce coincided with a number of problems within 
Dahomey itself. Slave raiding failures, inefficiency at Whydah, and a series of 
problems and crises within the Dahomean monarchy severely weakened their. 
trading position26. As a result of these problems the director of the French fort 
was able to state in 1777 that not only had their been little trade at Whydah the 
previous year and that Badagry and Porto Novo were full of ships, but that also 
the Dahomeans were 'in a state of weakness' and that 'they will be incapable of 
resistance' to an attack from their neighbourS 27. However, it is interesting to 
note that de Montaguere recognised the important role of this westerly 
movement of slaves along the coast in the economy of the area. He stated that 
despite Whydah's problems in procuring slaves directly from the interior there 
were a sufficient number at Porto-Novo and Badagry for a considerable quantity 
to be passed along to WhVdah, although disputes with the peoples along the road 
west had disrupted this route. He added however, that after these difficulties had 
been resolved, 'the captives from Porte Nove and Badagris came in quite large 
quantities'28. 
In this way then the easterly Atlantic ports benefited from the situation of their 
larger interior neighbours during the middle years of the eighteenth century. But 
their increasing success and prominence ultimately resulted in tensions of their 
own as the coastal neighbours began competing for a larger share of trade. 
Badagry was never able to establish itself as the dominant port in the area due to 
its equally and often more successful neighbours. In 1737 Hertogh himself 
25 lbid, p. 45. 
26 lbid, p. 45. 
27 AN: C. 6/26 6 October 
1 
'1777 Olliver de klontaguere, Director of the French Fort at Whydah In 
Law, ce Material... p. 50. 
28 lbid, p. 50. 
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opened a second port at Ekpe, in order that he might trade with the exiled King of 
Jakin29- However, it was the rise of Porto-Novo, founded by the exiled Alladas 
which proved to be Badagry's major commercial rival during this period. A 
place called 'Ardres' emerged in about 1750 as a place of European trade and this 
is probably a reference to Porto-Novo. However, it was in 1758 that the name 
'Porto-Novo' was itself first mentioned as being 'recently opened'. It was not 
until the mid 1760s that Lagos began a limited trade with Europe30. 
Despite Avoseh's description of Badagry as 'the headquarters of the European 
slave traders' and the dominant coastal power as late as the chieftaincy of Akran 
Pojeagonwu, who was holder of the title until 1784, the competition between 
ports ultimately led to Badagry losing its premier position to Porto-Novo after 
1765 31. In 1780 the Director of the French Fort at Whydah was able to state that it 
was at Porto-Novo where 'all the trade is done' because the King of Oyo regarded 
the country as his own 32. However, the next couple of years brought problems 
for the 'all-powerful' Oyos from the north, which ultimately affected all its 
contacts on the coast. According to Lionel Abson the end of 1782 saw a 
devastating defeat of the 0yo military machine by the Bariba to the north east. 
Politically the episode was distracting to say the least, and commercially it proved 
damaging. As Abson noted 'these were the people by whose excursions used to 
give life and commerce to Porto Novo and Badagree' 33. He went on to note that 
at Badagry there were eight ships waiting for supplies of slaves but not a single 
slave had been purchased for the two months since the defeat. It would appear 
however, that these drastic problems of supply were to some extent solved by the 
middle of the next year as Abson himself noted when he stated that there were 
seven or eight ships, both Portuguese and French waiting off Badagry for delivery 
29 Law, '... The Early History of Badagry', p. 22. 
30 Ibid, p. 22. 
31 Avoseh, 
-A 
ShQrt History of Badagry, p. 17. Also see chapter 2, p. 56. 
32 AN C. 6/ 26 30 December 1730 De Montaguere in Law, Contemporary Source Material.... p. 51. 
33 PRO T70/1545 16 February/ September 1783, Abson, Whydah. 
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of up to six hundred slaves each 34. It is also necessary to note however, that an 
earlier letter from Abson would seem to indicate that Whydah was not in a 
position to take too great an advantage of the problems of its more easterly 
neighbours. Possibly due to problems of supply itself, he complained to Miles 
that I you could not have picked a time that could more embarrass me than the 
present for slaves' 35. 
Problems for the eastern ports were compounded during this period by the 
outbreak of hostilities between Porto-Novo and Badagry in 1781. Presumably as a 
result of commercial pressures and tensions, although Akinjogbin has offered a 
more political interpretation, the disruption caused by this war led the French 
Director at Whydah to observe that its continuation would once again restore the 
trade of Whydah to its 'ancient splendour, 36. By 1783 then the commercial 
pressures along the coast had combined to seriously threaten Badagry. Having 
lost its prominent position on that part of the coast, its struggle to maintain a 
commercial role led ultimately to guerrilla-style hostilities with its most 
immediate rival Porto-Novo. However, in threatening the security of its 
neighbour Badagry ultimately threatened the commercial success of its former 
powerful patron Oyo, a formidable adversary. Further to the west, the militaristic 
power of Dahomey was only too keen to take any measures which would secure 
Whydah's prominence in the Atlantic slave trade. 
An examination of Badagry as an Atlantic port during the eighteenth century is 
therefore full of paradoxes. As a result of its commercial success, the town 
attracted the jealousy of neighbouring powers. However, it was only as a result of 
these neighbours' greater successes that Badagry became expendable. 
Furthermore, the flexibility and 'free-marketeering' on which the town's 
34 PRO T70 /1545 15 August 1783 Abson, Whydah. 
35 PRO T70/1545 Undated 1782 Abson, Whydah. 
36 AN C6 / 26 24 November 1781 De Montaguere in Law, Contemporary Source Material... pp. 51-52. 
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successful economy, was based, ultimately led to internal competition so virulent 
that commercial concerns were put before the preservation of the state itself. 
Badagry's Internal Divisions 
Badagry's failure to maintain its immense initial successes did not only apply to 
the commercial sphere. Clearly it is problematic to separate features of the state 
such as it commercial and political life, as the one obviously has great 
repercussions for the other. However, to achieve a complete overall picture of 
the town's history during this period, it is necessary to analyse each factor 
separately, only then is it possible to build up not only a chronological account of 
the Badagry, but also a picture of the motivations and causes within that 
chronology. 
The early part of Badagry's history was not only a period when the town 
achieved economic prominence. The foundation of such a diverse settlement, 
intent on both security and trade, necessitated its establishment in some form of 
political unit. However, as noted in the examination of Badagry's political 
system, 'unit' is not a word which best describes the political structure of that 
place. Indeed almost from the outset Badagry was riven by political dissent and 
intrigue which led to a factionalism so severe that when both its security and 
commerce, its very reasons for being, were threatened and then destroyed in 
1784, the town's fragmented political system was not only unable to resist, but 
was itself in many ways to blame. 
What emerges from an examination of Badagry's political history is the fact that 
there was virtually no development of new political institutions. The enforced 
establishment of diverse peoples on the site recognisable as the city of Badagry 
during the 1730s, did not lead to the emergence of a recognisable polity which 
one can term 'Badagrian'. Instead , as noted earlier, each group maintained 
its 
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own identity and at best a strained tolerance of its neighbour. As other 
immigrants arrived either as individuals or as groups, although often initially 
taken under the wing of a hosting group, the culture of Badagry would seem to 
have dictated that ultimately they struggled to assert their own claims in the 
town, both economic and political. Zinsu, Adele, Mewu, and Akitoye for 
example were all individuals who sought to carve their own very special niches 
in the town's structure. Likewise the groups of later immigrants such as the 
Yorubas and Sierra Leonians obviously formed distinct groups there. Badagry 
never acted as a melting pot, nor did its disparate pieces ever fit together, and 
these patterns, established during the early part of its history, remained intact. 
0 
At its foundation Badagry was a small community gathered very much under 
the control of one man, Hendrick Hertogh. Avoseh states that the Dutchman was 
more than a resident trader- and that 'He was really their King though he wore 
no crown, 37. He suggests that Hertogh entered fully into the life of the town and, 
for example, showed the people how best to administer justice. How accurate was 
this picture of centralised harmony is difficult to verify and if it indeed existed it 
lasted only a couple of years until Hertogh's assassination in the first half of 1738. 
Contemporary accounts of that murder point to 'the son of a black caffacier called 
Prince' who was identified as being a 'fidase' ie 'of Whydah, 38. Tradition, as 
recorded by Avoseh, identifies this Whydah prince as Kotugbosu, eldest son of 
the Whydah Prince Heru, who, on fleeing Whydah, as noted earlier, had died at 
Seme [Porto-Novo beach] 39. But clearly a section of his followers had reached 
Badagry by 1738 along with his sons Kotogbosu and later Kuton, who established 
themselves in the area which came to be known as Ahoviko 40. According to 
Avoseh's account, Hertogh named Kuton, the younger brother, as head of the 
37 Avoseh, A Short History of BadagEy p. 15. 
38 The murder of Hertogh by 'four fidase negroes I was reported by Bronsserna on 31 July 1738. Further 
details reported by a French slaver, named one of the assassins as the 'son of a black caffacier' [Van 
Dantzig, The Dutch and the Guinea Coast... p. 337]. 
39 Avoseh, A Short HistoEy-of Badagry, p. 27. 
40 lbid, p. 27. 
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Ahoviko Whydahs, but this angered Kotugbosu who murdered the Dutchman as 
he returned home one night 41. The murder of Hertogh not only ended a period 
of almost monarchical rule, but also demonstrates the factional tensions which 
were in existence under the surface from the very outset. 
Hertogh's assassination, according to Avoseh, resulted in civil war and the 
expulsion of Kotugbosu, Kuton and all their followers. Tradition states that both 
princes met untimely deaths shortly after, but their followers and families were 
able to take refuge elsewhere. Only later in the century were they able to return 
and re-establish themselves at Ahoviko 42. The war which resulted in the 
princes I expulsion was short-lived and contemporary sources imply that peace 
was quickly restored. According to Badagry's local historian, at the death of 
Hertogh, his Agent, the Werne 'prince' resident at Ijegba, 'was unanimously 
elected by the whole town to be king 43. However, this interpretation of tradition 
would seem to be more concerned with legitimising the Akran of 1jegba's claim 
to authority over the town than an accurate analysis of events. From a 
contemporary account it would appear that the Akran was certainly a prominent 
figure within the town during this period but the source also makes reference to 
the jengen who, according to Avoseh, came to Badagry from Whydah as servant 
to Hertogh and was made a chief after the Dutchman's death44. It is possible. that 
it was both the jengen's and the Akran's position as servants of Hertogh which 
allowed them to dominate their respective population groups from Whydah and 
Weme (the jengen's position being assured after the expulsion of the Ahoviko 
Whydahs). As a result then, these chiefs were able to assume a political 
prominence within the town as a whole. According to one contemporary source 
however, the caboceers at Badagry, after Hertogh's murder, 'having come 
41 fbid, p. 27. 
42 lbid, p. 27. 
43 lbid, p. 15. 
44 14 May 1748 Chevallier, Badagry in Van Dantzig, The Dutch and the Guinea Coast p. 341; 
Avoseh, A Short History-of Badagry, p. 25. See chapter 3, p. 84. 
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together, resolved to appoint one of the company servants here present as 
commander' 45. Whether there were other Badagrian chiefs or caboceers 
involved in the decision making process is unclear. But it was evidently the 
jengen and Akran who handed over Hertogh's possessions to his successor 
under the supervision of 'Captain Blank' a caboceer from Porto-NOVO 46 The 
company servant in question was Bronssema, who had previously been based at 
Lagos. It would seem that he only spent a couple of years at Badagry before the 
Dutch abandoned their factory leaving the town in the hands of the indigenous 
chiefs. 
It would appear then that initially the jengen and the Akran were certainly the 
most prominent indigenous political figures in the town. Avoseh gives the 
Akran a royal background, but this may merely be a ploy to legitimise his later 
position47. What would seem more likely is that it was their commercial success 
which led to political prominence. Avoseh states that after the death of his 
patron Hertogh, Akran Gbafoe 'carried on a big trade with the outside world' 48. 
But although Avoseh outlines the early history of the jengen rather too briefly, it 
is clear that his involvement in the testing of tobacco closely associated him with 
the commercial life of the town, and offered him great potential after the 
Dutchman's death49. 
Avoseh attempts to establish the supremacy of the Akran in the Badagry political 
order during this period. He states that after the death of Hertogh, not only was 
the Chief of 1jegba recognised as monarch, but that the jengen was his 
counsellor50. This neat picture of the two influential elements in the town co- 
existing so harmoniously not only contradicts later manifestations of inter - ward 
45 28 May 1738 Bronssema, Badagry in Van Dantzig, The Dutch and the Guineil Coas-t p. 340. 
46 See p. 156. 
47 See chapter 3. p. 83. 
48 Avoseh, A Short Histojýý of Badagry, p. 16. 
49 lbid, p. 25. 
50 Thid, p. 25. 
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relations, but also commercial commonsense. It was during this period that the 
Akran developed a relationship with the Portuguese traders on the coast and the 
Jengen allied himself with the French. These were the main European powers 
operating out of Badagry during the mid to late eighteenth century. If both chiefs 
were acting as agents to their respective partners they were then in competition 
with one another. Avoseh indirectly supports this picture and indeed presents a 
convincing case for initial Ijegba supremacy by indicating the immense 
commercial success that the Akran Gbafoe achieved. Possibly during this 
chieftaincy the Jengen could not compete. Gbafoe's successor, Akran Yeku of 
Yeku-Whe House was also a 'great slave trader and very wealthy' 51. Yeku's 
commercial ambitions seem to have included the establishment of a prison, or 
slave barracoon at Ganho under the management of a refugee from Weme 
Whegbo 52. However, it is interesting that during the mid to late years of the 
eighteenth century, there were no contemporary references to the Akran, and it 
would appear to have been the jengen who assumed the prominent political 
position within the town. According to contemporary accounts, the jengen or 
'Guinguin', was the dominant figure and was said to govern Badagry during the 
mid eighteenth century. In a slightly later French account the jengen is referred 
to as the King of Badagry 53. This prominence continued until 1781 when 
Akinjogbin names 'Gangan', a misreading of 'Guinguin', as the leader of the 
Badagry forces in initial hostilities against Porto-Novo. Akinjogbin mistakenly 
calls Gangan, the Akran of Badagry, whereas he is clearly describing the jengen 54. 
Accounting for the rise of the Jengen and the apparent political demise of the 
Akran is not simple. However, a clue may be found in a close examination of the 
internal politics of Ijegba. Despite the apparent commercial success of the second 
Akran, Yeku, it is interesting to note that, according to Avoseh, he wa s the only 
51 lbid, p. 16. 
52 lbid, p. 16. 
53 Law, The ý; Iln o_mmunities... p. 29. 
54 Akinjogbin, Dahomey and Its Neighbours pp. 156 & 165. 
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Akran to emerge from the Yeku-Whe lineage [Whe = House], after which the 
house passed into extinction. This does perhaps imply that there may have been 
an internal crisis which damaged the fortunes of Ijegba as a whole. This theory 
may be supported by the fact that the only other Ijegba House to produce only one 
Akran and ultimately fall into extinction was Soba-Whe. This lineage during the 
1790s produced the fifth Akran, Soba, who was eventually overthrown as a result 
of jealousy and internal squabbles 55. Whatever the condition of the Ijegba 
fortunes at the end of Yeku's chieftancy, the title of Akran then passed to 
Pojeagonwu. Even Avoseh has little to say of this figure except that he was 'a 
slave trader', but not specifically a successful one, and that by the early 1880s he 
was 'bedridden from illness' 56. This would however seem to be rather an 
exaggeration of this Akran's weakened state as Dalzel clearly names the '0clah' 
as one of the generals who fought under the command of 'Davi' [the Wawu] 
against Dahomey in 1784 57.. 
Potential problems within Ijegba and the passing of the title to a potentially 
much weaker figure may have allowed the Jengens of Awhanjigo to assume a 
political prominence within Badagry. However, according to at least one 
contemporary source, the period was still one of political turmoil. De Chenevert 
& Bullet stated in 1776 that supplies of slaves from Oyo were plentiful and that 
the Oyo traders were enjoying the advantages of coming to the coast themselves 
to trade directly with the Europeans, however they feared that 'this arrangement 
will continue, if the divisions of Badagri do not drive them away'58. However, 
the political struggle within Badagry during this period was not between the 
Awhanjigo Whydahs and the Ijegba Weme elements of the town, but initially 
between the Jengen of Awhanjigo and the pretender Zinsu. According to Law 
and Akinjogbin, throughout the 1770s, Zinsu, a renegade from Porto-Novo, was 
55 Avoseh, A Short HistoEy of Bad, 2=y, p. 16. 
56 ibid, p. 17. 
57 Dalzel, The History of DahQ= p. 185. 
58 De Chenevert & Bullet 1776 in Law, ConternporaEy Sources... p. 49. 
149 
attempting to usurp control within Badagry, presumably to take advantage of the 
town's huge commercial potential. Very little is recorded as to the conduct of his 
campaign. However, according to Akinjogbin, by 1776 he had been defeated and 
expelled, at which point he went to Porto-Novo and continued plotting 
unsuccessfully, this time with Dahomey, to re-open jakin as a competitor to 
Badagry59. 
The Jengen at Badagry however, now faced a more serious crisis and was 
ultimately deposed in 1782 and deported to Brazil. Akinjogbin claims that the 
exile of the Jengen was as a direct result of his hostilities. with Porto-Novo from 
1781 onwards. The disruption of commerce which arose from this dispute, finally 
led to Alafin Abiodun ordering his capture and expulsion in an attempt to 
stabilize the situation on the coast 60. The sanction or indeed direction of Oyo 
may certainly have been present. However, Dalzel in actual fact implies that it 
was a far more internalised struggle, which may have combined with the 
objectives of Oyo to achieve the result. Indeed there is no indication of any force 
from Oyo or any other external source being sent to carry out the expulsion, and 
it would therefore seem likely that factions within Badagry were also working to 
rid the town of the Jengen. Dalzel concluded that during this period the town 
'was divided by party, which ... occasioned the expulsion of 
Genguem their late 
Prince, 61. Unfortunately the trader does not name the parties which divided the 
town, and therefore it is only possible to surmise. However, it is interesting to 
note that after the deportation of the Jengen, the same year saw the command of 
the Badagry troops being taken by 'Dovi' or 'Dave', again mistakenly called 
Akran by Akinjogbin, but more correctly the title given to the leader of the 
Ahoviko Whydahs, named as Sotu Agojo by Avoseh. The local historian states 
that it was only after the Dahomey War of 1784 that the Ahoviko Whydahs were 
59 Akinjogbin, Dahomey and Its Neighbours p. 165. 
60 lbid, p. 165. 
61 Dalzel, The History of Dahomy p. 182. 
150 
able to return to Badagry and settle 62. However, there is evidence that a 'Prince 
Davie' was in fact active in Badagry during the 1770S 63. It is possible to surmise 
then that the re-introduction of a further Whydah element into the town during 
the 1770s gave rise to a new layer of internal strife, between Awhanjigo and 
Ahoviko Whydahs. Possibly with the short term support of Oyo, the Ahoviko 
Whydahs were able, in 1782, to secure the expulsion of their rival, the jengen. 
Foreign Relations 
What emerges from an examination of Badagry's internal politics then is a 
picture of continual struggle throughout the period between competing factions 
within the town. However, such tensions were not merely the result of very 
localised conflicts but were greatly influenced by much wider external factors, 
most obviously the Atlantic slave trade. The desire for ever increasing trade not 
only stimulated intense competition within Badagry itself, it also clearly forced 
the town into a much wider sphere of commerce, involving both neighbouring 
coastal and interior states, who sought to either curb or control the town's 
commercial success. 
The two most important powers in the area were the Oyo Yoruba to the north 
east and Dahomey to the north west. During the 1720s and 1730s the young and 
aggressively militaristic state of Dahomey attempted to force its way onto the 
international scene by carving out territory on the seashore, notably at Whydah 
in 1727. In 1730 the much older and still more powerful state of Oyo managed to 
secure an agreement confirming Dahomey's tributary status, in an attempt to 
curb its coastal incursions. However, the accord broke down and Oyo was 
compelled to enforce its will in a number of military operations of its own which 
in 1730 forced the removal of the Dahomean capital from Abomey to Allada. By 
1748 Dahomey's status as tributary was confirmed and the two powers slipped 
62 Avoseh, A Short History of Badagry-, p. 27-28. 
63 PRO T70/32 7 May 1776, D Mill, Whydah. 
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into an uneasy alliance which remained in place until 1823 when Dahomey was 
finally able to throw off Oyo dominance 64. 
Tension between the two powers remained constant throughout the remainder 
of the century. Supposedly an alliance based on inequality, the demise of Oyo 
influence and the increasing, but still struggling power of Dahomey forced both 
into uncomfortable compromise. As Dalzel shrewdly pointed out, the 
combination of brawn and brain could be a formidable and dangerous 
combination 65. The interior's relations with the coast were a reflection of this 
tense but surprisingly effective alliance. Outwardly there would appear to have 
been little common ground between the two. As noted before Dahomey was keen 
to concentrate trade at its newly acquired coastal port of Whydah by stifling 
commerce elsewhere. Its hostility towards its 'greatest enemies' the easterly ports, 
was obvious and occasionally resulted in military expeditions against them. 
Some sources have suggested that there was an attack on Badagry as early as the 
1730S 66. Law, however, disputes this claim but concludes that suggestions of such 
an attack may have arisen from the very real threat posed by Dahomey67. But, as 
Newbury points out, the desire to annihilate commercial competition did lead to 
the elimination of jakin in 1732 and an attack on Ekpe in 1747 68. Furthermore, 
in 1763 Porto-Novo beach was attacked and European prisoners taken 69. Oyo 
efforts to curb the excesses of Dahomey in this part of the coast would be 
understandable and its ability to do so rested largely on damage limitation rather 
64 R Law &A Asiwaju, 'From the Volta to the Niger c. 1600-1800' in Ajayi & Crowder, Histolýý of 
West Africa. Vol 1, (3rd ed, London, 1985) p. 444. 
65 The trader noted that: 
Although Adahoonaou possessed a great share of personal courage, he 
appears to have been remarkably deficient in every other endowment 
requisite for the government of a great kingdom. His bravery and enterprising 
spirit, served only to point him out as the fit engine for accomplishing the 
wishes of his more politic and formidable neighbour and master, the King 
of Eyeo. 
[Dalzel, The HistoEy of Dahomy p. 2061. 
66 Verger, Trade Relations... p. 147. 
67 Law . ..... 
The Early History of Badagri', p. 26. 
68 Newbury, The Western Slave Coast... p. 27. 
69 PRO T70/1159 3 August 1763 Day Books Williams Fort, Whydah. 
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than outright opposition. Contrary to Dahomean aims, Oyo, subsequent to the 
opening of the more easterly ports, had found an affective commercial route 
which enabled it to by-pass the more restrictive Whydah trade altogether. Law 
has pointed out that there is no evidence to suggest that Oyo had any authority 
over that coastal area prior to the 1770S 70. However, the attractions of its 
commercial possibilities ultimately focused its attentions and Verger cites 
evidence that at least by 1777, both Badagry and Porto-Novo were seen to be 
under the 'protection' of the OyOS 71. It would appear then that, despite the 
conflicting interests of Oyo and Dahomey on the seashore, the deterioration of 
relations between the coastal states themselves, ultimately offered the interior 
powers a common interest in the form of Badagry. 
Badagry's coastal relations 
Early attempts to retain any form of unity between the coastal states was quickly 
destroyed and rivalries, mainly over commerce arose rapidly after foundation 72. 
According to contemporary Dutch sources, as early as 1738 there were problems 
between Apa and Badagry when Hertogh himself became involved in a 'major 
war, 73. This may have been the result of Hertogh's decision to open a rival 
factory at Ekpe to the west, which provoked his host the King of Apa 74. 
Akinjogbin has also suggested that there were early conflicts between Badagry 
and Jakin 75. However, his evidence for this is confused and it is difficult to 
accept a chronology which dates attacks on Jakin in 1736 and 1738 when the town 
had already been destroyed by attacks from Dahomey in 1732 and 1734. 
However, during the early period of Badagry's history it was Porto-Novo which 
70 R Law, The Qvo Empire c-1600-c, 18a6 A West African Imperialism in the Era of thQ Atlantic 
Slave Tra (OUP 1977 Repr. Greg Revivals, 1991), p. 176. 
71 Verger, Trade Relations... p. 183. 
72 Law, The ý7,, An Communitics.... p. 22. 
73 14 october 1738 J. Meese, Epe & 26 December 1738 Des Bordes, Whydah in Van Dantzig, The 
Dut -h and th, Guinea -C"2-as-t-, pp. 
340-341. 
74 Law, p. 22. 
75 Akinjogbin, Dahomey and Its Neighbours p. 106. 
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emerged as its main commercial rival. Founded by Allada refugees in or around 
1730 after that town's destruction in 1724, Porto-Novo was soon playing an 
important role within Badagry itself 76. From contemporary Dutch sources, it 
would appear that after Hertogh's murder in 1738 the King of 'Ardrah' sent an 
official called 'Captain Blank', who has been identified as the Yevogan or White 
Men's Chief, to restore order there and install Bronssema, the Dutch agent, as 
successor 77. Ultimately Badagry may have been able to throw off the influence. 
from both Apa and Porto-Novo, possibly through military campaign, by the very 
end of the 1730S 78. 
As the coastal states struggled to assert themselves commercially during the latter 
half of the eighteenth century, so tensions between them heightened. According 
to Akinjogbin in 1776 an unsuccessful attack was launched on Badagry from 
Porto-Novo under the command of the pretender Zinsu and by 1781 Badagry and 
Porto-Novo had declared war 79. However, it would appear from contemporary 
sources that the struggle between Zinsu and the jengen was an internal conflict 
preceding the former's expulsion to Porto-Novo8O. Akinjogbin suggests that 
subsequent incursions from Badagry were an attempt at revenge for Zinsu's 
assault, however, it was in fact commercial competition which ultimately lay 
behind the war and drew in other coastal ports such as Ekpe and Lagos. The . 
Director of the French fort at Whydah stated that 'a quite considerable war of the 
peoples of Badagris ... against the peoples of Portenauve' had erupted and 
'interrupted it [the trade] absolutely' 81. The commercial interpretation is the 
more likely as a result of Oyo's concentration of trade at Porto-Novo from the 
mid 1770s onwards. The director of the French fort at Whydah commented that 
these hostilities were initially helpful to the trade of Whydah, but warned 
76 Law, The Gun Communities-, p. 15. 
77 28 May 1738 Bronssema, Badagry in Van Dantzig, The Dutch and the Guineil Coast p. 340. 
78 Law, '... The Early History of Badagri', p. 25. 
79 Akinjogbin, Dahomey and Its Neighbours, p. 156. 
80 De Chenevert & Bullet 1776 cited in Law, Contemporary Sources... p. 49. 
81 AN C6 / 26 24 November 1781 De Montaguere in Law, Contemporary Sources... p. 51. 
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ominously that this would not be allowed to continue by the Oyo 'who supports.. 
the people of Portenauve' 82. 
Badagry then, in an attempt to assert itself commercially, brought down the 
disapproval of Oyo. The balance of power between the two coastal states was 
therefore severely weighted in Porto-Novo's favour from the very beginning. 
However, during the initial hostilities Badagry did manage to ally itself with 
Lagos and 'the whole region of Benin' to the east against Porto-Novo and Ekpe. 
But these alliances were by no means conclusive or secure. Benin, by this period 
only nominally overlord of Lagos, was merely in a position to offer moral 
support to the campaign, whilst ultimately the protagonists' allies proved fickle 
and shifted sides. Ekpe allied itself with Badagry and by 1784 Lagos supported 
Porto-NOVO 83. 
Ekpe had evidently chosen to change allegiances at the wrong time. Porto-Novo, 
in order to protect its interests, allied itself with Dahomey. Dahomey, presumably 
with the tacit approval of Oyo and seizing the opportunity to serve its own 
interests, launched an attack against'Ekpe, Gauza and Kittone' [Agonsa and 
Ketonou]. However, these attacks were inconclusive as a correspondent from 
Cape Coast Castle reported that 'peace is again restored there and ... they make 
their trade as usual, 84. Furthermore, these assaults apparently failed to warn 
Badagry of the dangers of continuing its aggressive policy. In mid 1782 Abson 
from Whydah described a further attack by Badagry on Porto-Novo beach, 
presumably under the new leadership of 'Davi' 85. The Dahomey/ Porto-Novo 
alliance went on the offensive, once more and Ekpe was attacked in December 
1782. This time the town the town was destroyed and according to Abson, about 
82 Ibid, p. 51. 
83 Law, '... The Early History of Badagri', p. 28. 
84 PRO T70 / 33 30 January 1782 JB Weuves, Cape Coast. 
85 PRO T70 /1545 9 July 1782 Abson, Whydah. 
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two hundred slaves were taken86. The way was now cleared for an attack on the 
more important enemy, Badagry. 
The Destruction of Badagry 1784 
In August 1783 Lionel Abson at Whydah reported that 'The Dahoman Army is 
now before Badagrie assisted by the Porto Novo people and Sessu [Zinsu] so I 
imagine it will fall'87. According to Dalzel the initial attack on Badagry was 
carried out by only a small number of Dahomean troops who went to Badagry 
beach where they seized a number of people belonging to 'Prince 
Davee ... employed as porters or water rollers' and possibly also a French Officer 88. 
However, the town itself was not attacked and only two months later Abson 
himself was reporting further excursions by the Badagrian's onto Porto-Novo 
beach 89. 
A second attack was planned. According to Abson, this took place at the end of 
November or the beginning of December 1783. On 4 December he reported that 
'Badagree is destroyed by the Dahomeans 4 days ago and upwards of 1000 slaves 
taken' 90. However, his report was premature and according to the Day Book 
from Whydah for 11 December, this attack had also proved unsuccessful and the 
Dahomean troops retired via Whydah 91. According to Dalzel's account, the 
Dahomean war chief, the Gau, had attempted a further expedition to the beach, 
but finding no plunder had tried an assault on the town, crossing the lagoon 
with the help of the Porto-Novans. But the Badagry people, having gained 
intelligence of the attack, laid an ambush in the rushes, attacked the approaching 
Dahomean army, and after a fierce fight in which their were casualties on both 
86 PRO T70/1545 14 December 1782 Abson, Whydah. 
87 PRO T70 /1545 15 August 1783 Abson, Whydah. 
88 Dalzel, The HistooL of Dahomey p. 179; PRO T70/1545 20 November 1783 Abson, Whydah. 
89 PRO T70 /1545 18 October 1783 Abson, Whydah. 
90 PRO T70 /1545 4 December 1784 Abson, Whydah. 
91 PRO T70/1162 11 December 1783 Day Book Williams Fort, Whydah. 
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sides, forced the Dahomey's into retreat 92. It was the Porto-Novans who had 
betrayed Dahomey and indeed Dalzel reported that as a result, Abson 
subsequently received a letter from 'Dovi's' son 'Onum' containing a warning to 
the Dahomean King of the treachery of Porto-Novo 93. 
Whatever, Onum's aim in warning Dahomey, he did not succeed in either 
destroying the Dahomey/ Porto-Novo alliance or fending off another attack. By. 
mid 1784 a formidable force had been gathered to launch a third assault on 
Badagry. Akinjogbin states that as well as the forces of Dahomey and Porto-Novo, 
soldiers from Mahi and Ketu also joined the alliance 94. By this time Lagos too 
had switched allegiances. Akinjogbin states that the port merely agreed to remain 
neutral, however, according to Dalzel, under the leadership of Ologun Kutere 
war canoes were sent to aid the aggressors. Law has also emphasised the role of 
Oyo within the invading army. Citing Dalzel's account, he concludes that Oyo 
messengers marched with the army and were ultimately 'in effective command' 
of the huge combined forces and that'nothing of importance was under taken 
without their concurrence'95. 
Supplied by the pretender Zinsu, the combined forces marched on Badagry two 
months after the end of the Dahomean Annual Customs and effectively besieged 
the town in the late summer of 1784. Along their course they 'laid waste to the 
whole country' and took many prisoners. On arrival in the Badag ry area the 
force, so vast that it required four hours to walk from one extremity of the camp 
to the other, rested for three days. Badagry was effectively cut off. Lagos sent war 
canoes as far as three miles east of the town and blocked the lagoon, capturing 
and enslaving any Badagrians who ventured that way 96. Virtually surrounded 
92 Dalzel, The Historv of DahQD-, y-, p. 180. 
93 Thid, p. 182. Also see chapter 3, p. 98. for a further details about 'Onum'. 
94 Akinjogbin, Dahomey and Its Neigalb-ours p. 166. 
95 Law, The Oyo Empir pp. 176-178; Dalzel, The History of Dahomy p. 183. 
96 Dalzel, The History of Dahomy p. 183. 
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by both land and water, the Badagrians attempted to counter attack. According to 
Dalzel, the encamped enemy, became slack in discipline and furthermore, the 
Gau had ventured down river to perform some religious rites. Taking their 
opportunity while they could, the Badagrian forces attacked in three divisions led 
by Davee' of Ahoviko and assisted by his generals 'Possu' [the Posu of Posuko] 
and 'Oclah' [the Akran of Ijegbal. As a combined military force, the fragmented 
population of Badagry was surprisingly effective. But although the attack went. 
initially in Badagry's favour, the Gau's deputy, Hwenu, rallied the troops and 
turned the tables. With the return of the war chief, the Badagrians were routed 
and the Dahomean army was 'quickly in possession of Davees head' 97. The 
defeat was resounding. Although many Badagry women, children and men, who 
had been left to guard the town itself, were able to escape eastwards and were 
harboured by Lagos, the Badagry army was annihilated and 'six thousand heads 
were sold to the King of Dahomey by his soldiers 98. All prisoners captured were 
to be sent, by agreement, to Oyo. But tensions arose over other spoils and Alafin 
Abiodun sent a force south to intercept the Dahomean army. On learning of this, 
the Dahomean King, Kpengla, ordered his generals to dismiss their Oyo guides 
and return home a different way. Law concludes, however, that the incident did 
not cause a lasting breach between Oyo and Dahomey and indeed the Alafin 
reduced Dahomey's tribute by half in gratitude for their assistance in the 
campaign 99. 
Reconstruction 1784-1821 
Badagry had suffered a resounding defeat. According to Dalzel's dramatic 
account, the skulls of the slaughtered were taken back to Dahomey where they 
were used to decorate the walls of the palace. On finding that they did not have 
enough to complete their design, the King declined to space them further apart 
97 Thid, p. 185. 
98 Thid, p. 185. 
99 Law, The Oyo Empire- pp. 176-178, 
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and accordingly executed a further one hundred and twenty seven Badagrian 
prisoners to complete his 'hellish purpose' 100. But as noted, the annihilation of 
Badagry was a military defeat. Of those not involved in the campaign, only about 
two hundred were captured whilst the rest were able to escape down the lagoon 
to Lagos. Contemporary evidence suggests that the invading army did not 
remain in the Badagry area for long, but returned home within the month, eager 
to show off their spoils and receive their rewards 101. The area was left under the 
control of the Dahomey's ally, Zinsu, who had provisioned the besieging forces. 
It was under his influence that Badagry began the process of rebuilding. 
According to Badagry tradition, as recorded by Avoseh, Zinsu was a Prince of 
Ijegba Ward, a nephew of the first Akran Gbafoe, who had saved Badagry from 
destruction by negotiating successfully with his friend, King Ologun Kutere of 
Lagos, to break up the alliance of powers threatening the town. Having 
successfully ensured an end to the siege, Zinsu was sent home from Lagos with 
three canoes loaded with provisions for the starving Badagrians. On his 
triumphant arrival in the town, the bed-ridden Akran Pojeagonwu expired and 
Zinsu was proclaimed 'King Akran' and took the name of jiwa 102. This 
interpretation would however, appear to be largely an attempt to legitimise 
Zinsu's claims to the title of Akran and also the claims of the Akran to an 
accepted supremacy within the town. Zinsu's early origins are difficult to 
establish. Dalzel stated that he was not in fact of Badagry origin at all, but came 
from Porto Novo 103. But although the events surrounding his initial arrival at 
Badagry are unclear, by the second half of the 1770s he had clearly forged an 
extremely successful political and economic career within that town. In 1776 a 
man named 'Sessou', clearly identifiable with Zinsu, was being described as 'war 
100 Dalzel, The Histou of Dahomy p. 190-192. 
101 PRO T70/1162 3 January 1785 Day Book Williams Fort. 
102 Avoseh, 
-A- 
Short HistojýL of BadagQý pp. 17-18. 
103 Dalzel, The HistoLy of Dahomy, p. 197. 
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Captain and first merchant in Badagry' 104. The origins of his military strength 
are equally unclear. Whether he relied on military support from Porto-Novo or 
had gathered supporters within Badagry is unrecorded, but it is evident that by 
the 1770s he was able to instigate a military campaign in an attempt to take 
complete control of the town. His initial attempts were unsuccessful, as noted 
earlier, and he had been expelled from Badagry by the jengen's forces by the end 
of 1776. After several years of unsuccessful plotting from the safety of Porto- 
Novo, the war of 1784 was Zinsu's opportunity once again to make his mark. 
Having played a vital role in provisioning the besieging rather then besieged 
forces, he was able to take possession of the town, after the withdrawal and 
presumably with the consent of the invading army. 
Zinsu's ability to take effective control of Badagry, notably by assuming the title 
of Akran, is questionable. There is evidence for example that, far from occupying 
the position of Akran at Ijegba, he based himself instead at 'Geumeuil' 
[unidentified], a place on the beach one and a half miles away from Badagry 
itself'05. Akinjogbin also alludes to a shift away from Badagry proper when he 
states that on taking over the remnants of the town, Zinsu initially established 
'another Badagri' near to the coast until 1787 when he built two new ports, one at 
Badagry and one at 'Cap Blanc' [unidentified] 106. Zinsu's success as an 
entrepreneur has been noted by Avoseh, who claims that as 'Akran' he was 'the 
greatest slave trader' and 'exceedingly wealthy' 107. His conclusion however, 
must be seen in the context that Badagry had been effectively destroyed in 1784 
and this must have adversely affected the town's trade. But there is evidence to 
suggest that commerce did begin a rapid recovery after the devastation of 1784, 
and British trade ships were setting out for that place in 1785 108. By 1788, Badagry 
104 1 November 1776 Dewarel, Director of the French Fort at Whydah cited in Verger, Trade 
Relalions... p. 184. 
105 Law, '... The Early History of Badagry', p. 31. 
106 Akinjogbin, Dahomey and Its Neighbours, pp. 166-167. 
0" Avoseh, A Short HistoEy of BadagL. X, p. 18. 1Y 
108 PRO T70/1552 30 August 1785 Departures and Arrivals at Cape Coast. 
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was again regarded, along with Porto-Novo, as the trading partner of Oyo 109 
Badagry's ability to recover economically during this period may be explained by 
the development of a conflict between Porto-Novo and Dahomey. Shortly after a 
successful combined attack on Weme in 1786, the alliance broke up over Porto- 
Novo's increasing commercial success. Relations between the two powers 
became increasingly strained until 1787 when a Dahomean military campaign 
was launched against the coastal state. Akinjogbin has used this example as an 
illustration of the increasing influence of Dahomey and the waning power of 
Oyo 110. However, once again it was Oyo that stepped in to suppress Dahomey's 
aggression, threatening military action itself should the campaign continue, a 
threat which, according to Dalzel, caused panic in Dahomey 111. But even the 
threat of insecurity at Porto-Novo was enough to make European traders look 
elsewhere and the Badagrian commercial community was not slow to take up 
the opportunityI12. 
Further research may reveal more clearly the nature of Zinsu's supremacy at 
Badagry. However, it would appear that ultimately he failed to reconstruct the 
town securely, on any site, despite increasing commercial success. Indeed he 
faced, perhaps due to this economic recovery, challenges from both without. and 
within which he could not withstand. A familiar pattern had been re-established. 
As a result of problems on the western part of the coast, the continued search for 
commercial openings led to a rapid rise in the importance of Lagos during the 
latter part of the eighteenth century 113. Alongside the tensions between Porto- 
109 AN C6 / 26 24 January 1788 Gourg, Director of the French Fort at Whydah in Law, Contemporary 
Sources.... p. 59. 
110 Akinjogbin, Dahomey- and Its Neighbours, p. 167. 
111 Dalzel, The Histay of Dahomy p. 196. 
112 Law, '... The Early History of Badagry', p. 31. 
113 According to Law, Lagos only became prominent at the end of the eighteenth century under 
Ologun Kutere who succeeded to the throne in about 1780. Law suggests that the rapid rise in the 
Lagos population during this period can be largely accounted for by increases in the number of slaves 
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Novo and Dahomey, the western ports faced further disruption in their long- 
standing trading patterns caused by the outbreak of war between Britain and 
France in 1793, and the temporary abolition of the French slave trade between 
1794 and 1802 114. As the alliance between Porto-Novo and Dahomey crumbled 
into antagonism, Badagry, under the guidance of Zinsu, aligned itself with Porto- 
Novo, at one point, planning, but not ultimately carrying out a joint attack on 
Whydah, apparently with the support of Benin and Lagos 115. However, support 
from Lagos was short-lived and it switched sides, as Law concludes 'distracting 
Zinsu's attention towards the east'116. 
The local historian of Lagos; Losi, states that the rise of Lagos led to increasingly 
close links between that state and its neighbour BadagryI17. These relations 
would seem initially to have been largely diplomatic and involved the taking of 
wives from Badagry and visits from the Lagos King. These links became 
increasingly close until Losi states that Badagry became both a place of refuge for 
Lagos Kings and that some 'Kings of Badagry were crowned by the Kings of 
Lagos' 118. Although miscalculating the dates of the period (Losi dates the rise of 
Lagos as occurring in the earliest years of the eighteenth century), he does 
provide a valuable summary of the complex relationship between the two 
communities. His reference to the former as a place of refuge for the Kings of 
Lagos, alludes to the episode when Prince Akinsernoyin stayed at Badagry during 
from the Mahi and Hausa countries in the interior [Law, 'The Career of Adele... ', p. 371. 
114 According to Adams: 
Lagos only rose in importance as a place of trade when the European 
war and revolution in France prevented the slave-ships belonging to 
France carrying on their usual trade at Ardrah; and the latter place 
derived its consequence from the King of Dahomey monopolizing 
the trade in slaves in his own dominions; which proving extremely 
injurious to the interests of both the white and black traders, drove 
them to the expedient of seeking another market. 
[Adams, Remarks- pp. 218-2221. 
115 Law, '... The Early History of Badagri', pp. 32-33. 
116 Ibid, p. 32.. 
117 Losi, HistoLy of Lag pp. 13-14. 
118 Ibid, pp. 13-14. 
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the reign of his predecessor, prior to the 1760S 119. Badagry's local historian also 
records the event and states that it established a 'friendly relationship' between 
the two powers 120. Losi's reference to the 'Kings of Badagry' being crowned at 
Lagos is undoubtedly an indication of the town's tributary status. Indeed 
although Avoseh maintains that the relationship between the two powers was 
based on equality and good will, it becomes apparent from an examination of 
further accounts that as Lagos' commercial and political strength grew in the 
latter part of the eighteenth century, so ultimately it came to intervene in the 
affairs of Badagry as an increasingly dominant partner and benefactor, ultimately 
itself forcing Badagry into tributary status. The path towards increasing 
dominance was aided and abetted by internal dissent in Badagry during the 
immediate post-destruction period of the 1780s. 
Within Badagry, a bitter power struggle was once again emerging. According to 
contemporary sources, shortly after Zinsu's establishment in the area, a claimant 
to the position of jengen, said to be the son of the previous title holder, was able 
to return from exile in Brazil. His arrival on the coast in 1788 resulted in a power 
struggle which threatened the security of the whole area. The Jengen requested 
the help of both Porto-Novo and Lagos to 'restore himself to the throne of his 
ancestors'121. If forthcoming this threatened to alienate Dahomey, which had 
now renounced its allegiances with both Porto-Novo and Lagos and was growing 
increasingly antagonistic towards the easterly ports, having attacked Porto-Novo 
itself in 1787122. 
Whether the newly returned jengen was successful in his applications to the 
coastal powers is not mentioned, however another French source states that in 
1788 a military assault from Lagos was launched against Zinsu's base at 
119 Law, 'Trade and Politics... ' p. 344. 
120 Avoseh, A Short History of Badagry pp. 32-33. 
12131 August 1786 Gourg, Whydah, in Verger, Trade Relations... p. 188. 
122 Thid, p. 188. See also p. 161. 
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Guerneuil. Law concludes that this attack may have resulted in the deposition of 
Zinsu and the establishment of a 'friendly regime in Badagri' since from that 
point Zinsu disappears from the Badagry scene and Lagos subsequently played an 
extensive role in Badagrian affairs 123. 
The internal political scene of Badagry during the subsequent period is confused. 
This arises largely from the fact that accounts of the period are limited, and 
Avoseh is the major resource. It is also a reflection of the confused political 
character of the period itself. The presumed deposition of Zinsu did not stabilise 
the internal situation, indeed it would appear potentially to have destabilised it. 
Unfortunately, due to Avoseh's concentration on 1jegba-based politics, there is 
no evidence to suggest the role of the recently restored Jengen within the town. 
However, the local historian does allude to upheaval within the 1jegba Ward 
which suggests that the reconstruction of the town had done nothing to iron out 
internal rivalries or tensions. The successor to Zinsu (who is counted as an 
Akran of Ijegba by Avoseh) was Soba, a poor man who was jealous of the 
commercial success of other houses within the town. Avoseh implies that Soba's 
jealousy was directed at others within the Ijegba Section itself. However, his 
identification of Zinsu's House, which he states was Jigbeko, as well as 
Pojeagonwu, may be another symptom of Avoseh's wish to legitimise Zinsu as 
an Akran within the traditional ward structure rather than an accurate reflection 
of events. As noted above, contemporary evidence would seem to suggest that 
Zinsu, even at the height of his power was established on the periphery of the 
town. It is possible and even likely that in the post-Zinsu period, the remnants of 
his following were accepted into Badagry proper, and clearly elements did forge 
extremely successful commercial careers 124. However, to suggest that they were 
able to become so quickly and so closely associated with the Jigbeko House is 
impossible to verify, although it may explain Zinsu's subsequent election in 
123 Law, The Gun Communities-', p. 25. 
124 Avoseh, A Short History of Badagry p. 18-19. 
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tradition to the position of Akran. 
Whether jealous of other elements solely within 1jegba Ward itself, or a 
combination of 1jegba and newly arrived 'Geumeuil' elements, Avoseh 
emphasises the weakness of the fifth Akran. He goes as far as to say that in an 
attempt to curb his competitors success, the embittered Soba plotted with 
Dahomey and planned an attack by which 'he should be able to avail himself 'of, 
the wealth of these two houses and the Dahomeans were welcome to anything 
they could get' 125. It is impossible to ascertain the exact role of this Akran in the 
subsequent Dahomean campaign against Badagry in 1790. However, Badagry 
tradition does suggest a decisive role for the Posu in the 'defeat' of the 
Dahomean army 126. At this point, the Akran, his treachery discovered, made a 
mysterious exit by turning himself into an anthill 127. Avoseh's account, 
although incredible in places, does perhaps suggest that, in the face of 1jegba 
difficulties, it was the Posu who took the more dominant role amongst the 
Weme sections of the town. As already noted, the first contemporary mention of 
the Posu occurs in Dalzel's account of the 1784 siege, when that chief, presumably 
the first Posu Athigbiri, was wounded 128. His son Wrawru succeeded to the title. 
It was this Posu, according to Avoseh, who successfully defended Badagry against 
the Dahomean army and as a result of the disappearance of the Akran, usurped 
the title and took over the palace at Ijegba 129. This account of events is however, 
somewhat distorted, notably in the description of the Posu's defeat of Dahomey. 
According to contemporary sources, Dahomey was eventually pacified by the 
intervention of Lagos rather than any military success by the Posu. Furthermore, 
it is difficult to assess the accuracy of the coup d'etat recounted by Avoseh. Stating 
that Posu Wrawru took the title of Akran would seem to lend itself once again to 
125 Tbid, pp. 18-19. 
126 According to Avoseh, the attack of 1790 was defeated by Posu Wrawru who met the invading 
army at Apaku field [unidentified] [Ibid, p. 191. 
127 Ibid, p. 19-20. 
128 Dalzel, The History of Dahomy, p. 185. 
129 Avoseh, A Short History- of Badag1y, pp. 19-20. 
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an 1jegba based version of events, the implication being that the Akran's title was 
supreme and therefore desirable. However, it may be that in this case Avoseh is 
essentially accurate. As another Weme leader within Badagry, it is possible that at 
the disappearance from the political scene (presumably either by death, desertion 
or merely ineffectiveness) of the Akran himself, the Posu was ultimately able to 
assert himself as the politically dominant figure within the Werne section of the 
town, thus essentially usurping the Akran's position. 
There is very little evidence from which a clear account of this Dahomean attack 
on Badagry may be drawn. However, Avoseh's romanticized account of this 
second attack clearly ignores the role played by Lagos 130. According to local 
historian Losi, subsequent to the increasing power of Lagos, both commercial 
and political, Badagry was under the control of Lagos and the Badagrians would 
I not do anything without first obtaining the consent of the Lagos King' 131. This 
influence was increased in the early 1790s when Badagry once again became the 
object of Dahomean aggression. According to Losi the King of Lagos bought off 
the Dahomeys with presents 'because the King of Badagry was his very good 
friend' 132. Law and Asiwaju have concluded that by buying off the King of 
Dahomey, King Ologun Kutere of Lagos sought to make Badagry officially a 
tributary of Lagos 133. It was attempting to enforce this tribute that Lagos 
destroyed Badagry during the autumn of 1793. According to Miles, an English 
correspondent, Lagos launched an attack of six hundred canoes on the town and 
cut Badagry's supply lines into the interior: 
The cause is their refusal to continue payment of a tribute for succour 
afforded them by the caboceer of Lagos when the King of 
Dahomey's army ravaged their country about three years since 134 
130 It is interesting to note that in the Day Books of the Royal African Company, no mention of the 
1790 attack is made at Whydah despite the usual practice of the governor of the 
English Fort 
giving presents to returning armies. 
T31 Losi, His : )[y of Lagos, p. 15. 
132 Ibid, pp. 15-16. 
133 Law & Asiwaju, 'From the Volta to the Niger-', p. 453. 
134 PRO T70/1484 10 October 1793 Miles, Popo. 
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Although this report does not give evidence as to the outcome of the 
confrontation, Robertson later stated that Badagry was in fact destroyed, and it 
would appear that the town was affirmed as tributary to Lagos until the 1820s 135. 
It is also interesting to note that after the Porto-Novo /Dahomean tensions of the 
late 1780s the 1790s and early 1800s saw once again a revival of Porto-Novan 
influence over Badagry. Indeed a source cited by Verger from 1805 stated that the 
King of Porto-Novo was 'master' not only of Porto-Novo, but of Ekpe, Badagry 
and Lagos as well 136. Furthermore, in a power struggle which ensued in the 
early nineteenth century, Porto-Novo was apparently called upon by the exiled 
Akran Zofun, who had been invested at Porto-Novo, to regain his position 
within Badagry 137. 
The ravages of the 1790s had a seriously detrimental effect on the economy of 
Badagry, and the town found great difficulty in recovering. However there is 
evidence from an English Captain, who may have been reporting on heresay, 
that as early as 1795 '1 am told the place begins to hold up its head again and that 
slaves are plenty' 138. It would also appear that at least a number of Portuguese 
ships were still calling there, a factor which would appear to have played a part in 
the internal struggles of the much weakened state 139. 
According to Avoseh, Posu Wrawru, hero of the Dahomean campaign found his 
civil position untenable. 'There being nobody of note among his followers', he 
was forced to rely on kinsmen from Whydah 140. From exactly where these 
'kinsmen' came is unspecified and whether they were related by marriage or 
blood is unclear, however, Wrawru immediately faced opposition from another 
section of the Whydah community lead by the Jengen, Sinto Agara III of 
135 Robertson, Notes on Africa p. 283. 
136 Verger, Trade Relations., p. 283. 
137 Avoseh, A Short History of Badagjy, p. 22. 
138 PRO T70 / 1571 9 August 1795 J Fayrer in Law, -The Early History of Badagri', p. 36. 
139 Verger, Trade Relations... p. 48 1. 
140 Avoseh, A Short HistoEy of Badagry pp. 19-20. 
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Awhanjigo Ward, who even Avoseh calls the 'senior chief' 141. He states that 
after only seventeen days the Posu was tricked into leaving Badagry altogether by 
the jengen, whose initial attempt on Wrawru's life had failed. The deposed Posu, 
sought help at Porto-Novo, but was unable to secure aid in a counter attack and 
died, according to Avoseh at ja [unidentified] 'from anger and 
disappointment'142. 
The internal politics of Badagry, during the subsequent period are confused. It 
would appear however, that the fortunes of Awhanjigo Ward took a significant 
turn for the worse and indeed the position of the jengen seems to have lapsed 
from political prominence. Avoseh offers no explanation of this occurrence, but 
from the information that he does give it would appear that the jengen's line 
suffered either a rupture or obscurity towards the end of the eighteenth century. 
The chieftancy of Sinto Agara Ill was, he says, 'made during the time of Akran 
Soba' and he was therefore presumably the son of the jengen exiled to Brazil who 
had returned and resumed his place in Badagry after the initial repulse of Zinsu 
in 1776. It was either this jengen or his successor Athunde IV who was involved 
in the expulsion of Posu Wrawru c. 1790. However, Avoseh states that it was the 
following Jengen, Gbede V who signed the Treaty of Cession in 1863. Even if 
Sinto Agara, Athunde and Gbede were extremely long-lived chiefs, it is likely 
that the jengen line was broken or a single figure has been missed. Avoseh 
admits himself that 'The order of the jengen is not quite clear and only seven of 
them are known to history' 143. From the lack of any further information it 
would appear that the considerable power of the jengen's of Awhanjigo waned 
during this period and the chieftaincy was pushed into the background of 
Badagrian political life. The events surrounding this political demise and even 
the date are difficult to assess, but it is possible that it may have taken place 
141 lbid, p. 20. 
142 Ibid, p. 20. 
143 lbid, p. 25. 
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almost immediately after the expulsion of Posu Wrawru. By 1793 a contemporary 
English source was citing the Akran as the 'principal Caboceer' of Badagry and 
stating that it was largely as a result of this man, that Lagos had launched its 
attack that year 144. It is possible to surmise that the internal power struggle of 
Badagry had once again been resolved by external factors, notably in this case the 
ensuing war between France and Britain from 1793 and the abolition of slavery 
and the Slave trade in France between 1794 and 1802, which may have adversel y 
affected the commercial interests of the French Chief Jengen, to the advantage of 
the Portuguese Chief Akran. 
I would suggest that from the end of middle years of the 1790s until c. 1820 the 
Akrans, as Portuguese chiefs, were therefore able to assume a political 
prominence within the town, which does not appear to have been challenged by 
other identifiable wards. This is not to suggest that their position was a secure 
one. Indeed the 1790s and early nineteenth century were a time of great upheaval 
within Badagry, with challenges arising from both within Ijegba Ward itself and 
also from outside the town. The attack launched upon Badagry in 1793 from 
Lagos temporarily deposed Akran Yede 145. However, it would seem likely that 
Yede was able to return to the town some time after this event. Avoseh's 
assessment that Yede's reign continued with 'a successful slave trade and a good 
reign', may be an exaggeration, given that even by the early nineteenth century 
Badagry had not recovered from the ravages of 1793 146. However, Yede's return 
would seem plausible as his unpopular successor Zofun managed to maintain 
his very insecure hold on the chieftaincy until c 1821. As a result of one, initially 
successful, deposition attempt, Zofun was able, with the help of Porto Novo, to 
retake his place at Badagry. However, in the face of concerted opposition it 
would seem unlikely that Zofun's unpopularity would have enabled him to 
144 PRO T70/1484 10 October 1793 Miles, Popo. 
145 PRO T70 / 1484 10 October 1793 Miles, Popo. 
146 Avoseh, A Short History of Badagry, p. 22. 
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maintain his position for over twenty years, which would be the case had Yede 
not returned. 
Furthermore, the early nineteenth century would appear to have been a period 
when the traditional chieftancy faced a challenge from a different source. 
Robertson in the 1800s named a man called 'Agoussa' as the 'principal trader' at 
Badagry 147. This man is not identifiable with any ward chief, however, he is 
possibly the same man as Agosu, named by Avoseh, as Zinsu's son 148. As noted 
above, Avoseh places the Zinsu lineage within the Ijegba Ward, notably as part of 
jigbeko House. However I would suggest that this link is likely to be tendentious. 
Agoussa/Agosu was an example of a 'new man', who, like his father, was able to 
assert himself within the Badagry structure. It would appear that Agoussa, like 
his father was determined to make his mark on the political sphere. Law suggests 
that he was perhaps the same 'Gansa', who was named in Porto-Novo sources as 
a 'chief' of Badagry, killed in a confrontation in the early nineteenth century. 
This conflict was probably that by which Zofun was able to reassert his position 
within Badagry and Law concludes therefore that Agoussa may have been a rival 
authority to that of the legitimate Akran149. The post destruction period then 
would appear not only to reflect but to have reinforced the commercial basis on 
which power rested within the Badagry political arena. 
147 Robertson, Notes on Africa p. 286. 
148 Avoseh, A Short History of Badagjýý p. 18. 
149 Law, 'The Gun Communities-', p. 31. 
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Chapter Six 
The Adele Period c. 1821-1835 
After the devastation at the end of the eighteenth century and the painfully slow 
process of reconstruction during the early years of the nineteenth century, 
Badagry was once again forced to take centre stage in the complex web of coastal 
politics by the arrival in c. 1821 of Adele, a King of Lagos in exile. What is striking 
about the period of Adele's fourteen year residence in Badagry is that, like Zinsu 
in the 1780s, he was able to take control of the much weakened town. However, 
unlike this predecessor, Adele was able, as a result of his own abilities and of 
much wider factors, not only to assert his own position within the state, but also 
re-establish Badagry as an important economic and political centre within the 
coastal framework. 
The sources for this period in Badagry's history are relatively rich. As well as 
those accounts based on coastal traditions such as Avoseh, Payne, Losi, Geay, 
Akindele and Aguessy there are, for the first time, a number of contemporary 
sources which, if only briefly, focus directly on the state of Badagry itself, rather 
than its interaction with its more prominent neighbours 1. The first set of such 
sources are those provided by the British expedition led by Royal Naval Officer 
Captain Hugh Clapperton 2. The aim of the exercise was for Clapperton to make 
further contact with the Sokoto Caliphate, the interior power he had visited four 
years previously after trekking inland from Tripoli with Captain Denham. This 
second visit, approaching from the south, would investigate the possibilities of 
establishing a direct trade route between the interior and the Slave Coast 3. A 
major part of Clapperton's remit included tracing the course of the Niger. The 
1 Avoseh, A Short-Lbstay of Badagry JA0 Payne, Table Qf Principal Evelats in Yoruba His 
(Lagos 1893); Losi,. istory Qf Lagos Geay, 'Origine, Formation et Histoire du Royaume de Porto- 
Novo', Akindele & Aguessy, Contribution L'etude de Mistoire .... de Porto-Novo. 
2 For further details of Clapperton see T Nelson, A Biographical Memoire of the latc Dr Oudney, 
(London 1830). 
3 PRO C02 /16 30 July 1825 Bathurst (CO), London. 
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river remained a mystery and various theories and a number of abortive and 
inconclusive missions were despatched during the early nineteenth century to 
ascertain its true course. Indeed it was Clapperton's party which identified the 
final resting place of perhaps the most famous of these travellers Mungo Park. 
Clapperton's second expedition of 1825-26 into the interior from the south at 
Badagry proved disastrous. The original expeditionary force led by Clapperton 
consisted of another Royal Naval Officer Captain Pearce, surgeons Dr Morrison 
and Dr Dickson, a British trader Mr Houtson and four servants. These junior 
members of the party were, Richard Lander, a civilian employed by Clapperton as 
his personal servant, Mr Dawson a seaman engaged as servant to Dr Morrison, 
Columbus, a 'mulatto', who was embarked at Whydah to pursue a different 
route with Dr Dickson via Abomey, and Pasko, a Hausa. Of the original nine it 
was two of these servants, Richard Lander and Pasko, who survived to re-emerge 
at Badagry at the end of 1826 4. Furthermore, plans for a direct trading route 
between Sokoto and the coast proved to be illusory with Sultan Bello holding 
insufficient influence as well as insufficient interest to make it a reality. But the 
expedition did provide some very important source material as regards Badagry. 
Mr Houtson was engaged as one of the party at Whydah. It was this trader, who 
argued that the expedition should embark from Badagry rather than Benin as 
they had originally planned. It would appear that not only had Houtson 
quarrelled with the King of the more easterly power but he had also established a 
trading post at Badagry the previous year 5. Indeed it was Badagry's proven 
trading links with the interior which finally persuaded Clapperton that it would 
be prudent to follow this course as he noted that it was the 'constant 
communication' which existed between Mr Houtson at Badagry and the interior 
which led him to believe that 'the route by this direction promises fairer 
4R Lander, Captain Clapperton's Last Expedition to Africa Vol 2, p. 235. 
5 PRO C02 /17 28 November 1825 Capt Willis (HMS Brazen), off Badagry; C02 /15 29 November 
1825 Clapperton, off Badagry. 
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prospects of success than by any other we could have chosen' 
Despite only remaining at Badagry briefly on the outward journey, the few letters 
and journal of Clapperton, both published and unpublished prove useful 7. 
Captain Pearce and Mr Houtson also provided short written accounts 8. 
However, by far the most useful Piece of evidence is the journal kept by the sole 
European survivor Richard Lander. In it Lander recounts the expedition in some 
detail from its departure from Portsmouth and landing at Badagry on 28 
November 1825 to his return to the town on 21 November 1826 where he 
remained for over two months awaiting the arrival of a British ship. Lander's 
value as a source for an historical study of Badagry is obvious in that, if nothing 
else, it is the earliest known written account of Badagry by someone who had 
actually spent time there. Lander was often guilty of over-generalisation, but 
despite being a relatively uneducated man, or perhaps because of this, he wrote 
very much as an individual, making observations which were often less clouded 
with prejudice and less biased towards a particular cause than other observers 
both before and after him 9. 
Lander's published and unpublished writings of this period are supplemented by 
a second visit to Badagry in 1830. Having returned to England and a surprisingly 
cool reception, Lander remarkably offered his services to the British Government 
for a second time. They took up his plan to return to Africa, this time along with 
his younger brother John as an unsalaried partner. The aim was, once again, to 
ascertain the true course of the Niger. This second journey of 1830-31 was highly 
successful. The small party, travelling inland once more from Badagry, reached 
the Niger above Boussa and were able to succeed where Park had failed and 
6 PRO C02/15 29 November 1825 Clapperton, off Badagry. 
7 Clapperton's journal was published in 1829. However, more details of Badagry are contained in 
his unpublished papers collected in the C02 African Exploration series at the PRO. 
8 These are also found in the PRO C02 and ADM55 series. 
9 See R Lander, Captain Clapperton's Last Expedition to Africa, Vols I&2 and PRO C02 series. 
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travel by water, along the river, to the sea 10. Using these fascinating sources it is 
possible to gain a relatively clear picture, at least of Badagry's outward appearance 
and operation. Under the guidance of Adele the town was once again beginning 
to show signs of success. This is in sharp contrast to Edward Bold's assertion in 
1822 that Badagry was 'a small inconsiderable residence' 11. By 1830 John Lander 
was describing it as 'wonderfully populous' 12. 
According to Clapperton, Badagry's domestic economy was booming. The 
surrounding countryside was producing 'corn, calavances, yams, sweet potatoes, 
plantains, oranges, limes and various other fruits and vegetables' to supply the 
market every five days 13. Furthermore it would appear that Badagry was once 
again not only sustaining itself by local trading, but was playing an increasing 
role in the Atlantic economy. After the abolition of the Atlantic slave trade by the 
British in 1807, the imposition of the Anti-Slave Trade Squadron of the Royal 
Navy and the gradual (friminalisation of slaving by the other trading nations, the 
nineteenth century saw the gradual shift from slave to more 'legitimate' articles 
of trade from West Africa. However, as noted by Lovejoy, despite increasing 
pressures, the early part of the nineteenth century was the perio d when the Slave 
Coast overtook the West Central area for slave exports and assumed a new 
prominence in the now largely illegal trade 14. Pressures from the Squadron were 
clearly recognised. Richard Lander noted the highly surreptitious way in which 
slaving ships operated off the coast, landing their Captain and returning only on 
a specified date to embark slaves as quickly and quietly as possible 15. The resident 
slave traders he met in Badagry in 1826 were clearly unwilling to have their 
presence made known to the British cruisers 16. But in the face of such 
10 See R&J Lander, 
' 
Tournal of an Expedition... Vols 1-3. 
11 E Bold, Thg: Merchants-and Mariners African Guide (London 1822), p. 60. 
12 R&J Lander, Tommal of an Expedition.... Vol 1, P. 19. 
13 PRO C02/15 6 December 1825 Clapperton's journal, Badagry. 
14 Lovejoy, TransformatiQns in Slavery... p. 55. 
15 R Lander, Captain Clapperton's Last Expedition to Africa, Vol 2, p. 239. 
16 On his return to Badagry from the interior, when a British naval ship finally appeared in the 
area, presents were sent to Lander: 
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opposition, Badagry had been able to reassert itself as a slave trading centre by the 
1820s. According to accounts of the Clapperton expedition there were as many as 
seven or eight resident slave traders in the town during this period 17. These 
men were 'almost exclusively' Portuguese, and inhabited a total of five separate 
slave factories 18. It is interesting to note that Badagry was also trading in other 
items. The chief export was slaves, but the Badagrians also offered 'palm oil, 
ivory and large quantities of cloth. The latter item was greatly valued along the. 
coast and amongst the slave and mulatto population of Brazil and the English 
trader Houtson had established a factory at Badagry in 1824, presumably to tap 
these resources 19. By the middle of the 1820s Badagry was once again in the 
ascendant. In a letter of 1825 Clapperton went as far as to state that rising as it was 
in importance over Porto-Novo, Badagry 'will eventually be the chief outlet of 
all the exports from the Soudan' 20. 
There were several factors which had enabled Badagry to recover its position as 
an international commercial centre during this period. Lovejoy, in his detailed 
analysis of the slave trade, states that the expansion of the commerce of the slave 
coast was largely instigated by political upheaval in the interior. He suggests that 
the interior wars initiated by Oyo and the rise of Dahomey led to a struggle by the 
coastal towns for both their survival and to 'control Oyo's trade with the 
Europeans'. These struggles ultimately led to increased numbers of slaves being 
available 21. Clapperton's account would seem to suggest that Badagry was able to 
take advantage of the upheaval in the interior to pursue its own ends. In 1825 he 
noted that the inhabitants of the town, though poor, 'subsist chiefly by war - and 
on the condition that I would not make my countrymen acquainted with the fact 
of any Portuguese being in the town 
f1bid, Vol 2, p. 2451. 
17 Ibid, Vol 2, p. 240. 
18 Ibid, Vol 2, p. 245. 
19 PRO C02 /15 6 December 1825 Clapperton's journal, Badagry. 
20 PRO C02/15 29 November 1825 Clapperton, off Badagry. 
21 Lovejoy, Transformations in SlaveiW, p. 55. 
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the commissions they secure as brokers on the trade of Eyeo with the whites, 22. 
Although the trade was predominantly slaves, trade from Oyo also included the 
cloth mentioned above. Oyo then was, until this period, still the dominant 
political and commercial force. However, the 1820s were a period of imperial 
decline which escalated, as Oyo collapsed, into warfare and chaos. According to 
Law's analysis of the situation, weaknesses and disputes at the centre ultimately 
enabled those on the periphery to assert themselves and the whole of 
Yorubaland was thrown into devastating conflict, the eclipse of Oyo and 
substantial population displacement southward 23. Furthermore, the period that 
saw the decline of imperial power allowed Dahomey to expand once more. But 
the westerly power was prevented from asserting itself as wholly predominant by 
the foundation of other power bases in the Yoruba area. As a result of shifting 
rebels and refugees, the Yoruba wars produced a series of new political centres at 
Ilorin, lbadan, Ijaye and Abeokuta which replaced Oyo in the balance of power 
between east and west 24. The destruction across Yorubaland over the following 
years was noted by the missionary Bowen in 1850 25. 
According to Newbury the initial disruption of the interior enabled the coastal 
states such as Porto-Novo and Badagry to assert themselves and actually begin 
slave raiding on their own 26. Clapperton's emphasis on warfare at Badagry, 
would seem to illustrate this point 27. However, Newbury goes on to state that 
this period of assertiveness was only brief and after 1830 and the foundation of 
new centres, notably at Abeokuta, communities like Badagry were once again 
22 PRO C02/15 6 December 1825 Clapperton's Journal, Badagry. 
,I 23 Law, The Ovo Empire- pp. 261-277. 
24 Newbury, The Western Slave Coast..,, pp. 34-48. 
25 Bowen reported that by 1850: 
of all the places visited by the Landers, only Ishakki, Igboho, Ikishi and a few 
villages remain. Ijenna (Ijanna) was destroyed a few weeks after my arrival in 
the country 
f Bowen, -Adventures and 
Missiouary Labours... p. 114. 
1-0 Newbury, The Western Sla e Coast..., p. 35. 
27 He noted that although friendly to their allies they were 'ferocious and cruel in war' as well as 
'brave and enterprising' especially since Adele had taken command [PRO C02/15 6 December 1825 
Clapperton's Journal, Badagry]. 
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caught between the power politics of dominant interior states. But, it does appear 
that the coastal town was able to make the commercial transition between centres 
relatively easily. Folayan in his examination of the role of the Egbado area in the 
commercial life of the region states that the decline of Oyo saw the rapid 
establishment of new trade routes between Badagry on the coast and Abeokuta 
via Ota. This smooth transition was vital for a state which was not only 
dependent on supplies for its international trade, but also for its domestic 
market28. But the dangerous fragility of relations between the coast and their 
interior partners was illustrated by the jealousy and suspicion with which the 
Clapperton expedition of 1825 and then the Lander expedition of 1830 were 
viewed 29. Furthermore the coastal situation was also under scrutiny as Badagry 
was still, until the 1820s, a tributary of Lagos and subject to Dahomean influences 
from Whydah 30. Careful diplomacy was required to not only take advantage of 
the commercial opportunities offered by the collapse of Oyo, but also to survive 
the struggle over its bones. Badagry found in Adele a leader who was not only a 
diplomat skillful enough to secure relations with the interior, but was able 
through his position as ex-King of Lagos to reassert Badagry's independence on 
the coast and, ultimately, re-establish the town as an Atlantic Port. 
Adele's Arrival At Badagry 
Lagos had risen under the direction of Ologun Kutere during the latter part or 
the eighteenth century to a commercial and military prominence which had 
forced Badagry into tributary status in 1793 31. According to tradition Ologun 
Kutere had three sons, the middle son being Adele, born to a Badagry woman, 
possibly near MOWO 32. Despite being the second son, Adele succeeded to the 
28 Folayan, 'Trade Routes in Egbado... ', p. 82. 
29 Rumours about the purposes of the expedition preceded the travellers. For example the King of 
Ijanna had heard that they were planning to make war on the King of Oyo [R Lander, Captain 
Clappert n's Last Exr)editiQn --to- 
Africa... Vol 1, p. 68. 
30 Smith, 1ýýd m'-s of thg Yoruba, p. 82. 
31 Law, 'The Career of Adele-', p. 40. See chapter 5, p. 166-167. 
32 Ibid, p. 38; Bowen, ... Adventures and 
Missionary Labours... p. 102. 
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throne of Lagos in or about 1807 or 181133. The account of Richard and John 
Lander states that despite being the favourite of his father, Adele was not King of 
Lagos during this period, and that he was expelled after quarrelling with his elder 
brother Osinlokun who held that position34. However this account is 
contradicted by several sources and Law has concluded that rather than the 
Landers mistaking the story 'it may reflect an attempt by their informants to put 
Adele's behaviour in the best possible light'35. 
There are several reasons why Adele was able to become King of Lagos in 
preference to his elder brother Osinlokun. According to Losi's account, based on 
Lagos tradition, Adele was able succeed his father as he was the favourite son. It 
is said that as prince he had taken care of his father's property and impressed him 
with his skills as a craftsman36. Furthermore, Adele established an important 
role for himself in the Lagos court, taking on spiritual and political duties by 
learning the secrets of Ifa divination and arranging the sacrifices for his father, 
and also acting as interpreter between the King and his visitors. As a result Losi 
states that Adele was well liked amongst both 'his father's children' and the 
chiefs of Lagos 37. Subsequently at Ologun Kutere's death Adele was made King. 
According to Houtson, his succession was even made possible by a brother, 
'Ajan', who must surely be Osinlokun. According to this account, the scheming 
elder son agreed to forego the position voluntarily believing that he would 'have 
the sole direction of affairs, whilst his brother should have all the responsibility'. 
However, as Houtson noted, 'Ajan' was sorely mistaken and, on taking the 
throne, Adele 'showed a spirit of independence totally incompatible with Ajan's 
Views, 38. According to Losi, during the early years of his reign Adele was 
33 Law, 'The Career of Adele-', p. 39. 
34 R&J Landerlournal of an Expedition-, Vol 1, pp. 48-49. 
35 Law, 'The Career of Adele... ', p. 40. 
36 Losi, History of Lagos p. 16. 
37 Thid, p. 17. 
38 PRO ADM55/11 Folios 15,16 & 23-24'An Account of Adeely ex-caboceer of Lagos ... by John 
Houtson Esq'. For this reference I am grateful to J Bruce Lockhart who is currently preparing a 
biography of Clapperton. 
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extremely popular and having experience of the court he was able to rule wisely 
and generously and 'the elders took notice of his good conduct' 39. However, 
after 'many years', it would appear that Osinlokun, perhaps disappointed in his 
hopes of a puppet king, revolted by going to Ebute-Iga near Ikorodu to worship 
his mother's fetish and refused to return to the capital. With the help of the 
1jebus, Osinlokun was able to defeat Adele in battle. Although he did not unseat 
him, it would seem that Adele's popularity within Lagos was also waning and 
the chiefs were tiring of his rule. Losi states that the reasons behind this 
increasing unpopularity were that Adele had 'changed his mode of government' 
had allowed the introduction of the Egungun fetish, which was 'unbecoming to 
the dignity of a King', and also allowed Islam to be practiced freely. Furthermore 
it would appear that Adele was humiliated after an abortive attempt to carry the 
remains of Ologun Kutere to Benin, the traditional resting place of the Lagos 
Kings. According to tradition, Osinlokun had been behind an attack on the 
mission carried out by a marauding party of Ijos or Mahins. Although the 
subsequent conflict between the two brothers led to Osinlokun's temporary 
removal to Isheri, the combined pressures on Adele's Kingship proved too great 
and he was deposed. Adele was exiled from Lagos and Osinlokun took the 
throne40. 
Finding a satisfactory date for the deposition of Adele, which allows for all the 
events of his early reign, is difficult. According to Payne, having succeeded to the 
throne in 1775, Adele was overthrown in 1780 41. However, as noted by Law, the 
local historian has set his chronology of events far too early and the five years of 
kingship are not supported by Losi's assertion that he reigned for'many years' 42. 
Adele's expulsion was far likelier to have taken place in about 1821. This is the 
date given by Gollmer in his 'List of Kings of Lagos'. The assertion by Captain 
39 Losi, HistolY Of LaV. p. 17. 
40 Ibid, p. 17. 
41 Payne, Table of Principat Events... p. 2. 
42 Law, 'The Career of Adele... ' p. 42, footnote 54. 
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Pearce that Adele had been expelled fifteen years prior to 1825 may have resulted 
from a miscopying of the figure '51 43. 
After his expulsion from Lagos, tradition states that Adele and his followers took 
refuge at Badagry. According to Losi 'On his arrival there the people welcomed 
him and ... appointed him their paramount chief' 44. The acceptance of Adele as 
'paramount chief, even king, of Badagry obviously requires some qualification., 
However, ultimately his establishment in such a position is not as remarkable as 
it might at first appear. Firstly the acceptance of an alien ruler was not without 
precedent in the history of Badagry, Zinsu having been able to take a similar step 
in the aftermath of the 1784 war. However, from an examination of the evidence 
it is clear that it required skill, daring and some degree of luck. According to the 
Landers and later accounts based on local tradition, Adele found acceptance at 
Badagry due to his 'filial piety, 45. As well as bringing his followers and children 
from Lagos, Adele also brought with him his aged mother and the skull of his 
father. Both Losi and Payne claim that the people of Badagry were so 'edified by 
this behaviour, and by these marks of filial piety, that they adopted him for their 
chief' 46. Law has stated that although clearly impressed by this outward show, 
rather more was involved in Adele's assumption of power than his duty as a 
son. For example, Adele's mother was said, in local tradition, to have been a 
Badagry woman. Law has suggested that it would have been possible for Adele to 
call upon his maternal relatives in his quest for Badagrian support 47. The role of 
relatives through the female line in establishing a commercial and political 
position has been examined by Sandra Barnes in relation to Lagos. Barnes states 
that using such relatives as sponsors enabled outsiders to gain a foothold in 
societies where strangers had little status and this may have applied in the Adele 
43 fbid, p. 42; PRO C02/15 28 November 1825 Pearce's journal, off Badagry. 
44 Losi, History of Lagos p. 20. 
45 R&j Lander, journal of an Expedition... Vol 1, p. 49-50. 
46 Losi, Histo s, p. 20; Payne, Table of Principal Events... p. 2. Also see chapter 4, pp. 118- 
119 for an examination of the use of 'heads' skulls and ancestors as a 
force for political cohesion. 
47 Law, 'The Career of Adele-', p. 43. 
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case 48 . Furthermore Law adds that the possession of his father's skull may also 
have been seen in Badagry as a symbol of Adele's position as the legitimate ruler 
of Lagos, an authority to which the town was subject at this time. Law concludes 
that the expulsion of Adele and his subsequent removal to Badagry with the 
skull may have been seen as an opportunity to assert their independence 49. This 
interpretation is supported by the Landers who in their account of Adele's rise to 
power at Badagry stated that as part of their acceptance of the exiled king the 
people envisaged a military campaign against Lagos 50. It is also notable that, 
according to this account, soon after his arrival there, a pursuing force from 
Lagos attacked the town and was beaten off. The Badagrians used this hostile act 
as an opportunity to declare their independence5l. 
As a way of asserting their position as an independent state the acceptance of 
Adele into Badagry would have made good political sense. However, the internal 
political position was not clear-cut and the exiled King did face some opposition. 
The internal struggles recounted in tradition have focused on the Ijegba and 
Posuko sections of the town. This is understandable as it was almost exclusively 
these Portuguese trading partners who were operating out of Badagry during this 
period and it is likely then that they were the most dominant wards. According 
to Avoseh, Akran Zofun opposed Adele's settlement in the town. Tradition 
states that Zofun was an unpopular Akran who had been expelled once before by 
another claimant to the position, Soton. Only after gaining help from Porto- 
Novo was Zofun able to retake his chieftaincy at Badagry 52. Adele's arrival in 
the town was opposed by Zofun, but this time he was 'finally driven out with his 
Posu'. Tradition states that Soton of Ganyinko House took the title of Akran, and 
48 S Barnes, 'Ritual, Power and Outside Knowledge' journal Qf Religion in Africa (IRA) 20/3 (1990) 
U. 248-268. 
Law, 'The Career of Adele... ' p. 44. 
50 According to the Landers, Adele was welcomed by the 'principal people of Badagry and told 
'lead Us on to war, and we will fight against your brotherf and either prevail over him or perish' [R 
&j Lander, Journal of an Expedition... Vol 1, p. 511. 
51 lbid, Vol L p. 51. 
52 Avoseh, A Short Histay of Badagry, p. 22. Also see chapter 5 p. 169-170. 
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Zofun retired to Ja' where he died, although it is possible that he was able later 
to return to Badagry once more and live quietly in retirement 53. Thus Adele's 
residence at Badagry was the source of some contention amongst certain sectors 
of Ijegba Ward and also, it would appear within Posuko. However, I would 
suggest that Adele's arrival was not the initial stimulus to these squabbles, but 
was merely the means by which they were at least superficially resolved, and that 
the exile's arrival was used by certain factions to gain the upper hand in an 
internal struggle. Just as Zofun had previously used help from Porto-Novo to 
regain his title, so possibly the Soton faction used Adele to help their cause. 
According to Badagry tradition it was Posu Awhanpa who sent for Adele to come 
to Badagry. Although Avoseh's reconstruction of events is not entirely clear, it 
would seem then that Awhanpa sought Adele's help in removing the previous 
holder of the Posuko chieftaincy, who joined Zofun in exile 54. In this way then, 
Adele's arrival in Badagry resulted in the establishment of other houses over 
1jegba and Posuko. The loyalty of these houses to the exiled King continued until 
1829 when the Posu was killed in a military campaign against Lagos 55. 
It would appear then that Adele was able to take advantage of existing internal 
strife to establish himself as an important force within the Badagry political 
framework. However, rather than emerging merely as a chief, by 1825 the 
Clapperton expedition clearly saw him as the King of Badagry 56.1 would suggest 
that Adele employed considerable political skill to emerge as the effective ruler of 
the place in the early 1820s. Apart from his maternal links with the town, Adele 
reportedly established further similar links by marrying a number of Badagry 
y, p. 22. See below p. 187. 53 Avoseh, A Short Histoly of Badagl: 
54 According to Avoseh, Posu Awhanpa called Adele from Ado to come to Badagry. As Akran Zofun 
and 'his Posu' were driven out of Badagry due to Adele's arrival it is likely that Awhanpa allied 
himself with the pro-Adele faction in order to assert his claims to the title of Posu. Presumably 
only after Adele's successful establishment and the expulsion of the Zofun faction was Awhanpa 
able to take the title of Posu. [Ibid, p. 301. 
55 R Lander, Captain Clapperton's Last Expedition to Africa, Vol 2, p. 249; R&J Lander, journal of 
an Expe-ditiMli..., Vol 1, P- 9- 
56 R Lander, Captain Clapperton's Last Expedition to Africa, Vol 2, pp. 250-251. 
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women 57. However, it was by offering the state the chance of becoming a leading 
coastal power, through his military and diplomatic skills, that Adele was able to 
secure his position. Soon after his arrival the exiled king was given the 
opportunity to prove himself as a military commander. As well as defeating 
several attempts by Lagos to reconquer Badagry, Adele also went on to Play a part 
in civil unrest within Porto-NOVO 58. Adele's role in these intrigues led not only 
to joint Porto-Novan and Dahomean attacks of retaliation, but also to the 
removal of at least one important Porto-Novan chief, the Mewu or Mehu, to 
Badagry itself in 1835 59. The dangers of this situation are apparent. However, by 
1825 Clapperton was stating that, as a result of his bravery against Dahomey, 
Porto-Novo and Lagos, Adele had raised the people of Badagry from an 
insignificant community to a people who were 'respected and feared by the 
Alladahs [Porto-Novans] and Lagos - and even ... regardless of the friendship or 
enmity of Dahomey himself, 60. 
Having reasserted Badagry as a military power, it would appear that Adele went 
on to cultivate vital diplomatic and commercial links with neighbouring states. 
This once again gave the port an important role in coastal affairs, most notably in 
the development of trading links between the Atlantic and the African interior. 
Clapperton himself noted that despite Badagry's reassertion of its military 
position under Adele, the town remained a tributary to Oyo. Indeed he added 
that Badagry was likely to replace Porto-Novo as chief port of trade for that 
kingdom 61. This implies that Badagry's continued close and amicable links with 
57 It is Avoseh who mentions Adele's marriages to Badagry women. Unfortunately he gives no 
further details than to say that there were about ten Badagry wives [Avoseh, A Short HistoEy of 
Badagr: ý, p. 331. 
58 Ac-co rding to Capt Pearce, since his expulsion from Lagos with only a few followers, Adele had 
been able to gather enough support at Badagry 'to subdue a number of towns depending on Lagos and 
also to conquer Ardrah [Porto-Novo I', f PRO C02/15 28 November 1825 Pearce's Journal, off 
Badagry]. 
59 Pearce actually stated that more than one caboceer left Porto-Novo for Badagry during this 
period although there is no evidence to support this [PRO C02/15 28 November 1825 Pearce's 
journal, off Badagry]. Also see pp. 192-194. 
60 PRO C02/15 6 December 1825 Clapperton's journal, Badagry. 
61 PRO C02/15 6 December 1825 Clapperton's journal, Badagry. 
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Oyo were, at least commercially, the sensible option. 
The Adele Period in Badagry 
Despite their sharply contradictory accounts of Adele's physical appearance both 
Clapperton and Lander would seem to agree that by the middle years of the 1820s, 
he was the prominent figure at Badagry 62. Lander called him a 'King', and 
described how state visits and receptions were carried out with 'all the pomp and 
barbarous magnificence of African Royalty' 63. His accompanying retinue of one 
hundred a fifty (excluding musicians !) and his appearance 'gorgeously arrayed' 
in scarlet and gold with his 'fighting chiefs' walking by portray him as every inch 
the monarch that he was 64. 
Lander went on to describe government under Adele as being, like that of 
"Yariba [Oyo], Nyffe [Nupe] and Houssa [Hausaland]', 'a perfect and unlimited 
despotism' 65. However, the situation was more complex than this. The notion 
of despotism ignored the influence of other sources of authority, which through 
the institution of the ward chiefs, was undoubtedly still in existence. In Richard 
Lander's account of 1825 allusions to the ward chiefs were somewhat indirect. He 
refers to the 'Badagrian great men' as drinking partners or as part of Adele's 
retinue, he does not allude to any specific political or commercial role 66. Only 
'fighting chiefs' were noted during this Visit 67. One was named as 
'Bombanee'[Bombani], a fellow exile from Lagos who was described by 
Clapperton as 'a drunken barbarian' but one whose influence over the people 
62 In 1825 Clapperton described Adele as being'a good-looking man, below the middle size, rather 
spare, with a prepossessing and intelligent countenance' [PRO C02/15 I December 1825 Clapperton's 
Journal, Badagry]. Although equally impressed by Adele's regal bearing, Lander, in marked 
contrast to his master, described a man of forty or forty five years and 'five feet nine inches in 
height, and rather inclined to corpulencey' ! fR Lander, Captain Clapperton's Last Expedition to 
Africa Vol 1, p. 501. 
63 Thid, Vol 1, p. 46. 
64 Ibid, Vol 1, pp. 46-47. 
65 Ibid, Vol 1, p. 285. 
66 Ibid, Vol 1, pp. 50-51. 
67 Ibid, Vol 1, pp. 46-47. 
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'could lead them to anything, 68. The other chiefs were 'Accra' [the Akran] and 
'Poser' [the poSU] 69. However, during the second visit it emerged that the chiefs 
of Badagry were also operating on a very important political level within the 
town. 
John Lander noted in his visit of 1830 that besides Adele 'the King of King's', 
'four fellows assume the title of royalty' 70. He then went on to list the kings 6f 
'Spanish', 'Portuguese, 'English' and 'French' Towns. It seems likely that there 
was confusion over the identification of the first two wards. I would suggest that 
the king of 'Spanish Town' was in fact the old Akran of Ijegba, normally called 
'Portuguese Town. Lander later noted he had been the 'sole governor' of the 
country 'until his authority was wrested from him by a more powerful hand?. 
This may refer merely to the position of Akran becoming subject to the new king 
but it is more likely that this was a reference to the chieftaincy dispute at Ijegba 
and the deposition of Akran Zofun. Although tradition states that Zofun died at 
ja', it is possible that the old chief had returned to Badagry by 1830 and lived 
there 'in retirement'. The 'Accra', referred to by the Landers, must have been 
Adele's politically active ally Soton 71. Lander added that the old retired chief, 
made a living from selling slaves to both Spanish and Portuguese traders, so a 
Portuguese connection was maintained. However, the Portuguese Town named 
by Lander would seem to be in this case Posuko Ward, which in various other 
sources was allied with either the Dutch or Portuguese. The final two were 
obviously Ahoviko and Awhanjigo Wards respectively. The identification of 
these four ward chieftaincies is consistent with an examination of Badagry's 
political structure 72. Those wards with predominantly Portuguese trading 
partners, the main commercial force operating out of Badagry during this period, 
68 PRO C02/15 2 December 1825 Clapperton's journal, Badagry. 
69 See above p. 182. 
70 R&j Lander, Tournal. of an Expedition-, Vol 1, p. 17. 
71 lbid, Vol 1, p. 17. 
72 See chapter 3, p. 82-88. 
185 
had been in the ascendant, whilst the 'Davi' or 'Wawu' of Ahoviko and the 
jengen of Awhanjigo were still clearly holding political positions within the 
town structure, if not taking a prominent role in state affairs. From Avoseh's 
account it would appear that the chiefs of Wharako, Ganho and Boeko were also 
active during the period73. No mention was made of these other chieftaincies in 
contemporary accounts and it would seem likely that they were eclipsed by their 
more dominant neighbours. 
It is clear then that certain ward chieftaincies were in operation under Adele. 
Clapperton in a brief examination of the government structure stated that 'The 
town of Badagry is govern'd by its own caboceers - but subject to Addeley' 74. The 
operation of these caboceers as factions was evidently rife within the political life 
of the town even under the authority of 'the King of Kings' 75. It would appear 
that on civil matters each ward operated much as a pressure or interest group, 
and gaining as much support within that structure was evidently essential for 
any undertaking. An illustration of this process was given by the Landers who, 
on attempting to leave Badagry in 1830, were faced with opposition from a 'party 
of the populace, 76. No indication is given as to the identity of such a party, 
however, it would seem likely that it involved ward loyalties. To counteract this 
opposition the Landers were advised to petition various other chiefs and win 
them over to their cause 77. Ultimately permission to embark on their journey 
was given by Adele. It is difficult to assess whether the various factions at work 
within the town applied pressure directly to 'the King' , or whether Adele merely 
assessed the more popular cause. But it is clear that the operation of factions 
73 From Avoseh's account it would appear that during the time of Adele, Soton was Akran, 
Awhanpa the Posu until his death in 1829; Wawu-Zanwhoro-Mesi, the Wawu of Ahoviko and 
possibly Athunde the Jengen of Awhanjigo. The Finhento may have been either Aminu or Tofon 
whilst the chiefs of Ganho and Boeko are unnamed fAvoseh, A Short HistoQL of hada= pp. 22, 
27,25,281. 
74 PRO C02/15 6 December 1825 Clapperton's Journal, Badagry. 
75 R&J Lander, 
' 
Journal of an Expedition- Vol 1, p. 17. 
76 lbid, Vol 1, P. 15. 
77 fbid, Vol 1, p. 15. 
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within Badagry still played a vital role in the operation of the town. Adele did 
not change the political system from a multi-party basis to a despotism. Adele 
provided Badagry with a figurehead round which to rally. The cult he developed 
surrounding the head of his father guaranteed the Badagrians success in their 
military undertakings and guaranteed him a focal position within the town 
itself. At the same time, Badagry provided Adele with a vehicle by which he 
might launch his attempts to retake the throne of Lagos. But ultimately the 
factional intrigues of the Badagry political system remained unchanged even 
under the veneer of autocratic government. 
Another example of factional influence within Badagry during this period is one 
that illustrates the potential political role of newer immigrant groups to the 
community, who, in this case at least, were able to use the fragmented ward 
structure to suit their own ends. Richard Lander's accusation and trial at Badagry 
on his return from the interior is one example of such a pressure group in 
operation. According to both tradition and Lander's own account it was the 
intrigues of the Portuguese at Badagry which provoked this crisis. These resident 
traders obviously saw the Englishman's presence in their midst as a threat to 
both their now 'illegal' trading operations and their role as middlemen between 
interior and coast. According to Avoseh, the Portuguese traders spread the 
rumour that Clapperton and Lander were spies who had been sent to study 
Badagry and its people as part of a British plot to take control of the town78. The 
rumours spread amongst both the chiefs and Adele who began to shun Lander's 
presence. Ultimately it was resolved to try the case and the Cornishman was 
summoned to undertake trial by poison79. The trial itself was carried out by the 
'Fetish Priest', according to Avoseh, at Agbalata80. However, although no 
identifiable chiefs were present, Lander referring only to 'a nLmber of priests and 
78 Avoseh, A Short HistoI: y- of Badagry, p. 33. 
79 Lander provided a detailed account of his trial in his published journal [R Lander, Captain 
ClaI212erton'5 Last Expedition to Africa Vol 2, pp. 254-260. 
80 Avoseh, A Short History f Badagry., p. 33. 
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elders', according to Badagry tradition, the Akran played an important role in the 
operation of the event, notably guarding the prisoner with five hundred 
soldierS81. The involvement of the Akran of Ijegba fits with the pressure for trial 
originating with the Portuguese inhabitants, although it is possible that Avoseh 
is, as usual, seeking to establish a prominent role for that chief. However, his 
description of Lander's survival provides another example of the various 
factions at work within the town for Avoseh alludes to 'friends' who advised' 
him to take an antidote to the poison82. Lander himself did not mention such 
advice and noted that he took an emetic on his own initiative. However, both 
accounts conclude that his miraculous survival was seen as an overwhelming 
sign of his innocence and Adele and the Badagry chiefs abandoned their 'cold 
reserve and stiffness and sent Lander presents and provisions, stating that 'the 
Portuguese were wicked men' 83. 
The ability of the Portuguese to use the ward structure for their own political 
ends is notable, not least in that they were such a small group. The Adele period 
also saw the arrival of a far larger number of immigrants into the town, which as 
a result, led to the introduction of Islam. Avoseh dates the arrival of Islam in 
Badagry to 1821 84. Muslims must have visited the town prior to this period, 
notably as traders, but it is likely that the arrival of a large number of Muslims, 
who not only visited, but settled at Badagry, coincided with the Adele period. 
The Arrival of Islam at Badagry 
The spread of Islam through West Africa at the end of the eighteenth century 
and in the early years of the nineteenth century has been examined by a number 
of historians. Suffice to say here that the initial southward movement of 
81 R Lander, Captain Clapperton's Last EA12edition to Africa. Vol 2, p. 256; Avoseh, A Short 
Histo[y-of Badagge, p. 33. 
82 Ibid, p. 35. 
83 R Lander, Captain Clapperton's Last Expedition to Africa, Vol 2, p. 259. 
84 Avoseh, 'Islam in Badagry' in Falola, 'The Minor Works... ' p. 241. 
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relatively small groups of Muslims from the north, in search of trade and land, 
was revolutionised by the rise amongst them of the radical religious leader 
Uthman Dan Fodio. He sought to purify the practice of existing Muslims and 
spread the word by jihad [holy war] throughout the area incorporating 
Hausaland, Bornu, Nupe, Yorubaland and even threatened,, at one stage, Old Oyo 
itself. This militaristic movement ultimately resulted in the establishment of the 
Sokoto Caliphate first under the leadership of Dan Fodio and then under that'of 
his son Sultan Bello. 
The development of Islam to the north under such violent conditions led not 
only to an increasing number of Muslims moving southward in search of 
commerce but also to a large number of slaves. According to Lander, Adele had 
inherited numbers of Hausa slaves from his father, a proportion of whom were 
Muslim 85. Indeed, as noted above, one of the reasons for Adele's decline into 
unpopularity at Lagos was his toleration of Islamic worship 86. According to 
Lander, Adele had brought a large number of these 'Haussa Malam' slaves with 
him to Badagry on his expulsion. However, disruption in the Yoruba interior 
resulted in a second phase of southward population movements which included 
large numbers of Yoruba Muslims. Again these movements largely followed the 
trade routes through the interior, and Avoseh states that Islam was brought to 
Badagry by a Yoruba Muslim, Ramalana Saibu Ogboalejo who arrived in Badagry 
from Oyo with his sons and a group of other 'traders and brave men' in 1821 87. It 
is interesting that Avoseh identifies Ogboalejo as a friend of Adele. Although it is 
uncertain, it is possible that this friendship may have pre-dated their exile from 
their respective homes and have developed from commercial contact during 
Adele's residence at Lagos 88. 
85 R&j Lander, Tournal of an Expedition... Vol 1, pp. 38-49. 
86 See p. 179. 
87 Avoseh, 'Islam in Badagry', p. 241. 
88 Avoseh, A ShQrt Histoi3: oEUaddgE: Y, p. 61. 
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The initial Badagry Muslims consisted of both free traders and slaves. The free 
Muslims under Ogboalejo, established themselves initially at Ganho Ward and 
built a mosque there 89. However, According to Avoseh, there were other 
resident Muslims established at Posuko Ward, at least after 1830, who lived in 
the compound of Posu Agongoro 90. The status of these Muslims is a little 
unclear, although Avoseh implies that they may have been slaves 91. According 
to Avoseh's history of Islam at Badagry, the establishment of various Muslim' 
pockets throughout the town characterised its development. This separatism 
culminated in the 1850s when rival mosques were established in other sections. 
However despite its 'factional' nature, Islamic influence was firmly established 
within Badagry from the 1820s onwards 92. 
The Muslim inhabitants of Badagry had a high profile within the town's social 
structure from the outset, taking a role not only as traders but also as religious 
and possibly political figures. The Muslim community as a whole would appear 
to have been held in high regard within the town structure. This was most 
notably demonstrated in the celebration of Ramadan as a public holiday 93. 
However, the role of more learned individuals as teachers amongst the 
population was viewed differently. Although there were no conversions 
amongst the Gun inhabitants, Islam clearly came to play an important spiritual 
role amongst all sections of society. Lander stated that the Mallams scattered 
throughout the countryside from Badagry to Sokoto made a good living by 
89 Avoseh, 'Islam in Badagry', p. 241. 
90 Ibid, p. 242. 
91 The implication that the Posuko Muslims may have been slaves arises from the statement by 
Avoseh that as they grew in number they decided to have their own mosque and Imam. A man 
called Abudulai was elected as Imam but it was only after discussions with Posu Agongoro, successor 
to Awhanpa, that Abudulai was 'released' and the position of Imam was established at Verekete 
mosque [Avoseh, 'Islam in Badagry', p. 2421. 
92 The background to these disputes between the Muslim factions at Badagry requires further 
research. Dispute along ward lines is a possibility but it is clear from the information given by 
Avoseh that polarisation and factionalism characterised Islam in Badagry during the second half 
of the nineteenth century, perhaps due to religious differences or along social lines, slaves versus 
freemen perhaps. [Avoseh, 'Islam in Badagry' pp. 242-2431. 
93 See chapter 4, p. 120. 
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writing charms against illness and bad luck94. But despite their success in 
propagating the religion further into the interior throughout Nupe, further 
south at Old Oyo, Ijanna and also Badagry, the missionary and teaching role of 
these Mallams was severely restricted. Lander reported that at Badagry none of 
these teachers were allowed to openly to profess their religion, on pain of death 
and that they were viewed with suspicion. Furthermore he noted that none of 
the Badagry Mallams were allowed to make themselves known to the British' 
party until after he had been acquitted of spying at his trial 95. This restrictive 
policy seems to be in direct contrast however, with the account given by John 
Lander five years later, when he described the trusted messengers of Adele as 
being 'Haussa Mallams' 96. The difference may lie in the fact that these Mallams 
were the 'very respectable' messengers of Adele. These messengers were certainly 
slaves but were reportedly only called on by their master in wartime and 
supported themselves independently by slave trading with the European dealers. 
However, these men of 'slave origin' were ultimately loyal to Adele himself. It 
may be that the travelling Mallams, following the trade routes through Yoruba 
and to the coast, were suspected of being something worse than the 'corpulent 
drones' that Lander saw them as. 
Foreign Aff airs 
The arrival of the exiled King at Badagry launched the town into a new phase of 
aggressive foreign affairs. Lagos' attempts under Osinlokun to reassert control 
over Badagry and its adopted prince, beginning in about 1822, were thwarted. 
Indeed Captain Pearce in 1825 reported that Adele had collected around him a 
sufficient force not only to repel Lagosian aggression but to 'subdue a number of 
towns depending' on that place 97. However, by the time of the Clapperton 
expedition Adele had still not risked an extensive campaign against Lagos, and 
94 R Lander, Captain Clapperton's Last Expedition to Africa, Vol 1, p. 275. 
95 lbid, Vol 1, pp. 277-280. 
96 R&j Lander, lournal of an Expedition... Vol 1, p. 37. 
97 PRO C02 / 15 28 November 1825 Pearce's journal, off Badagry. 
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Pearce suggested that the exiled King felt insufficiently strong to make an attempt 
on that place without an ally. Adele may have envisaged the possibility of 
recruiting British help in this matter. Possibly having noted the bombardment of 
Lagos by a British ship in 1825, when the Clapperton party arrived in Badagry, 
Adele sought promises of help in return for his abandonment of the slave trade. 
Captain Pearce certainly took Adele's propositions seriously. Indeed he noted 
that: 
This chief may be deserving of attention from his friendly 
disposition towards the English and especially from the specific 
proposal which he has made through Mr Houtson to the British 
Goverrunent to destroy the slave trade from the borders of Dahomey 
to the River Benin comprehending Lagos the greatest outlet of slave 
traffic 98 
Law has suggested that Adele may have been serious in his promises to give up 
the trade as the Badagry palm oil trade may have offered a realistic alternative 
even at this early stage. However, he ultimately feels that Adele was more likely 
to be telling his British visitors what they wanted to hear 99. In any event, 
Clapperton, though encouraging, was unable to make any promises of British 
help and the only promise he did make, for the delivery of a field gun, was 
ultimately broken 100. Adele was forced to look for allies elsewhere. 
Looking westwards, the King was unable to secure an alliance with Porto-Novo, 
and indeed relations with that state quickly deteriorated into warfare. The final 
deposition of Akran Zofun over Adele's arrival may have severely damaged 
relations between those neighbours. As already noted, Zofun had been both re- 
installed and supported as Akran by Porto-Novo after his original expulsion in 
the early nineteenth century. Moreover, according to Porto-Novan tradition the 
98 Pearce's hopes of cooperation between an African king and Britain in the suppression of the slave 
trade ultimately became the key to British policy on the west coast during the 1840s and 1850s 
when both Dahomey and Lagos emerged as the focal points of anti-slave trading activity. Adele's 
optimism over a British alliance has been attributed to a brief attack on Lagos by a British ship 
earlier in 1825 which, according to Ajayi, was undertaken at Adele's request [PRO C02/15 28 
November 1825 Pearce's journal, off Badagry; JF Ajayi, 'The British Occupation of Lagos 1851-61', 
Nigeria Maga7, ine, 69 (1961), p. 981. 
99 Law, 'The Career of Adele... ', p. 49. 
100 PRO C02/15 18 December 1825 Clapperton, Ijanna. 
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1820s were a period of civil unrest within the more westerly state. The eleventh 
King there, De-Tohi, was challenged by a pretender Oussou Gandin. Both were 
descendants of the founder of Porto-Novo; Agbanlin. De-Tohi was a grandson on 
his father's side, whilst Oussou Gandin was not only a paternal but also a 
maternal great-grandson. At the death of Oussou Gandin the challenge was taken 
over by another grandson Oueze and Oussou Gandin's mother Gouti 
AttagnonlOl. Whether Adele from Badagry became embroiled in the affairs of 
Porto-Novo in an attempt to secure allies against Lagos can only be supposition. 
However, it is clear that during this period Adele launched a series of attacks on 
its westerly neighbour. According to Robert Pearce, by 1825 Adele and the 
Badagrians had conquered Ardrah 'from whence he has transported the chief 
caboceers with their property to Badagry' 102. This may have been an exercise to 
put more resources at the disposal of Adele. However, the result of Adele's 
assaults on Porto-Novo in the early 1820s was no clear cut victory, and Pearce's 
conclusions were drawn as a result of Adele's propaganda. Using Porto-Novo 
tradition it would appear that the civil unrest there did result in the removal of 
at least one important chief, the Mewu, to Badagry. However, Oueze, more 
usually De Hueze was able to secure power within Porto-Novo. It would seem 
then that if Adele from Badagry had co-ordinated attacks on its neighbour, 
possibly he had allied himself with the losing faction, that of De-Tohi. This king 
was himself forced out [to an unknown destination] and his primeminster, the 
Mewu, sought refuge at Badagry 103. If this interpretation is largely speculative, it 
is certainly true that conflict between Badagry and Porto-Novo did not end with 
the expulsion of the old ruling group, and indeed warfare continued until the 
beginning of the next decade. Soon after their arrival at Badagry in 1830 the 
Lander brothers were able to note that 1peace has been established between Porto- 
101 Geay, 'Origine, Formation et Histoire ... de Porto-Novo', p. 632. 
102 PRO C02/15 28 November 1825 Pearce's journal, off Badagry. 
103 Geay, 'Origine, Formation et Histoire ... de Porto-Novo', p. 632. 
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Novo and Badagry' 104. Ultimately Pearce's assertion that Porto-Novo had been 
conquered prior to 1825 was premature to say the least. 
However, the Badagry threat to Porto-Novo remained dangerous, and 
precipitated a surprising new alliance on the coast between the westerly power 
and its old enemy Dahomey. Losi, recording Lagos tradition, clearly outlines the 
role which Dahomey played in assaulting Badagry during this period. According 
to his account the Dahomean army took advantage of the dry season to march on 
that place, but on reaching the lagoon the water was remarkably high. The 
invading army, unskilled in the tactics of naval warfare began to cut logs to fill 
the lagoon so that they might march across. According to Losi, as the operation 
neared completion it was Adele who used magic to defeat the invading army. 
Turning himself into a beautiful woman, and crossing the lagoon into the 
enemies camp he offered the Dahomeans poisoned bread. All those that had 
eaten died within a single night and the remaining army fled 105. This fantastic 
victory over a marauding enemy does appear to have its roots in an attack of the 
period. The Gold Coast Gazette of 1823 noted that the King of Dahomey, as a 
result of the increased demand for slaves, had invaded neighbouring states from 
where palm oil had been supplied. However, the attack was disappointed as the 
inhabitants were warned of the assault and abandoned their towns and 
villages106. It would seem likely that this description alludes to a Dahomean 
campaign against Badagry and, although clearly less of a conclusive victory than 
tradition would claim, the failure of Dahomey is confirmed. 
In his analysis of lagoon relations, Law suggests that this alliance of Porto-Novo 
and Dahomey against Badagry may indicate a realignment of the balance of 
power in the area. He suggests that the reconciliation between these two powers, 
104 R&J Lander,. Tournal of an Expedition... Vol 1, p. 14. 
105 Losi, Histor, ý: -QJ-L-agsm, p. 
21. 
106 Royal Gold Coast Gazette Vol I No 12 21 January 1823 in Law, Contemporay Sources... p. 85. 
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may have been due to recognition by Porto-Novo that Oyo was no longer 
sufficiently powerful to guarantee its protection. However, he also adds that it is 
possible the formation of a much stronger alliance between Badagry and Oyo may 
well have forced Porto-Novo into the arms of its rival 107. There is no evidence 
to suggest exactly when the alliance between Oyo and Adele was formed, 
although, as noted above, by 1825 Adele was certainly paying tribute to that place. 
The relationship had possibly been established prior to Adele's settlement at 
Badagry due to personal contacts he may have made with Oyo traders whilst still 
at Lagos. After his establishment at Badagry, Oyo may have been encouraged to 
divert their trade through that port hoping initially that it may prove less 
vulnerable to Dahomean raids. After the reconciliation between Porto-Novo and 
Dahomey, and the onslaught of aggression between the lagoon states Law 
concludes that Dahomean involvement may have stimulated a breach with Oyo 
which ultimately led to Dahomey's successful rebellion against its former patron 
in 1823 108. Badagry's allegiance with Oyo would appear, therefore, to have been 
based on both commercial requirements and also political ones. As noted, Oyo's 
break with Porto-Novo once more put Badagry at centre stage of the 
interior/ Atlantic trade route whilst political allies were what Adele required to 
regain his throne at Lagos. But in the light of its declining power, Oyo was unable 
to act as the influential ally that Adele required. 
However, in 1829 Adele's quest for the Lagos throne appeared to take a 
significant turn in his favour without the necessity for an ally. With the death of 
Osinlokun, Adele was disappointed in his initial hopes of being recalled when 
the Lagosians, instead appointed Osinlokun's son Idewu. But the exiled King 
took the opportunity, according to Losi through the advice of 'bad people', to 
launch a military campaign against Lagos 109. Losi states that Adele was 'utterly 
107 Law, 'The Career of Adele... ' p. 45. 
108 Law, '... The Early History of Badagri', p. 37. 
109 Losi, Histoly of Lagos p. 20. 
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defeated' and his bravest generals were taken, many of them killed 110. That 
Adele suffered a humiliating defeat at this time is supported by the account of 
Richard and John Lander who returning to Badagry in 1830 found Adele 
depressed and despondent having lost not only his battle but also his faithful 
generals 'Bombanee and Poser in battle' 111. By the time of the Landers' visit 
Adele had also suffered a illness and a terrible fire at the palace which had 
destroyed his ammunition store as well as a number of the palace inhabitants' 112. 
What is more, his futile assault on Lagos apparently prompted the government 
there to act against him once more. Instead of launching a military attack, the 
Lagos authorities employed subterfuge. According to the Landers, they conspired 
with the French chief of Badagry, presumably the Jengen, to destroy the ex-King 
by poison. The Jengen was possibly hoping to restore his chieftaincy to the 
political prominence of his predecessors but the plot was discovered. The French 
chief was tried and found guilty, but ultimately pardoned 113. 
With the arrival of the Lander expedition Adele once again appealed for British 
aid. However, the half-hearted attempts by the Lander brothers to supply 
material help from Cape Coast Castle, were ultimately seen by Adele for the 
worthless promises that they were, and their visit ended in a coolness on both 
sides. It would appear that Adele's fortunes as adopted monarch of Badagry had 
reached an all time low. 
Events in the interior however were moving once more in Adele's favour, or 
perhaps more realistically in a direction which Adele could use to his advantage. 
The dissolution into violence of Yorubaland in the 1820s as a result of the decline 
of Oyo authority, led to the displacement of large numbers of people and a 
significant population movement southward towards centres such as Ibadan and 
110 lbid, p. 20. 
111 R&j Lander, lournal of an Expedition Vol 1, p. 9. 
112 Ibid, Vol 1, pp. 9-10. 
113 Ibid, Vol 1, p. 54. 
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Abeokuta. Initially this may have proved damaging to the coastal states, as it led 
to disruption of trading routes through the country. Law notes for example that 
the successful 1jebu army tended to sell its slaves at Lagos, therefore putting 
Badagry at a distinct disadvantage. However, the establishment of Abeokuta 
created a new political centre in Yorubaland with which Adele might ally114. 
According to Losi, Adele seized on an alliance with the Egbas due to his marri , age 
to Efunremi, an Abeokutan woman of Owu descent 115. Indeed the local 
historian says that Adele had in fact visited Abeokuta 116. However, Law has 
suggested that it was the alliance of Lagos with 1jebu and Ibadan, interior rivals of 
Abeokuta would have been far more crucial in shaping Adele's policy. 
Meanwhile, for Abeokuta, an alliance with Badagry meant access to a coastal port 
and thus to supplies of imported firearms which were becoming increasingly 
important in the Yoruba wars 117. But Adele was prepared to be a more active ally 
in the campaigns of the early 1830s and, for example, he aided the Egbas in their 
attack on Ota. Ota had sided with Lagos, and despite help from both the Ijebus 
and lbadan, the Egba, on account of the help given by Adele, were able to conquer 
them118. Adele also took part in a defensive campaign against the Ijebus at the 
Owiwi River where again, according to Lagos tradition, he helped the Egba on to 
victory 119. The date of this campaign is not specified in either Payne's or Losi's 
recording of tradition. Folayan clearly notes the participation of Bombani at 
Owiwi, thus suggesting a date before 1829, however, I would conclude that this 
reference is misleading and that this campaign against the Ijebu took place in the 
early 1830s 120. Both Payne and Losi also then mention a diplomatic victory for 
Adele whereby he affected a temporary reconciliation between the Egba and Ijebu, 
114 Law, 'The Career of Adele-', p. 53. 
115 Losi, His_toly-of Lagos p. 22. 
116 Ibid, p. 21. 
117 Law, 'The Career of Adele-', p. 53. 
118 Losi, History of Lag pp. 22-23. 
119 Ibid, pp. 21-22. 
120 Folayan, 'Egbado to 1832: The Birth of a Dilemma' THSN iv/1 (1967), p. 32. 
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Payne mistakenly stating that the crucial meeting took place at the Ogboni House 
at Lagos 121. 
By the early years of the 1830s then Adele had clearly re-established his role in the 
politics of the area as a whole and placed Badagry as the coastal link with the 
newly established power at Abeokuta. Furthermore, setbacks among the Ijebu/ 
Ibadan allies, notably in their campaign against Ota, 'caused great consternation. 
at Lagos'122. Law suggests that defeat at a second siege of Ota c. 1834 or 1835, to 
which Idewu had dispatched his younger brother Kosoko, lost him any support 
that may have remained, his suicide was ordered by the King of Benin, and 
Adele was recalled 123. Adele returned to Lagos in 1835 after fourteen years in 
exile. However, his second reign was short-lived and he died in 1837. 
121 Payne, Table of Principal Events... p. 2. 
122 Losi, History of La pp. 22-23. 
123 Law, 'The Career of Adele-', p. 55. 
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Chapter Seven 
The Arrival Of The Sierra Leonian Emigrants And The 
Wesleyan Methodist Mission 
1838-1845 
The arrival of the Sierra Leonian Emigrants 
The British Crown Colony of Sierra Leone was formed in 1808, from the 
remnants of an experiment in social engineering 1. With its basis firmly in the 
anti-slavery movement, the initial establishment at 'Granville Town' in 1787 of 
a settlement of British blacks sought idealistically to create a utopian society based 
on free agricultural labour, whilst at the same time solving the problem of the 
'black poor' in Britain 2. The first settlement of about three hundred and twenty 
six inhabitants failed miserably as a result of extreme physical hardship and 
adverse local political conditions. Its subsequent takeover by The Sierra Leone 
Company in 1791 led to a second phase of settlement, mainly by Nova Scotian 
blacks. This group was largely made up of those who had fought for the British 
during the American War of Independence in return for the promise of land to 
farm in the British Colony of Nova Scotia. At the end of the war such promises 
were largely forgotten and it was during a mission of complaint to London that 
one of their leaders, Thomas Peters, met with a director of the Sierra Leone 
Company, and was offered land in the African settlement. About one thousand 
two hundred in number headed there in 1792. This second group'of emigrants 
was beset again by the same harsh conditions, as well as further difficulties 
created by outside sources. The Company itself, having promised free land to 
work, insisted on high rents once the settlers had landed. War in Europe not 
only made supplies sparse and irregular but finally led to the bombardment of 
1 The most comprehensive study of Sierra Leone is still C Fyfe, A HistoIX of Sierra Leone (OUP, 
Oxford, 1962). 
2 The so called 'black poor' of Britain, a group made up of freed slaves, the unemployed etc were 
regarded as a serious social problem at the end of the eighteenth century and early nineteenth 
century. Numbers were never large although 20-30,000 slaves were freed in London, Liverpool and 
Bristol [P B Clarke, West Africa and ChristianitY (London 1986), p. 311. I 
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Freetown, the settlement's capital, by the French in 1794. Discontent and 
desperation led to a revolt which was squashed by a joint force of British troops 
and newly arrived Maroon settlers from Jamaica. The Sierra Leonians' hopes for 
a new self governing state were ended as the Company took direct control over 
all its affairs until 1808 when it was turned into a Crown Colony. From this 
period onwards the small settlement was expanded by groups liberated from 
slave ships by the British Navy as a result of the Anti-Slave Trade Act of 1807. 
Clarke estimates that by 1815, six thousand such 'recaptives' had settled amongst 
the original Nova Scotian and Maroon population of about two thousand 
Despite its painful beginnings Sierra Leone remained a focus of idealistic hopes 
and aspirations. In the early nineteenth century the anti-slavery movement 
developed hand in hand with a rising spirit of evangelicalism in Europe. For 
many in Britain, the Colony became the key to visions of free, Europeanised, 
Christian Africans spreading the Gospel and civilization through commerce 
amongst their less fortunate brethren along the West Coast. This ideal was 
proposed most famously, but not solely by Thomas Buxton in his 'African Slave 
Trade and Its Remedy' in 1839, and ultimately attempted unsuccessfully by the 
first Niger Expedition of 1841. However, as Kopytoff has pointed out, such 
government backed grand gestures had already been largely overtaken and 
preceded by Africans themselves who from 1838 had begun emigrating back 
towards their homelands 4. 
Understandably, many of those 'liberated' Africans who had been deposited at 
Sierra Leone were eager to go home. As a result of the Yoruba Wars and then the 
activities of the anti-slave trade squadron, many slaves exported and 
subsequently re-captured had originated from the hinterland of the Slave Coast 
during the end of the eighteenth and early part of the nineteenth centuries. 
3 lbid, p. 34. 
Kopytoff, A Preface to Modem Nigeria.... pp. 36-38. 
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Thus it was to this region that many sought to return 5. Furthermore, as Ajayi 
notes, through Sierra Leonians operating as traders right along the coast, links 
between the new and the old country were firmly re-established 6. Initially both 
church and political authorities at Sierra Leone sought to curb this movement. 
They feared both that the religious commitment amongst those who were 
Christians was not strong enough for them to act as suitable pioneers and that 
the emigration of so many British subjects might incur expensive obligations' 
towards their government. An initial request to HM Government was made by 
Thomas Will and twenty two other leading Sierra Leone residents in November 
1839 'to establish a colony to Badagri ... and ... to send missionary with US' 7. This 
was met in Whitehall with the reception that 'We cannot send them' but that 
'they can go if they wish, 8. But the initiative had already been taken and 
Governor Doherty at Sierra Leone noted that thirty four emigrants had already 
left 9. 
Arriving on the coast the Sierra Leonians faced a mixed reception. It was said that 
those who disembarked at Lagos were ill treated and robbed as they attempted to 
make their way into the interior 10. However those that landed at Badagry were 
5 See chapter 6, pp. 196-197. 
6 [Ajayi, Christian Missions.... p. 271. It is important to note that these emigrants were not the first 
to migrate to the Badagry area from British held territories. When the Landers visited the town in 
1830 they met two 'mulattos' there. One was an unnamed man from Sierra Leone who acted as 
interpreter and advisor to Adele, the other, called Hooper, also an interpreter, was proud of his 
English parentage and was an ex-soldier from Cape Coast [R &J Lander, Tournal of an Expedition.... 
p. 161. From an examination of the Cape Coast records it emerges that John Hooper did not in fact 
have an English father, although his grandfather was indeed a European. His claims to have 
served for many years as a soldier with the Gold Coast Corps also prove to be false. Although his 
father, Elias Hooper had a long and distinguished career in the Corps from 1761 until 1798, his son, 
enlisted at eleven years as a bell boy and promoted to Corporal at seventeen, was ultimately 
demoted at eighteen and then dismissed from the service the same year. What became of John 
Hooper between 1798 and 1830, when he met the Lander brothers at Badagry, is unrecorded [PRO 
T70 /1337 Cape Coast Garrison Ledger January-June 1780; T70 / 1338 Cape Coast Garrison Ledger June- 
December 1780; T70/1448 List of all living and dead at Cape Cost 1740-46; T70/1454 List of all 
servants and officers at Cape Coast 1750-69]. 
7 C0265 /154 15 November 1839 Petition by Thomas Will, Sierra Leone in 30 November 1839 
Doherty, Sierra Leone in Ajayi, Christian Missions-L. pp. 27-28. 
8 C0265 /154 Minute by Russell on 30 November 1839 Doherty, Sierra Leone in Ibid, p. 28. 
9 C0265/154 March 1840 Doherty, Sierra Leone in Ibid, p. 28-29. 
10 Freeman, Tournal of Various Visits.... p. 230. 
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on the whole given a warm welcome. Abeokuta, the major centre of Egba refugee 
groups and an ascendant political power, became the focus of emigrant attention 
as they sought both displaced families and communities and a new beginning in 
the interior. Kopytoff has suggested that it was the Egbas' good relationship with 
Badagry, initially established during the Adele period which largely accounts for 
the Sierra Leonians' good reception in that port. It has also been suggested that 
the Badagrians were slave dealers and not raiders, and thus less likely to enslave 
the arrivals who were further endeared to their hosts by the presents that they 
brought1l. I would suggest that it was these factors in combination with the ward 
organisation at Badagry, which evidently appointed the English Chief as their 
natural host. It was this organised reception of 'strangers' and the adherence to 
international loyalties along well understood lines that distinguished the 
Badagry reaction to the Sierra Leone arrivals so markedly from that which they 
experienced at Lagos 12. 
11 Kopytoff, Preface to Modern Nigeria.... p. 46. 
12 According to Benjamin Campbell, Consul for the Bight of Benin from 1850-1859, but active on the 
west coast of Africa for twenty years before that, the Wawu's reception of the Sierra Leone people 
was remarkably generous. Due to the siege at Ado and the insecurity of the road into the interior in 
1838, the Wavru wrote to Sagbua, head of the Egba war camp at Ado, requesting him to ensure safe 
passage for the immigrants. But the reply he received was negative in the extreme. According to 
Campbell, Sagbua stated that the Egba did not wish to see people again 'whom they had once sold 
out of the country' and that the Badagry chiefs should share them amongst themselves. But 
according to the Consul: 
considering that they had brought with them, what in the eyes of the Badagry 
chiefs, was considered a large amount of property, this was a most tempting 
recommendation to Wowu, but, he declined acting on it, the Sierra Leone 
people had been consigned to his protection by the Governor of that place 
Thus the Wawu advised them to wait, while he gave them land in his part of the town to build 
houses. Some that were impatient left and were captured and mistreated by the Egba. But 
eventually the prosperity of these new arrivals attracted the Egba and they were allowed to 
travel inland safely [PRO F084/976 17 October 1855 Campbell, Lagos]. Campbell's glowing report 
of the Wawu's behaviour must be understood in the context of Badagrian politics in the mid-1850s. 
At the outbreak of civil war in 1851, the Wawu and many of his fellow chiefs had been expelled 
and left Badagry in chaos. eager to open the lagoon for commerce, Campbell needed to re-establish 
order in the town. He petitioned forcefully for the re-establishment of the Badagry chiefs in the 
face of equally vehement opposition by missionaries and Egba chiefs. But ultimately it was 
Campbell, who had the resources at his disposal, and with his encouragement the Wawu and his 
fellow chiefs retook the town. The storm of criticism levelled at Campbell as a result forced him to 
justify his actions to the Foreign Office. Campbell's very favourable description of the Wawu's 
actions in the early 1840s was the result. But aside from Campbell's obvious bias, it is evident that 
ward reception of 'strangers' was an accepted part of Badagry's divided structure. Okaro K'Ojwang 
has suggested that this was one of the reasons 'which accounted for the British choice of Badagri as 
a base from which to penetrate Nigeria in 1841' [Okaro K'Cjwang, 'Society, Trade and Politics at 
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The numbers involved in the emigration movement are difficult to ascertain 
exactly, but it is possible to gain a general picture. As noted by Ajayi, the 
emigrants tended not to be the leaders of Sierra Leone society; and, for example, 
not one of the twenty three signatories on Thomas Will's original request for a 
colony made their way to the Slave Coast. Instead the emigrants tended to be 
individuals, families and small groups who initially chartered ships and made'. 
their own way to Badagry. It would appear that groups each numbering between 
one hundred and fifty and one hundred and eighty landed there during the early 
part of the 1840s. One for example arrived in November ý842 and another in May 
184313. Such groups were evidently still arriving by 1845 in ships often owned by 
Sierra Leonian entrepreneurs taking advantage of the traffic in both emigrants 
and goods between the two places 14. In 1842 it was estimated that two to three 
hundred emigrants had been landed at Badagry during the previous three years 
and by 1845 this number had been increased to about seven hundred in total15. Of 
those landed it is clear that nearly all initially made their way towards 
Abeokuta16. However, it would appear that many such emigrants maintained 
strong links with the coast, for both commercial and security reasons 17. 
Furthermore, as the road between Abeokuta and the coast was frequently blocked 
by the continuing war, notably around Ado, movement between the two places 
was often difficult and some were deterred from making the journey. It was 
noted in 1843 that of 180 emigrants landed in May of that year fift y still remained 
on the coast 18. In this way then Badagry was established during the early 1840s as 
Badagri... ', p. 441. But this clearly gives the 'British' too proactive a role in what was ultimately a 
reaction to Sierra Leone emigration. 
13 WMMSA 14 November 1842 Freeman, Badagry; WMMSA 13 May 1843 De Graft's journal in 10 
July 1843 De Graft, Badagry. 
14 WMMSA 30 April 1845 Annear's Journal, Badagry. 
15 Freeman, Toumal of Various Visits... p. 230; PRO C096/8 12 May 1845 FO Draft, London. 
16 WMMSA 3 October 1842 Freeman, Badagry. 
17 In his account of the period, Freeman commented that within a month of his arrival on the coast, 
many of the Sierra Leone people had gone into the interior, but, he added, this was merely to 'Visit 
their friends' fFreeman, Tournal of Various Visits- p. 2141. 
18 WMMSA 10 July 1843 De Graft, Badagry. 
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the gateway to the interior, but also itself became host to a further significant 
immigrant group. By 1845 the Sierra Leone population of Badagry was estimated 
to be about two hundred, and by 1851 this had increased to five hundred19. 
Badagry in 1838 
By the time of the Sierra Leonian arrivals at Badagry, the trading pattern on the 
West Coast of Africa was undergoing substantial change. As a result of the British 
search for more 'legitimate' products, despite patchy progress, the value of palm 
oil imports into Britain from that coast as a whole rose by 677o over the ten years 
between 1838 and 1847 20. Along the Slave Coast, attempts by British traders such 
as the Hutton Company increased the tonnage exported from only one thousand 
tons in 1835 to about two and a half to three thousand tons in 1846 from factories 
established at, among other places, Whydah, Aguey, Popo and Badagry. William 
Hutton himself stated that eventually the palm oil trade from that area would 
become as valuable as that from between Benin and the CameroonS 21. 
But however enterprising the 'legitimate' merchants were, such trade had by no 
means displaced the commerce in slaves by the early 1840s, and the ever vigilant 
19 CMSA CA2 / 043 / 95 19 January 1845 Gollmer's Journal, Badagry; PRO F084 / 863 23 July 1851 
Liberated Africans, Badagry in 17 October 1851 Capt Hamilton, London. 
20 According to figures collected in 1848, the value of palm oil imported into Britain from the West 
Coast of Africa between 1838 and 1847 was as follows [PRO F084 / 751 'An account of the quantity 
and value of palm oil imported into the United Kingdom from the West Coast of Africa in the last 
ten years']: 
1838 Value E281,372 
1839 E343,449 
1840 E315,458 
1841 E397,076 
1842 E420,171 
1843 E407,884 
1844 E414,570 
1845 E500,833 
1846 E360,452 
1847 : E469,448 
21 PRO F084 / 710 19 July 1847 W Hutton, London. 
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Anti-Slave Trade Squadron was clearly struggling to have any effect 22. Although 
the later 1830s and 1840s saw the founder of the house of De Souza at Whydah 
decline into old age and debt, the same period saw the establishment of new 
figures able to respond to the eastward shift of the trade. Most notable of these 
was Domingo Martinez, a Brazilian taken under the wing of De Souza during the 
1830s who defected to Lagos and a more promising employer. On his patron is 
death a short time later Martinez took over the business himself. After a brief 
sojourn in Brazil and his re-establishment at Porto-Novo in 1846, Martinez only 
reached the peak of his commercial and political powers in the final years of the 
1840s. Far from finding that his trade in slaves was being replaced by that in more 
'legitimate' articles, Martinez, above all others proved the compatibility of the 
two trades. The combination made him the most prominent slave trader in the 
Bight of Benin after the death of De Souza in 1850 23. 
The success of the slave-traders both, African and European, was evident. 
According to the Methodist missionary, Thomas Birch Freeman, there was no 
place along the whole West Coast of Africa where the slave trade was carried on 
so much as on the Bight of Benin and no part of the Bight met the vigour of the 
area between Cape St Paul and Lagos 24. 
However, Badagry itself was not flourishing. According to Ajayi, the town's 
Atlantic trade had fallen into 'ruin and decline, resulting in poverty and 
'persistent grumbling' about the 'absence of trade' 25. Freeman explained 
Badagry's lack of Atlantic operations as being the result of British influence, 
which by 1843 he stated was 'more powerfully felt than at any other point along 
22 The expense and limited success of the squadron led to calls for its abolition inside and outside 
Parliament during the mid to late 1840s. See chapter 8, p. 251-252. 
23 See DA Ross, 'The Career of Domingo Martinez in the Bight of Benin 1833-64', I_AIL 6 (i) (1965), 
yf . 79-90. WMMSA Freeman on Slaveiy in the Bight of Benin. 
25 Ajayi, Christian Missions... p. 34. 
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the shores of the Bight' 26. He was presumably referring to the additional focus of 
both missionary and naval attentions from 1842 onwards. But it would appear 
that such attentions had not basically changed the pattern of Badagrian 
commerce, and had merely modified it. 
There is very little evidence to suggest why Badagry, which in 1825 had five 
Portuguese factories, should have declined as an Atlantic port in the period prior 
to increased British attentions from the end of the 1830s. Ajayi suggests that it 
was the vigilance of the British Squadron. However, this alone would surely not 
account for a decline which did not affect the port's near neighbours. The return 
of Adele to Lagos and the resultant resurgence of factionalism within the town as 
the chiefs attempted to reassert authority may provide some clues. However, the 
fact that as early as 1830 the Landers did not meet a Portuguese slave-trader there 
indicates that Badagry's position as an Atlantic Port was at least in decline prior 
to the departure of Adele. Without further evidence it is possible only to 
conclude that Badagry was unable to compete with her nearest neighbours, 
notably Dahomean-dominated Porto-Novo and Lagos, at which places the 
Atlantic dealers, such as Martinez, were based. It must be assumed that the 
disruption on the road between Badagry and its sometime patron Abeokuta 
during this period discouraged the Egba from establishing an important trade in 
interior war captives along this path. It would appear then that Badagry even 
before 1842, was acting not as a point of slave embarkation, but as a point of 
collection and despatch in the lagoon traffic. Freeman noted the importance of 
the lagoons by which spies in the various towns were able to avoid the attentions 
of the squadrons and that 'a constant communication is kept up betwixt the 
parties by means of canoes' 27. According to this source such agents were 
operational in all towns, where they purchased and shipped slaves bywater to 
more amenable embarkation points, including Badagry. The missionary Annear 
26 WMMSA Freeman on Slavery in the Bight of Benin. 
27 WMMSA Freeman on Slavery in the Bight of Benin. 
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in a later episode described how such transactions operated. He stated that a 
Sierra Leonian kidnapped at Badagry was taken by his captor to the Chiefs Posu 
and Akran who subsequently sent him to Lagos to be sold to a Portuguese slave- 
dealer there 28. 
Badagry's decline as an Atlantic Slaving port prior to 1842 was not, it would 
appear, as a result of competition from 'legitimate' trade. The factory belonging. 
to Mr Houtson, established in 1824, had clearly disappeared at his death in 182529. 
There was no trace of any further commercial enterprise on Lander's return to 
Badagry either in 1826 or again in 1830. It would also appear that a Captain 
Marmon was unsuccessful in his attempt to establish a factory there in 1838 30. 
But in 1841 Thomas Hutton established a factory at Badagry which proved far 
more lasting. Revd Freeman's Journal of his initial impressions of Badagry in 
the early 1840s portray a busy port. In 1842, for example, four ships arrived 
between the end of September and the beginning of November, one of which; 
the 'Oscar', was clearly involved in taking palm oil from the Hutton factory 31. 
According to Governor Hill, Hutton's factory was readily supplied with palm 
oil32. 
There is no evidence to suggest population figures during the 1830s. But it has 
been estimated that by the mid-1840s Badagry's population was as high as eleven 
thousand, although it is more likely to have been around the five to six 
thousand mark estimated by a contemporary source 33. After the departure of 
28 Freeman, Tournal of Various Visits... p. 207. WMMSA 24 September 1844 Annear's journal in 21 
October 1844 Annear, Badagry. 
29 See chapter 2, pp. 59-60. 
30 Okaro KOJwang has suggested that Captain Marmon's palm oil trading activities were so 
successful that the King of Dahomey plotted to have him removed from Badagry [Freeman, Journal 
of Various Visits.. - p. 247; 
Okaro K'Ojwang, 'Society, Trade and Politics in Badagri... ', p. 531. 
31 Freeman, fournal of Various Visits ... / p. 207. 
32 PRO C096/4 16 May 1844 Hill, Cape Coast. 
33 Espousing the missionary cause by writing without firsthand knowledge of the area, Miss Tucker 
estimated Badagry's population during this period as 11,000 [Tucker, Abeokuta.... p. 971. However, 
resident missionary Charles Gollmer estimated in 1845 that the figure was closer to 5000 or 6000 
f CMSA CA2 / 043 / 95 28 January 1845 Gollmer's Journal, Badagry]. It is interesting to note here that 
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Adele, Badagry also evidently maintained its 'number of petty chiefs' who were, 
according to a source from 1843, 'in a great measure independent of each 
other'34. The 'petty chiefs' operational in Badagry after the departure of Adele 
again can only be reconstructed using sources from the early 1840s. However, 
assuming that the pattern, if not the exact personalities themselves, would have 
remained constant over approximately seven years, it is possible to gain a general 
picture of political authority over that period. According to one of the first 
missionary arrivals at Badagry in 1842 there were by this time 'several towns' in 
Badagry identified as English, French, Spanish and Portuguese by one source and 
as English, French, Portuguese and Dutch 'etc' by another of the same period35. 
'Warru' more usually Wawu, was clearly identified in both sources as the Chief 
of English Town 36. The Wawu of this period is named by Avoseh as Wawu- 
Zanwhehoru-MeSi 37. Due to his close links with British visitors the Wawu 
featured prominently in British written accounts of Badagry in the 1840s and 
1850S 38. In 1843 he was described by one missionary visitor as being 'a very good 
sort of man, very friendly and attentive and would do anything forUS1 39. 
Another personality identified as an English Chief during the 1840s was Mobi of 
Boeko Ward. According to Avoseh this particular chief, named Podowu, was the 
first such chief after the ward had changed from priestly control. Intriguingly, 
Avoseh also states that the title or name Mobi was a nickname given to the chief 
by Brazilians. This possibly indicates a commercial connection with this group 
and also suggests that Brazilian merchants, if no longer resident within Badagry 
such was the influence of Miss Tucker's work that Gollmer's eldest son and biographer chose to use 
that lady's figures rather than those of his subject! [C HV Gollmer, His Life and Missio=Y 
Labours (London, 1889), p. 181. 
34 WMMSA 21 March 1843 De Graft, Badagry. 
35 Freeman, lournal of Various Visits, -, Appendix C; WMMSA 21 March 1.843 De Graft, Badagry. 36 Freeman, Tournal Qf Various Visits... p. 206; WMMSA 21 March 1843 De Graft, Badagry 
37 Avoseh, A Short Histolý: of BadagEy, p. 28. 
38 As 'British' host, it is understandable that the Wawu should appear prominently in British 
written sources. But this should not automatically imply a political prominence. It would appear, 
however, that the British presence and commercial potential did give the Wawu an important 
olitical role during this period. 
9( WMMSA 21 March 1843 De Graft, Badagry. 
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itself, certainly retained close ties with the port 40 
Using the account given by Avoseh, the jengen or French Chief, called jingi' by 
Freeman, may have been Jengen Athunde 41. lt was he who appeared as the 
successor to that position after the politically skillful Jengen Sinto Agara had, in 
the final years of the eighteenth century succeeded in expelling his main political 
rival the Posu WrawrU 42. But it is also possible that the jengen at this time Was 
his successor Jengen Gbede during whose time, Avoseh states, 'the town was 
ceded to the British' 43. Both these possibilities suggest unusually long 
chieftaincies, and it may well be that certain holders of the title have been 
omitted44. 
As during the Landers' visit, the identification of a 'Spanish' chief as distinct 
from the Portuguese chief is confusing. But a clue to his identity may be that the 
'Okhan' or Akran of Ijegba Ward was a prominent chief. Indeed in 1845 he was 
identified as a 'Headchief of this place, 45. In the same year a meeting of all the 
'principal chiefs ' was described at the house of the 'Portuguese Chief', indicating, 
I would suggest, that the Akran was indeed the Portuguese chief46. From 
Avoseh's list it would appear that the Akran in question was Akran Toyi of 
jigbeko House who retained his chieftaincy into the 1850S 47. 
The Dutch Chief during the 1840s has been clearly identified as the Posu of 
Posuko Ward, although the informant admitted that he had previously 
mistakenly identified him as a French Chief 48. From Avoseh's account it would 
40 Avoseh, A Short Histoa of BadagLy, p. 28. 
41 Freeman, Journal Qf Va6ous Visits... p. 207; Avoseh, A Short Histojý: of Badagiz: p. 25. 
42 Ibid, pp. 19-20. 
43 Ibid, p. 28. 
44 rbid, p. 28. 
45 CMSA CA2/043/96 12 August 1845 Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
46 CMSA CA2 / 085 / 228 18 May 1845 Townsend's journal, Badagry. 
47 Avoseh, A Short Histwzý of BadagLy p. 23. 
48 WMMSA 10 July 1843 De Graft, Badagry. 
209 
seem likely that the holder of the title was Agongoro who, like the Akran, 
retained the title into the 1850s. The favourable description of him in the early 
1840s as 'a very influential man and a great warrior a man of good judgment and 
friendly disposition' fits with a similar sketch of the early 1850S 49. In this later 
account he was said to be a man of 'majestic aspect', 'acute intellect' and 'good 
judgment' 50. 
Chief Bala of Asago Ward was also mentioned during this period, although 
usually indirectly. Avoseh states that the whilst the first holder of that title 
arrived soon after Hendrick Hertogh in the 1730s, the second was in power 
during the early 1860S51. Avoseh may have miscalculated the number of Balas at 
Badagry, or they may indeed have been a considerable space between the first and 
second holders of the title, but it would appear that., at least during the early part 
of the 1840s, this chieftaincy was in operation. There are also references to Banker 
and Bahler, who were evidently the same person and must be the Bala of Asago. 
Unfortunately no further information is given about the chief 52. From the mid 
to late 1840s there are also an number of references to a Chief Motang 53. From a 
number of missionary sources, this chief evidently played an increasingly 
important political role by the end of that decade. He was finally identified in 
1851 as being the Balla or Bala of Asago 54. 
There are no specific contemporary references to the other ward chiefs in 
Badagry, notably those of Ganho and Wharako. Indeed there is no contemporary 
49 WMMSA 10 July 1843 De Graft, Badagry. 
50 CMR October 1851, pp. 218-219,21 March 1850 Thomas King's Journal, Badagry. 
51 Avoseh, A Short Histojý: of BadagLry p. 26 
52 Annear referred to 'Banker' [WMMSA 26 April 1845 Annear's Journal, Badagry] and Martin 
referred to 'Bahler' [WMMSA 26 June 1846 Martin's journal in 5 September 1846 Martin, Badagry]. 
There are references, also by Annear in the same year, to 'Ogbanga' as one of Badagry's 'chief 
warriors' [WMMSA 24 Marýh 1845 Annear's journal, Badagry]. Unless Annear was extremely 
careless in noted down the names of these men, 'Banker' and 'Ogbanga' must have been two different 
fri res. The latter title may be connected with the Yoruba military title 'Gbonka', ]. 
5fCuMSA CA2 / 043 /108 10 August 1850 Gollmer's Journal, Badagry. 
54 CMSA CA2 / 043 / 11128 March 1851 Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
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mention of Ganho Ward until the 1860s. However, tradition suggests that this 
chieftaincy was established by an early Akran. According to Avoseh it was the 
third chief of this ward who held the position during the early 1860s so I would 
suggest that the position may have been created during a period of Ijegba 
dominance at the height of Portuguese commercial activity at Badagry in the 
latter years of the eighteenth and early part of the nineteenth centuries. In this 
way then the holder of the title in the 1830s and 1840s may have been only the'. 
second chief of Ganho named by Avoseh as Su-Dahogan55. The Finhento of 
Wharako Ward during this period may have been either Aroyon, who held the 
title in the 1850s or his predecessor Tofon 56. But it would appear that both these 
chiefs remained in the background of Badagry political life during the 1840s. 
There were then at least six prominent ward chiefs active in Badagry by the 1840s, 
with two others, unidentified by contemporary sources, remaining in the 
background of political life. However, by this time therew. ere also clearly other 
important personalities who were very influential in the political and 
commercial life of the town. Although dating his arrival is impossible without 
further evidence, it is clear that by the mid 1840s the Chief of Apa or 'Akpa', 
Hertogh's original patron in the area, was now spending 'the greater part of his 
time at Badagry, 57. Described merely as a small town about three miles west, Apa 
no longer held any influence over Badagry, and the transferal of its chief into 
that town,, where he had no discernible political role, would indicate the virtual 
absorption of Apa into Badagry territory. 
Another individual immigrant to Badagry who does however appear by the 
1840s to have taken on an important role was the Mewu, the exiled 'prime 
minister I of Porto-Novo. During the upheavals of the latter 1820s and'very early 
55 Avoseh, A Short HistoEy Qf BadagEy p. 31. 
56 Ibid, pp. 31-32. 
57 In June 1846 Gollmer noted that the chief of Apa 'at present resides here' [CMR March 1847, p. 49, 
7 June 1846 Gollmer's journal, Badagry]. 
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1830s this chief had sought refuge at Badagry under Adele58. However, by the 
1840s it is clear that this Mewu had established himself at Mowo, a town to the 
north east of Badagry, where he had usurped the position of the native chief and 
resided as a figure 'very celebrated for the number and power of his fetishes, and 
his devotion to the various gods of the country, 59. But the Mewu, it would 
appear, had also taken on more than a symbolic role as a religious sage, for at his 
base on the frontier he was 'intrusted with the defence of Badagry, against all' 
enemies from the interior 60. There are also a number of references to 'Alassa' 
Chief of Ease, who was either a periodic resident, or frequent visitor to Badagry 
throughout the 1840S 61. That ward chieftaincy was not the only route to 
prominence is also supported by evidence that a man called Ajagbi or Ajagbe, 
was described as 'one of the principal warriors at Badagri' as well as a 'respectable 
inhabitant' 62. Furthermore, 'Ahamara' or Ahamarra' was noted as a 'notorious 
slave catcher, 63. The internal politics of the ward system also appears to have 
thrown up at least a couple of other men to prominence. Accordingly one source 
of the mid-1840s briefly mentions a man called Losoco, who was an unsuccessful 
claimant to the titleof poSU 64. Another mentions Honbati, presumably the same 
figure as the Hunpatin, who is described by Avoseh as a prominent figure in 
Boeko Ward 65. 
That such political fragmentation both inside and outside the wards should have 
been heightened during a period of economic hardship is easily understandable 
58 See chapter 6, pp. 192-194. 
59 CMSA CA2 / 085 / 230 25 November 1945 Townsend's Journal, Badagry. 
60 WMMSA 28 May 1846 Martin's Journal in 5 September 1846 Martin, Badagry. 
61 CMR October 1846, p. 231.25 November 1845 Townsend's Journal, Badagry; CMR May 1848, p. 81, 
23 May 1847 Gollmer's Journal, Badagry; CMR June 1849, p. 124,11 April 1848 Smith's journal, 
Badagry. See also chapter 9, p. 307, footnote 113. 
62 WMMSA 26 June 1846 Martin's Journal in 5 September 1846 Martin, Badagry; CMR October 1846, 
p. 228., 10 August 1845 Gollmer's Journal, -Badagry; CMR December 1848, p. 257,9 / 10 December 1847 
Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
63 CMSA CA2 / 043 / 98 27 February 1847 Gollmer's journal, Badagry; CMR December 1848, p. 257, 
9/ 10 December 1847 Gollmer's journal, B adagry. 
64 WMMSA 26 April 1845 Annear's Journal, Badagry. 
65 CMR December 1848, p. 257,9 / 10 December 1847 Gollmer's journal, Badagry; Avoseh, A Short 
HistoLy of Badagly, p. 33. 
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within a system based largely upon commercial competition. An observer of the 
period stated that the divisions between chiefs, initially based on the nationalities 
of past slave traders resident in the town, were, in the early 1840s, 'kept up with a 
zeal which breeds jealousies and animosities among the chiefs sometimes, 66. 
Not surprisingly then, the arrival of a new immigrant group with commercial 
connections both to other parts of the coast and to Europe was welcomed by at 
least certain sections of Badagrian society as an opportunity for improvement, 
but was viewed by other sections with suspicion. 
The Early Sierra Leonian Community at Badagry 
As British subjects the Sierra Leonian emigrants were taken under the wing of 
the 'Wawu', the 'English Chief' of Ahoviko Ward. In this way then, it was 
recognised by that chief, by the Sierra Leonians themselves and the other ward 
chiefs that it was the Wawu's duty to defend the interests of these strangers. In 
return it was evidently envisaged that the Sierra Leonians would bring increased 
commercial activity to Ahoviko. Avoseh notes that it was James Ferguson, a 
'flourishing trader', who initially 'became very intimate with Chief Wawu' 67. It 
is interesting to observe that the missionary Samuel Crowther enthused in early 
1846 that on landing at Badagry the first thing the Sierra Leonian people did was 
inform the chiefs of their 'detestation against the slave trade, 68. It is highly 
probable that this dislike emerged from a desire for self preservation and as a 
means by which to espouse the cause of a more 'legitimate' commerce in which 
they themselves sought to take part. It must be noted that the most explicit 
reference to the operation of the Wawu's role as host and protector occur when 
the chief neglected this duty, evidently as a result of his disappointment in the 
low return on his investment 69. 
66 WMMSA 21 March 1843 De Graft, Badagry. 
67 Avoseh, The HistojZL of St Thomas's BadagjX p. 5. 
68 PRO F084 / 663 19 April 1845 Crowther's journal, Badagry in 7 January 1846 Coates, London. 
69 PRO F084 / 663 19 April 1845 Crowther's journal, Badagry in 7 January 1846 Coates, London. 
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As well as stimulating a new line commercial link to Badagry however, the 
Sierra Leonians also occasioned the arrival of far less tangible but arguably more 
influential imports: Christianity and 'civilisation'. 
The spiritual well-being of the immigrants had occasioned grave concern 
amongst the churches established at Sierra Leone. The religious beliefs of the 
Sierra Leonians were mixed. Amongst those who emigrated were some who' 
continued to practice traditional religions and also Muslims, who possibly, 
amongst other motives, hoped by emigration to escape the Christian ethics of the 
colony. But amongst them were a number of committed Christians, including 
James Ferguson. Ferguson, a member of the Methodist Church at Sierra Leone, 
emerged as a leading figure, as both trader and Christian, amongst the new 
Badagrian arrivals. Seeking to fulfill the hopes of Thomas Will and Co, who had 
sought to use a settlement at Badagry to espouse the Christian cause, Ferguson, in 
association with Chief Wawu, wrote to the leader of the Methodist Community 
at Sierra Leone in March 1841 requesting a missionary 70. 
The call for a missionary at Badagry coincided with a peak in evangelical fervour 
and political manouvering. The failure of the Niger expedition in 1841 forced a 
reassessment of missionary policy and tactics. Although, as Ajayi notes, it was 
recognised that the emigrants were not 'the crusaders against the twin evils of 
idolatory and slavery' which Buxton had envisaged, they did offer an alternative 
path after the dramatic failures of the official experiment on the Niger 71. As a 
result of this, and encouraged by reports of the emigrants' good reception both at 
Badagry and Abeokuta, Revd Thomas Dove, head of the Methodist Church at 
Sierra Leone, agreed to the settlers' request. Thomas Birch Freeman, 
Superintendent of the Methodist Mission at Cape Coast, with Fanti assistants Mr 
and Mrs William De Graft, were despatched to Badagry. They arrived on 24 
70 Avoseh, The History of St Thomas's Badagry, p. 5. 
71 Ajayi, christian Missions... p. 30. 
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September 1842 with the intention of making the town an outstation of the Cape 
Coast Mission 72. 
The missionary party were warmly received at Badagry by James Ferguson, 
Captain Parsons, the agent residing at the newly established Hutton factory, and 
also by Chief WawU 73. Eager to begin their work, they quickly erected a 
temporary bamboo chapel and mission house of planks brought from Sierra 
Leone, costing in total E300 74. Freeman himself noted only that the mission 
station was established on a 'sizeable piece of land in a healthy part of the 
town, 75. But it is interesting to note that although, according to a later description 
by Miss Tucker, the missionaries established their premises in the English ward 
of the town, according to William Gollmer, a missionary arrival of 1845, the 
original Methodist premises were based, like Hutton's factory, in the French 
section. Gollmer stated that it was only as a result of the Methodist settlement 
that the land was subsequently transferred under English control 76. 
The Initial Progress of Christianity at Badagry 
Having nowhere to preach, the missionaries began by holding services under an 
awning77. However, by 13 October 1842 a temporary bamboo house had been 
erected and a service was held three days later attended by 'many of the pagan 
natives ... who appeared interested and attentive, 
78. By the middle of November 
a temporary bamboo chapel had been completed which held up to two hundred 
and regular services were begun 79. 
72 Ibid, p. 31. 
73 WMMSA 11 October 1842 De Graft, Badagry. 
74 Ajayi, Christian Missions... p. 31. 
75 WMMSA 3 October 1842 Freeman, Badagry. 
76 The reason for Hutton's establishment in Awhanjigo was clearly to give his factory easy access to 
both lagoon and sea. The WMMS may also have desired such access [CMSA CA2/043/95 6 February 
1845 Gollmer's journal, Badagry; NNAI CS05 /2 Agreement Between Ghingy Cabacier of Badagry 
and Thomas Hutton of London for the Sale of a Plot of Land in the Centre of Badagry, Badagry, May 
2218421. 
77 Freeman, Tournal of Various Visits... p. 207. 
78 Ibid, p. 209. 
79 WMMSA 14 November 1842 Freeman, Badagry. 
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Reminiscences about the Badagry mission and later accounts have tended to 
present a pessimistic view from its very inception. According to Miss Tucker 
Badagry was 'anything but a pleasant or promising station' 80. Even Revd 
Freeman in the introduction to his published journal stated that 
friends of Africa ... declared that, should the attempt be attended 
with success, they should regard that success as furnishing proof 
that there is nothing too difficult for missionary enterprise to 
achieve 81 
Badagry was described as a place of superstition, cruelty, and slave-trading, 
populated by a corrupt and drunken population. However, these accounts were 
coloured by later disappointments. From Freeman's own writings of the early 
period and the letters and journals of his missionary assistant William De Graft, 
it would appear that the mission began optimistically. De Graft described his 
work as 'delightful' and Freeman reported that, due to the friendly reception 
they received, they were able to make 'an encouraging commencement of their 
work' 82. 
On finding that the majority of Sierra Leone emigrants had continued on into 
the interior towards Abeokuta, Freeman followed in December 1842, after 
receiving a cordial invitation to do so by the Egba King Sodeke 83. Travelling via 
Mowo and the Abeokuta military encampment at Ado, the visit played a vital 
role in shaping missionary policy 84. He remained at Abeokuta on ly eight days 
but was impressed by Sodeke's evident hospitality and apparent interest in 
Christianity 85. It was at this early stage that Abeokuta began to emerge as the 
focus of missionary efforts. Freeman noted in his journal that just as commercial 
80 Tucker, Abeokuta. - p. 
98. 
81 Freeman, lournal of Various Visits... P. 198. 
82 WMMSA 11 October 1842 De Graft, Badagry; Freeman, lournal of Various Visits... p. 200. 
83 Soon after the missionaries arrival on the coast Sodeke sent a messenger to meet them with the 
P resent of a pony, saddle, bridle and an invitation to visit him f1bid, p. 2091. 
4 lbid, pp. 215-217. 
85 Kopytoff, Preface to Modern Nigeria... p. 49. 
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intercourse was already established with the interior via Badagry, so it would be 
by this route that they would spread the Word86. Freeman returned to the coast 
for Christmas then left on 29 December for Whydah, from where he was 
eventually able to make a journey on to Abomey 87. Freeman had feared that the 
intervention of Dahomey might have interrupted the mission at Badagry. But, 
having reassured the Dahomean King over reports that in a fort rather than a 
chapel was being built there, he was impressed by the King's request for a 
mission at Whydah and his apparent willingness to abandon the slave trade 88. 
At Badagry, the mission under the care of De Graft began tentatively. Initial 
indigenous interest in the services of the church gave rise to large and 
'attentive' congregations 89. These sometimes included the Gun chiefs Wawu, 
Akran and jengen, along with some of the Muslim inhabitants of the town 90. 
But interest quickly dwindled. By early 1843 De Graft was forced to admit that 
despite the maintenance of numbers at about forty or fifty, the congregation was 
principally made up of Sierra Leonians and also some Egba people, who visited 
the town every week from Abeokuta to attend the market 91. By the middle of 
that year Methodist Society membership had increased from an initial twenty 
among the emigrants to forty-five. This included ten new converts to 
Christianity from amongst the Sierra Leonians, two Fantis and two elderly 
Muslim immigrants from the interior whom De Graft named Simeon and 
Anna92. There were no Gun converts or members. De Graft stated that the only 
progress amongst these people was that, whereas initially they had been 
86 Freeman, Journal of Various Visits... p. 201. 
87 Ibid, pp. 201 & 213. 
88 lbid, p. 201. 
89 Ibid, p. 210. 
90 The chiefs, it would appear, attended church only on particular occasions, for example the first 
service and also the day before Freeman departed for the interior. Muslim visitors, probably from 
the interior, also attended sporadically, presumably due to their periodic commercial connections 
with the town [Ibid, pp. 207,214 & 2121. 
91 WMMSA 21 March 1843 De Graft, Badagry. 
92 WMMSA 10 July 1843 De Graft, Badagry. 
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suspicious, those that came, now came confidently into the chapel 93. However, 
the divided nature of Badagry's political structure was clearly causing problems. 
The Wawu, from whom the mission had received 'unwavering kindness and 
support', continued to maintain a secular interest in their presence 94. He sent 
ten boys, including his son, to the mission school, established in January 1843 95. 
But, according to De Graft, by that time the Wawu was the missionaries' 'only 
friend' amongst the Badagry chiefs 96. 
The suspicion with which the mission was viewed was clearly associated with its 
'Englishness'. This gave it a very difficult position within the town. De Graft 
stated that, in reply to his request for children for his school, the Portuguese chief 
refused, saying that his people would only be educated in Portuguese, in a 
Portuguese school. The missionary added also that, perhaps for similar reasons, 
the Dutch Chief would not send children to the school either. He lamented that 
in this way his work was then confined 'to a very small portion of the town 
indeed'. Noting that nationality was the root problem, De Graft simplistically and 
ominously suggested that the solution may be to 'concentrate them all into one 
body of British subjects'97. 
The second half of 1843 saw improvements, at least in the progress of the 
mission school. By July of that year the original thirteen children had been 
increased to forty or fifty boys and girls. This number now included six children 
belonging to the Posu, who had recently had a change of heart 98. De Graft stated 
at this point that now, as well as having the Wawu and Posu on their side, the 
French chief was also supportive of their cause and that such connections 
93 WMMSA 10 July 1843 De Graft, Badagry. 
94 WMMSA Early 1843 Freeman, Cape Coast. 
95 WMMSA 21 March 1843 De Graft, Badagry. 
96 WMMSA 21 March 1843 De Graft, Badagry. 
97 WMMSA 21 March 1843 De Graft, Badagry. 
98 WMMSA 10 July 1843 De Graft, Badagry. See Figure 8. 
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increased his hopes of reaching the Topo' people 99. However, his suggested 
imperialistic solution to Gun indifference and suspicion almost became a reality. 
In the late summer of 1843, at the request of Revd Freeman and with the 
compliance of Governor Maclean at Cape Coast Castle, Badagry was placed under 
the British flag. Freeman's aims were wider than those of De Graft. He had 
emerged from his travels in the coastal hinterland having identified Abeokuta as 
the most promising focus for missionary activity. The movement of the Sierra 
Leonian emigrants into the interior was the key measure by which he saw the 
spread of Christianity and the suppression of the slave trade being achieved 100. 
However he evidently also recognised the dangers posed to the Egba link with 
the missionaries by insecurity and jealousy on the coast. Furthermore the 
Badagry mission faced a further threat from Lagos. According to Freeman, there 
was open opposition from the Lagos people to the establishment of legitimate 
traders and a mission. In early 1843 he wrote that not only was it the Lagos people 
who had misinformed the Dahomean King that the British were building a fort, 
but also that the continuous threat to the Hutton factory and the mission station 
meant that a close watch was kept on the lagoon in case Lagos should launch an 
attack on its neighbour 101. Freeman concluded that it was only the establishment 
of Badagry under British influence that would secure the link between that part 
of the coast and the interior 102. 
Ajayi has suggested that, having visited both Abeokuta and Dahomey, Freeman 
would have welcomed either power taking over effective rule at Badagry, in 
order to preserve the security of the mission103. But it would appear from 
contemporary sources that neither power was able or willing to provide the 
satisfactory intervention that the missionary required. Freeman was evidently 
99 WMMSA 10 July 1843 De Graft, Badagry. 
100 WMMSA Freeman on Slavery in the Bight of Benin. 
101 WMMSA Early 1843 Freeman, Cape Coast. 
102 WMMSA Freeman on Slavery in the Bight of Benin. 
103 Ajayi, Christian Missions... p. 35. 
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optimistic about the Egbas' receptiveness towards the Sierra Leone emigrants, but 
he also envisaged the relationship between Badagry and Abeokuta as a possible 
weakness in the process. At the same time as noting the 'friendly' relations 
between the two places he also recognised that this friendship was 'by no means 
free from jealousy'. He concluded that it was the 'bringing of the two parties into 
friendly relations with England' which would 'remove that jealousy and throw 
open a wider field for the introduction of Christianity and consequent 
civilization'. Freeman then went on to expose the dangers of the situation when 
he noted that to secure such a link required a careful balance of policy between 
the states which might otherwise lead to 'serious misunderstandings and 
perhaps wars betwixt them' 104. The suggestion that Abeokuta might not have 
been in a position to secure direct control over Badagry or was at least unwilling 
to do so without further pressure and support from an outside source, may have 
much to do with the continued difficulties the Egba faced in maintaining its ties 
with the coast. The Egbado country, notably around Ota, had proved obstructive 
in the quest for a route to the sea, and the attempt to maintain direct control over 
areas even further south would, at this stage, have been undesirable. Much 
more satisfactory was the maintenance of links through commercial and 
diplomatic influences which not only gave the Egba a coastal port without actual 
military intervention, but also in return, gave them added manpower in their 
campaign in the Egbado country 105. 
Badagry's relationship with Dahomey was also that of a nominal tributary, but in 
reality was less mutually advantageous. Contemporary sources evidently saw the 
coastal state as being under the protection of Dahomey at this stage, however, the 
King of Dahomey, having been reassured that British intentions were peacefu., 
104 WMMSA Freeman on Slavery in the Bight of Benin. 
105 In July 1848 De Graft noted that the Posu had only recently returned from the Ado encampment 
where he had been helping the Egba siege. De Graft added that he was returning merely to deal 
with some public business and would probably soon go back to the encampment [INTMMSA 10 July 
1843 De Graft, Badagry]. 
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was understandably more concerned with the commercial situation at 
Whydah106. Telling Freeman exactly what he wished to hear, the King not only 
granted the fullest assurance of his protection for the Christian mission at 
Badagry, but expressed an anxious wish that a missionary station and school be 
established at Whydah. He also appeared ready to abandon the slave trade in 
return for monetary concessions and guarantees of 'legitimate' commerce 107. In 
this mood of optimism Captain Foote of the Royal Navy drew up two treaties to 
be signed by the King on Freeman's proposed return to Abomey108. 
Freeman's obvious continued concern over the situation at Badagry, despite his 
optimism over Abeokuta and Dahomey, was matched by the anti-slaving and 
territorial ambitions of Governor Maclean at Cape Coast Castle. On being 
petitioned by letter, Maclean immediately saw that'advantage should be taken of 
the present favourable disposition evinced by the King of Dahomey, from whose 
territories, he stated, more slaves had been exported in the previous thirty years 
than from any other similar stretch of coast 109.1n May 1843 he wrote to the 
Colonial Office suggesting that the British fort at Whydah should be re-occupied 
and that Popo and Lagos be established as outposts. By these measures Maclean 
was convinced that'we should ... speedily effect the entire suppression of the 
slave trade along the Dahomey coast'. He concluded that if he was not so soon to 
be withdrawn from his post he should 're-hoist the British flag at Whydah, and 
Badagry, which I could do at a very trifling expense' 110. Having expressed his 
support for such a scheme Maclean was confronted with Freeman himself who 
had just returned from Badagry, Abeokuta and Dahomey. The missionary 
pressed for action. Becoming even more enamoured with the project, Maclean 
took the initiative and, in August 1843, ordered that a Sergeant be sent to Badagry 
106 PRO C096 /2 20 May 1843 Maclean, Cape Coast. 
107 PRO C096 /2 20 May 1843 Maclean, Cape Coast. 
108 WMMSA Freeman on Slavery in the Bight of Benin. 
109 PRO C096 /2 20 May 1843 Maclean, Cape Coast. 
110 PRO C096/2 20 May 1843 Maclean, Cape Coast. 
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to raise the British flag over the town in return for a 'few presents' to the Badagry 
chiefs 111. The onerous duties of this single member of the Gold Coast Corps were 
that, without interfering in the 'affairs of the natives' he was to 'prevent all 
attempts at the exportation of slaves', 'protect the British missionaries and 
traders' and also 'the numerous Emigrants who have lately removed from Sierra 
Leone to that place' 112. 
Avoseh has described the arrival of the Sergeant in Badagry as the arrival of 
British influence in Nigeria 113. But I would suggest that the affair was merely 
the symbolic gesture of an influence which had already begun to pervade 
Badagrian politics from at least the arrival of Freeman in 1842 and arguably from 
that of the Sierra Leonians in 1839 onwards. Ajayi has suggested that in the long 
run the establishment of a British 'garrison' at Badagry signified a shift in the 
attention of the British government, which until that point had been wholly 
focused on the area of the Niger Delta 114. But if such a shift did take place, it does 
not appear to have caused the Colonial Office to make an immediate re- 
assessment of the British position in the Bight of Benin. A low-key letter to 
Governor Hill, Maclean's more circumspect replacement, at the end of 1843 
merely stated that no objection was made to this 'temporary' arrangement, and 
that Hill should at some point assess the 'expediency' of garrisoning Badagry 115. 
Ultimately it would appear that the formation of a 'British policy' on the Slave 
Coast during the early part of the 1840s remained very much in the hands of 
those individuals who were active on the coast itself, whether as Government 
agents, missionaries or traders. 
111 PRO C096 /2 16 September 1843 Maclean, Cape Coast. 
112 PRO C096/2 16 September 1843 Maclean, Cape Coast. 
y of BadagEy, p. 33. 113 Avoseh, A Ehort Histoj: 
114 Ajayi, Christian Missions p. 35. 
115 The short-lived garrisoning of Badagry has been largely ignored. However, it is important to 
note that, despite the very temporary and extremely small-scale nature of the affair, the 
missionary residents, at least, viewed the town as 'British Badagry' [PRO C096/4 16 May 1844 
Hill, Cape Coast]. 
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Badagry Under the British Flag 
The early months of 1844 saw the arrival of a new Methodist missionary at 
Badagry when Revd Annear and his wife arrived in May of that year to replace 
the De Grafts116. According to Annear it had initially been the Society's intention 
for him to proceed on to Abeokuta, but by August 1844, for unexplained reasons, 
he had been instructed to remain on the coast 117. 
Despite numerous bouts of ill health for both himself and his wife, the couple 
began their mission work at Badagry with vigour and enthusiasm 118. From his 
own early writings, Annear appears to have become popular with the ward 
chiefs, who were all willing to have their children educated in the school 119. 
Furthermore, with the support of two unnamed chiefs, the missionary 
determined to begin a boarding school120. By July 1844 he was further encouraged 
by the success of this venture and his wife was also operating a girls' school 121. 
At the tea-party given by the Annears to celebrate their first wedding anniversary 
in September 1844, the mission's scholars numbered thirty eight 122. 
From Annear's journal and letters, it would appear that the Badagry church 
congregations were also encouraging. Throughout 1844 he wrote of 'large I 
numbers gathered for Sunday worship, which continued to grow 123. Annear, 
like both Freeman and De Graft, saw the Egba as the most promising focus for 
Christianity 124. But he also expressed optimism over other sections of Badagry 
116 WMMSA 2 June 1844 Annear, Badagry. 
117 WMMSA 23 August 1844 Annear, Badagry. 
118 On a number of occasions Annear noted that he was too ill to carry out his duties [WMMSA 23 
August 1844 Annear, Badagry]. 
119 WMMSA 2 June 1844 Annear, Badagry; WMMSA 27 July 1844 Annear's Journal in 23 August 1844 
Annear, Badagry. 
120 WMMSA 2 June 1844 Annear, Badagry. 
121 WMMSA 27 July 1844 Annear's journal in 23 August 1844 Annear, Badagry. 
122 WMMSA 20 September 1844 Annear's journal in 21 October 1844 Annear, Badagry. 
123 WMMSA 30 September 1844 Annear's journal in 21 October 1844 Annear, Badagry; WMMSA 8 
December 1844 Annear's journal, Badagry. See Figure 9. 
124 In August 1843 Annear wrote sentimentally how: 
My heart has often been the seat of delightful emotions while 
beholding the athletic warrior from the Encampment with his 
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society attending the chapel, including Sierra Leone immigrants and labourers 
from Cape Coast. But it is important to note that in June 1844 Annear was also 
claiming that, while half the congregation was made up of visitors from the 
interior, the rest were Badagrians 125. Who exactly he meant by 'Badagrians' is 
unclear. It would appear that he was including Sierra Leonians resident at 
Badagry in this category. But in August of that year he also stated that whilst two- 
thirds of the hundred and fifty strong congregation was made up of Sierra 
Leonian emigrants and labourers, as many as a third were 'heathens from the 
town' 126. It is clear that a large proportion of the Badagry congregation were 
'strangers'. But it would seem that there were also a number of Gun people 
attending the Sunday service. However, despite this cause for optimism, actual 
conversions were very low among all sectors of society. In August 1844 Annear 
recorded the baptism of an'aged native' and his wife. But presumably this was 
referring to the same 'Simeon' and 'Anna' who had joined the church under De 
Graft. These first converts were not Gun, both being Muslim exiles from the 
interior 127. 
To what extent the apparent, if hesitant, progress of the Badagry mission during 
1844 may have been in any way attributable to the raising of the British flag and 
its incorporation into Maclean's 'informal and largely illegal protectorate' is 
difficult to assess 128. Ajayi has noted the energy with which Sergeant Bart 
appears to have acted and the establishment of the mission premises as 'the fort, 
the gaol and the temple'. Furthermore, Annear seems to have assumed an 
increasingly secular role 'if any political affair go wrong demanding the 
interference of British law and authority' 129. There is little evidence, from even 
destructive 'war-hatchet' over his shoulder kneeling in the 
presence of God with the congregation 
[WMMSA 2 June 1844 Annear, Badagry]. 
125 WMMSA 2 June 1844 Annear, Badagry. 
126 WMMSA 23 August 1844 Annear, Badagry. 
127 WMMSA 23 August 1844 Annear, Badagry. 
128 Ajayi, Christian Missions... p. 35. 
129 Ibid, pp. 35-36. 
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Annear's writings, by which to assess how successful the resident Sergeant was in 
carrying out his impossibly difficult duties for suppressing the slave trade and 
protecting British subjects without, contrary to orders, becoming involved in 
'native affairs'. Indeed, the few mentions he does receive in Annear's journal 
appear to involve his attendance at various social events 130. From this lack of 
evidence, and the accompanying accounts of missionary activity, it would appear 
rather that the presence of the British flag at Badagry was used by Annear himself 
to take on a more political role, while the military man remained very much in 
the background. It was Annear, for example, who, in October 1844, after the 
kidnap of a girl from the mission yard, succeeded in gaining the Wawu's help in 
the search by threatening to leave the town and cause English ships to destroy the 
place 131. But Annear's increasing embroilment in the town's political affairs 
coincided with Badagry's descent into political intrigue against the mission. 
By the latter part of 1844 Annear's initial popularity among all the chiefs had 
declined into suspicion and jealousy. Most notably the 'Portuguese Chiefs' were 
resentful of his relations with the Wawu, as both host and friend. Indeed the 
missionary stated that any I agreement or compact' with one of the chiefs was 
met with suspicion and hostility by the others 132. In an attempt to avert 
increasing inter-ward tensions a meeting of the chiefs was called whereby all 
were to take a vow that they were not plotting against each other in secret. 
However, the occasion was used by the Posu to accuse the English chief of 
conspiracy against his fellows. Despite the Wawu's ritual denials and his 
assurances that the missionaries were the friends of all, the occasion was 
interrupted by the untimely arrival of one of the snakes sacred to Dangbe. 
Annear's dramatic and unnecessary destruction of this snake would appear not 
130 For example on the wedding anniversary of the Annears, the Sergeant joined them 
for tea along 
with the agents from Hutton's factory 
[WMMSA 20 September 1844 Annear's journal in 21 October 
1844 Annear, Badagry]. 
131 WMMSA 30 October 1844 Annear's Journal, Badagry. 
132 WMMSA 27 September 1844 Annear's Journal in 21 October 1844 Annear, Badagry. 
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only to have destroyed the solemnity and purpose of this important occasion, but 
furthermore to have alienated the Wawu, the leading adherent of Dangbe, who 
was 'shamed' by the action 133. 
The decline of Annear's popularity in Badagry after a rather promising start had 
several causes. It is clear that Annear both intentionally and unintentionally 
came into some ideological conflict with sections of the Badagry population. He- 
himself disputed the assertion that Africa was a clean slate on which the 
missionaries could work. Indeed he argued that, although lacking the 
organisation of, for example, India, here too the missionaries must refute the 
teachings of the local religions 134. There were only isolated incidents of 
concerted opposition from the indigenous priests of Badagry. That which did take 
place was more symbolic, for example the construction of an enormous idol of 
clay at the spot Annear chose for preaching near the market place 135. However, 
whereas initially the ward chiefs had apologised for any disrespect and 
antagonism shown by their spiritual brethren, it was the chiefs themselves who 
now increasingly began to threaten the security of the Badagry mission. 
The major internal threat of this period came, surprisingly, from Chief Mobi of 
Boeko, a chief who had been identified as an English chief and a lieutenant of the 
Wawu. Annear's rescue of a young boy enslaved by Mobi's men so enraged the 
chief that an attack on the mission yard seemed imminent. A night was spent by 
both parties preparing for confrontation, and it was only by the mediation of the 
Wawu and compromise by both parties that serious conflict was avoided 136. 
Annear clearly recognised that the division between slave-trading and anti-slave 
trading was illusory, and that the chiefs were only 'English' for the sake of 
commercial gain. He ultimately concluded that: 
133 WMMSA 10 October 1844 Annear's Journal in 21 October 1844 Annear, Badagry. 
134 WMMSA 10 November 1844 Annear's journal, Badagry. 
135 WMMSA 20 October 1844 Annear's Journal in 21 October 1844 Annear, Badagry. 
136 WMMSA 1 November 1844 Annear's Journal, Badagry. 
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it seems next to impossible for any good cause to prosper, until a 
superior physical force be established, and the present petty chief 
rendered amenable to a higher bar 137. 
After a short honeymoon period then, Annear and the mission evidently 
became the focus of virulent hostility. On 11 September 1844 the mission 
premises were set on fire. Thanks to a change in the direction of the wind, the 
chapel itself was not damaged, but the houses of the mission canoemen and , 
some Sierra Leonians were destroyed. Furthermore, in his account of events 
Annear added that, whilst the fire raged, one section of the mission employees 
were engaged in stopping the townspeople from breaking in and plundering the 
yard. The cause of the fire was found to be an incendiary device 138. 
Annear did not blame the Badagry people for the attack on the mission. Instead 
he concluded that the fire had been started by spies either from Porto-Novo or 
Lagos, who he claimed were acting in retaliation against his cordial relations 
with the Egba. This relationship had been enhanced by a visit of his to the 
besieging force around Ado in the preceding month139. However, to separate 
internal and external politics at this stage, as in most other periods, was to distort 
the nature of the town's situation. Even from Annear's own accounts it is 
evident that the operation of foreign elements within Badagry was closely linked 
with internal factions. 
Annear had noted in August that despite the ward chiefs' continued outward 
friendliness, many 'palavers' had recently taken place between them and the 
chiefs of the surrounding country. Annear concluded that the basis of these 
'palavers' was the slave trade, 'which continues to be carried on to a very great 
I i37 WMMSA 1 November 1844 Annear's journal, Badagry. 
138 WMMSA 11 September 1844 Annear's journal in 21 October 1844 Annear, Badagry. 
139 Annear spent three days at the encampment. During the course of this visit he promised to go to 
Abeokuta with I-Lis wife and also helped the army to build a scaffold from which they could keep a 
watch on their enemy [WMMSA 6-9 August 1844 Annear's Journal in 23 August 1844 Annear, 
Badagry]. 
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extent' 140. However, from his own accounts it is evident that this assessment of 
Badagry's increasingly complex relations with her neighbours was an over- 
simplification. By the latter months of 1844 Annear's own writings show that 
Badagry was becoming increasingly sensitive to the various external influences at 
work in the area. 
Porto-Novo's role in a small raiding party which attacked Badagry beach at the - 
beginning of 1844 was the precursor to a serious decline in relations between the 
two lagoon states during that year. Porto-Novo's growing hostility was said to be 
as a result of suspicion and jealousy over the missionary presence in the town. 
According to Annear, Porto-Novo was eager for missionaries of their own, and 
he determined to visit that place at the earliest opportunity 141. However, there is 
no evidence that he was able to make such a visit. Indeed it would appear that 
relations between Badagry and Porto-Novo continued to deteriorate throughout 
that year. The political motivations behind such regular skirmishes were also, 
understandably, and perhaps convincingly, interpreted in commercial terms. The 
missionary noted that, although the two communities 'call themselves at war', 
it was really nothing more than 'trifling disturbances' for the purposes of slave- 
raiding and trading 142. Lagos on the other hand posed serious security questions 
from the east. After the open hostility of 1843 Lagos was itself plunged into 
internal strife by the development of a dispute over the kingship. This dispute 
distracted that power from continuing an aggressive foreign policy. But the 
arrival in Badagry during 1844 of the Lagos chief Eletu or Letidu drew the town 
into a closer involvement in its neighbour's affairs. Annear clearly 
misinterpreted Eletu's position at Lagos. He called him the 'rightful sovereign of 
Lagos'who had fled to Badagry as a result of his brother's attempts to 'rest the 
sovereignty out of his hands and usurp his authority' 143. He was in reality one 
140 WMMSA 23 August 1844 Annear, Badagry. 
141 WMMSA 2 June 1844 Annear, Badagry. 
142 WMMSA 12 December 1844 Annear's journal, Badagry. 
143 WMMSA 12 October 1844 Annear's journal in 21 October 1844 Annear, Badagry. 
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of the town's most important chiefs, who was so angered and fearful at the 
decision by his master King Akitoye to recall Prince Kosoko, the King's nephew 
and sometime pretender to the Lagos throne, from Whydah, that he removed 
himself to Badagry. Despite Annear's inaccuracies over the motives for Eletu's 
flight, the establishment of a large displaced Lagos force did make Badagry a 
dangerous threat to Lagos. The missionary noted that the exiled minister brought 
with him 'great numbers of his faithful subjects', and further that 'the chiefs 
here regard him as a brother chief, and treat him with great respect' 144. The 
shrewd Eletu also clearly recognised the potential role of British influence in the 
area and quickly proclaimed himself an anti-slave-dealing and 'English' chief. 
Having seen the error of his ways, Eletu appealed to Annear's commercial and 
moral sense by proclaiming that he would not return to Lagos, where he wished 
to engage in a profitable palm oil trade, until the Portuguese slavers had either 
been driven away or had become lawful merchants 145. A few weeks later the 
wily chief continued to further his cause by indirectly suggesting the possibility of 
easy British intervention at Lagos. Indeed he reported that the 'nest of slave 
dealers' had been thrown into a state of unrest by recent British assaults on two 
slave ships in the roadstead 146. 
While both African and missionary elements at Badagry became increasingly 
involved in the slave-stealing policies of Porto-Novo and the supposed 'anti- 
slave dealing' party of Lagos, problems among its interior neighbours were also 
beginning to affect the town adversely. The optimism that Freeman had evoked 
about the King of Dahomey was short-lived. Early in 1844 a joint raid by 
Dahomey and Porto-Novo took place on Badagry beach. Canoes were burnt and 
Captain Faulkner, master of the Little Grace, and ten of his crew, who had been 
landing goods, were seized and taken off to Whydah 147. According to the 
144 WMMSA 1.2 October 1844 Annear's Journal in 21 October 1844 Annear, Badagry. 
145 WMMSA 12 October 1844 Annear's Journal in 21 October 1844 Annear, Badagry. 
146 WMMSA 7 November 1844 Annear's journal, Badagry. 
147 WMMSA 2 June 1844 Annear, Badagry. 
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Foreign Office, the raid was instigated by De Souza at Whydah and it was the 
Dahomean King who ordered the captives to be released 148. However, according 
to Annear, the cause of the raid was widely held Dahomean fears that the coast 
was to be blockaded. In retaliation the Dahomean monarch threatened to 
blockade Badagry and any other place connected with the British149. 
Rumours of Dahomean attacks continued to circulate throughout 1844. The most 
serious of these occurred in early June, when Annear himself received 
notification from Whydah that a war party was on its way. Reports of 
Dahomeans on the beach kept everyone within the town for three days. 
Eventually a party of men were sent across the lagoon but could find no trace of 
the supposed attackers. It was claimed that the forces had been forced to retreat 
only by the destruction of their ammunition in a heavy thunderstorm 150. 
Stories of imminent disaster at the hands of the Dahomeans continued to alarm 
the town until the end of 1844 151. 
In the face of increasing pressure from Porto-Novo and Dahomey, Annear's 
reaction was to turn to his only friends, the Egba. He envisaged a military 
campaign against Badagry by Alake Sodeke which would once and for all bring 
the port under direct Egba control. Dahomey's claims to tribute, he decided, could 
either be bought off by the Egba or force could be used to defy it. Either way, 
Annear concluded that Egba intervention was the best way both of securing their 
position on the coast and of ending the slave trade once and for all. But he was 
forced to concede, even to himself, that an attempt to establish Egba authority 
could take place only once the prolonged siege at Ado was at an end 152. 
148 PRO F084/ 604 19 May 1844 FO Draft, London. 
149 W"MMSA 2 June 1844 Annear, Badagry. 
150 WMMSA 2 June 1844 Annear, Badagry. 
151 In December 1844 Reports of an invading army from Dahomey continued to circulate, although 
no appearance was made [WMMSA 16 
December 1844 An-near's journal, Badagry]. 
152 WMMSA 27 September 1844 Annear's Journal in 21 October 1844 Annear, Badagry. 
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Unravelling the relationship between the Badagry chiefs and these dangerous 
neighbours is a complex process. There was a professed alliance between the ward 
chiefs and Abeokuta, by which 'Each chief in Badagry forwards his share of help 
to the encampment'. But it became increasingly evident to Annear that certain 
chiefs were, in practice, less than supportive. Fearing the imposition of direct 
Egba control once the siege was completed and enjoying the profits that campaign 
brought through slaving, 'Aterah (Akran) and Posu' secretly plotted for a 
continued stalemate and it was only 'the English Chiefs .... who really wish to 
conquer the enemy' 153. Indeed according to Annear's sources at the end of 1844, 
the Akran and Posu did more than just hope for such a continuation. Whilst 
apparently sending their share of military help to the Egba, both chiefs were also 
actively involved in supplying provisions and ammunition to the Ados 154. In 
an attempt to check their double-dealing allies, the Egba, in December 1844, used 
the pretext of strengthening their forces at the encampment, to bring the 
activities of the Badagry chiefs under control and separate the troublemakers. 
Chiefs Posu, 'Motang' [Bala] and Wawu were summoned to the encampment 
whilst, the Akran, Jengen and the new 'English Chief' Eletu were to maintain a 
skeleton defensive force on the coast 155. 
The departure of the Badagry troops at the end of that month did not bring about 
an end to the intrigues of the chiefs, but it did revive Egba military activity 
around Ado156. It also raised fears, in a more exposed Badagry, of a renewed 
Porto-Novan assault 157. Not least to entertain these fears was Annear, who at 
the beginning of November had been informed of the imminent departure of 
153 WMMSA 7 August 1844 Annear's Journal in 23 August 1844 Annear, Badagry. 
154 WMMSA 16 December 1844 Annear's journal, Badagry. 
155 WMMSA 16 December 1844 Annear's journal, Badagry. 
156 WMMSA 10 February 1845 Annear, Badagry. 
157 The troops for Ado left on the 21 December 1844 and on Christmas Eve Annear went down the 
lagoon himself to inspect the area where Porto-Novan troops were alleged to be amassing. 
Evidently no trace of them was found, but Annear did see Badagry canoes carrying soldiers to guard 
the waterway [WMMSA 24 December 1844 Annear's Journal, Badagry]. 
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their resident Sergeant158. Without further evidence of the motives behind this 
Soldier's removal it is only possible to assume that Governor Hill, in whose 
hands Cape Coast had been left, had decided to reverse Maclean's decision. He 
withdrew the 'garrison'. The 'slightly hysterical' terms with which Annear 
greeted this news are understandable in the light of increasing tensions at 
Badagry. As Ajayi has concluded, it was not the British flag over Badagry which 
gave Sergeant Bart his influence, but his ability to signal for help to British 
shipS159. The political ramifications of such an individual were far greater than 
may be suggested by mere lack of numbers. But in reality it had been Annear 
himself who had used the threatened sanction of naval force at Badagry during 
the period of occupation. In his scathing indictment of Governor Hill, Annear 
clearly recognised the individualised nature of British authority along the coast, 
by which 'unaccountably fickle minded persons'were able to instigate acts from 
which 'Her Majesty and Her supporters at home would shrink from doing' but 
which were 'done with impunity by those who represent her abroad' 160. But he 
failed ultimately to recognise the potential political power of his own position. 
Annear mistakenly saw the departure of Sergeant Bart in December 1844 as the 
abandonment of Badagry by the British. However, the following year was to see 
the rise of 'British influence' at Badagry to hitherto unprecedented level. 
158 On 6 November 1844 Annear noted that the Sergeant had informed him that he would be 
leaving by the next ship, as instructed by the Governor of Cape Coast. Obviously very bitter, 
Annear complained that the Sergeant was eager to leave and even suggested, somewhat confusedly, 
that the reason for the 'garrison's' withdrawal was: 
because a certain individual - who in the time of need has found a 
home under this very roof, and whose life when in danger has been 
brought back and cherished by ourselves - because he would rather 
have Her Majesty's soldiers and Officers around him, for purposes 
which himself but knows; of that the power which he professes, 
and the importance he attaches to himself, may be known to use 
who are far off - if not for good, for evil. 
Annear, in his anger, would appear to have combined both Governor Hill and the resident Sergeant 
into one, common foe [WMMSA 6 November 1844 Annear's Journal, Badagry]. 
159 Ajayi, Christian Missions... p. 35-36. 
160 WMMSA 6 November 1844 Annear's Journal, Badagry. 
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Chapter Eight 
The Arrival of the Church Missionary Society and King Akitoye 
1845-1850 
The month following the departure of Sergeant Bart saw the arrival at Badagry 
of a second missionary force. The young Anglican missionary Henry Townsend, 
under the direction of the Church Missionary Society, had undertaken a brief, 
research mission to Abeokuta in early 1843. He had arrived at Badagry just as 
Freeman had returned from his fact finding tour of the interior 1. Equally 
impressed by what he saw at the Egba capital, Townsend returned to Britain for 
ordination and then proceeded on to Sierra Leone to prepare for a mission to 
Abeokuta. 
The main CMS Party did not arrive at Badagry until January 1845. The group 
consisted of Revd Townsend, the noted African cleric and veteran of the Niger 
Expedition Revd Samuel Crowther and Revd CA Gollmer from the Basel 
Seminary, resident at Sierra Leone since 1841 2. There were also two Sierra Leone 
School Teachers Mr Marsh and Mr Phillips, Mark Willoughby an interpreter, 
four carpenters, three labourers and two servants along with respective wives 3. 
Initially intending to move directly on to Abeokuta, this large party learned on 25 
January, only eight days after their arrival, of the death of Sodeke, the Egba king. 
Advised by the generals at the Ado encampment not to continue -on to Abeokuta 
1 For further details of Townsend's life and work see G Townsend, Memoir of the Revd Henry 
Townsend. (London 1887). Also see Ajayi, Christian Missions.... pp. 32-33. 
2 For details about the life and work of Samuel Crowther see J Payne, The Black Bishop, Samuel 
Adjai Crowther (London, 1900); SA Crowther, Tournal of an Expedition up the Niger and Tshada in 
1_Ul (London 1855); SA Crowther and JC Taylor, The Gospel on the Banks of the Niger. Tournals of 
the Niger Expeditions of 1857 and Missionaly Notices (London 1859). For details of Charles 
Gollmer see Gollmer, CA Gollmer.... 
3 Townsend's wife was Sarah Pearse of Exeter whom he had married in 1840. Crowther was married 
to Susan Thompson, a schoolmistress of Yoruba origin. They had been married since 1829 and had six 
children, two of whom came with them to Badagry. Gollmer was accompanied by his second wife, 
Eliza Phillips, a missionary at Kissey, whom he had married at the end of 1843. However, she 
died soon after arrival in April 1845. Interpreter Mark Willoughby also arrived at Badagry with 
his wife and three children [See W0 Ajayi, 'A History of the Yoruba Mission 1843-1880', MA 
Thesis Bristol 19601. 
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until the funeral ceremonies had been concluded, the party returned to Badagry 
and were forced temporarily to 'turn their attention to spiritual wants of the 
mixed population of Badagry' 4. It was not until a year and a half later that 
Townsend and Crowther were eventually able to make their way on to 
Abeokuta. 
The new arrivals initially lodged at the Methodist mission until, according to 
5 Avoseh, the Wawu and Mobi were able to 'locate a piece of land' for their use 
The area on which they settled was 'at the extreme east of Badagry', and belonged 
to the English section of the town, at Boeko Ward6. According to Revd Gollmer 
the fact that the land was already 'English' meant that the mission party were not 
required to pay for it. In return however, their hosts at least expected to gain the 
loyalty and support of their 'strangers' and guests 7. 
The CMS party quickly set to work building a mission house, church and 
outhouses surrounded by a perimeter fence enclosing an area of two hundred 
square feet 8. The impressive bamboo church, measuring fifty feet by twenty five 
feet and with a twenty foot bell tower was opened on 9 March 1845 9. However, it 
was the mission house, completed in early June, which attracted most attention 
and wonder in the town. The frame had been brought from Sierra Leone and 
once assembled it measured forty four feet long and twenty six broad, was raised 
4 CMR March 1846, p. 56. 
5 It is interesting to note that although the mission house has come to be seen as the first building at 
Badagry constructed on two levels, it would appear from the much earlier Lander account that King 
Adele's house at Badagry was similarly constructed in the 1820s [Avoseh, 'First Storey Building in 
Nigeria', in Falola, The Minor Works..., p. 247; chapter 1, p. 42]. 
6 CMSA CA2 / 085 / 227 17 March 1845 Townsend's Journal, Badagry. 
7 Gollmer was told that payment for the land was not required because: 
This lot belong to English Town, and you are English men; besides 
our fathers never sold ground, therefore we cannot take payment for 
this. 
Although initially loath to settle on the land without payment, the business was agreed before 
witnesses and Gollmer accepted that the only condition imposed by the owner was that 'suppose 
trouble comes ... we go 
help him'[CMSA CA2/043/95 6-15 February 1845 Gollmer's journal, Badagry]. 
8 CMSA CA2 / 043 / 95 22 February 1845 Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
9 CMR March 1846, p. 56,9 March 1845 Townsend's journal, Badagry. 
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on ten pillars, painted black and white, and had windows, landing and step rails 
painted green. Most notable of all was the tarred and shingled roof 10. Forced for 
the time being to concentrate their attentions at Badagry, the CMS workers took a 
vigorous approach to their work. Not merely preaching on Sundays in the 
church and under a tree near the market place, they carried the gospel right into 
the heart of Badagry's commercial life by preaching to the market women as they 
worked 11. Gollmer also tirelessly visited the local chiefs and dignitaries in theiT 
homes 12. They also travelled beyond Badagry itself visiting local towns such as 
Idale, Okeodan, Ado, Igbeji, Idoggo and Porto-Novo13. 
Despite their impressive premises, greater resources and obvious vigour, 
however, the CMS mission faced similar difficulties to those of their Methodist 
neighbours. Their initial congregations were relatively large, attracting between 
about ninety to one hundred into the church, and between one hundred and 
forty to one hundred and thirty to their open-air meetings. However, by early 
1846 the number attending Sunday service had dropped to between fifty to sixty. 
Although it would appear the number rose to between sixty to seventy later that 
year, and remained constant until the end of 1847, no advances were made and 
1849 saw a slight decrease to between forty to sixty attendants 14. 
10 CMP Ladyday 1847. 
11 CMR March 1846, p. 57,25 May 1845 Gollmer's Journal, Badagry. 
12 CMR October 1846, p. 228,10 & 24 August 1845 Gollmer's Journal, Badagry. 
13 CNIR October 1846, pp. 229-231,12 July, 17 & 25 November 1845 Gollmer & Townsend's journals; 
CMR October 1847, p. 225. 
14 See Figure 9. 
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The congregations were, like those of the Methodists, largely made up of Sierra 
Leonian emigrants, about two-thirds according to Revd Gollmer's estimate 15. 
Those'natives' that did attend were primarily made up of Egba traders, who, it 
was claimed 'draw nearer in' 16. The 'aloof'Gun on the other hand, according to 
Townsend, assured the missionaries that they would happily attend church 
services and 'amend their lives' in return for some kind of payment 17. 
These patterns were reflected in the numbers of practising Christians in Badagry. 
The origin of local communicants, which at most reached eighteen, were never 
revealed although it is likely that they were overwhelmingly Sierra Leonian in 
origin. Likewise candidates for baptism, who rose in number from six at the end 
of 1845 to a peak of fourteen at the end of 1846, were not identified18. However, 
the very small number of those who actually converted, only eight in total, were 
made up of equal numbers of Sierra Leonians and Yorubas 19. There were no 
Gun conversions. 
But the missionaries' determination and tenacity continued. Gollmer at the 
beginning of 1846 accepted that'This ground has been fallow for so long a time, 
and has consequently become so very hard, that the breaking up of it requires 
time and labour, 20. Furthermore the mission schools gave rise to some guarded 
optimism. The Sunday school, attended by adults, began strongly with forty 
pupils eager to learn to read and write when it opened along with the church in 
15 Parliamentary Papers Slave Trade Session 1847-48 No. 4 para. 8043,4 July 1848 Gollmer's 
evidence. 
16 CMR October 1847, p. 221, December 1846 Gollmer's Journal, Badagry. 
17 CMR October 1846, p. 227,7 December 184-5, Townsend's Journal, Badagry. 
18 In May 1846 there were nine male and nine female communicants at Badagry along with seven 
male and four female candidates for baptism [CMSA CA2/043 /99 18 May 1846 Gollmer's Journal, 
Badagry]. By December 1846 there were nine male and seven female communicants and seven male 
and seven female candidates for baptism [CMSA CA2/043/101 16 December 1846 Gollmer's journal, 
Badagry]. 
19 The CMS claimed only four conversions to Christianity by 1849 [CMS, The Yoruba Mission, 
(London 1906), p. 271. 
20 CMR October 1847, p. 50, June 1846 Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
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early March 184521. By the end of 1846 the number of those in attendance had 
dropped to twenty one, but this figure had risen again by the middle of 1849 to 
between thirty and thirty SiX 22. The children's school, opened initially as a day 
school on 10 March 1845, faced early opposition from some of the people and 
chiefs. Amongst these hostile chiefs was the Wawu, of the English town. His 
hostility in early 1845 towards the possible establishment of a new Hutton Co 
factory further east at Ajido had resulted in a distinct cooling of relations between 
himself and Revd Annear of the Methodist mission23. It would appear that the 
chief's disillusionment with his missionary friends extended to include the CMS 
party, for he refused to allow any of his people to send their children to the newly 
established school 24. However, by the latter part of 1845 there were twenty three 
children attending regularly, three of whom were boarders, and Crowther was 
able to report that the school was exciting interest amongst pupils and parents 
alike 25. Despite setbacks, such as the death of a boarding pupil, which led to the 
removal of a number of children, the mission school was undoubtedly a 
succeSS26. Pupil numbers ranged from just nineteen to a total of sixty one 
scholars in 1849 27. Furthermore, the attainments of those attending was a cause 
for missionary optimism. Townsend reported that the 'native scholars' made 
21 CMSA CA2 / 043 95 9 March 1845 Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
22 CMSA CA2 / 043 10116 December 1846 Gollmer's journal; CMR March 1850, p. 50,1 July 1849 
Smith's journal, Badagry. 
23 WMMSA 19 March 1845 Annear's Journal, Badagry. 
24 CMSA CA2 / 043 / 95 10 March 1845 Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
25 CMSA CA2/085/2303 November 1845Towsend'sjoumal; CMSA CA2/031/91 10 August 1845 
Crowther's journal, Badagry. 
26 CMR May 1848, p. 82,5 May 1847 Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
27 See Figure 8. 
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considerable progress in English and the senior boarders were reading and 
writing 'with ease', and undertaking a study of the principles of Christianity28. 
On his arrival in early 1850, the catechist Thomas King stated thatThe progress 
made by the children in various branches of instruction is sufficient to cheer the 
drooping hopes of the labourers, 29. 
Those attending the Sunday school were overwhelmingly Sierra Leordian. I. 
Townsend noted that 'we have not yet been able to persuade any of the natives of 
Badagry to attend' 30. However, the advantages of literacy persuaded some 
Badagry people, including some chiefs, to send their children to school. The 
Mewu, apparently had four sons there3l. By January 1846 they were joined by 
two children of the Wawu, now evidently appeased32. More surprisingly still, in 
June of that year the Posu, who had initially been most hostile to the mission, 
brought a son to be educated33. 
But despite the continued success of their school, the missionaries became 
increasingly discouraged by the spiritual progress of the Badagry mission, 
especially after the removal of Townsend and Crowther to Abeokuta and the 
establishment of a mission station there in the second half of 1846. This mission, 
which by 1850 had attracted two hundred candidates for baptism, provided an 
unfavourable contrast to Badagry 34. Gollmer, left on the coast, became 
increasingly pessimistic or at least resigned to their lack of progress although the 
newly arrived missionary Isaac Smith stated in late 1848 that 'I am not without 
hope even of these dry bones'35. By 1850, in the face of increasingly difficult local 
political conditions Gollmer lamented that 'Our work seems to go backward, 
28 CMSA CA2 / 085 / 23124 March 1846 Towsend's journal, Badagry. 
29 CMR October 1851, pp. 218-219,21 March 1851 King's Journal, Badagry. 
30 CMSA CA2 / 085 / 23124 March 1846 Townsend's journal, Badagry. 
31 Gollmer, CA Gollmer... p. 38. 
32 CMSA CA2 / 043 /18 January 1846 Gollmer, Badagry. 
33 CMSA CA2/043/100 3 June 1846 Gollmer's Journal, Badagry. 
34 CMR April 1850, p. 73; CMI August 1849, pp. 93-94, Gollmer's description 
35 CMSA CA2 / 082 /12 27 July 1848 Smith's journal, Badagry. 
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instead of forward' 36 
The Methodist mission at Badagry from early 1845 continued with renewed 
vigour. This may have occurred due to rumours which reached Revd Annear in 
December 1844 that the Society was contemplating the complete abandonment of 
the station37. But it was also clearly connected with the arrival of the CMS party. 
Annear reported the arrival of the new mission with great pleasure on 17 
January 1845 and the gratification that he felt when he was able to receive the 
newcomers, especially when some of the party were in a 'very delicate state of 
health 38. Cordial relations between the two missions continued throughout the 
period of their co-existence in the town. But the presence of another missionary 
party at Badagry certainly stimulated the Methodists on to greater efforts. Most 
obvious was the building of a new Methodist church. Beginning in late March 
1845, shortly after the completion of the Anglican church, Annear worked hard 
to construct an even larger building in the style of an English country chapel 39. 
Having completed the church itself by the end of April, Annear went on to build 
a thirty to forty foot tower in front of the chapel to act as both bell-house and 
look-out post 40. He also attempted to revive his evangelical role and reported 
that in early March 1845, after preaching to the church congregation, he had led 
the people to the other side of the town where he had never preached before, 
where their singing attracted a large crowd4l. 
Annear's efforts to revive the fortunes of the Methodist Church in Badagry were 
certainly made from a very much weakened position. Unlike their CMS 
counterparts, the Methodist mission was ill-supplied with both provisions and 
36 CMR October 1851, p. 219,25 October 1850 Gollmer, Badagry. 
37 In December 1844 Annear had certainly heard rumours to this effect [W_N4MSA 27 December 1844 
Annear, Badagry]. 
38 WMMSA 10 February 1845 Annear, Badagry. 
39 Annear's church was to be fifty-eight foot by twenty-eight foot and rested on twenty three 
illars [WMMSA 24-28 March 1845 Annear's Journal, Badagry]. 
01 WMMSA 26 April -2 May 1845 Annear's journal, Badagry. 
I 
41 WMMSA 9 March 1845 Annear's journal, Badagry. 
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guidance from its Cape Coast headquarters. In early 1845 during the period of 
structural re-building at the mission, Annear recorded that he was forced to 
barter for goods and that his people were unpaid42. The mission remained 
neglected throughout June of that year and by the beginning of July Annear was 
obliged to send a man on a dangerous visit to Lagos in order to procure 
supplieS43. It was only in the middle of August that a letter of encouragement 
arrived 44. Annear however, bore the neglect stoically. Indeed at a suggestion by. 
Captain Foote of HMS Albatross that they might perhaps leave the station he 
declared that they could not abandon their flock 45. 
But Annear's successor saw the mission more in terms of a great sacrifice. John 
Martin took over somewhat reluctantly in March 1846 46. It is clear that he was 
determined to do his duty, but Martin looked elsewhere for a suitable place to 
establish Christianity. He complained of Badagry that'with respect to the natives 
generally, I cannot say much that is encouraging, 47. After the departure of his 
Anglican neighbours Townsend and Crowther for Abeokuta, Martin looked to 
the Egba capital and regretted that the Methodists also could not make a start in 
the interior 48. 
But it was ultimately during Martin's tenancy that the fate of the Badagry 
mission once more became of interest. From those at home in England came 
supplies of clothes and provisions for the benefit of their West African 
brethren49. But, more importantly, there also came a revival of interest from 
headquarters at Cape Coast. At the end of September 1847 John Thomas was sent 
to relieve Martin, enabling him to proceed on to Abeokuta with the view of 
42 WMMSA 30 April & 19 May 1845 Annear's journal, Badagry. 
43 WMMSA 7 July 1845 Annear's journal in 16 August 1845 Annear, Badagry. 
44 WMMSA 16 August 1845 Annear, Badagry. 
45 WMMSA 8& 11 September 1845 Annear's journal in 11 October 1845 Annear, Badagry. 
46 WMMSA 25 April 1845 Martin, Badagry. 
47 WMMSA 5 September 1845 Martin, Badagry. 
48 WMMSA 5 September 1845 Martin, Badagry. 
49 WMMSA 10 August 1846 Martin, Badagry. 
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beginning missionary operations there 5(l. From then on the coastal station was 
to be viewed largely in terms of unfavourable comparison to Abeokuta. 
But at Badagry, Annear's earlier efforts in the face of great adversity had initially 
reaped some rewards. In the first part of 1845 he admitted that the congregations 
were 'small' due to the number of emigrants who had left the town for the Ado 
encampment -'11. However at the opening of their new building the church was 
full. He noted that no chiefs were present, a sign that the Wawu remained 
alienated, and it would appear that the main body of the congregation was made 
up of Fanti workers attached to both the mission itself and to the English Factory, 
emigrants from Sierra Leone and Egba visitors 52. Although less specific about 
the numbers attending their services than the CMS, from more general accounts 
it is possible to gather that their church congregations assumed a similar pattern 
to that of their newer colleagues, remaining largely constant throughout the 
1840s, dropping slightly during 1846, but reviving again the following year. The 
numbers are difficult to ascertain. In 1843 a congregation of forty to fifty had been 
described as 'good', roughly in line with CMS numbers. In 1848 however, 
Freeman made an estimate of two hundred and fifty attending public worship in 
Badagry at both the church and the preaching house. This much larger number 
may perhaps indicate the total numbers attending Christian services in the 
town53. Like their Anglican colleagues, the Methodists continued. to attract only 
small numbers of people wishing to convert to Christianity, and again these were 
not from amongst the Gun population. In early 1845 Annear reported that he 
had four candidates for baptism. Three of these were emigrants and one a Yoruba 
woman who had been a Muslim, the third Muslim convert 54. In July 1846 
Annear's replacement Martin noted a further Egba man who desired admittance 
50 WMMSA 21 September 1847 Martin, Badagry. 
51 WMMSA 3 March 1845 Annear's Journal in 8 March 1845 Annear, Badagry. 
52 WMMSA 15 April & 24 & 27 N/lay 1846 Martin's journai in 5 September 1846 Martin, Badagry. 
53 WMMSA 3 August 1845 Annear's Journal in 16 August 1845 Annear, Badagry; WMMSA 29 March 
and 19 April 1846 N4artin's journal in 5 September 1846 Martin, Baclagry. 
, 94 WMMSA 26 April 1845 Annear's 
Journal, Badagry. 
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into the Church, although whether this man actually converted goes 
unrecorded55. According to Freeman by 1848 the Methodist Church at Badagry 
had twenty four full church members and twenty three members on trial, 
indicating a slightly larger following than the Anglican Church of the period 56. 
The Methodists also renewed their educational role. In April 1846 Martin set up a 
Sunday school. Less successful than its CMS predecessor the school initially 
attracted between twenty eight and thirty four pupils but by 1848 it was schooling 
only sixteen57. However, the children's school proved to be more successful. 
Again, Methodist accounts prove less specific over the number of pupils in 
attendance. As noted, in 1844 thirty eight pupils had been recorded, and in March 
1845 Annear reported that he had twenty children under his personal care, 
presumably as boarders 58. The numbers involved remained constant. Freeman 
noted in 1848 that the number of children attending school was thirty nine 59. 
The identity of the children attending the school again followed a similar pattern 
to that established in the CMS mission school once it had found its feet. In April 
1846 John Martin noted that several chiefs of Badagry and the neighbourhood 
had sent their children to their school 60. One of these chiefs was undoubtedly 
Mobi of Boeko, whose daughter, Sophia, behaved better than any other little girl 
Revd Annear had seen before either in England or in Africa6l. Annear also 
noted that he had three children in his school who belonged to a man who had 
claims to the Posu chieftaincy 62. It is possible to conjecture that the somewhat 
surprising change of heart and enrollment of a son of the Posu himself at the 
CMS school early the following year may have been the result of this apparent 
internal dispute, and may have been an attempt to secure missionary allies. Of 
55 WMMSA 20 July 1846 Martin's Journal in 5 September 1846 Martin, Badagry. 
56 WMMSA Freeman's Report 1848. 
57 WMMSA 20 July 1846 Martin's Journal in 5 September 1846 Martin, Badagry. 
58 WMMSA 25 March 1845 Annear's, Badagry. See figure 8. 
59 WMMSA Freeman's Report 1848. 
60 WMMSA 25 April 1846 Martin, Badagry. 
61 WMMSA 13 July 1845 Annear's Journal in 16 August 1845 Annear, Badagry. 
62 WMMSA 26 April 1845 Annear's Journal, Badagry. 
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the neighbouring chiefs who had children at the school only the King of Ajido is 
named in 1848 as having sent a boy to attend63. 
The evidence then does not suggest that the Methodist mission suffered as a 
result of the Anglican arrivals. Indeed, both groups would appear to have 
maintained similar congregation numbers and similarly small numbers of 
converts. Although the CMS Sunday school was evidently more successful than 
that of the Methodists, the successes of the respective mission schools is more 
difficult to assess. Unfortunately there is no corresponding evidence from the 
Methodists to suggest whether they were on a par with the sixty one pupils, both 
day and boarding, of their neighbours in 1849. But until that period missionary 
accounts would seem to suggest that whilst CMS numbers were more erratic 
than those of their Methodist neighbours, both appear roughly comparable until 
at least 1848. If numbers of pupils and congregation sizes as well as actual 
converts are a measure of Missionary 'success', both Anglican and Methodist 
missions would appear to have had similar levels of very limited success in 
Badagry. 
It is necessary, then, to attempt an assessment of whether the 'limited success' of 
the Badagry mission during this later period of renewed intensive missionary 
activity was due to similar factors to those which limited the work of the earliest 
arrivals. Obviously both Anglican and Methodist missions faced a number of 
obstacles which were not peculiar to the Badagry mission. The high rates of 
illness and mortality amongst the missionaries themselves and indeed examples 
of missionary incompetence, notably Mr Marsh's drunkenness, are obvious 
caseS64as were the incidents of accidental fires in or around the mission yards 
which, although never wholly destroying either premises, did, for example in 
63 WMMSA 16 may 1848 John Thomas's journal in 31 July 1848 Thomas, Badagry. 
64 Gollmer complained on several occasions of the drunken behaviour of catchecist William Marsh, 
until he was eventually dismissed in 1851 
[ CMSA CA2 / 043 /ill 14 May 1851 Gollmer-s journal, 
Badagry]. 
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August 1847, damage mission buildings, on this occasion the houses of the 
school boarders and watchmen of theCMS65. 
Such incidents however, go little way to explaining why the Badagry mission, in 
notable contrast to that in Abeokuta, failed to attract even a small number of 
local converts, and indeed relied on newer immigrant or visiting groups, notably 
from Abeokuta as well as from Sierra Leone. In May 1848 Marsh explained that, 
the problems facing the Badagry mission were 'idolatry', 'Mahomedanism' and 
the Slave Trade 66. Ajayi has supported the strong hold of traditional religions on 
the people of Badagry as a reason for Christianity's failure. He states that 
although there was no open hostility or persecution, as for example later J 
occurred at Abeokuta, the people were spiritually closed to these new exclusive 
teachings 67. Okaro K'Ojwang has also guardedly suggested that it was opposition 
to the 'missionary attempt to isolate the people from their traditional culture and 
social beliefs' 68. Both explanations require further examination. During the 
missionary period the Gun of Badagry certainly acquired a reputation for being 
'much degraded by superstition and idolatory' 69. In 1847 Gollmer noted that the 
peoples of surrounding areas did not have the 'numberless host of fetish all 
about in the streets as at Badagry' 70. The implication was then that the religious 
piety of these townspeople prevented them from turning to the mission. 
Gollmer also went on to assert that it was the nature of religious belief amongst 
the Tantheists' along the coast, in contrast to the 'more susceptible' Yoruba 
Tolytheists', which prevented their coming into the Christian Church7l. 
Gollmer's distinction between the beliefs of coastal and interior spiritual beliefs is 
difficult to support. Indeed, as noted previously, many of the Gun beliefs and 
65 CMR May 1848, p. 85,29 August 1847 Golhner's journal. 
66 CMSA CA2/067/11 June 1847 Marsh's journal, Badagry. 
67 Ajayi, Christian Missions... p. 34. 
68 Okaro K'Ojwang, 'Society, Trade and Politics... ' pp. 66-67. 
69 CMR October 1851, pp. 218-219,12 March 1850 King's journal, Badagry. 
70 CMR October 1847, p. 225, January 1847 Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
71 CMR October 1847, p. 225, January 1847 Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
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gods were often identical to those of the Yoruba. Furthermore an examination of 
the nature of Gun beliefs reveals a complex system of absorption and 
assimilation of a variety of imported teachings. However, despite the apparent 
openness of Badagry to spiritual influences, it is, paradoxically, this very aspect 
which provides clues as to why its people remained closed to Christianity. The 
exclusivity of the Church did not fit with Gun beliefs. Time and time again the 
missionaries were distressed to find that although their local audience might 
agree with what thev had said, they were equally unwilling to forgo their other 
beliefs /2. The ability to accept different teachings and indeed sometimes adopt 
aspects of those teachings, for example the annual veneration of the Whydah 
python 'Dangbe, whilst remaining the follower of another belief was an alien 
concept to the Christian teachers. Despite the attempts of the missionaries to find 
common ground between their teachings and the beliefs of their Gun 
neighbours, the Christian Church ultimately demanded total commitment to its 
own philosophy, and a complete rejection of the practices and beliefs it often 
found so abhorrent 73. 
The reluctance of Badagry's Gun population to subscribe to a single belief or 
philosophy derived from the nature of both their spiritual and secular needs, but 
was not peculiar to Badagry. The nature of West African indigenous religions, 
whilst often projecting the notion of a supreme god or being, makes such a 
concept more accessible to human experience by the use of less abstract and easily 
identifiable intermediarv gods, who develop a very active and interdependent 
relationship with the human world they inhabit 74. It was therefore possible at 
72 For example, Smith complained that although he had some hopes of the Mewu, who had shown 
and interest in the activities of the missionaries, the chief would not stop making offerings to his 
other gods [CMSA CA2/082/16 30 September 1849 Smith's Journal, Badagry]. ,7 73 The missionaTies, in their efforts to attract adherents to the Christian Church and to gain a 
superficial understanding of the local situation, looked for parallels between Christianitv and Gun 
beliefs. On one occasion Smith was :, urprised to hear that the Posu did not dispute the 'immortality 
of the soul' [ý: MR March 1850, p. 50,11 March 1849 Smith's Journal, Badagry I. But limited 
understanding and a lack of religious practice and ideology suitable for 'Christianisation' led the 
missionanes to demand wholesale rejection of these beliefs. 
74 See chapter 4. 
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Badagry for elements of Christianity to be acceptable, but at the same time it was 
feared that an abandonment of the other gods would bring punishment. 
Furthermore, the nature of indigenous gods and their worship provided a wide- 
ranging philosophy which touched almost every aspect of life. In this way Ajayi 
notes that traditional spirituality was 'not so much a matter of personal beliefs as 
the culture of the whole community, 75. In a settlement such as Badagry this 
community culture was intensified as the population sought to use it as both a 
spiritual and political framework. In a place with so little sense of community, 
both politically and commercially, it was the operation of religious beliefs and 
practices, which developed some sort of 'culture of the whole community' on 
which the operation of Badagry's government, law and order and society rested. 
Ajayi states that Islam was the more easily acceptable religion amongst Africans, 
having more in common with their traditional beliefs by not separating Church 
and State. Certainly Islam assumed a role in Badagry with both a spiritual, and 
political importance. Islamic charms to protect against misfortune, disease and 
death were used by people who were also clearly engaged in other religious 
practices. The Mewu, for example, a figure noted for his spirituality in local 
religions, was evidently a great believer in the power of Islamic charms 76. But in 
relation to complete conversion, Islam faced similar difficulties to those of 
Christianity amongst the Gun of Badagry. Despite obvious missionary efforts by 
Muslims resident in the town, it was only among the Yoruba visitors to the coast 
that Islam was 'a fashion, 77. There were no Gun conversions to Islam and it 
cannot ultimately be said to have proved a major obstacle to Christianity at 
Badagry, except possibly amongst the Egba and Sierra Leone residents. 
75 Ajayi, Christian Missions... p. 4. 
76 When Townsend visited the Mewu at his Mowo home in 1845 he described the chief in his 
apartment surrounded by charms made from: 
bones of various animals, bottles, calabashes, strings of cowries, and a few 
scraps of Arabic writing ... 
They were charms to avert evil 
LC. IM March 1846, p. 54,30 January 1845 Townsend's journal, Badagry]. 
77 CMSA CA2/067/ 11 June 1847 Marsh's journal, Badagry. 
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That Christianity and also possibly Islam acted as a potential threat to the very 
fragile framework of Badagry society goes some way to explain the difficulties 
faced by the Christian missionaries, especially during a period of dangerous 
upheaval both inside and outside the town. But more importantly still I would 
suggest that Christian doctrine also demanded the immediate dismantling of 
Badagry's complex political and economic structure and most obviously the 
abandonment of the slave trade. 
Badagry as An Atlantic Port in 1845 
Despite the assertion of some of the Christian missionaries that the people of 
Badagry were at a loss as to how to make a living in any other way than trading 
in slaves, it is evident that by 1845 there was a growing palm oil trade in the 
town. Despite numerous setbacks, involving, for example, inclement weather or 
political intrigue, the palm oil trade along the slave coast was gaining increasing 
importance78. Indeed by the latter part of the 1840s the growing number of British 
firms engaging in the oil trade faced intense competition from French, Hamburg, 
Sierra Leone and even Portuguese traders more accustomed to deal in slaves 79. 
Ajayi states that, at least initially, the arrival of missionaries at Badagry did attract 
British traders to the area. But I would suggest that the West Coast traders 
required more promising commercial conditions than those offered merely by a 
missionary presence and that it was only after the Hutton factory at Badagry had 
proved itself a viable and successful operation that other traders actually settled 
on that Part of the coast. What both the Sierra Leonian and missionary arrivals 
78 1849 was a bad year for palm oil due to unusually heavy rains [PRO F02/4 5 March-1850 W 
Huttorý London]. 
79 By 1847 the Hutton Company had 8-10 factories between Cape St Paul and Lagos [PRO F084/699 
25 March 1847 W Hutton, London]. Along with Sierra Leone trading vessels such as the Wonderful, 
French and Hamburg ships were also operating along the coast [PRO F02 /45 November 1849 Forbes, 
off Whydahl. Even the Portuguese trader De Souza had loaded five ships in 1846 [PRO F084 / 699 7 
December 1846 T Hutton, Cape Coast in 25 March 1847 W Hutton, London]. 
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did do, however, was to establish a shipping link between Badagry and other 
ports. As well as the ships owned by, for example, the Hutton Company itself 
operating along the coast, and other European ships trading independently, there 
were vessels such as the 'Wonderful', owned by a liberated African Captain W 
Johnson, which transported emigrants homeward but also engaged in oil 
trading80. By 1849 a CMS Deputation to Lord Palmerston stated that seven vessels 
owned by Sierra Leonians were operating along the coast and thatEmigration 
and trade from Sierra Leone have been carried on by Native enterprise with 
much spirit, 81. 
The increased numbers of ships engaged in legitimate commerce visiting 
Badagry indicates that articles for trade were certainly available. The main 
commodity was palm oil, and according to Governor Hill at Cape Coast in 1844, 
the 'large premises' belonging to the Hutton Co at Badagry was able to get a 'very 
good Supply' 82. By September 1846 Gollmer were able to state that there was 
more trade at Badagry than at any other time and that Hutton's agent had taken 
on one thousand two hundred puncheons of oil in the last eight months whilst 
Mr Johnson of the Wonderful was also increasing the number of puncheons he 
was shipping 83. 
The origins of Badagry's palm oil supply are not identified, but with Lagos closed 
to the Egba, it would seem likely that a large proportion of Badagry's supply 
originated from that direction. Hutton's agents in the town, Captain Parsons, and 
his assistant Mr Duggan (or possibly Huggan), were joined by other commercial 
80 WMMSA 2 April 1846 Martin's journal in 5 September 1846 Martin, Badagry. 
81 PRO F084/777 Memoranda for the use of a deputation of the CMS appointed to wait upon 
Viscount Palmerston to solicit protection for the liberated Africans, being British Subjects who have 
emigrated from Sierra Leone to Badagry and Abbeokuta and for the European Missionaries who 
reside at those places, 1849. 
82 WMMSA 18 April 1846 Martin's Journal in 5 September 1846 Martin, Badagry. 
83 Unfortunately Gollmer does not say how much of an increase this was in Hutton's trade. He also 
says that Johnson had taken eighty puncheons out from Badagry in February 1846 and about one 
hundred by September 1846. Whether this was a monthly or six monthly total is unclear [CMR 
March 1847, p. 55,4 September 1846 Gollmer, Badagry]. 
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settlers 84. The Bristol traders Randolf Brothers arrived in 1848 and, for the Gold 
Coast firm of Banner Brothers, A. Legresley evidently established premises some 
time between 1849 and 1850 85. Then in 1851 Mr Sandeman acting as agent for 
Forster and Smith settled in the town 86. According to Avoseh the European 
merchants GB Scale or Scala, and Grote along with the African Merchants Shitta 
Bey and Taiwo Olowo were also active at Badagry prior to 1851, when they 
transferred their operations to Lagos 87. The establishment of this number of 
firms and independent merchants evidently provoked serious competition 
between traders and in early 1850 Gollmer complained that Thomas Hutton had 
been at Badagry for a month trying to shut out other traders and expel the Bristol 
merchant Captain Vickerman. The attempt to establish a trading monopoly was 
contrary to the very fabric of Badagry's commercial operation and Gollmer 
concluded that Hutton would not succeed 'as the chiefs people wish for more 
traders' 88. 
The Badagry's wish for more traders however, extended to those engaged in 
slaving as well as 'legitimate' trade. Gaining an accurate picture of the operation 
of the slave trade during this period is difficult, largely due to the subjective 
accounts provided by missionary sources. During the earlier part of the 1840s the 
missionaries, in an attempt to achieve greater protection and support from the 
British Government, had somewhat overdramatized the position of the trade 
there. At the same time as Governor Hill was reporting the 'very good supply' of 
palm oil reaching the Hutton factory, Revd Annear was claiming at the end of 
1844 that 'slavery is the sole traffic of the town' and that Hutton's palm oil 
84 According to Annear's journal for September 1844 a Mr Huggan had recently arrived at Hutton's 
factory [WMMSA 20 September 1844 Annear's Journal in 21 October 1844 Annear to London]. But in 
1845 Gollmer clearly noted that they were met by Mr Parson's assistant Mr Duggan [CMSA 
CA2 /043 / 95 17 January 1845 Gollmer's Journal, Badagryl. Subsequent accounts would seem to 
indicate that it was in fact a Mr Duggan who worked at the Hutton factory. 
85 Newbury, The Wgstern ýIave Coast... p. 42. 
86 Ajayi, Christialt MissiQns... p. 59. See chapter 2, p. 60. 
87 Avoseh, The HistomL of St Thomas's.... (revised ed. ), p. 9. 
88 CMSA CA2/043/5a I March/May 1850 Gollmer, Badagry. 
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factory did not receive enough oil to pay its own expenses 89. This very negative 
view of the Badagry commercial situation, so clearly in contrast to the opinion 
expressed by Hill, was evidently an attempt to encourage the British authorities 
to re-deploy a military force on that part of the coast, during the period when 
even the individual Sergeant was in the process of being withdrawn and 
missionary security fears were at a peak. In this light then, Annear presented the 
presence of a military force as the sole means by which the slave trade, which' he 
claimed was so virulent at Badagry, could be put down and the anti-slave trading 
party protected 90. A number of the more secular British agencies at work on the 
coast were also in favour of a more interventionist role. The trader William 
Hutton was one, and as early as 1843 he had strongly advocated the re-occupation 
of Whydah 91. 
The subsequent withdrawal of Sergeant Bart ultimately signalled the end of 
immediate missionary hopes of intervention. As a result, by 1846 the 
missionaries had changed their tactics. Having failed to inspire action over 
Badagry's internal struggle between slave trader and 'legitimate' trader, the 
missions turned their attention to the interior and their spiritual hopes for 
Abeokuta. Badagry was now presented on the basis of its links with the inland 
state and as the only route by which the missionary societies could move towards 
the interior. Coates, Secretary of the CMS urged that Badagry, a town now 
described as 'comparatively free from the Slave Trade', required protection from 
its slave trading neighbours notably the King of Benin to the east and the King of 
89 WMMSA 30 October 1844 Annear's Journal, Badagry. 
90 Annear concluded that: 
I am fully of the opinion, that until the British authorities, or some other 
superior power, concentrate sufficient strength here to enforce anti-slavery 
principles, and put down the traffic by main strength, it will be a very, long 
time before it be abandoned 
fWMMSA 30 October 1844 Annear's Journal, Badagry]. 
91 Hutton urged that a treaty be made with the King of Dahomey and Whydah be occupied. He 
used the example of the occupation of the Gold Coast forts to illustrate the success of such a measure 
in suppressing the slave trade. Hutton's petitions came at the same time as both Revd Freeman and 
Governor Maclean were advocating similar ideas [PRO C096 /2 23 March 1843 W Hutton, London]. 
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Dahomey to the west 92. Whether Badagry was presented as a haven of slave 
dealers or as the only glimmer of hope for legitimate trade along the Slave Coast, 
both arguments sought the goal of direct action. To achieve that goal the case was 
presented in the most dramatic and simplistic terms possible, as a 'great struggle' 
between good and evil or anti-slave trader versus slave trade. It was a conflict 
which threatened impending crisis and civil war. By September 1845 Townsend 
was describing the 'great struggle' over Badagry in terms of 
those who are interested in the slave trade, those who are 
interested in the English residing here, and those who begin to feel 
the evil of the slave trade. Those who formerly used to get all the 
trade in Badagry now get none, and those who formerly had nothing 
now get all. The old slave-trading party therefore, wish to obtain 
what they formerly had; and, finding that the slave trade cannot 
be carried on as it used to be, while white men are here, they would 
be glad to get us out of the way, if they knew how to do it violently 
would be to cause civil war 93. 
A more accurate picture of the commercial situation at Badagry during the latter 
part of the 1840s is far less dramatic, and in many ways was reflective of the slave 
trading pattern right along the coast. The 1840s saw a number of measures which 
did, to some extent, both increase the profits and ease the path of the slave trade. 
In 1842 for example the British Government had questioned the legality of 
destroying goods belonging to foreign merchants found in slave factories, thus 
making the actual destruction of barracoons possibly illegal (a problem which 
was only solved in 1848). Furthermore in 1845 the Mixed Courts for the trial of 
Brazilian Traders had been broken up which left no channel for the 
condemnation of Brazilian ships. More importantly, however, the same year saw 
the opening of British markets to slave-grown sugar, by the removal of 
differential duties, a measure which stimulated planters in Cuba and Brazil to 
increased production to meet the growing requirements of the British market 94. 
But the Slave Trade did not remain unchecked. The Hutt Committee of 1848/49, 
92 PRO F084 / 633 7 January 1846 Coates, London. 
93 CMSA CA2 / 085 / 229 7 September 1845 Townsend's journal, Bad agry. 
94 CMI April 1851, p. 71. 
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instructed by Parliament to look in to the most effective ways of ending the trade, 
was unable, despite the intentions of William Hutt in the Chair, to bring about 
an end to the expensive Anti-Slave Trade Squadron. The committee did 
conclude that Squadron was facing an impossible task but, due to pressure 
largely from missionary sources in Britain, who exerted a huge influence in 
parliament, notably on Palmerston at the Foreign Office, the Squadron was 
retained. 
The most acceptable view of these boom and bust descriptions of the 1840s slave 
trade is somewhere between the two. With the slave trade still very much a force 
to be reckoned with, the emergence of other significant trade articles on the coast, 
merely enabled traders to diversify. Indeed the 'notorious slave dealer' Martinez, 
became so successful in his palm oil dealings that curbs on his activities were 
demanded by other European merchants operating on the coast 95. 
This pattern of successful co-existence was also reflected at Badagry. Despite the 
missionary assertions of a division between slave trading and anti-slave trading 
parties, it is evident from a closer examination that this conflict of interests was 
merely a political ruse. Whilst evidence would suggest that the palm oil trade at 
Badagry was expanding, kidnapping and slave trading clearly continued to 
operate 96. Even the idealist Annear was forced to admit by the end of 1844 that 
the Wawu was not the enemy of the slave trade he had hoped, and also that a 
number of the Sierra Leonians trading at Badagry were involved, including 
Captain Johnson who collected both palm oil and slaves at the port 97. The 1840s, 
then, were a period of potential economic reconstruction and expansion at 
95 PRO F084/775 21 August 1849 Duncan, Whydah. 
96 Shortly after the arrival of the CMS mission, Crowther was made aware of five recent cases of 
Sierra Leone immigrants being kidnapped [PRO F084 / 663 19 April 1845 Crowther's journal, 
Bad agry in 7 January 1846 Coates, London]. 
97 In December 1844 Annear noted that Capt Johnson had arrived off Badagry to collect palm oil, 
but had also bought twelve slaves. Annear added that two or three of the principal Sierra Leone 
inhabitants at Badagry were involved in slave trading [WMMSA 23 December 1844 Annear's 
journal, Badagryl. 
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Badagry. Whilst evidently maintaining her position as an important point on 
the lagoon slave trade, the arrival in some force of a new wave of European and 
African traders re-established the town once more as an Atlantic port. But the 
very factors which had combined to create such huge potential ultimately 
produced a dangerous mix and pushed the town towards commercial obscurity. 
Badagry 1845-1850 
An interesting aspect of Badagry's history during the 1840s was the seeming lack 
of inter-ward strife. There was the implied division within Posuko ward over the 
chieftaincy which was never again alluded to and which does not appear to have 
had further repercussions 98. There is also a description by Annear in 1844 of a 
knife fight between two wards of the town. However, this appears to have been 
organised very carefully, and to have followed remarkably strict guidelines, 
resulting in only one casualty and the public punishment of a man accused of 
fighting unfairly. Indeed Annear's account of the incident would seem to 
indicate an organised method by which disputes were settled between wards 
rather than a spontaneous outbreak of warfare 99. Other than the usual number 
of kidnappings and attacks within the town, which appear to have been carried 
out on an individual basis, it would seem then that the 1840s saw surprisingly 
little internal conflict. That is not to say that the usual divisions were not in 
existence and indeed 1845 onwards saw a period of intense political diversity 
within the town, as loyalties split over the kingship dispute at Lagos. But, 
remarkably, such marked splits never erupted into an internal dispute, and 
indeed it would appear rather that they worked towards preserving Badadgry's 
security during a period when external pressures threatened to tear the town 
apart. I would suggest that this apparent suspension or paralysis of inter-ward 
conflict may have been due to the overwhelming external influences which were 
98 In April 1845 Annear briefly referred to a man called 'Losoco I who he said 'ought legally to fill 
the chair now occupied by Possu the Dutch Chief' [WMMSA 26 April 1845 Annear's Journal, 
Badagry]. 
99 WMMSA 27 September 1844 Annear's journal in 21 October 1844 Annear, Badagry. 
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brought to bear upon the town during the period and which focused Badagry's 
attention on the outside world. 
According to Kopytoff, as the influence of anti-slaving methods grew and 
internal wars disrupted domestic routes, the economic situation in Badagry 
worsened. But as noted above, overall the 1840s were not so much a period of 
economic decline, as of reconstruction. Badagry's flexibility and competitiveness 
was equal to meeting these new challenges, and indeed continued to do so 
throughout that decade. However, increasing intervention from external 
European and African sources ultimately combined to paralyse the town's free- 
marketeering existence. As a result the Gun chiefs of Badagry were alienated by 
their 'strangers', and for the first time in their history became or at least came to 
be seen as a unit and as a single group or faction. 
Not surprisingly, it was British influences which acted as a major polarising force 
within the town. The early reaction to missionary teachings tended to be 
indulgent. Although making virtually no headway, Christianity and its disciples 
were received, at least initially, with the utmost politeness and good will by the 
chiefs 100. However, despite the overall economic performance of the town, 
certain chiefs were unable to function competitively due to the restrictions placed 
upon their 'illegal' traffic and traders. The Akran observed in 1846 that although 
he had been glad to welcome the English to Badagry he had been disappointed by 
the amount of commerce they had brought and he now wished for Portuguese 
traders to come 101. 
100 The diplomatic handling of the missionary visitors is illustrated by an extract from Gollmer's 
journal in 1845. The missionary noted, with no trace of irony, that on paying the Posu an unsolicited 
visit, the chief was: 
beyond expectation, friendly and saluted me as usual. I at once informed him 
that this was the Lord's day, and that I wished, if he would allow me to speak to 
him and his people about God and his Word. Possu said it was good; but all his 
people were away: if I would come at another time, and give him notice, he would 
keep them together 
[CM-R October 1846, p. 228,24 August 1845 Gollmer's Journal, Badagry]. 
101 CMSA CA2 / 043 / 99 10 May 1846 Gollmer's Journal, Badagry. 
254 
Initially the English section of the town fully supported the British presence. 
Wawu stated spiritedly that 'I am an English Chief and as such will die' 102. Such 
sentiments may have stimulated conflict between pro and anti English factions. 
However, at the same time, the' English' sections of Badagry were becoming 
increasingly alienated from their British missionary strangers. As early as April 
1845 Annear was lamenting that the Wawu's attempts at a monopoly in the 
palm oil trade were not only resulting in'disgust' from both Gun and English 
residents alike, but that hostility was also being directed at those English residents 
by the Gun. Indeed, Annear feared that it would be the Wawu who was 'the 
cause of the destruction of the little English community here unless he be driven 
from among us very shortly' 103. Increasing resentment ultimately spilled over 
into direct action aimed, largely at the 'English' residents of the town. In 1846 the 
Badagrians began a campaign of opposition by refusing to allow the Sierra 
Leonians to work at Hutton's factory. A policy of houseburning and kidnapping 
continued to harass the Sierra Leone residents, until in 1850 they launched a brief 
counter attack of their own against the Gun people 104. 
The polarisation of the Gun population at Badagry was compounded by events in 
neighbouring states. The port's sensitivity to affairs in the interior continued 
throughout the 1840s. Badagry continued to function under the patronage of 
Abeokuta, that state for example maintaining cordial relations through the 
existence of Egba consuls in the town but at the same time Abeokuta continued 
to pose a military threat to its unpredictable tributary 105. According to Annear, 
102 PRO F084 / 663 20 August 1845 Townsend, Badagry in 7 January 1846 Coates, London. 
103 WMMSA 19 April 1845 Annear's Journal, Badagry. 
104 According to the CMR Gollmer, with help from Commander Patey of HMS Flying Fish settled 
matters through conciliation [CMR October 1851, p. 2231. 
105 Folayan notes that Egba consuls named 'Gbogboro', were posted to Badagry from the 1830s 
onwards [Folayan, 'International Politics in a Frontier Zone: Egbado 1833-63', Odu, 8 
(1972), pp. 15- 
161. The first contemporary reference to these representatives came from Gollmer, who in April 
visited'two Abeokutan men, who reside 
here as a kind of private agents or spies, and who often 
visit us'. Despite these supposedly 
frequent visits however, this is the only occasion on which these 
men were directly mentioned 
[CMR March 1847, p. 49,12 April 1846 Gollmer's journal, Badagry]. 
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despite the military support given to the Egba at the encampment by each chief of 
Badagry, it was only the English chiefs who wished for an end to the stalemate 
siege, the other chiefs fearing that after conquering their enemies at Ado, the 
Egba might then turn their military attentions to Badagry itself 106. By 1845 
Annear himself was convinced that the dangerously balanced relationship 
between the two was near to breaking point and that the Egba would be obliged to 
take Badagry under direct control 107. Furthermore, the relationship was also 
sensitive to outside influences. The fragility of the vital commercial link between 
Abeokuta and the coast was exposed when in February 1845 an attack was 
launched against the Egba besieging force at Ado by Dahomey. This led to a 
temporary abandonment of the camp and closure of the road to the interior 108. 
Dahomean victory was however short-lived and within a couple of weeks the 
Dahomean army was struggling home 109. After a brief respite the Egba, turned 
their attentions westward, sending out scouting parties to monitor the 
movements of the Dahomies and in the process destroying villages belonging to 
Porto-Novo 110. 
Badagry faced obstruction and disruption of her routes not only from the north 
and north east but also directly from Dahomey itself. According to Governor Hill 
at Cape Coast this was a result of the influence of 'some ill minded people at 
The military might that these agents represented was frequently brought to the attention of the 
Badagry people through reports of the Egba's military campaigns, most notably around Ado, and 
from occasional threats to the port itself. In June 1845 the Egba chief Sagbua, promised to send down 
an escort for the CMS party once Sodeke's funeral proceedings were out of the way. In the same 
message he added that 'As for Badagry, and Ajashe, and all the foolish people of that part, I shall 
quench them'f-CIM March 1846, p. 61,11 June 1845 Gollmer's Journal, Badagry]. 
106 The suspicions of the Akran and Posu were certainly not unjustified. On putting their fears to 
Somoye, head of the Egba camp at Ado, Annear noted that'he laughed very knowingly but gave no 
definite answer' [WMMSA 7 August 1844 Annear's Journal in 23 August 1844 Annear, Badagry). 
107 WMMSA 19 March 1845 Annear's Journal, Badagry. 
108 CMR March 1846, pp. 58-59, February 1845 Crowther's journal, Badagry. 
109 According to Annear the Egba retaliated shortly after they had been expelled and were re- 
established in their camp by early March [WMMSA March 1845 Annear's Journal in 8 March 1845 
Annear, Badagry]. 
110 In June 1845 Annear reported that two villages in the Porto-Novo area had been destroyed by 
Egba troops [WMMSA 20 June 1845 Annear's Journal in 16 August 1845 Annear, Badagry]. 
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Whydah' headed by De Souza 111. Furthermore, Revd Crowther pointed out that 
the Dahomey's assault on the Egbas around Ado was an attempt to open the road 
for slaves between Dahomey and Lagos. The arrival of Dahomean troops in the 
area raised fears of an assault on Badagry itself, according to Mr Hutton and Mr 
Hanson, who arrived from Whydah, because Badagry was withholding their 
yearly tribute112. The town spent the latter part of February 1845 in high anxiety 
preparing for attackI13. 
However, by 1 March confused reports were arriving from the interior and 
Dahomean attention was once more focused there as their forces at Ado were 
scattered and the Egba returned to the encampment with renewed 
determination. But a further threat from Dahomey's coastal ally Porto-Novo 
kept Badagry on alertI14. According to Annear, slave-dealing individuals at both 
Lagos and Whydah had made a substantial present of gunpowder to the Porto- 
Novans to encourage them to renew their efforts against their coastal 
competitor115. Indeed a number of skirmishes were reported around the town, 
with parties from Porto-Novo approaching not only along the lagoon during 
mid-March, but also from the direction of Mowo 116. Badagry's forces were much 
divided. According to Gollmer, the threat towards Mowo had led to the despatch 
of reinforcements, evidently including the Akran, Banker [Bala] and Posu, 
leaving 'all the old men, and boys with as many soldiers as were left' to defend 
Badagry itself 117. On 16 March an attack on Mowo was launched and defeated 
with four Porto-Novans killed and a number of prisoners taken 118. A couple of 
days later Annear himself had a lucky escape from an approaching naval force of 
111 PRO C096/4 6 March 1844 Hill, Cape Coast. 
112 WMMSA 25 February 1845 Annear's Journal in 8 March 1845 Annear, Badagry. 
113 WMMSA 22 February -1 March 1845 Annear's journal in 8 March 1845 Annear, Badagry. 
114 WMMSA 22 February -I March 1845 Annear's Journal in 8 March 1845 Annear, Badagry. 
115 WMMSA 18 March 1845 Annear's Journal, Badagry. 
116 WMMSA 18 March 1845 Annear's journal, Badagry. 
117 CMSA CA2/043/95 24 February 1845 Gollmer's journal, Badagry; WMMSA 24 March 1845 
Annear's journal, Badagry; WMMSA 2 March 1845 Annear's journal in 8 March 1845 Annear, 
Badagry. 
118 WMMSA 18 March 1845 Annear's Journal, Badagry. 
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Porto-Novans and Isos. Heavy firing occurred from both lagoon and land. The 
fighting lasted two days with all sections of Badagry society, including emigrants 
and Fanti taking part. But, although they sent out a small naval force of only 
twelve canoes to meet an enemy of four hundred in eighty canoes, hundreds of 
guns were fired from the bank at the narrowest part of the lagoon. Ultimately, 
according to Annear, the Badagry's plan was well executed and the Porto-Novans 
feared to force their way through the well-guarded defences and retreated 119. The 
Porto-Novan forces, frustrated at Badagry, gave vent to their anger at a small 
village belonging to the town called 'Teum' [possibly Itohun] which lay on the 
lagoon. However, even there, despite its small population, the attack was 
repelled. Further enraged, the invading forces turned their attention once more 
to Badagry. But the threat was not realised. As news of Dahomean attacks on 
Porto-Novan villages filtered through, the alliance collapsed. Furthermore the 
timely arrival of Commander Leyton and HM Cruiser Cygnet just off the coast 
provided a further persuasive argument towards withdrawal, and the Porto- 
Novans crept home under cover of darkness 120. 
Thus immediate danger was averted by the temporary collapse of the alliance 
and the outbreak of fighting between Dahomey and Porto-Novo. But by April 
they were again a joint threat to Badagry. Furthermore, Annear evidently 
recognised that elements within Badagry itself, whom he only identified as 
'some of the chiefs', were 'corresponding with them on the subject of their 
taking this place and driving away the English' 121. 
On 27 April Annear reported a joint Porto-Novan/Dahomean attack on Opoho a 
village a short distance away where many people of the town went to trade. Now 
that now peace had been restored between the allies they were once again 
119 WMMSA 18 March 1845 Annear's journal, Badagry. 
120 WMMSA 20-22 March 1845 Annear's journal, Badagry. 
121 WMMSA 19 April 1845 Annear's journal, Badagry. 
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preparing themselves to launch an attack on Badagry. The gong-gong was 
sounded throughout the town and people began packing up ready to leave 122. 
Reports filtered through of enemy sightings on the beach 123. On 8 May Annear 
called a meeting of all the Badagry chiefs to discuss what should be done, should 
the enemy come. The chiefs replied that they would repel them and asked 
Annear to help pay for their defence. He dismissed them as purely self- 
seeking124. But, although missionary accounts of this period provide only an' 
incomplete narrative of events along the lagoon it is evident that the Badagry 
chiefs were actually involved in negociations and diplomatic manoeuvres to 
pacify the lagoon. In May 1845 a meeting between all the Gun chiefs (except the 
Wawu), Porto-Novo and Ado, along with observers from Abeokuta, was hosted 
by Lagos 125. There is no evidence to indicate what discussions took place at this 
meeting, or whether any resolutions were passed, and clearly no lasting solution 
was reached, but it would appear that temporarily fears of attack from the west 
were eased. Furthermore, the meeting marked a turning point in the focus of 
coastal events as attention shifted from west to east, with affairs at Lagos taking 
on a new and urgent precedent. 
Martin Lynn has argued that British sights became focused on Lagos only after 
John Beecroft, Consul for the Bights of Benin and Biafra from 1849 onwards, had 
failed in his mission to Dahomey in 1850. He states that Beecroft's aggressive 
policy towards Lagos was formulated merely as a way of shifting attention away 
from his failures at the Dahomean capital 126.1 would suggest however that 
Lynn's interpretation does not take fully into account earlier events which gave 
rise to an increasing role for Lagos in coastal affairs after Kosoko had seized 
power in 1845 and clearly focused at least missionary sights on Lagos. 
122 WMMSA 28 April 1845 Annear's journal, Badagry. 
123 WMMSA 7 May 1845 Annear's journal, Badagry. 
124 WMMSA 8 May 1845 Annear's journal, Badagry. 
125 WMMSA 1 June 1845 Annear's Journal, Badagry. 
126 M Lynn 'Consul and Kings: British Policy, 'the Man on the Spot', and the Seizure of Lagos, 1851' 
Tournal of Imperial and Commonwealth Hig= UICH), Vol x No. 2, (Jan 1982), p. 153. 
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Under King Akitoye, the youngest brother of King Adele, Lagos had remained 
somewhat in the background of coastal affairs. He professed a position of 
neutrality in the conflict between Porto-Novo and Dahomey against Badagry and 
the Egba during the early months of 1845 although in fact surreptitiously a party 
had been despatched to act as guides to the Dahomeans in the Egba country127. It 
would appear that Akitoye, rather than involve himself directly in coastal affairs 
preferred to influence events indirectly, for example through his allies at Ado. 
Prince Kosoko, nephew of Adele and Akitoye was a very. different prince. Having 
been overlooked at the death of Adele in 1837, Kosoko was once again 
disappointed at the death of King Oluwole in 1841 when Akitoye was crowned. 
But his benevolent uncle insisted that Kosoko return from Whydah, despite 
opposition from powerful elements within Lagos, such as Chief Eletu, who went 
into voluntary exile at Badagry on his return 128. Not content, however, with his 
position as Prince, Kosoko quickly began scheming against his trusting uncle. 
Attempting to solicit the help of his neighbours, Kosoko entertained a number of 
the Badagry chiefs at Lagos in early June of 1845 and, according to Annear entered 
into an agreement with them and another powerful but unnamed chief of a 
neighbouring town to banish the English from the country and restore the slave 
traders 129. Exactly which Badagry chiefs were present on this occasion is not 
stated by any source. However, from accounts of following events it would 
appear that the Posu was among those who attended and that the Wawu and 
possibly one or two others remained at home 130. Whilst the Badagry chiefs were 
still feasting with Kosoko, Akitoye in turn looked to the English at Badagry as a 
possible source of support against his powerful opponent. Following the example 
of Adele and Eletu before him, Akitoye appealed to the missionaries in a way 
127 WMMSA 4 March 1845 Annear's journal in 8 March 1845 Annear, Badagry. 
128 Losi, History of Lagos p. 34. See also chapter 7, pp. 228-229. 
129 WMMSA 18 June 1845 Annear's Journal in 16 August 1845 Annear, Badagry. 
130 WMMSA 14 July 1845 Annear's journal in 16 August 1845 Annear, Badagry. 
260 
they would understand and which would be most likely to gain him the support 
he desired. On 7 June 1845 Annear received a letter from the King recounting his 
disillusionment with the slave trade and asking for help in destroying the traffic. 
In order to attract support the dispute over the Lagos throne had been turned 
into a struggle between slave-trading and anti-slave-trading parties131. 
Despite Annear's belief that Akitoye had little fear of the weaker Kosoko party, 
tensions continued to mount and by 10 June he was writing that insurrection 
was now expected 132. Akitoye gathered his forces and recalled Eletu from 
Badagry. While his minister prepared himself for departure, Kosoko's Badagrian 
guests returned home 133. According to Annear, the Wawu and one or two other 
chiefs sent troops towards Bissie [unidentified] to help the Eletu/Akitoye party, 
whilst the Posu and others expressed concern that they had chosen the weaker 
side. Annear concluded that, by not sending any help to Akitoye, the latter had 
openly affirmed their support for Kosoko. By 24 July Eletu's forces had reached 
Lagos and war broke out. According to Annear's account the fighting raged until 
the 15 August, when Eletu was captured and put to death. Gaining a clear picture 
of Badagry's role in the military campaign is difficult, to say the least. It would 
appear that troops supporting Eletu did take part in the battle, and a small 
number of casualties were reported. According to Annear, as many as eleven 
were killed 134. But Gollmer claimed that there was only one Badagry fatality, the 
rest of the troops running away 'so that Badagry may be said to have taken no 
share in the contest' 135. The limited military support from both Badagry and 
Abeokuta was not enough and, despite the rejection by Porto-Novo of Kosoko's 
calls for help, the usurper was finally able to seize the advantage. Indeed, 
131 WMMSA 7 June 1845 Annear's journal in 16 August 1845 Annear, Badagry. 
132 Annear noted that Akitoye was not afraid of Kosoko 'being the stronger party of the two', 
although he recognised him as a'powerful enemy'fWMMSA 7 June 1845 Annear's journal in 16 
August 1845 Annear, Badagry I- 
133 WMMSA 10 June 1845 Annear's journal in 16 August 1845 Annear, Badagry. 
134 WMMSA 14 July 1845 Annear's journal in 16 August 1845 Annear, Badagry. 
135 CMR October 1846, p. 223 21 July 1845 Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
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Gollmer identified Badagry's lack of support for the King as a decisive factor in 
his defeat, stating that had Badagry interfered in the conflict by blockading the 
lagoon to Kosoko's reinforcements, ammunition and provisions, the usurper 
would not have been successful 136. As it was, Akitoye's forces were defeated, he 
fled and Kosoko took control. 
Badagry and Kosoko 
Kosoko's victory at Lagos and the expulsion of Akitoye immediately placed 
further pressures on Badagry. The acceptance of Adele and Eletu as political 
refugees had created a precedent and established the town as a recognised 
sanctuary for exiled Lagosians. Indeed it is interesting to note that, during the 
1845 Lagos conflict, it was rumoured that, should he lose, Kosoko planned, with 
the help of the Posu, to take refuge at Badagry. But it was ultimately Akitoye who 
was expelled from the town, and within a few days reports were arriving that the 
exiled King was on his way to Badagry. Under the guardianship of Egba troops, a 
message was sent, however, not to the Wawu or any other Gun chief at Badagry, 
but to the Mewu at Mowo asking him to receive the king 137. Akitoye was 
initially taken to Abeokuta, but at the end of September a further message was 
received on the coast stating that he intended to come to Badagry, from where he 
could gather strength to regain his throne. Annear feared for the security of the 
exiled monarch in the town but stated that, as he was on good terms with all the 
British subjects there, they would do all in their power to help him 138. Indeed, by 
this stage, Annear had clearly been persuaded that the end of the slave trade 
rested on Akitoye's restoration and the deposition of Kosoko. He went on to 
suggest that support for Kosoko at Badagry among the Akran, Bala and 'several 
other chiefs here' arose from their poverty and their reliance on the presents sent 
by men such as Kosoko. Should British power be established, Annear'continued, 
136 CMR October 1846, p. 224,18 August 1845 Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
137 WMMSA 18 August 1845 Annear's journal, Badagry. 
138 WMMSA 25 September 1845 Annear's journal in 11 October 1845 Annear, Badagry. 
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then these men would mend their ways 139. Apart from the missionary's 
continued advocacy of British intervention in the area, it is also interesting that a 
shift had taken place, at least in his opinion, in the position of the 'English 
Chiefs' at Badagry. When listing their supporters he named Akitoye and Mewu 
along with the King of Ajido as 'English chiefs'. No mention was made of the 
Wawu or any other Gun chief despite previous support for Akitoye. The CMS 
missionary Townsend, also saw the assumption of power at Lagos by Kosoko as -a 
watershed in these terms. He noted that the new King would 'exercise 
considerable influence over the chiefs of Badagry' and that this influence would 
be directed towards re-establishing the slave trade in the town140. Gollmer 
initially believed that the divisions of the Badagry chiefs would lead to inactivity. 
He noted in early August that, despite meeting to discuss events at Lagos,, 
We did not expect that the chiefs would take any decisive measure 
as some of the chiefs are friends of Kosoko, whilst the others are 
friends of Akitoey the two contending parties 141 
However, by the end of August he too was fearful that the connivance of the 
Topo Chiefs' at Badagry would lead to the expulsion of the English and the re- 
establishment of the slave trade 142. It would appear that the alienation of the 
Gun chiefs as a whole was, at least in missionary eyes, almost complete. 
But the polarisation of the Gun chiefs was not merely the oversimplified 
expression of missionary fears, it was also an identifiable result of. pressures 
exerted on the town from both Lagos and Abeokuta. Eager to sustain his 
advantage, Kosoko sent friendly messages to his supposed allies at Badagry to 
confirm their loyalty and ascertain whether they were prepared to keep their 
agreement with him 143. He proposed that peace should exist between the two 
powers and a slave market be re-established. This was interpreted by Townsend 
139 WMMSA 25 September 1845 Annear's journal in 11 October 1845 Annear, Badagry. 
140 PRO F084/663 20 August 1845 Townsend, Badagry I in 7 January 1847 Coates, London. 
141 CMSA CA2/043/96 12 August 1845 Goilmer's journal, Badagry. 
142 CMSA CA2/043/96 25 August 1845 Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
143 WMMSA 23 June and 7 July -1.845 Annear's journal in 16 August 1845 Annear, Badagry. 
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as a 'notice for the English people to quit'. Only the Wawu opposed the message, 
and continued stating his right as an 'English Chief' to receive Englishmen there 
144. But evidently neither side of this supposed alliance had faith in the other, as 
rumours abounded that the new Lagos King intended to take matters into his 
own hands and come and destroy the place himself. Gollmer noted that, far from 
holding to any alliance with the chiefs, Kosoko's bitterness at the friendship of 
the Wawu and Akitoye, and the lack of support he got from his allies meant that, 
although he sent them presents and promises, he was already endeavouring to 
persuade the people of Porto-Novo and Ado to assist him in an assault on the 
town 145. According to Crowther, Kosoko and De Souza at Whydah were so 
nervous about British influence spreading from Badagry that they were 
determined to expel all traces of it from the coast 146. Furthermore, it was clear 
that the Badagry chiefs themselves saw the new regime at Lagos as a potential 
force for change within their town. Having been in league with Dahomey in 
their attempts to drive out the English, by May 1845 some of the chiefs were 
making an effort actively to encourage Kosoko in an assault on the town 147. 
Badagry was thrown once more into a state of excitement, and Annear and the 
missionaries, the major cause of contention, not only prayed for the arrival of a 
cruiser but also sent a petition 'to any of HM Naval Officers on the West Coast of 
Africa' calling for assistance 148. To make matters worse, the Dahomean threat 
was revived in August 1845 over non-payment of tribute and also over another 
'old bone of contention', which was the failure of the Badagry chiefs to inform 
144 PRO F084 / 663 8 May 1845 Crowther's journal, B adagry in 7 January 1846 Coates, London. 
145 CMR October 1846, p. 224,18 August 1845 Gollmer's Journal, Badagry. 
146 PRO F084 / 663 7 January 1846 Coates, London in 8 May 1845 Crowther's Journal, Badagry. 
147 Annear reported in May that: 
We have now reason to believe it too true that some of our chiefs are 
now making an effort to carry out their objective of driving away 
the English - not by violence on their part - but by inducing the King 
of Lagos, and the other warring parties on his side, to make a 
renewed and more vigorous attack on the town, and thereby causing 
us to fly for safety 
Annear did not give any specific evidence to support his beliefs [WMMSA 8 May 1845 Annear's 
journal, Badagry). 
148 PRO F084 / 663 Extract of a Memorial sent to a ship of war, and the Governor of Cape Coast by 
the British Residents of Badagry in 7 January 1846 Coates, London. 
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the King of Dahomey that his representative in the town had died 149. Although 
no military action was taken at this stage, by the end of 1846 the road between 
Abomey and Badagry was closed. However, it would appear that Thomas Hutton, 
by negotiation at Whydah, was able to travel the road himself, first by hammock 
to Godomey and then by water to Porto-Novo and on to Badagry. Whether 
Hutton's journey reopened the road to all, however, was not stated directly 150. 
Porto-Novo again began to pose serious problems from the west. Towards the 
end of August 1845 reports began circulating in Badagry that the Porto-Novans 
were on their way to the town. When their canoes arrived at the beginning of 
September, although token hostilities ensued, Annear concluded that it was their 
intention merely to cut off Badagry's lagoon links from both east and west 'and 
be at hand in carrying out Cosoco's purposes' 151. Badagry made hasty 
preparations for war, but on the eve of conflict the timely arrival of Captain York 
aboard HMS Albatross, on 7 September, in response to the Missionaries call for 
aid, dissuaded the Porto-Novan forces from pursuing an all out attack 152. The 
situation, however, remained tense for the remainder of the year. As soon as the 
Albatross had departed reports again arrived that the enemy were on the beach. 
Yet again the arrival of a British cruiser dispersed the marauding party 153. 
Whilst reports of imminent attack by a Lagos, Porto-Novo and Ado alliance 
plagued the town, Kosoko sustained his attempts at winning the Badagry chiefs 
over to his cause, sending presents and promises of trade 154. 
The position of the Badagry chiefs at this time was virtually impossible. 
However, it was the divisions between them that seem to have sustained the 
149 WMMSA 11 October 1845 Annear, London. 
150 PRO F084 / 669 7& 20 December 1846 T Hutton, Whydah in 25 March 1847 W Hutton, London. 
151 WMMSA 31 August 1845 Annear's Journal in II October 1845 Annear, Badagry. 
152 WMMSA 7 September 1845 Annear's journal in II October 1845 Annear, Badagry. 
153 On 14 September Annear reported that Badagry people proceeding up the beach had seen a 
hostile party approaching and retreated quickly. Annear was 'in constant expectation of seeing the 
smoke curling over the house and canoe on the beach'. But again the arrival of a British cruiser 
evidently frightened the party away [WMMSA 10 - 16 September 1845 Annear's Journal in 11 
October 1845 Annear, Badagry]. 
154 WMMSA 6 September 1845 Annear's Journal in 11 October 1845 Annear, Badagry. 
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town during this very difficult period and enabled them to maintain a number of 
very conflicting links. Badagry's divided loyalties during the Lagos civil war, if 
earning them scorn, certainly avoided full-scale war. Moreover, their ability to 
maintain links with Akitoye and the Egba alongside an admittedly difficult 
relationship with Kosoko is astonishing. That such divided loyalties did not force 
Badagry itself to collapse into warfare was, I would suggest, indicative of the 
extreme flexibility made possible by the independent and extremely opportunistic 
nature of the town's chieftaincies. Indeed, when towards the end of 1845 this 
difficult balance did threaten to collapse over the professed failures of the Wawu 
as an 'English Chief', the other Gun chiefs charged him with treachery in not 
doing his duty towards the missionaries. At a meeting of the chiefs the Wawu 
was accused of not keeping the missionaries informed of events and was 
instructed 'to make everything connected with our position amongst them 
known to us, or else they would supplant him and do it themselves' 155. But the 
remarkable balance of Badagry loyalties was not allowed to continue. In 
December 1845 Akitoye made his way towards the coast and the British 
missionaries at Badagry began not only to espouse his cause but also to call for 
positive British intervention at Lagos 156. 
Badagry and Akitoye 
By November 1845 Akitoye had made known his intention of leaving Abeokuta 
for Badagry. According to Gollmer, Kosoko begged and bribed his friends at 
Badagry not to allow it, and proposed to them that the Mewu, the friend of 
1-95 WMMSA 5 September 1845 Annear's Journal in 11 October 1845 Annear, Badagry. 
156 The British residents at Badagry warned that Kosoko hoped to take control of the whole area 
and: 
should he be allowed to remain in authority, and no protection be afforded 
the English at this place, nothing less can be the result of his proceedings 
than the entire obstruction of all communications for any other than slave 
dealing purposes 
[PRO F084/663 Extract of a Memorial sent to a British ship ... by the British residents of Badagry in 
7 January 1846 Coates, London I. Townsend also wrote of Akitoye being 'enabled' to regain his 
authority at Lagos [PRO F084/663 3 November 1845 Townsend, Badagry in 7 January 1846 Coates, 
London]. 
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Akitoye, should be persuaded to leave Mowo and return to Porto-Novo, so that 
Kosoko would occupy that village and do what he could to prevent Akitoye from 
passing. However, despite the concurrence of 'a few of the chiefs', Kosoko was 
unable to proceed as the Mewu, who was 'esteemed for his good character' and 
for the number of his followers, 'silenced all', and Akitoye was permitted to 
come 157. 
On 24 December the missionaries went to Mowo along with the chiefs to meet 
Akitoye. According to Townsend's account, the Akran and Posu offered verbal 
resistance to Akitoye's residence at Badagry, stating that it was not for the 
Mewu's or Akitoye's sake that they had come to Mowo but to meet Somoye, the 
Abeokutan general, who had escorted the exiled Lagos King. Indeed, Townsend 
recounted that the Posu denied having been consulted about Akitoye's arrival at 
all. The situation threatened to erupt into a serious argument between the Mewu 
and Posu. However, the matter was settled by Somoye, who diplomatically 
calmed both parties but ultimately warned the Posu against ignoring the wishes 
of the Egba 158. 
Having dispelled the immediate opposition to his residence at Badagry, Akitoye 
settled in the town. Exactly where was established was not specified, but it is 
important to note that it was at this point that the Mewu gave up his position at 
Mowo and transferred to Badagry proper 159. It would seem likely that at this 
point the Mewu saw English support for his friend, Akitoye, as an opportunity to 
lever himself into a yet more prominent position within the town. The Mewu's 
success in doing just this was outlined in a description by Martin as early as 
March 1846, of the Mewu as 'one of the principal chiefs of the country' 160. 
Indeed both the Mewu and Akitoye appear to have established themselves 
157 CMSA CA2/043/97 10 November 1845 Gollmer'sJournal, Badagry. 
158 CA2 / 085 / 230 24 December 1845 Townsend's Journal, Badagry. 
159 CMSA CA2 / 043 / 97 10 November 1845 Gollmer's Journal, Badagry. 
160 WMMSA 31 March 1846 Martins'Journal in 5 September 1846 Martin, Badagry. 
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successfully. Despite the initial opposition to his settlement there, it is clear that 
as a monarch in exile he was treated with respect and deference by all members of 
society, even the Posu stood in his presence 'not daring to sit in the presence of 
the king' 161. 
Akitoye lost no time in securing the 'friendship and protection of the English'162. 
He presented himself as a force against the slave trade and actively helped th6 
missionaries replace the roof of the Methodist mission house 163. Moreover 
Akitoye began a campaign of blockade against Lagos, cutting the town off from its 
allies at Porto-Novo and its supplies from the west 164. The Badagry missionaries 
were only too willing to become allied to Akitoye's cause. Disappointed time and 
time again by the Gun chiefs, they saw the restoration of the reformed slave 
trader Akitoye at Lagos as the key to ending the trade once and for all. 
It would appear, however, that all sections of the Badagry population attempted 
to take advantage of Akitoye's arrival in their midst, notably by using it as an 
opportunity to hunt for slaves. On June 18, for example, Martin recounted how a 
number of warriors were despatched down the lagoon towards Lagos on a raid. 
According to Martin they returned with a quantity of booty and a number of 
captives 'who no doubt will be sold into slavery' 165. Although it is not clear 
exactly whose men they were, and indeed whether in fact they were Gun, several 
days later a further raid under the leadership of 'Ajagbi' one of Badagry's 
'principal warriors' left for Lagos 166. This Ajagbi must surely be the Ajagbe 
described by Gollmer as one of the most respected inhabitants of the town 167. 
The implication then was that he was certainly not merely one of Akitoye's 
161 WMMSA 7 April 1846 Martin's journal in 5 September 1846 Martin, Badagry. 
162 WMMSA 25 April 1845 Martin, Badagry. 
163 WMMSA 30 March 1846 Martin's journal in 5 September 1846 Martin, Badagry. 
164 WMMSA 25 April 1846 Martin's Journal, Badagry. 
165 VVMMSA 18 June 1846 Martin's Journal in 5 September 1846 Martin, Badagry. 
166 WMMSA 26 June 1846 Martin's Journal in 5 September 1846 Martin, Badagry. 
167 CMR December 1848, p. 257,10 December 1847 Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
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Lagos retinue. 
Lagos, however, continued to pose a threat to Badagry's security. In August 1846 a 
force from the east was reported to be approaching along the lagoon but was 
repulsed at Iworo and Ajido with the loss of twenty one men168. By the end of 
1846 the general feeling was that Kosoko was about to make a full scale attack169. 
Furthermore, it would appear that Akitoye was rapidly becoming increasingly 
disillusioned with his British allies and their inability to help him regain his 
throne. Having become equally dubious about Akitoye's anti-slave trading 
sentiments, Martin reluctantly reflected that 'it seems probable that a man 
stealing war will be carried on for many years between both parties' 170. 
The campaign of regular raids did continue on well into the following year and 
on into 1848 and 1849. Indeed Akitoye himself appears to have been one who 
profited from such excursions 171. Despite the missionaries' continued support 
and their determination that the deposed King's restoration was the key to 
suppressing the slave trade and opening up the interior via the water route to 
Abeokuta, they were frustrated by the lack of action taken to secure this end. 
Furthermore it was not only missionary sources who saw British military 
intervention as the only way of securing Lagos and thus suppressing the slave 
trade. Trader William Hutton by 1847 had himself turned his attention to the 
role of Lagos. Noting that Whydah, the 'chief emporium of slaves', was too 
closely watched by the cruisers to allow frequent embarkation, he stressed that De 
Souza was using the port, along with eighteen or twenty other Brazilians and 
Portuguese, and virtually controlled the King there. Hutton's proposed solution 
was the cession to Britain of the beach between lagoon and sea from Whydah 
168 CMSA CA2/043/100 12 & 15 August 1846 Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
169 WMMSA 25 November 1846 Martin, Badagry. 
170 WMMSA 25 November 1846 Martin, Badagry. 
171 Smith for example reported that two expeditions sent out by Akitoye had returned with at 
least thirty nine slaves [CMSA CA2/082/12 29 June 1848 Smith's journal, Badagry]. 
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along to Badagry and Lagos 172. 
Back in London, the Foreign, Colonial and Admiralty Offices hesitated. Memos 
were sent back and forth between departments. Ultimately, however, to delay a 
firm decision and in order to achieve a clearer picture of the coastal situation, a 
party under Commander Middleton was despatched to carry out a detailed 
survey of the lagoon 173. Lord Grey of the Colonial Office concluded that all 
questions of occupation should wait until Middleton's report was complete 174. 
Unfortunately, due to his untimely death from fever, Middleton was never able 
to complete his survey and the decision remained untaken 175. Understandably, 
then, dissatisfaction and impatience with such impotent support threatened 
even Akitoye's goodwill and did little to dissuade those so disposed from 
continuing their 'illegal' business. All sections of Badagry began once again to 
look elsewhere for suitable commercial and political alliances. 
Continued Egba preoccupation with Ado and their own internal concerns did not 
allow for distractions from Badagry. The road between the interior and the coast, 
although still officially closed, was still bringing Egba traders to the coast, but the 
route was a dangerous one and parties of traders faced attack notably from bands 
of Lagos people 176. According to Gollmer, Badagry and Ado had made peace in 
January 1846 177. But despite the apparent ending of hostilities between these two 
powers, which was reinforced at the behest of the Posu throughout the first half 
of 1846, the missionaries were disappointed in their hopes that Abeokuta would 
follow suit. Indeed insecurity between the coast and the interior continued long 
172 PRO F084 / 710 19 July 1847 W Hutton, London. 
173 PRO C096 /12 30 November 1847 Adm to Middleton in 30 November 1847 Adm, London. 
174 PRO C096 /12 Grey's Memo attached to 18 August 1847 FO, London. 
175 On 26 January 1849 Governor Winniett reported Middleton's death [PRO C096/15 ý6 January 
1849 Winniett, Cape Coast]. 
176 In June Martin noted that a revenge raid was launched on a town connected with Lagos in 
retaliation for the murder of three Egba traders killed on the road to Badagry [VVMMSA 18 June 
1846 Martin's journal in 5 September 1846 Martin, Badagry]. 
177 CMSA CA2/043/1 8 January 1846 Gollmer, Badagry. 
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after the initial CMS party had been allowed to travel on to Abeokuta in July 
1846. 
But Domingo Martinez, 'the rising spirit' based at Porto-Novo beach, was only 
too willing to become involved in affairs at Badagry 178. Due to the activities of 
Martinez and presumably the settlement with Ado, by 1846 relations between 
Badagry and Porto-Novo were much improved. Despite individual incidents'of 
occasional piracy, a peace was concluded between Badagry and Porto-Novo, 
probably in March 1846 179. As a result during the course of that year an 
'extensive intercourse' developed between the two powers, involving the 
shipment of slaves and other trade goods along the lagoon180. Gollmer also 
stated that Martinez was actively providing the Badagry warriors with weapons 
and ammunition with which they could supply him with slaves 181. As an astute 
trader in all articles, Martinez was willing to go much further to secure his 
commercial aims. Sources at Badagry continued to report his intrigues with the 
King of Dahomey by which he attempted to sustain the war in the interior and 
therefore maintain a ready supply of slaves 182. 
Martinez continued to be a source of anxiety to the missionaries for the 
pragmatic trading chiefs at Badagry were happy to receive any presents he sent183. 
Rumours that Martinez was to visit the town itself and engage in trade abounded 
during 1846, but ultimately proved fruitless 184. Stating that he was unable to 
establish a factory due to the presence of the English, Martinez offered the chiefs 
an incentive by setting up a factory at Ajido a few miles east in February 1847. His 
178 PRO F084 / 710 17 March 1847 T Hutton, Cape Coast in 19 July 1847 W Hutton, London. Also see D 
Ross, 'The Career of Domingo Martinez in the Bight of Benin 1833-64'LAa 6 (1) (1965), pp. 79-90. 
179 Martin reported at the end of April that a peace had been concluded a few weeks previously 
[WMMSA 25 April 1846 Martin, Badagry]. 
180 CMSA CA2/043/101 5 October 1846 Gollmer's Journal, Badagry. 
181 Parliamentary Papers Slave Trade Session 1847-1848 No v, First Report From the Select 
Committee on Slave Trade, Para 8031,4 July 1848 Gollmer's evidence. 
182 PRO F084 / 710 17 March 1847 T Hutton, Cape Coast in II July 1847 W Hutton, London. 
183 PRO F084/710 17 March 1847 T Hutton, Cape Coast in 11 July 1837 W Hutton, London. 
184 CMSA CA2 / 043 / 100 11 August 1846 Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
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establishment there was all the more galling to the missionaries since they 
themselves had seen the town of Ajido as a significant, if small, cause for hope 
only a couple of years earlier 185. Martinez, then, was a focus for missionary 
bitterness over the inactivity and inability, as they saw it, of the other British 
forces on the coast. This sense of frustration was made all the more acute by the 
trader's willingness to intervene in the Lagos dispute and it was he who offered 
Akitoye his first serious opportunity to retake the throne. 
From the missionary point of view Lagos had become the key to ending the slave 
trade, and both Methodist and Anglican missionaries petitioned for Britain to 
take 'possession of the place' 186. But no action was taken and, according to the 
Methodist missionary John Martin, Akitoye's despair at the lack of British 
military support forced him to look to Martinez, who was only too willing to 
take on the challenge. The trader's initial support for Akitoye was clearly a result 
of his hostility towards the new regime at Lagos and its supporters rather than 
his approval of the anti-slave trading cause. Ajayi has dated Akitoye's initial 
assault on Lagos to March 1846. However, there is no evidence in Martin's 
journal, the source cited by Ajayi, to support this very early date 187. Martin, who 
only arrived in Badagry at the end of March 1846, does however suggest that a 
force went down the lagoon in early 1847 and this later date is verified by an 
unnamed employee of the Hutton Company working at Badagry beach188. The 
party of eight or ten thousand consisted of Dahomeans, who were evidently now 
prepared at least to suspend their quarrels with Badagry over tribute and consuls, 
Badagrians and neighbouring townspeople, hired at enormous expense, and was 
headed in person by Domingo Martinez accompanied by two of De Souza's sons. 
185 WMMSA 17 May 1847 Martin, Badagry. 
186 After the foundation of Martinez's establishment at Ajido, Martin urged the British 
Government to action at Lagos as he felt that this was the only way to suppress the slave trade 
fWMMSA 17 May 1847 Martin, Badagry]. Gollmer too feared that, now firmly entrenched further 
east, it would be Martinez who would help Akitoye regain his throne and thus reinforce the hold of 
the slave trade on the town [CMSA CA2 / 043 /102 17 March 1847 Gollmer's Journal, Badagry]. 
187 Ajayi, Christian Missions p. 38. 
188 PRO C096/12 8 April 1847 unnamed trader at Badagry in 3 September 1847 W Hutton, London. 
272 
Martin gave the reasons for Martinez's role as the number of slaves a successful 
raid would have given him, and also his desire to be 'king of slave dealers' at 
Lagos as De Souza was at Whydah. Martinezs aims were, however, frustrated as 
the assault was a complete failure 189. According to the trader working at Badagry 
beach, after three weeks detention at Lagos and many fruitless attempts to take 
the town, the combined army dispersed and returned to their homes 190. 
Martinez's failure at Lagos did nothing to ease the tension around Badagry. 
According to Commander Middleton who arrived at the beginning of 1848 to 
attempt his survey of the lagoons, 'we found the country here even more 
disturbed than we had anticipated' 191. Dahomey's military support proved 
short-lived and by July 1848 it was feared that its annual slave hunting war 
would be directed against Badagry 192. Not only had the Mission of that year by 
Brodie Cruickshank, Chief Magistrate at Cape Coast, failed to persuade Dahomey 
to abandon the slave trade, but it might appear from the words of King Ghezo 
that his visitors' attempts had in fact renewed his antagonism against the powers 
on the coast. As the king pointed out in response to Cruickshank's assertion that 
legitimate trade was the route to wealth, this was indeed the case for Porto-Novo, 
Ajido and Badagry which had once paid tribute to Abomey, but which were now, 
as a result of the palm oil trade, becoming rich and setting 'my authority at 
defiance' 193. Suspicion and rumour continued to plague the town throughout 
the remainder of the year and attack seemed imminent. But at the last moment 
the Dahomean army turned on the market town of Okeodan thirty miles west of 
Badagry 194. It was rumoured on the coast, although there is no evidence to 
support the view and it was vehemently denied by CMS catechist Marsh, that, 
189 WMMSA 17 May 1847 Martin, Badagry. 
190 PRO C096 /12 8 April 1847 unnamed trader at Badagry in 3 September 1847 W Hutton, London. 
191 PRO C096 /14 1 March 1848 Middleton, Badagry in 4 July 1847 ADM, London. 
192 This was reported by Martin's successor at the Methodist mission, John Thomas [WMMSA 2 July 
1848 Thomas'Journal in 31 July 1848 Thomas, Badagry]. 
193 PRO F084 / 777 4 December 1849 evidence presented by CMS Deputation to Lord Palmerston. 
194 WMMSA 9 January 1849 Thomas, Badagry. 
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having been robbed at that place, it was in fact the Revd Go] Imer who had 
persuaded the King of Dahomey to attack Okeodan 195. But, whatever the 
motivating force, Okeodan was completely destroyed with enormous casualties 
and reportedly nineteen thousand captives taken 196. Not surprisingly, the 
Dahomean assault did little to quiet Badagry fears, and reports continued to 
circulate that after such a glorious victory the army would turn its attention to 
the coast. Indeed, by mid January 1849 hysterical rumours described the 
Dahomean troops as only four days away 197. CMS Missionary Isaac Smith, 
Methodist missionary John Thomas and Mr Duggan of the Hutton Factory sent a 
desperate appeal for help to Captain Hasting of HMS Cyclops, asking that a 
reminder be sent to the King of Dahomey stressing that British subjects should 
not be molested 198. 
The position of the English residents at Badagry had reached a critical point; at 
the mission house they kept the gates locked and a watchman patrolling, Revd 
Thomas never ventured out without a stout stick, and Captain Parsons of the 
Hutton Company had been forced to pay money to pass along the street to his 
factory199. It is important to note here that the increasing animosity evidently 
displayed towards the British as a result of the restrictions on Badagry's 
commercial life was not extended during this period towards Akitoye. Although 
the exiled king's presence in the town had closed the commercial road to Lagos, 
the occasional slave raiding forays against that power and the significantly 
195 PRO F084/777 25 March 1849 Marsh's Journal, Badagry, presented as evidence by the 4 
December 1849 CMS Deputation. 
196 This must have been an exaggeration of the true figure [PRO F084 / 777 25 Marsh 1849 Marsh's 
Journal, Badagry, presented as evidence by the 4 December 1849 CMS Deputation]. 
197 CMSA CA2/082/14 13 January 1849 Smith's Journal, Badagry. 
198 PRO F084/777 25 March 1849 Marsh's Journal, Badagry, presented as evidence by the 4 
December 1849 CMS Deputation. 
199 The newly arrived Commander Middleton used Capt Parson's insecurity as an example of 
political unease in the town [PRO C096/14 I March 1848 Middleton, Badagryl. However, it is 
necessary to bear in mind that Capt Parsons was also reported to be unpopular due to a number of 
more personal intrigues. In January 1848, for example, Gollmer reported that trouble threatened to 
erupt between locals and the factory agents over the 'bad conduct of the Captain's assistant, 
presumably Mr Duggan, and Parson's'native woman'[CMSA CA2/043/106 2 January 1848 Gollmer's 
journal, Badagryl. 
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improved relations with Porto-Novo via Martinez evidently provided a 
satisfactory consolation. Indeed evidence would suggest that Akitoye continued 
to be treated at this time with the utmost respect by his Badagry hosts 200. 
Akitoye's position within Badagry was not without its difficulties, but those 
reported were not of a particularly partisan nature. In early 1849 tensions 
threatened to erupt into violence over the decision to allow Isa, the exiled Chief 
of Idale, to settle at Badagry. Akitoye was violently opposed to accepting him as' 
the Chief had betrayed him by informing Kosoko of his movements at the 
beginning of the year (the circumstances of which go unrecorded). This dispute 
would not, however, appear to have placed Akitoye and all the Gun chiefs on 
opposing sides. The Posu's father, it was claimed, was in some way involved in 
Isa's banishment 'and in this country children and children's children seek 
redress for their parents' wrongs, while any branch of the offending party exists 
The implication then was that both the Posu and Akitoye were opposed to the 
Chief of Idale. However, after careful negotiation and mediation, the expected 
trouble was diffused201. 
But it was at this stage that Palmerston at the Foreign Office, a vehement 
opponent of the slave trade, perturbed at attempts in London, notably through 
the Hutt Committee, to remove even the Anti-Slave Trade Squadron, took the 
guarded measure of appointing British Consuls to the area. John Beecroft was 
appointed as Consul for the Bights of Benin and Biafra and John Duncan as Vice- 
Consul at Whydah. Their instructions were simple; they were merely to 
% encourage and extend British commerce and thereby to displace the slave 
trade, 202. As Ajayi notes, no mention was made of missionaries, Badagry, 
Abeokuta or Lagos, but 'It was then that missionary influence, working through 
a pressure group in London stepped into the picture, 
203. The following period 
200 CMSA CA2 / 082 / 11 11 April 1848 Smith's Journal, Badagry. 
201 CMR March 1850, p. 55, Smith's Journal, Badagry. 
202 PRO F084 / 775 29 May 1849 Palmerston to Duncan; 30 June 1849 Palmerston to Beecroft. 
203 Ajayi, Christian Missions... p. 61. 
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saw British influence from London and on the coast reaching new heights. This 
influence was to have a disastrous effect on Badagry. 
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Chapter Nine 
Tie bdagry Civil War 1851-1854 
1851-1854 was a 
_period-whii 
saw a dramatic culmination of events at Badagry. 
Always teetering on theirikof disaster,, the early 1850s saw a drawing together 
of the various strands vii&kad always threatened to Push the town over the 
edge. Commercially Bzhgvwas struggling to develop a successful Atlantic palm 
oil trade. At thcb same -kneitfaced- intense external pressure from its lagoonside 
neighbours and the ht*yjvwerful interior powers who sought to mould 
affairs on the uoast to:, iebwvn ends. The arrival of two powerful 'refugees', the 
Mewu from Pcrrto-Now aid Akitoye from Lagos, further stretched Badagry's 
abilities to sust. -ain itsiwawful foreign relations. These factors in themselves 
were not new. Each repemted an often repeated pattern to which Badagry's 
flexibility had previouiy nevided a check and somewhat haphazard safeguard. 
But from the eýarly 186 afErther presence had become increasingly involved in 
coastal affairs land uld" 
demanded an end to that flexibility in both 
commercial arRd politiul lams. The increasing and largely unchecked 
involvement uf Britisimoinem-'al, religious and, after 1849, also political agents 
in coastal affabrs courtbadd Badagrian pragmatism and subtlety and attempted 
to enforce a cansisteivy4plicy which the British could more easily understand. 
Under such intense pissmBadagry collapsed into civil war in June 1851. 
Hitherto no camprehmiwtxamination of the Badagry civil war has been 
made. Historical acconts, isually written in the context of more general studies 
of coastal politics, hamteakd to present Badagry's collapse as the inevitable fall 
of a dangerously inserwead peripheral state, in the context of the town's total 
susceptibility W widerAdiie forces. Newbury, for example, concludes that the 
conflict was thme resultif *dynastic quarrel between Kosoko and Akitoye, 
whilst Ayandete, notwTikng-ly, sees it as a struggle against the encroachment 
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of the missionary factor 1. Their conclusions are understandable and not 
inaccurate, but in reality offer only individual threads within a more complicated 
picture and neglect wholly the internal aspects of Badagrian affairs, which 
ultimately proved so important in not only allowing but actually stimulating the 
town's dissolution into warfare. In his more detailed examination of the period, 
Okaro K'Cýwang makes a surprisingly brief analysis of the civil war itself. The 
organisation of his material, whereby he has separated political and economic 
aspects into separate chapters, and indeed separate sections of his analysis, fails to 
identify links between the various causes of the war and indeed makes a very 
limited attempt to doSo 2. Furthermore, as a result of the general tendency 
towards a coastal perspective, the Badagry civil war has been presented only as a 
passive response to coastal pressures. It has yet to be seen itself as an important 
motivating factor in coastal affairs. I would argue that the civil war at Badagry 
warrants further consideration in this light, particularly in relation to events at 
Lagos a few months later. 
Contemporary observers of the war in Badagry, although often providing useful 
accounts, have also tended to interpret events oversimplistically, usually to suit 
their own pressing aims. For some it was the result of individual prejudice, a 
reflection of very personal dislikes and rivalries 3. Other, often missionary, 
reports, accounted for the explosion of violence in terms of virulent anti-British 
I Newbury, The Western Slave Coast... pp. 47-48; Ayandele, Dahomey and Its Neighbours... p. 9- 
10. 
2 Okaro KOJwang briefly describes how, three months after the Dahomean assault on Abeokuta of 
March 1851, 'the two factions' at Badagry confronted each other. He makes no detailed analysis of 
the causes of the war, but suggests that: 
the pre[o] - Kosoko forces sought to preserve their independence while the 
prefo] - Akitoye party were bent on subjugating the former and installing 
the Mewu as the sole ruler 
[Okaro KOJwang, 'Society, Trade and Politics in Badagry... ', p. 1201. 
3 In 1854 Consul Campbell concluded that it was the CMS missionary Charles Gollmer who had 
been largely to blame for the outbreak of violence [PRO F084/950 1 May 1854 Campbell, Lagos). But 
the identification of Gollmer as the cause of 'all the strifes and the civil war in Badagry' was 
largely the result of the bitterness which developed between Campbell and the CMS agents at 
work on the coast soon after his appointment as Consul at Lagos. 
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feeling 4. The supposed role of Dahomey, and more notably Lagos in stirring up 
such feeling and even launching the initial attacks on the town were presented 
as evidence to support the view that British intervention was required to protect 
British lives, commercial interests and allies. Badagry's collapse into anarchy was 
the ideal opportunity to present the struggle between so-called anti-slave trader 
and slave trader in simple terms that everyone would understand5. These 
accounts therefore require careful consideration as sources of empirical evidence, 
although they undoubtedly say a lot about the development of British thought 
and ideas. But such accounts proved to be not only descriptive but ultimately 
prescriptive in defining the development of sides in the conflict. From a careful 
analysis of the evidence it would appear that the extent of the initial outbreak 
was somewhat confused and perhaps surprisingly limited. But the British view 
of a conflict between Gun chiefs and the Mewu/Akitoye party, and more simply a 
slaver versus anti-slaver group, did in fact lead to polarisation and the 
subsequent development of British 'policy' along these lines. In order to gain an 
accurate understanding of the events of the Badagry civil war it is necessary, 
then, to both look beyond these somewhat distorted images and also use them to 
make a detailed assessment of events in the wider context of coastal affairs and 
their town perspective. For ultimately Badagry's collapse into civil war was the 
result of a number of complex factors which were indeed indicative of wider 
coastal problems but which had taken on a typically Badagrian character. 
4 Revd Townsend, identified the Badagry civil war as indicative of the hatred felt by the slave 
trading cause, led by Kosoko, towards the anti-slave trade campaign of the British [PRO F084/892 
5 August 1851 Townsend, Abeokuta in 5 January 1852 Hamilton, London]. 
5 On arriving at Badagry in August 1850, The American missionary Thomas Bowen'was informed' 
that: 
Gezo and Kosokkoh were concocting a plan to destroy Abbeokuta and subdue 
Badagry, so as to expel the English merchants and missionaries and restore 
the slave trade 
[Bowen, Adventures and Missionary Labours... p. 96). 
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The Consular District 
The appointment of Consuls to the coast of West Africa was, according to Martin 
Lynn, an attempt by the Foreign Office, headed by Palmerston, to urge Dahomey 
into an anti-slave trading treaty, and in the light of increased Anglo/French 
competition along the coast, to forge closer commercial links with that kingdom. 
Lynn, however, goes on to suggest that Palmerston's policy towards the coast was 
ultimately remoulded by those very agents and that to deflect attention away 
from the Consul's personal failures at the Dahomean capital during 1850 and 
1851, despatches from the coast increasingly directed London further east towards 
Lagos6- 
It is easy to understand how Palmerston was persuaded to accept Lagos as the key 
to British anti-slaving and commercial aspirations. According to Lynn individual 
agents on the coast were enough their own masters to be ultimately the 
formulators of 'British policy' in west Africa, a 'policy' which culminated in the 
bombardment of Lagos and the deposition of its King at the end of 1851. The low 
priority of West Africa amongst other more pressing foreign concerns, the 
difficulty of communications between London and the coast, the huge 
geographical areas involved and also, lastly, the personalities of the Consuls 
themselves played key roles in giving the West African agents freedom of action. 
Palmerston appointed sixty year old John Beecroft as Consul for the Bights of 
Benin and Biafra. A one-time trader who had acted as British Governor at 
Fernando Po, Lynn points out that, with his humble background and a 
somewhat 'murky' career, 'Beecroft was far from the typical picture of a member 
of Her Majesty's Consular service ... 
7. Appointed in a temporary capacity under 
Beecroft as Vice-Consul based at Whydah was the explorer John Duncan. But 
Duncan died shortly after taking up the post and was replaced by the abrasive 
6 Lynn, 'Consuls and Kings... ', p. 150. 
7 lbid, p. 152. Also see M Lynn, 'John Beecroft and West Africa 1829-54' PhD Thesis, I 
London 1979. 
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Louis Fraser in December 1850 8. 
As instructed by London, Duncan and Beecroft embarked on a series of meetings 
with the Dahomean King at his capital in an attempt to negotiate an end to the 
slave trade. The efforts of both Vice-Consul and Consul at Abomey proved to be 
almost unqualified failures. However, after visiting other areas in the Bight of 
Benin, the Consul began to direct attention towards other concerns 9. His mission 
to Abomey in May 1850 accompanied by Commander Forbes failed to extract the 
hoped for treaty or any firm commitment towards British aims. As a result, in 
his writings on the mission, Beecroft attempted to obscure his own 
disappointments by questioning the influence of the Dahomean King over the 
coast 10. The Consul did claim, however, to have been impressed by affairs at the 
Egba capital, Abeokuta, despite this being a period when Christians were 
suffering persecution 11. In this way, he continued, it was Lagos, under the 
control of the usurper King Kosoko and allied with Dahomey, which both posed 
a threat to Egba stability and promoted the trade in slaves. Beecroft therefore 
concluded in his London despatches, somewhat incoherently, that it was Lagos 
which was the key to ending the slave trade 12. But whilst the Consul had 
evidently recognised Lagos as 'the focus of the slave trade in the Bight of Benin' 
by the end of 1850,1 would suggest that it was not merely his personal failure at 
Abomey which hastened Government attention further east 13. Missionary 
pressures, notably from the Church Missionary Society, also played an important 
role in persuading Palmerston, as early as 1849, that it was Lagos which posed the 
8 PRO F02 /4 December 1850 FO Draft, London. 
9 Duncan's visit to Abomey with Commander Forbes in October 1849 resulted in a promise from King 
Gezo to consider the abandonment of the slave trade. But when Beecroft visited the Dahomean 
capital a few months later to press home the advantage he was severely disappointed in the 
response of the King. 
10 Beecroft concluded that: 
this great Despot, the King of Dahomey, has been awfully exaggerated 
as to his wealth and power 
[PRO F084/816 Beecroft's journal of his Mission to Abomey May 18501. 
11 CMR October 1851, p. 218. 
12 PRO F084/816 Beecroft's journal ... May 1850. 
13 PRO F084 / 816 5 December 1850 Beecroft, Fernando Po. 
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most dangerous threat to their work. Furthermore, it was a number of their 
members operating at Abeokuta and Badagry who, having become deeply 
involved in local politics helped tip the balance between British diplomatic 
manoeuvring and direct action. 
A CMS Deputation met with Palmerston in December 1849. Producing evidence 
from their coastal correspondents, notably Townsend and Gollmer, the 
deputation pressed for the enforced security of the Ogun River to protect Egba 
interests in the light of continuing insecurities at Badagry 14. That Palmerston's 
thinking was influenced by this meeting seems apparent from a note written a 
few days later questioning whether it would in fact not be possible to compel the 
King of Lagos to enter into a treaty of slave trade suppression, or whether 'we 
might expel this chief and reinstate the friendly chief who was ousted ... 7115. 
Supporters of the Egba cause sought to influence Palmerston's commercial as 
well as his spiritual sensibility. In early 1850 the CMS deputation was followed up 
by a deputation of the Manchester Cotton Association 16. Palmerston's despatches 
to Beecroft in the earliest days of 1850, also drew the Consul's attention to the 
'pernicious influence which is exercised by the slave dealers at Lagos' and the 
presence of the deposed King'friendly to the English'who 'now lives in exile 
near Badagry'. In a crossed out section of the original draft Palmerston also went 
as far as to suggest that if Kosoko refused to enter into an agreement he could be 
expelled and replaced by Akitoye 17. These sentiments were however, only 
conveyed to the Consul a year later, when Beecroft was himself actively pursuing 
14 The deputation included the Right Hon Earl of Waldegrave, Sir Robert Harry Inglis MP, Sir 
Thomas Dyke Acland MP, Sir Edward M Buxton MP, Revd Henry Venn, Revd Henry Townsend, 
Revd CG[? ] Gollmer, and Mr William Hutton. The group pressed for the security of the Ogun River, 
in other words, the deposition of Kosoko at the River's mouth. Supporting evidence was presented 
in the form of missionary accounts describing the desire of the Egba people for Christianity in the 
face of oppression by the slave trading powers of Dahomey and Lagos [PRO F084 / 777 3 December 
1849 Chichester, London]. 
15 PRO F084 / 777 24 December 1849 Note by Palmerston attached to 3 December 1849 Chichester, 
London. 
16 PRO F084/816 28 February 1850 Palmerston, London. 
17 PRO F084 / 816 25 February 1850 Palmerston, London. 
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a more easterly policy 18. 
I would also suggest that it was the combination of both missionary and consular 
concerns over affairs at Badagry, in the early months of the 1850s which hastened 
empty threats to be changed to direct action by Britain's spiritual and political 
representatives. As its only coastal point of contact with Britain, Badagry 
provided Abeokuta with both its missionary links and more practically its arms 
supplies. But the early 1850s in Badagry were a period of extreme insecurity. The 
town's changing commercial fortunes over the previous decade had exacerbated 
rivalries between indigenous groups, and the ensuing political crisis was utilised 
by factions eager to secure their own ends. Other groups amongst the newer 
arrivals, notably the Sierra Leonians, were often blamed for the declining 
fortunes and increasing turmoil in the town. Perceiving the situation in over 
simiplistic terms and their Sierra Leonian flock as innocent victims, the 
Christian missionaries at Badagry became increasingly embroiled in local affairs, 
thus ironically themselves becoming a key element in the ensuing political 
chaos. lt was at this point that the British secular agents at work on the coast took 
the initiative, removing Akitoye from his increasingly dangerous place of exile 
to the safety of Fernando Po, and thus ultimately precipitating direct action 
against Lagos in December 1851. 
Badagry in the Early 1850s 
When Revd Gollmer returned to Badagry in the early part of 1850 from leave in 
England he wrote optimistically of the warmth of his welcome. He did, however, 
18 Palmerston instructed Beecroft to make treaties with any of the cl-defs along the coast of his 
district and to 'induce' Kosoko to enter into such an agreement. The following day Palmerston 
reminded Beecroft of the methods he might use in order to persuade the Lagos King: 
you should beg him to remember that Lagos is near to the sea and 
that on the sea are the ships and the cannon of England, and also to 
bear in mind that he does not hold his authority without a 
competitor and that the chiefs of the African tribes do not always 
retain their authority to the end of their lives 
f PRO F084/858 20 & 21 February 1851 Palmerston, London]. 
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note, evidently with some self-satisfaction, that in his absence, under the 
guardianship of Revd Smith, no increase had been made to the average one 
hundred and thirty people attending Sunday morning service and that there was 
'not one fresh' candidate for baptism 19. With the return of two of its most 
energetic members, Townsend and Gollmer, the Yoruba Mission was renewed 
with increased vigour. The arrivals of March 1850 also included Gollmer's new 
wife, another missionary couple Mr and Mrs Eugene Van Cooten and a 
Mechanic, Mr Huber. Numbers were boosted later in the same month by the 
arrival of three Gold Coast Catechists, James Barber, James White and Thomas 
King 20. 
Although Thomas King was destined to move on to Abeokuta after only a 
couple of weeks at Badagry, he recorded his initial impressions of the town. 
Shocked by the 'superstition and idolatry' which he found there and horrified by 
an execution for witchcraft which took place only a few days after his arrival, 
King nevertheless retained his optimism. Indeed he observed that the progress of 
the school children was 'sufficient to cheer the drooping hopes of the 
labourers, 21. Mr Van Cooten also maintained high hopes for his progress in 
preaching about the town and wrote of his warm reception in the palm wine 
sheds 22. But both Mr and Mrs Van Cooten were dead almost within the year. In 
June 1850 Revd Muller at Abeokuta also died and Revd Smith was sent from the 
coast to replace him, despite the increasing persecution of Christians at that place. 
At Badagry, although no organised form of religious persecution occurred, the 
missionaries became increasingly disheartened. By the end of 1850 the Anglicans 
still retained twenty two communicants, thirteen candidates for baptism and the 
19 CMSA CA2 / 043 /107 June 1850 Goilmer's journal, Badagry. 
20 Gollmer's third wife was Sarah Caroline Hoar. Mr Van Cooten was a Dutch surgeon who had 
trained for his missionary duties at Islington College [Ajayi, 'A History of the Yoruba Mission... ', p. 
641. 
21 CMR October 1851, p. 219,21 March 1850 King's Journal, Badagry. 
22 CMSA CA2 / 086 /7 28 April 1850 Van Cooten's journal, Badagry. 
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numbers attending Sunday service appear to have remained constant. But the 
numbers attending both Sunday and Day school were falling and their boarding 
school was 'almost broken Up, 23. Revd Gollmer wrote dramatically of a mission 
in crisis and stated that the people would not listen and seemed 'at present quite 
enraged against us'. He feared that there were a number in Badagry who were 
hoping to rid the town of missionaries once and for all so that 'slave traders 
could come here, 24. 
It would indeed appear that commercial concerns had brought the missionaries 
into conflict with the people and more importantly with certain chiefs. Gollmer 
was the subject of a vitriolic verbal attack by Chief Jengen over missionary 
hostility towards Portuguese traders operating in the town25. The other principal 
chiefs evidently dismissed Jengen's words as those of a drunkard. However, 
more surprisingly, during the same period, Gollmer also came into conflict with 
Chief Mobi of Boeko Ward, a figure traditionally recognised as an'English Chief 
The dispute arose over the position of the mission fence which Mobi argued 
would 'rob the fetish of his road. Other chiefs, including the Wawu, intervened 
on the mission's behalf but Gollmer noted that Mobi's hostility was evidently 
rooted in bitterness over the lack of material advantage their establishment in 
his ward had brought 26. By October 1850 all Gollmer's optimism and confidence 
had disappeared and he warned that the missionaries position was 'rather 
critical'. No evangelical progress was made, the boarding school was almost 
abandoned, the missionaries were insulted openly in the streets and Gollmer 
wrote that an unnamed chief spoke freely of driving them away 27. 
23 CMSA CA2 / 043 /108 24 September -1850 Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
24 CMSA CA2/043/108 24 September 1850 Gollmer's' journal, Badagry. 
25 CMSA CA2 / 043 /108 24 September 1850 Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
26 CMSA CA2 / 043 /109 30 September 1850 Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
27C October 1851, p. 210,25 October 1850, Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
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The difficulties faced by the Christian missionaries at work in Badagry were 
evidently symptomatic of far wider tensions and the suggestion that these 
problems were rooted firmly in commercial concerns requires further 
examination. The disruption of interior trade routes and supplies caused by the 
Yoruba wars was noted by the American missionary Bowen during his visit to 
the area in the early 1850S 28. Gollmer in 1851 also noted a 'scarcity of provisions' 
and high food prices which he concluded was the result of the lack of local 
agriculture and the Badagrian's obsession with trade 29. However, what is 
interesting about Badagry in the early 1850s is that evidence would seem to 
suggest that the Atlantic commerce of the town was in fact continuing to operate 
and indeed showed signs of increasing. Despite considerable upheaval, in October 
1851 Gollmer himself noted that as well as the ships of Hutton, two Sierra 
Leonian vessels and an American had carried 'a considerable quantity of oil away 
this year' and also that Domingo Martinez at Porto-Novo had apparently 
purchased a large quantity from Badagry 30. Evidence for an increase in Badagry's 
palm oil exports is supported by its increased attraction for foreign traders such as 
Mr Sandeman for the firm Forster and Smith who settled there during the early 
months of 1851 31. But there is no evidence to suggest a similar resurgence in 
slave trading at Badagry. Indeed, its almost complete omission from 
contemporary accounts would seem to suggest that this trade at Badagry was now 
firmly banished to the periphery. 
The success of Badagry's 'legitimate' Atlantic trade should be seen in the context 
of the town as a whole. Evidence would seem to suggest that the population was 
growing at a rapid rate. In 1845 Gollmer had put the number of inhabitants at 
between five or six thousand, but estimated in 1849 that the figure was now eight 
28 Bowen, Adventures and Missionary Labours... p. 114. 
29CM October 1851, pp. 225-226,28- January 1851, Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
30 CMR October 1851, pp. 225-226,28 January 1851, Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
31 CMSA CA2/043/19 5 July 1851 Gollmer, Badagry. 
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thousand32. Revd Bowen a year later put the figure closer to ten thousand 33. 
Bowen went on to describe a chaotic town swarming with 'thieves and 
drunkards, whose only object in life was sensual gratification' 34. The American's 
overdramatic puritanical distaste for Badagry does, however, suggest a town 
stretched to breaking point. 
The difficulties amongst the population of Badagry were intensified by the 
identification of certain groups as troublemakers or scapegoats. In August 1850 
Gollmer described the Muslims in Badagry as a 'numerous and powerful 
party'35. During the same period Van Cooten, lamenting the lack of Christian 
progress at Badagry, noted also that Islam was 'gaining ground, 36. However, 
despite the obvious strength of the Islamic section of the town's community, 
there is unfortunately very little evidence to suggest what political role was 
played by this group during the period. Despite the potential political influence of 
the Muslim population, they received startlingly little coverage in contemporary 
European reports. However, a group which did receive attention in such 
accounts were the Sierra Leonian settlers. That this group bore the brunt of 
Badagrian hostility to British anti-slaving methods was attested by the indignant 
missionary observers. This interpretation is understandable. The Sierra 
Leonians, who saw themselves as British subjects, were obvious scapegoats for 
hostility to British restrictions. Furthermore, with their European links it was 
clearly this group who were in an advantageous position to pursue their own 
legitimate trading ends. In this way then it was the Sierra Leonians employed in 
the British trading factories who came under particular attack during the latter 
part of 1850 and 1851 37. However the commercial aspect to increasing Sierra 
32 CMSA CA2 / 043 / 95 28 January 1845 Gollmer's journal, Badagry; = August 1849, p. 93, Gollmer's 
description.... 
33 Bowen, Adventures and Missionary Labours- p. 93. 
34 Thid, p. 99. 
35 CMSA CA2/043/108 11 August 1850 Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
36 CMR October 1851, p. 220,13 October 1850, Van Cooten, Badagry. 
37 CMSA CA2 / 043 /109 5&6 October 1850 Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
287 
Leonian unpopularity also suggests more complex undercurrents which meant 
that these new immigrants were not so much victims of circumstance but rather 
were an ascendant and competitive political force within the town. In 
missionary accounts it was the association of the Sierra Leonians with the palm 
oil trade which not only attracted hostility from other parties but also gave the 
smaller group the ability and confidence to pursue their own aims and 
ultimately to challenge the traditional political and commercial institutions of' 
the town. During the 1840s, there had certainly been occasions when the Sierra 
Leonians had challenged the automatic authority of their hosts. One group had 
threatened to renounce the Wawu as their 'English Chief' over his failure to 
redeem a kidnapped child38. In 1850 Bowen also noted a'strong minority of 
people', which he did not specifically identify, but who by implication may be the 
Sierra Leonians or at least the Christian element among them: this group, he 
noted, posed a challenge to the traditional gift-receiving practices of the town's 
ruling elite and as a result'These greedy chiefs are no longer able to rob men as 
they did Landers, 39. 
The evidently increasing tensions between some Gun and Sierra Leone sections 
are apparent from missionary accounts, despite their tendency to present them 
as victims of immigrant persecution and heroic struggle. Relations reached crisis 
point in October 1850 when'The Sierra Leone people rose in a body and took up 
arms against the Poposin Boeko Ward. The account given by Gollmer described 
how a catalogue of annoyance and sometimes injury inflicted by the 'Popos' had 
culminated in the burning down of an immigrant's house dangerously close to 
the Bristol factory. According to Gollmer, the Sierra Leonians demanded redress 
for the offence and the two perpetrators were brought to trial at the fetish. 
However, on being found guilty the criminals were allowed to escape'and those 
38 PRO F084 / 663 19 April 1845 Extract from Crowther's journal, Badagry in 7 January 1846 Coates, 
London. 
39 Bowen, Adventures and Missionary Labours... p. 99. 
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that gave chase were obstructed. Appalled by this fiasco the Sierra Leonians took 
up arms and the town was threatened with severe disturbances. Somewhat 
surprisingly Gollmer declined to take any part in the proceedings and noted that 
it was the Wesleyan Schoolmaster who ultimately 'took it upon himself' to call 
a meeting of both parties and settle the dispute 40. A few days later Commander 
Patey and HMS Flying Fish arrived off Badagry offering assistance. Gollmer 
replied that due to the critical state of the country, a declaration should be made, 
similar to that made five years previously, that as British subjects living in peace, 
the Naval Officers would not allow any injury to befall the English residents. 
Accordingly a meeting of chiefs and officers took place at which the Badagrys 
were asked if they wished the English to leave, 'to which the chiefs reluctantly 
replied in the negative' 41. 
It is imperative to recognise that Gollmer's distinction between Topos' and their 
Sierra Leonian opponents was ultimately misleading. Undoubtedly, as a result of 
their 'Britishness' this group were identified as the cause of commercial 
difficulty, as they themselves sought to assert their own political position. But in 
reality, these opposing 'sides' were more transient and illusory. As noted above, 
Sierra Leone and Gun traders were both engaged or sought to be engaged in slave 
and 'legitimate' trade. Therefore to suggest that, as a distinct group, the Sierra 
Leonians were a commercially and ultimately politically revolutionary force in 
Badagrian politics is inaccurate. There was no 'crisis of adaptation' as a new 
political order sought to emerge. It was merely the painful but continuous 
political struggle symptomatic of Badagry's efforts to maintain its economic 
lifelines. But what is important at this point is that the British perception was 
very different. Contemporary European sources crudely identified opposing 
groups and motives in an attempt to meet their own agendas and also merely to 
explain events in ways they themselves could more easily understand. As a 
40 CMSA CA2 / 043 /109 5,6 &7 October 1850 Gollmer's Journal, Baclagry. 
41 CMSA CA2 / 043 /109 9,10 & 11 October 1850 Gollmer's Journal, Badagry. 
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result, sweeping generalisations were made and the various strands of tension 
within Badagry were presented in terms of slave traders versus anti-slave traders. 
Since the arrival of the missionaries in the early 1840s, European perceptions of 
Badagry had always been more than merely the colourful descriptions printed in 
missionary publications. They had not only been influential in shaping British 
policy towards the coast but also African agendas. Maclean's garrison at Badagry 
was the direct result of missionary perceptions, as was Akitoye's adoption and 
manipulation of the anti-slave trade movement. But 1850 and the arrival of 
Consul Beecroft, with his direct recourse to British military power, made the 
shaping of British perceptions and policy of critical importance. 
Gollmer's journal for October 1850 went on to say that barely was the dispute 
between the 'Popo' and Sierra Leonians settled than another, even more 
dangerous confrontation, emerged between the Gun and the champion of the 
anti-slave trade movement, Akitoye 42. Tensions arose between the ex-King of 
Lagos and his hosts over continuing trade with Lagos. According to Gollmer, 
during Adele's exile at Badagry in the 1820s the Lagos road was closed and 
nobody dared to go there. However, despite Akitoye's attempts to enforce a 
similar embargo a number of Badagrians persisted in going down the lagoon to 
trade. The Badagry chiefs made token gestures to mollify Akitoye, but to little 
effect. On October 15 Gollmer wrote in his journal that, in exasperation, Akitoye 
had seized seven Ajido men fishing on the lagoon at Badagry and refused to 
release them until those that had gone to Lagos had been punished. The ward 
chiefs refused to comply and furthermore threatened Akitoye with expulsion 
from the town if the captives were not released within five days. Both sides 
prepared for confrontation, while neighbouring chiefs were called in over the 
matter. A local priest, Akibode, appealed to Gollmer to intervene, but"after 
mature consideration' Gollmer decided not to become involved 'since no one 
42 CMSA CA2/043/109 15 October 1850 Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
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knows who is right or wrong, 43. Ultimately this particular conflict came to 
nothing and both sides backed down. But the issue of traders going to Lagos 
remained contentious throughout the remainder of 1850. Tensions reached a 
peak in December of that year, just prior to the expected visit of Consul Beecroft 
on his way to Abeokuta. Despite renewed proclamations by the chiefs that 
departure for Lagos was forbidden and punishable by death, Gollmer noted that 
large parties from Badagry and the neighbouring towns continued to go down 
the lagoon. On 14 December a group of Isos and Badagry people prepared to 
depart for Lagos openly singing songs derogatory to Akitoye. Violence threatened 
to erupt44. The following days saw a series of threats, counter-threats and 
individual incidents of aggression. However, yet again neither side was 
provoked into all-out attack and, with the Isos' departure for home, the town 
was again quieted although the issue remained unsettled . Throughout January 
1851 the missionaries warned that 'we cannot tell when the dark threatening 
cloud will burst upon US, 45. 
It is evident that external affairs continued to play a crucial role. Throughout the 
October conflict between the Gun group and Akitoye's Lagos party, Gollmer also 
identified difficulties over relations with Abeokuta due to allegations of 
Badagrians robbing Egba traders. At the same time, Ipokia was calling on Badagry 
to mediate between it and Abeokuta in an attempt to avert an Egba assault on 
that place. Furthermore, there were yet again rumours and fears of a future 
Dalhomean attack on the town 46. 
The reaction of the British forces to the difficult situation faced by British subjects 
on the coast was to attempt a vigilant watch and, as noted, remind the Badagry 
chiefs of their obligations as hosts. Although little more was possible, 'Gollmer, in 0 
43 CMSA CA2 / 043 /109 15 October 1850 Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
44 CMSA CA2 / 043 /109 14 December 1850 Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
45 PRO F084/860 3 January 1851 Gollmer, Badagry in 26 March 1851 Venn, London. 
46 PRO F084/865 22 October 1850 Gollmer, Badagry in 3 January 1851 Hamilton, London. 
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a letter to Commodore Fanshawe evidently saw the role of naval 'Protection' as 
crucial to their continued safety on the coast. Gollmer went on to urge frequent 
landings and the discharging of a few guns from the sea but declined an offer of 
arms and ammunition47. There is also an interesting, but singular, reference to 
the appointment, in December 1850, of a Vice-Consul for Badagry. In a letter to 
Captain Trotter from Abeokuta, Revd Townsend mentions briefly that a Mr 
Beresford had been appointed to this position48. He included no further detail 
on the matter and the subject is not alluded to in any other despatch from either 
him or any other source. That Townsend was mistaken in this statement seems 
apparent, and may possibly be explained by over-enthusiastic Missionary hopes 
or merely rumour. Furthermore, some confusion may have arisen over the 
imminent visit of Consul Beecroft on his way to Abeokuta. 
The Arrival of Beecroft 
Consul Beecroft eventually arrived at Badagry on 2 January 1851 49. Welcomed 
enthusiastically by missionaries and the Sierra Leonian population, Beecroft was 
immediately informed of their fears and concerns 50. Despite reserving judgment 
initially, because 'there is no believing a great deal of what you hear', Beecroft 
had evidently already or very quickly concluded that Lagos was at the root of 
Badagry's difficulties 51. The development of Beecroft's thoughts during January 
1851 is, unfortunately, difficult to trace as a further account was delayed until his 
submission of a full report to Palmerston after his return to Fernando Po in 
February. According to this later report, the Consul initially held a private 
meeting with Akitoye, at which he was impressed by the deposed King's 
prudence. Beecroft was persuaded at this meeting by Akitoye and Gollmer, who 
was also present during this private interview, that 'there is a league formed 
47 PRO F084 / 865 22 October 1850 Gollmer, Badagry in 3 January 1851 Hamilton, London. 
48 PRO F084/860 10 December 1850 Townsend, Abeokuta. 
49 PRO F084/858 4 January 1851 Beecroft, Badagry. 
50 PRO F084/860 3 January 1851 Gollmer, Badagry in 26 March 1851 Venn, London. 
51 PRO F084 / 858 4 January 1851 Beecroft, Badagry; PRO F084 / 858 21 February 1851 Beecroft, 
Fernando Po. 
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with Kosoko ... the present ruler of Lagos and the Topos' of Badagry, against 
Akitoye so far advanced that his life is in danger, indeed he has offered a 
premium for his head 152. Beecroft urged Akitoye to keep his many followers 
under control, at least until he had returned from Abeokuta and then convened 
a meeting of all the Badagry chiefs. The Consul called together ten chiefs, in 
which number he included the eight ward chiefs, Akitoye and 'Mayo' [the 
Mewu] 'a staunch friend of Akitoye's'. At the meeting which took place the 
following day, after outlining the purpose of his mission and discussing some 
minor matters, Beecroft 'addressed them relative to Kosoko of Lagos tampering 
with some parties; relative to a person of note under their protection'. According 
to Beecroft's report, having impressed upon the chiefs their obligation to protect 
Akitoye, they in turn 'denied having any communication with Kosoko on that 
matter', and promised faithfully to preserve the peace until his return53. 
According to Gollmer's report to CMS Headquarters, however, the chiefs, or at 
least the Posu, acknowledged that there was a 'serious matter pending', but 
assured Beecroft that they did not wish to fight 54. Any comfort Beecroft may 
have taken from the Posu and his fellow chiefs was dispelled on his arrival at 
Abeokuta a few days later. His meetings with the Egba chiefs were dominated by 
their fears over Lagos under Kosoko and the intrigues of that King with the 
Badagry people. Furthermore, Beecroft was introduced to a man, presumably an 
Egba, who had been at Lagos and recounted two recent meetings between visiting 
Badagry chiefs and Kosoko to ascertain 'the best means to attack' the town 55. 
Evidently the meetings had proved inconclusive, with the conspirators raising 
fears over the possible use of English force against them. Beecroft, however, 
returned to the coast on 24 January fully convinced of the dangers posed by Lagos 
and that the population of Badagry were a 'faithless set of vagabonds' 56. 
52 PRO F084/858 21 February 1851 Beecroft, Fernando Po. 
53 PRO F084/858 21 February 1851 Beecroft, Femando Po. 
54 CMSA CA2/043/15 9 February 1851 Gollmer, Badagry. 
55 PRO F084/858 21 February 1851 Beecroft, Fernando Po, 
56 PRO F084/858 21 February 1851 Beecroft, Femando Po. 
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While Beecroft was at Abeokuta tensions at Badagry continued to be heightened 
from east and west. Thomas Hutton had been at Lagos, unsuccessfully attempting 
to establish a factory there. Returning west via Badagry, Hutton brought with 
him several messengers from Lagos whose presence in the town caused 
consternation amongst Akitoye's followers 57. At the same time, Gollmer was 
informed by Akitoye that a large party of Isos from the west were intending to, 
break the lagoon embargo and pass down to Lagos 58. Gollmer himself admitted 
to being uncertain of the object of this expedition, but the gesture was 
undoubtedly seen as provocative. On January 15 Gollmer fearfully noted that 
violence was about to erupt 59. Ultimately it would appear that the Gun backed 
down, despite reports that Lagos forces were waiting a few miles away at Ajido to 
help them. But the town remained on red alert. Significantly it was the Gun 
Wawu who, continuing to act as 'English Chief', sent messages requesting both 
missionaries and Sierra Leonians to remain in doors should they hear gunfire. 
Meanwhile a number of the town's inhabitants removed their families to a place 
of safety 60. 
By the time Beecroft returned to Badagry later in the month the two British 
warships jackal and Flying Fish were lying offshore. There is no indication as to 
exactly when these ships had arrived, nor indeed whether they had played a role 
in persuading the Badagrys to maintain an uneasy peace. Beecroft, it would 
appear, attempted to alleviate the situation by visiting six chiefs individually. As 
well as the Mewu and Akitoye, Beecroft went to meet the Akran, the Wawu, the 
Posu, the jengen and also chief Isa, the ex-chief of Idale. But it was evidently in 
the company of the Mewu and Akitoye that he attended church 61. 
57 CMSA CA2 / 043 / 110 12 January 1851 Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
58 CMSA CA2 / 043 /110 13 January 1851 Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
59 CMSA CA2/043/110 15 January 1851 Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
60 CMSA CA2 / 043 / 110 15 January 1851 Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
61 PRO F084 / 858 21 February 1851 Beecroft, Fernando Po. 
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The Consul's attempts to reconcile Badagry's factions was, however, only a 
partial solution. Rumours that the Iso party, evidently under the control of 
Porto-Novo, were still making their way down the lagoon were rife. Gollmer 
reported that the Porto-Novans, seeing that the road to Lagos was now open, 
were eager to take commercial advantage. However, fearing attack from 
Akitoye's people should they pass, they had hired a mercenary force for their 
protection. But Akitoye and the Mewu were claiming that, far from being a 
trading party, those from the west were going to join Kosoko's military forces in 
a concerted attack. Gollmer at this stage evidently still hoped to avoid 
confrontation within Badagry. Urging moderation, he warned that Porto-Novo 
could not only stop its own commerce with Badagry but also block the road to 
Ipokia and Ado 'by stationing some Isos at the confluence of the Ossa and the 
great branch leading up to Pokia and AdUI 62. Beecroft on the other hand was 
prepared for more decisive action. He instructed Akitoye that should the Isos 
arrive 'in hostile army' they should not be allowed to pass 63. 
Unfortunately, Beecroft's understanding of affairs at Badagry was woefully 
simplistic. Having been persuaded by the Egba and also by rumours of a plot for 
his own assassination, he regarded all aspects of Badagry's complex problems in 
terms of a power struggle between Kosoko and Akitoye. Badagry's economic 
problems and the deposed King's unpopularity, for example, he saw merely as a 
result of Akitoye's poverty and his inability to 'feed the vultures'. The Consul 
therefore concluded that removing the exile from the area would not only save 
his life but would 'ultimately put a stop to hostile intentions against Badagry by 
Kosoko ... and the King of 
Porto NOVO' 64. 
62 CMSA CA2/043/15 9 February 1851 Gollmer, Badagry. 
63 PRO F084/858 21 February 1851 Beecroft, Fernando Po. 
64 PRO F084/858 21 February 1851 Beecroft, Fernando Po. 
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Having informed Akitoye privately that he should take refuge at Fernando Po, 
Beecroft felt that there was little more he could or should do. There was another 
reported meeting between the Consul and five Badagry chiefs, one of whom was 
the Posu. According to Beecroft's report, the chiefs, unaware of his plans to 
remove Akitoye, appealed to him to mediate between the approaching Porto- 
Novans and the exiled King. However, Beecroft, confident in his own 
assessment of the situation, was not persuaded by their conciliatory language., 
Determined that they should not deceive him as to their true tenmity against a 
man that had kept them from starvation', the Consul 'rebuked them ... severely' 
in terms which evidently prevented any further meetings. He then sent a 
message to the Porto-Novan King instructing him that his forces should not 
come to Badagry and evidently spent the remainder of his visit meeting with the 
Sierra Leone people and chastising them for their lapses into slave owning and 
trading. Akitoye himself appears to have hesitated over leaving, but was 
ultimately persuaded to go 65. 
On 28 January 1851 Akitoye secretly accompanied Consul Beecroft on board the 
waiting ship and departed for Fernando Po. According to Revd Gollmer, the 
departure of Akitoye caused a sensation in Badagry. 'Never has a King done so 
before' exclaimed some of the people', although whether they were referring to 
his putting to sea or apparent abandonment of his people is unspecified 66. 
Gollmer also took pleasure in describing the alarm caused at Lagos. Obviously 
attempting to illustrate how easily an assault on Kosoko's monarchy might be 
made, the missionary recounted in a letter to Beecroft, that, fearing an attempt 
was about to be made to restore Akitoye, Kosoko and his party prepared to flee 67 
65 PRO F084/858 21 February 1851 Beecroft, Fernando Po. 
66 CMR October 1851, p. 224,29 January 1851, Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
67 PRO F084/858 18 March 1851 Gollmer, Badagry. 
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It immediately became clear, however, that Akitoye's removal had done nothing 
to alleviate the situation in Badagry and the imminent arrival of the Porto- 
Novans added increased urgency. Indeed, the removal of their leader appears to 
have made the already fearful Akitoye/Mewu faction in the town far more 
insecure and dangerous. At the request of the Badagry chiefs Gollmer called a 
meeting of the headmen of the Akitoye/Mewu group and appealed to them to 
remain calm. But the leaders, who arrived at the meeting clearly armed, would' 
not immediately agree to let the approaching Porto-Novans pass peacefully. 30 
January was spent in heated debate and recrimination. No agreement was 
reached except between Chiefs Posu, Motang and Mobi, who declared that, 
should the Porto-Novans be attacked, they in turn would fire on the aggressorS68. 
The following day was spent preparing for war. Many armed villagers joined the 
Badagry forces and others ran away. Groups of Sierra Leonians, began to seek 
shelter in the mission yard and an uneasy quietness fell over the town so that 
'the least noise was thought to be a signal for war'. Towards evening a large party 
approached the mission. The gate was closed against them, but surprisingly they 
sent a message thanking Gollmer for all his trouble and mediation. Gollmer, 
thinking prudence the better part of valour, chose to salute them from within 
the safety of the mission yard69. 
Beecroft's message to the King of Porto-Novo, that his troops should not 
approach the town, was ignored. The Consul's ring and his men were returned 
with the message that the King of Porto-Novo only desired to protect any goods 
that Kosoko may send him 70. The Mewu, evidently extremely anxious about any 
dealings with Porto-Novo, continued to insist that should they approach they 
would be attacked. However, according to his own account, it was ultimately 
68 CMSA CA2 / 043 / 110 30 January 1851 Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
69 CMSA CA2 / 043 / 110 31 January 1851 Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
70 PRO F084/858 18 March 1851 Gollmer, Badagry. 
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Gollmer who forced the Mewu to back down. The missionary informed the chief 
that should his forces attack they could no longer be considered the friends of the 
English. The Mewu was quieted and, within an hour of peace being declared at 
Badagry, the Iso forces of between two and four hundred men in one hundred 
canoes arrived opposite the town. Staying only long enough to exchange a few 
presents the Iso forces moved off along the lagoon to Lagos, where they stayed for 
only twenty days. Suffering from the effects of smallpox and drunkenness, they 
then returned home quickly and quietly 71. But in his Consular report on 
Badagry affairs, made admittedly from Fernando Po, Beecroft presented the 
peaceful settlement of the Iso problem in rather a different light. Indeed, Beecroft 
concluded that it was only the timely arrival of Commander Foote on board 
HMS Prometheus, who landed an Officer and a field piece, which averted the 
eruption of the town into violence 72. Gollmer himself, at the end of his 
dramatic journal account of these events and his own role in averting a violent 
confrontation, did admit that Mr Batten, an assistant at the Hutton Factory, had 
sent signals for aid to the recently arrived ship. But Gollmer concluded that 
when the naval officers, and presumably their field piece of which he makes no 
mention, arrived on shore at about the same time as the Isos appeared, the 
matter was already settled73. 
Yet again, however, this settlement proved to be of a very temporary nature. On 
5 February Gollmer called a meeting of the whole town, but only succeeded in 
getting the Akitoye / Mewu party to attend74. Over the next couple of days the 
arrival of messengers from Kosoko caused great tension within the town. 
Publicly these messengers requested the re-opening of diplomatic relations 
between the two states. However, Gollmer evidently suspected them of plotting 
secretly with the Badagry chiefs and, adopting an increasingly uncompromising 
71 PRO F084 858 18 March 1851 Gollmer, Badagry. 
72 PRO F084 858 24 February 1851 Beecroft, Femando Po. 
73 CMSA CA2 043 / 110 1 February 1851 Gollmer's joumal, Badagry. 
74 CMSA CA2 043 /110 5 February 1851 Gollmer's joumal, Badagry. 
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stance, he dismissed their overtures of friendship 75. 
February and March 1851 also saw a number of other disparate disruptive 
influences acting on the town from both within and without. On 20 February the 
Isos returned home peacefully, causing virtually no comment at Badagry 76. But 
three days later a serious fight broke out within the town between Mr Batten of 
the Hutton factory and another trader, Mr Randolphe from Accra. According to. 
Gollmer, Batten, hoping to drive all other traders from the town, claimed that 
the beach belonged to the Hutton Company who had bought it from the King of 
Dahomey. Accordingly, Batten had ordered all Randolphe's oil, which he was 
loading aboard a Bristol ship, to be removed from the beach. The quarrel 
dissolved into violence and Batten, having fired on Randolphe, was attacked, 
disarmed and subsequently flogged by that trader and his canoemen. The dispute 
between Batten and Randolphe threatened to take on a more serious aspect. The 
Posu took Randolphe's side whilst the Wawu, the English chief, took that of 
Batten. Gollmer was appealed to for intervention as it was feared that more 
widespread violence might erupt. The missionary, however, declined 
involvement in a 'trade quarrel' but privately noted that Batten had 'richly 
deserved' his flogging 77. 
Ultimately Badagry did not erupt into violence over this quarrel between foreign 
traders. But it is important to note that the subsequent hostility between the Posu 
and the Wawu contradicts the impression of Gun solidarity and indicates the 
complex nature of the various tensions acting within and upon Badagry during 
this period. In early March a further blow was dealt when Mr Van Cooten died. 
Van Cooten was evidently very well respected within the Badagry community 
and Gollmer noted that his death very much shook the chiefs, notably Chief Bala 
75 PRO F084/858 18 March 1851 Golimer, Badagry. 
76 CMSA CA2/043/110 20 February 1851 Golimer'sJoumal, Badagry. 
77 CMSA CA2 / 043 /110 25 February 1851 Golimer's Journal, Badagry. 
299 
who had regularly played host to the Dutchman78. The death of the more 
conciliatory Van Cooten provided a further distancing between the Badagry 
chiefs and the missionaries as represented by the forceful Revd Gollmer. 
Dramatic external events also had enormous repercussions for Badagry during 
early March. On the first day of that month the long-expected Dahomean army 
was sighted near to Abeokuta. Tension between the two powers had been 
increasing throughout the course of 1850 as Abeokuta continued to launch a 
series of campaigns against pro-Dahomean towns 79. But ultimately it was 
Kosoko who was blamed for persuading the Dahomeys to march on the Egba 
capital 80. The attack was made on 3 March and the fighting lasted two days. The 
Egba however gained the upper hand and the King of Dahomey's forces were 
defeated 81. 
The immediate post-attack period saw heightened anxieties and instability at 
Badagry. Even the popular Idagbe festival, held in April that year, was attended 
only by the Wawu and a few others 82. The Dahomean defeat immediately began 
to raise fears at the coast that the marauding army would, in desperation and 
anger, turn its attention to a more vulnerable enemy and march on Badagry 83. 
Furthermore coastal rivalries were heightened by the immediate closure of the 
Abeokuta /Lagos road by the Egba 84. But most dramatically, it rapidly emerged at 
Abeokuta, from captives taken, that a number of Badagrians, notably from the 
78 CMSA CA2 / 043 / 110 13 March 1851 Gollmer's Journal, B adagry. 
79 At the end of 1850 Townsend had warned that the Dahomeans were being provoked by Egba 
assaults on their allies and feared that they 'will not stop until some reverse teaches them to be 
moderate' fPRO F084 / 860 10 December 1850 Townsend, Abeokutal. 
80 Commander Fanshawe concluded that Kosoko had been so incensed by Akitoye's removal to 
Fernando Po that he had instigated the assault [PRO F084/865 30 March 1851 Fanshawe, off River 
Benin in 11 June 1851 Hamilton, London]. 
81 Gollmer rejoiced in the devastating defeat of the Dahomean army and wrote in delighted terms 
of the numbers of dead and wounded fPRO F084/865 26 March 1851 Gollmer, Badagry in 11 June 1851 
Hamilton, London]. 
82 Gollmer concluded that the poor attendance was the result of disharmony in the town [CMSA 
CA2 / 043 /11124 April 1851 Gollmer's Journal, Badagry]. 
83 PRO F084/858 26 March 1851 Townsend, Abeokuta in 11 June 1851 Hamilton, London. 
84 PRO F084/858 19 March 1851 Townsend, Abeokuta in 11 June 1851 Hamilton, London. 
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Posuko Quarter, had been a part of the besieging Dahomean army. As Townsend 
noted, the Egba 'could not henceforth mistake the character of Posser's pretended 
friendship' 85. The exposure of the Posu as an ally of Dahomey, was seized upon 
by the missionaries as an indication of the struggle at Badagry between good and 
evil. Subsequent instability and disturbance in the town was described in terms of 
a pro-slaving, pro-Kosoko party with the Posu as its figurehead. The 
identification of two 'sides' at Badagry was evidence enough that Kosoko at Lagos 
must go. Gollmer's tone was uncompromising. In a letter of 18 March to Consul 
Beecroft, the missionary lamented his failure in reconciling 'these two parties' 
and outlined the risk that Kosoko's continued presence at Lagos posed. Gollmer, 
whilst leaving the mechanics of the King's deposition to the military - 'you and 
HM Officers will know how to act' - did not fail to add that 'two boats would do it 
in an hour without much trouble, 86. 
But a closer examination of the Badagry situation, from the fuller missionary 
journal accounts, rather than the concise, dramatic calls for help to the Consul 
and the Naval Squadron, reveal a series of far more subtle tensions with no 
definitive 'sides'. One incident towards the end of March 1851 which threatened 
to erupt into violence occurred as a result of a relatively minor market dispute 87. 
It is evident that this dispute, which came under Gollmer Is general description of 
'frequent disturbances' and threatened outbursts in his despatch to Commodore 
Fanshawe, owed little to the struggle between slaver and anti-slaver at Badagry. 
But the reaction of Consul Beecroft to the Dahomean attack was also to look to 
the 'slave trading party' at Lagos and at a meeting with Commodore Fanshawe 
he urged the expulsion of Kosoko with renewed urgency. Fanshawe declined 
85 PRO F084 858 20 March 1851 Townsend, Abeokuta. 
86 PRO F084 858 18 March 1851 Gollmer, Badagry. 
87 According to Gollmer, 3d owed by a'Popo'woman to a Sierra Leone woman had resulted in bad 
feeling over a reluctance to repay the debt. Indeed, the 'Popo' woman had 'become possessed of a 
fetish' and the immigrants subsequent demands were therefore viewed as an affront to the gods. As 
a result payment of a fine was demanded by the 'Popo' population and the situation grew 
increasingly tense. It would appear ultimately, however, that the matter was allowed to drop 
[CMSA CA2 / 043 /11127 March 1851 Gollmer's journal, Badagry]. 
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direct involvement but promised the missionaries that a man of war would be 
anchored off Badagry88. A close watch was kept on that part of the coast 
throughout April and May 1851 89. But despite continued fears of Dahomean 
attack during the early part of June, as the fighting season drew to a close naval 
vigilance was relaxed 90. This partial withdrawal may perhaps have been due to 
the difficulties reported by Naval ships in contacting the shore through the 
heavy surf 91. But this explanation flies in the face of evidence which would 
suggest that during the same period Badagry was engaged in surprisingly 
vigorous commerce. On only one day at the end of May eight trading vessels 
were anchored off Badagry beach. Two were English, two Sierra Leone, two from 
Hamburg, one from the Netherlands and one from Havana. All were engaged in 
taking on palm oil 92. 
The Outbreak of Violence, June 1851 
Despite the apparently healthy commercial situation and the receding Dahomean 
threat Badagry remained extremely unstable. On 11 June four canoes approached 
the town from Lagos. According to Gollmer their arrival was part of an elaborate 
plot devised by Kosoko to suppress all support for Akitoye. Prior to their 
appearance, Gollmer recounted that a campaign had been waged to 'persuade' 
many of Akitoye's supporters at Badagry to return peaceably to Lagos. Others, he 
claimed, had been kidnapped and forcibly returned. Furthermore, the previous 
week Kosoko had joined with the chief of Okobo to destroy Mabo, a small town 
close to Lagos described as 'Akitoye's only stronghold in that quarter'. According 
to missionary sources Badagry was rife with rumours that Kosoko would shortly 
88 PRO F084/858 30 March 1851 Beecroft, Fernando Po. 
89 PRO F084 / 865 12 May 1851 Adams, position unrecorded in 25 June 1851 Hamilton, London. 
90 By 12 June it was claimed by traders at Badagry that a British ship had not been seen for five 
days 'although the Commodore said he would not leave the anchorage without a vessel' [PRO 
F084 / 860 11 October 1851 Forster and Smith, London]. 
91 According to Commander Adams, Commander Patey had not been able to land at Badagry in late 
April /early May'in consequence of the state of the beach' [PRO F084/865 12 May 1851 Adams, 
osition unrecorded in 25 June 1851 Hamilton, London]. ý2( 
CMSA CA2 / 043 /11123 May 1851 Gollmer's Journal, Badagry. 
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send a force to drive out not only the Mewu and Akitoye's remaining supporters 
but also the Sierra Leonians and missionaries. In his subsequent journal account 
Gollmer explained that the attack had been planned for 16 June but that 
ultimately events had moved too quickly93. 
The arrival of the Lagos canoes was presented by Gollmer as evidence of 
Kosoko's plot, and as the beginning of his assault and Badagry's collapse into 
violence. That the party from Lagos were the motivating force in subsequent 
events should at least be examined closely. Commander Heath in his second- 
hand account of events at Badagry recounted that, rather than being part of a 
politically motivated plot, the party from Lagos were in fact the group of traders 
they purported to be and landed at Badagry to visit and do business there. It was 
these traders, claimed Heath, who, while in the market place, began to sing songs 
of abuse about Akitoye. This provocative behaviour in turn led Akitoye's 
supporters to arrest two of the culprits, at which point, the remainder of the 
Lagos people, supported by the 'Popoes', 'flew to arms, the fight commenced and 
the town was burnt to the ground' 94. The explanation of the unruly market 
traders was adopted by Ajayi in his interpretation of the unplanned outbreak of 
civil war at Badagry. Indeed Ajayi also reasonably suggests that those from Lagos 
were in fact a group of women traders. There is however no evidence to 
positively support this assumption: all contemporary accounts referred merely to 
'people' 95. 
The only eyewitness account which suggested a role for the Lagos contingent was 
by Gollmer who was, it must be said, eager to see Kosoko's influence everywhere. 
The Methodist missionary Martin, in his account from Badagry on 16 June, did 
not mention the Lagos party but described an outbreak of fighting on 12 June 
93 CMSA CA2 / 043 /Ill 12 June 1851 Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
94 PRO F084 / 866 20 June 1851 Heath, off Badagry in 31 July 1851 Bruce, Prince's Is. 
95 Ajayi, Christian Missions., p. 70. 
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between Akitoye's people and the Badagrians 96. Indeed from a close 
examination of the Anglican's account it is possible to see that Gollmer was 
merely presuming the involvement of the Lagos people. It would appear that 
the Lagos traders had in fact left Badagry on the same day as they arrived, 11 June. 
According to Gollmer's account, a group of people did go to the market place 
where they were abusive to Akitoye. But the missionary clearly was unsure of 
their origins and suggested that they may have been'either left behind from the 
four canoes of yesterday or others who were here' 97. Gollmer's identification of 
these people as Xosoko's men' was thus based merely upon his own supposition 
and perception of events. 
Gollmer was, unfortunately, the only eyewitness to give any details about the 
causes of violence at Badagry. But it is possible to attempt an assessment of the 
situation by separating his chronological account from his personal 
interpretation of events. He stated that the confrontation began after insults were 
levelled at Akitoye in the market place. The account goes on to say that the 
Mewu appealed to the church to mediate as such provocation threatened to cause 
a disturbance. However, all attempts failed and despite appeals for calm, 
Akitoye's people seized and chained two of the offenders. According to Gollmer, 
it was Ahamara, a prominent member of Boeko Ward and one of the most 
successful traders at Badagry, who reacted to the arrests 98. He immediately called 
his men to arms and, despite further attempts at mediation, at about 11 o'clock, 
he and his followers fired upon Akitoye's people near the CMS Mission and the 
conflict began 99. 
96 WMMSA 16 June 1851 Martin, Badagry. 
97 CMSA CA2 / 043 /11112 June 185 51 Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
98 Ahamara was described as a 'notorious slave catcher' in Badagry [CMSA CA2 / 043 98 27 
February 1846 Gollmer's Journal, Badagry]. In his historical account of the Badagry civil war, Losi 
also identifies an important role for 'Ahamora' calling him 'the leader of the army of the king of 
Badagry' [Losi, Histou of Lagos p. 351. 
99 CMSA CA2 / 043 /11112 June 1851 Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
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The only other account which has attempted to give a detailed description of the 
outbreak of war is Avoseh's historical reconstruction. His account also explains 
that fighting broke out in Boeko Ward. However, Avoseh recounts that it was 
the Mewu who provoked a fight by secretly plotting with 'Gensenu' 
[unidentified] to fire a harmless charge into a funeral party at Athanpoji. This 
group of mourners were presumably connected with the Mewu himself, despite 
Avoseh's description of them as strangers, for, as planned, they ran to tell that 
chief that the townspeople had fired on them. The Mewu then gave the order 
that the town should be attacked, houses were set on fire, and the battle began 100. 
Both Gollmer and Avoseh were evidently keen to present these events to suit 
their own particular objectives. Gollmer in his contemporary account, was eager 
to establish grounds to support a British assault on Lagos. The local historian 
Avoseh, while also looking towards outside influences, used the Mewu to 
absolve the Badagrians themselves from blame. Both accounts clearly mix fact 
and fiction. Furthermore, in their far from satisfactory and distorted definition of 
I sides, both accounts neglect to give a detailed description of who exactly became 
involved in the conflict. Even from the accounts of the fighting itself, of which 
there are a number, it is difficult to achieve a picture of the principal figures. The 
Methodist missionary Martin evidently saw it as a conflict between Akitoye's 
supporters and the Badagry people. However, it is doubtful whether the parties 
involved were so simply divided. Ahamara of Boeko Ward was clearly identified 
by Gollmer as the leader of the Badagry forces, but what support, if any, he gained 
from the Badagry war chiefs is unclear 101. According even to Gollmer, his own 
attempts to mediate between the parties were supported by some of the chiefs, 
although he does not identify them. Furthermore, he did identify the 
unsuccessful attempts of the Jengen to pacify Ahamara and his party. But which 
chiefs, if any, actually fought alongside Ahamara is difficult to ascertain. Gollmer 
100 Avoseh, A Short Hstory of BadagjZý, p. 43. 
101 CMSA CA2 / 043 /11112 June 1851 Gollmer's Journal, Badagry. 
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claimed that the Posu, along with 'all the Popos of the west division', were 
defeated and driven away by Mewu and Akitoye's men on the first day of 
fighting leaving only Ahamara and about on hundred Topos' on the field 102. 
Avoseh, however, suggested that the Posu played no part in the battle itself. He 
stated that the chief's son was in fact shot down in cold blood and the Posu 
himself merely fled103. Sandeman, the trader who had only recently arrived at 
Badagry, also recounted a year later that Chief Wawu of Ahoviko Ward had 
played no part in the fighting, but that this chief 'not wishing to join either 
party', went to 'Wooroo' [Iworo ?I where he intended to remain for a day or two 
until everything was settled 104. The. only figure who was positively identified as 
having actively supported Ahamara's cause was Mr Randolphe, the Gold Coast 
trader who, it was claimed, had fired on Akitoye's supporters. The account of 
Randolphe's involvement, came, however, from Mr Duggan, an agent at the 
rival Hutton Factory 105. 
Despite the lack of clarity over actual 'sides' in the dispute, the collapse of the 
town into all-out war evidently provided an opportunity for the settlement of 
old scores and the achievement of political aims. The destruction was wholesale. 
According to Gollmer's journal the town was set alight by Akitoye's followers to 
give them room to fight 106. This caused widespread panic and many 
townspeople, including chief Isa, attempted to flee in dangerously overcrowded 
canoes. Many others took shelter in the mission yard while the town burned. By 
the end of the day the Posu and those from the western part of the town had been 
driven away leaving only Ahamara and his supporters to fight. The following 
day saw a resumption of the conflict, but evidently Ahamara was an early victim 
and the remaining forces began to retreat. As they withdrew eastward towards 
102 CMR- December 1852, p. 274,12 June 1851 Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
103 Avoseh, A Short Hist! 2ry of Badagj]ýZ, p. 43. 
104 PRO F084/893 28 January 1852 Sandeman and the Badagry Traders in 19 April 1852 Hamilton, 
London. 
105 PRO F084/866 20 June 1851 Heath, off Badagry in 31 July 1851 Bruce, Prince's Is. 
106 CMR December 1852, p. 273,12 June 1851 Gollmer's Journal, Badagry. 
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the mission yard the town was burnt and according to Gollmer, the Sierra 
Leonians, who had up until this time stayed out of the conflict, came under 
fire107. But in less than two hours the retreating forces were defeated and driven 
from the town108. According to Gollmer, 'the greater part of the town was 
destroyed'. This did not include British property however, although the Bristol 
factory of Mr Randolphe, part of the Hutton factory and the compounds of two 
Sierra Leone people were damaged. The soaking of the mission roof with water 
and a timely change in wind direction saved both the Anglican and Methodist 
mission premises 109. 
Whether actively involved in the conflict or not, it would appear that most of 
the Badagry ward chiefs either withdrew or were driven from the town, and the 
chief Mewu, who had led Akitoye's men, assumed the leadership of the much 
reduced state. One account from 1853 claims that chief Wawu was driven into 
exile at Topo' a 'small village between Badagri and Lagos', although, as noted 
above, other accounts would suggest that the Wawu had withdrawn voluntarily 
to Iworo 110. By February 1852 chief Wawu was said to be at a place called'Okobo' 
on the way to Lagos. Whether this was in fact the Topo' of the previous account 
is uncertain 111. According to Avoseh, the Akran initially fled to Lagos, then, 
presumably after December 1851, moved to a place called Akran Gbaji 
[unidentified] 112. Gollmer also noted that the jengen, despite promises to return 
in the immediate period after the conflict was persuaded by the Akran to remain 
at Ilassa [Ilase] 113. But evidently not all the ward chiefs and prominent people 
107 CMR December 1852, p. 274,12 June 1851 Gollmer's Journal, Badagry. 
108 PRO F084 / 866 16 June 1851 Merchants at Badagry in 31 July 1851 Bruce, Prince's Is. 
109 CMR December 1852, p. 274,12 June 1851 Gollmer's Journal, Badagry. 
110 PRO F084/920 28 October 1853 Confidential Communication: Notes respecting Wawu and 
Mayeu at Badagry. 
111 CMSA CA2/043/114 20 February 1852 Gollmer's Journal, Badagry. 
112 The connection between the place name and the chief's title may indicate a village which 
'belonged' to that chieftancy. It would therefore, presumably, have been relatively close to 
Badagry fAvoseh, A Short History of Badagjýý p. 231. 
113 it would appear that Ilase had friendly relations with Badagry during, at least, certain parts 
of the period. In May 1847 the chief of that place 'Chief Alassa' was present at Badagry and had 
attended a church service with a number of 
followers [CMR May 1848, p. 81,16 May 1847 Gollmer's 
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had left. There is evidence that both Honbati and Ajagbe remained in the town 
or returned shortly after the initial violence had ended 114. The King of Apa, who 
had taken no part in the fight had resided in Badagry on and off for at least four 
years and continued to settle there 115. Lastly it would appear that ward chief 
Bala, close friend of the late Van Cooten, was still in Badagry and attending 
church at the end of June 1851116. 
But not only had a large proportion of the town been destroyed by fire. It would 
appear that along with their chiefs a large number of the inhabitants had either 
fled or withdrawn, causing a dramatic drop in population. According to Bowen 
who returned to Badagry in 1851, the inhabitants now numbered no more than 
one thousand ! 117. This incredible fall recorded in November may, however, 
indicate that large-scale emigration occurred during the immediate post-conflict 
period as a result, for example, of the much reduced commercial circumstances of 
the town and continuing insecurity. According to Gollmer, the price of food at 
Badagry, which had already risen by about 200% due to the destruction of 
Okeodan and Igbeji by the Dahomeans, now shot up by 5007o 118. The unstable 
situation also adversely affected the Atlantic commerce not just of the town itself 
but of the surrounding area. The friendship of Domingo Martinez with the 
Mewu brought him into conflict not only with the exiled Gun, who threatened 
his factory at Porto-Novo beach, but also with the King of Porto-Novo himself. 
Hostile to the success of the Mewu, his rebellious ex-chief minister, the King 
froze all trade with Martinez and even threatened his life. The merchant was 
forced, temporarily, to seek sanctuary at Whydah, where he was able to secure the 
journal]. Evidently it was with this chief that the Jengen took refuge [CMSA CA2/043/112 15 July 
1851 Gollmer's journal, Badagryl. 
114 Honbati, described as 'one of the principal men here' was living at Badagry in early 1852 [CMR 
June 1853, p. 122,3 June 1852 Gollmer's Journal, Badagryl. It would appear that Ajagbe had never 
left the town [CMSA CA2/043/113 25 December 1851 Gollmer's Journal, Badagry]. 
115 CMSA CA2 / 043 / 112 15 July 1851 Gollmer's Journal, Badagry. 
116 CMSA CA2 / 043 /11125 June 1851 Gollmer's Journal, Badagry. 
117 Bowen, Adventures and Missionary Labours.... p. 52. 
118 CMSA CA2/043/111 25 June 1851 Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
308 
protection of the Dahomean King through the presentation of a large gift 119. 
Within Badagry itself the unfavourable commercial conditions would appear to 
have provoked ill-feeling between African and European traders. According to 
Gollmer, Mr Sandeman, had promised to pay $100 'footing' or'customary 
presents' to the people of Badagry on first settling there. His plans were, 
however, interrupted shortly after by the outbreak of war. After the initial 
conflict had ended the people demanded the sum but were refused by Sandeman 
who claimed that he was not liable to pay as he had yet to do any trade. The 
inhabitants became increasingly antagonistic towards the foreign merchant, 
especially as he subsequently refused to pay the usual price of $8 per ounce (of 
trade goods] and offered only $6. The gong-gong was sounded and it was 
forbidden to trade with either Sandeman or Mr Batten, who had sided with him. 
Gollmer was asked to mediate' but this only had the effect of causing a rift 
between the missionary and the European traders. Ultimately Batten was 
removed by the Hutton Co, much to Gollmer's evident relief, and Sandeman's 
position in the town became increasingly untenable 120. 
The initial violence was over, but Badagry, or what remained of it, remained 
dangerously insecure. The British signalled for help. Commander Heath aboard 
HMS Niger off Porto-Novo received news of 'a revolution' at Badagry and 
immediately made for that place. Arriving off shore on or about the 17 June, he 
was immediately visited by Mr Duggan. The following day he himself went 
ashore and met with missionaries Gollmer and Martin and traders Sandeman 
and McCoskry. However, Heath refused the residents' request to land troops 
there, due to the dangers of disease to his own men, and merely suggested that 
the English residents shelter either aboard the ship or at the beach 121. The British 
residents refused his advice, the traders over their concern for their property and 
119 CMSA CA2/043/112 31 August 1851 Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
120 CMSA CA2 / 043 / 23 2 January 1852 Gollmer, Badagry. 
121 PRO F084/866 20 June 1851 Heath, off Badagry in 31 July 1851 Bruce, Prince's Is. 
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the missionaries over their flock, and continued to press for active military 
intervention, stressing that Kosoko's forces were at Ajido only ten miles away 
and intended marching on Badagry. Heath's response was once more to suggest 
their removal to the beach and the provision of one thousand pistol ball 
cartridges and two thousand musket ball cartridges, for which he requested a 
receipt 122. 
The view taken by Heath, and subsequently endorsed by the Foreign Office, was 
that the disturbances at Badagry were rooted in the 'dispute between native 
chiefs' and that 'neither party evinced any hostile feelings towards the English 
residents' 123. However, whether the focus of resentment themselves or not, 
events would suggest that the concerns of the traders and missionaries were not 
unfounded as the remaining inhabitants came under a series of attacks. 
Although the presentation of the Badagry civil war as a Kosoko-inspired 
conspiracy is unfounded, the assumption of power by Akitoye's ally the Mewu 
clearly caused concern in Lagos. On 21 June a large party of canoes approached the 
town from the east. According to a letter from Badagry's merchants the group 
was made up of Topos and Kosoko's people' who sought to attack the place 124. 
The assault was mistimed, however, for on that day a party of six hundred Egba 
troops, headed by Chief Somoye had arrived to safeguard the port 125. Aided by 
these reinforcements the Mewu's men were able to repulse the Lagos raiders and 
themselves went on the offensive. On the following day they launched an attack 
on Ajido where the enemy, it was claimed, had retreated, and destroyed the 
town126. The Mewu's enemies were perturbed but evidently continued to harass 
Badagry with a series of small scale raids. According to the British residents it was 
122 PRO F084/866 17 June 1851 Heath to British Residents, off Badagry in 31 July 1851 Bruce, 
Prince's Is. 
123 PRO F084/860 18 October 1851 Forster and Smith, London. 
124 PRO F084/866 11 June 1851 Badagry Merchants in 31 July 1851 Bruce, Prince's Is. 
125 CMR December 1852, pp. 274-275 21 June 1851 Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
126 PRO F084/866 11 July 1851 Badagry Merchants in 31 July 1851 Bruce, Prince's Is. 
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clearly a Lagos-inspired campaign, which made several nocturnal forays to 
Badagry beach. One such raid resulted in the killing of two assistants from the 
Hutton factory, an Englishman and a Kruman who were guarding stores. The 
death of the English carpenter Mr Gee struck the other British residents with fear, 
and understandable paranoia resulted 127. But further afield at Abeokuta the 
missionary Townsend also saw the incident as indicative of the distinctly anti- 
British nature of events at Badagry. In a letter to Commodore Bruce, Townsend 
concluded that violence at Badagry was the direct result of British efforts to 
establish 'lawful trade' and were directed 'against the English nationally' 128. 
But the naval forces along the coast were not persuaded that affairs at Badagry 
were anything more than a 'native dispute' and that the death of Mr Gee was 
anything more than a complete accident 'incident to a state of civil war' 129. Bruce 
was also not convinced that Lagos had been behind the murderous party and 
concluded from the evidence of Commanders Heath and Jones that it was merely 
exiled Badagrians who had raided the beach 130. Even so, Bruce saw fit to instruct 
his ships that when necessary, they should fire across the lagoon to 'prevent the 
advances of war canoes from Lagos' 131. 
Badagry's Egba guardians were less circumspect. Townsend, in a letter from the 
capital on behalf of the chiefs, stated that the newly arrived forces had been sent 
to protect Badagry, in conjunction with the Mewu, from the attacks of the 'Lagos 
people' while hoping that the Badagry ward chiefs would soon return in 
peace132. Somoye, the Commander-in-Chief of Abeokuta's army was more 
forceful and less conciliatory. He clearly saw the war at Badagry as Kosoko's 
attempt to cut off all intercourse between the British and the Egba. As a result, the 
127 PRO F084/866 11 July 1851 Badagry Merchants in 31 July 1851 Bruce, Prince's Is. 
128 PRO F084 867 5 August 1851 Townsend, Abeokuta in 8 January 1852 Hamilton, London. 
129 PRO F084 866 29 July 1851 Jones, position unrecorded in 31 July 1851 Bruce, Prince's Is. 
130 PRO F084 866 31 July 1851 Bruce, Prince's Is. 
131 PRO F084/863 3 September 1851 Bruce, Loanda in 17 October 1851 Hamilton, London. 
132 PRO F084/858 15 July 1851 Letter from Abeokuta to the British residents at Badagry. 
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chief requested British help in deposing Kosoko and sent a force to 'chastise' the 
King of Porto-Novo for his support of Lagos 133. The decisive action of the Egba 
received unconditional support from a number of the British residents, who 
lamented that 'their conduct affords so favourable a contrast to that of our own 
countrymen in command of the squadron' 134. Indeed it would appear that a 
movement at Badagry, led by Gollmer went much further than the Basorun and 
advocated that Britain should in fact 'take territorial possession' of Badagry, 
Lagos and even Abeokuta 135. 
Commander Heath continued to maintain a more moderate course. Admitting 
that he had heard rumours of the Government's intention to 'adopt some 
measures against Lagos', he suggested that action should only be taken on the 
grounds of ending the slave trade rather than 'dishonestly pretending to care 
whether Kosoko or Akatoie is the rightful and legitimate king of Lagos' 136. But 
continued threats towards Badagry gave increasing weight to the views of 
Gollmer and his faction. In late July a large raiding party of between one hundred 
and fifty and two hundred canoes came up the lagoon from the east. Firing 
133 PRO F084/866 3 July 1851'Jobba Shoran'[= Basorun Somoye], Badagry in 31 July 1851 Bruce, 
Prince's Is.; PRO F084 / 892 3 September 1851 'Oba Shoron' [B asorun Somoye], B adagry in 8 January 
1852 Hamilton, London. 
134 Okaro K'Ojwang has identified this 'prolonged acrimony' which ensued between the British 
merchant community at Badagry and the British navy. However, he suggests that the matter 'does 
not bear directly on the issues under discussion'. By this he is evidently referring to the crux of his 
thesis, namely Badagrian resistance to British intervention. He then goes on to state that securing 
Badagry was 'the very objective for which the British and their allies had displaced the chiefs' 
[Okaro K'Ojwang, 'Society, Trade and Politics in Badagry... ', p. 12-141.1 would suggest, however, 
that the divisions between British factions, which became increasingly marked and bitter over this 
period, as demonstrated by the British residents at Badagry, were a vitally important part of any 
analysis of Britain's relationship with the coast during the 1850s [PRO F084/860 13 October 1851 
Forster and Smith, London]. By choosing to discount them it is too easy to reach greatly generalised 
and ultimately inaccurate conclusions such as Okaro K'Ojwang's sweeping statement that it was 
'the British and their allies' who had overthrown the Badagry chiefs. Clearly Britons had been 
involved in the eruption of violence in the town. As noted, economic pressures caused by the 
suppression of the slave trade had forced Badagry to redevelop its economy, missionary elements 
had polarised factions, merchants had squabbled and Consul Beecroft had interfered , with a 
lack of 
knowledge and sensitivity. But to discount the subtleties and differences between of the various 
strands of British interference and influence not only distorts the nature of the British presence on 
the coast, it also neglects the heightened tensions which were actively aroused by the increasingly 
bitter conflicts between these various factions so prevalent at Badagry and also at Lagos after 1851. 
135 PRO F084/867 7 August 1851 Heath, off Badagry in 17 October 1851 Hamilton, London. 
136 PRO F084/867 7 August 1851 Heath, off Badagry in 17 October 1851 Hamilton, London. 
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IT-, 
commenced, including shots from the premises of Mr Sandeman and the 
Methodist mission, and the party had retreated by mid day. Exactly who was 
involved in the raid is not certain. Gollmer stated that they had been sent by 
Kosoko in his attempt to 'get rid of the English' 137. There is no definitive 
evidence to support this view, but it would seem likely that Lagos was involved. 
That the exiled Badagry chiefs were able to launch such a large- scale attack 
without aid is doubtful. According to Somoye, his attempts at mediation between 
the Mewu and the chiefs had led to some successes and 'some of the chiefs have 
accepted my terms'. Unfortunately the Egba chief did not specify which chiefs had 
settled their quarrels and if, having done so, they had returned to Badagry. But 
the Commander-in-Chief did say that the other ward chiefs 'have taken to the 
bush where they lie in wait and kidnap all they can', adding that lately two Egba 
had been caught and murdered 138. This would suggest that the outlawed 
Badagry chiefs were certainly willing to oppose the new regime at Badagry. But 
the implication is that these bands of kidnappers were unlikely to have been in a 
position to launch a concerted attack of two hundred canoes. 
If Lagos had not been involved in the initial outbreak of violence, it would 
appear then that it had become embroiled in the subsequent harassment of the 
town. Rumours of possible Dahomean intervention also began to circulate. In 
early August Gollmer wrote to Fraser at Whydah requesting any news 139. At the 
same time Somoye also wrote to the Vice-Consul informing him that Kosoko 
had been sending presents to the Dahomean King and begging him to intercede 
on their behalf 140. In the face of such real and rumoured opposition, Badagry 
remained in a state of acute tension. In September a group of canoes, reportedly 
those of the Akran and the Posu, passed in front of the town and headed east 141. 
137 PRO F084/886 4 August 1851 Gollmer, Badagry. 
138 PRO F084 / 886 4 August 1851 'Oba Shoron', Badagry. 
139 PRO F084/886 4 August 1851 Gollmer, Badagry. 
140 PRO F084 / 886 4 August 1851 'Oba Shoron', Badagry. 
141 CMSA CA2 / 043 /112 11 September 1851 Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
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Throughout October and early November rumours of attack were occasionally 
thwarted by the sporadic presence of British ships off the coast 142. But evidently 
during those months there were at least two unsuccessful attempts by the Posu 
with forty canoes to attack the Mewu. According to Gollmer such raids were 
merely a foretaste, however. He claimed that a concerted attack by the Lagos 
forces and those of the Posu, supported by the Ijebus, Igbessas, Isos and others, 
was planned for mid-November. However, Gollmer's account of the planned' 
attack, ' which they made sure would bring about the desired end - the utter 
destruction of all living here, appeared in the Church MissionaZE Record over a 
year later, and was clearly written after the events of November 1851 had 
passed143. Gollmer may indeed have suspected an imminent assault; he had been 
predicting as much since June. But his certainty, without supporting evidence, 
that such an attack was destined for the middle of November may be connected 
more with his attempts to justify the actions of Consul Beecroft who 
providentially arrived off the coast at that time and informed Kosoko of his 
intention to pay him a friendly visit on his return from Badagry in a day or 
tWO144. 
Throughout 1851 despatches and memos were passed between the Foreign Office 
and the Admiralty over the 'practicability' of direct intervention at the coast 145. 
Having received news of the war at Badagry at the end of October, Whitehall 
authorised Beecroft to supply the people of Badagry with ammunition and 
muskets to defend themselves against the 'piratical attacks' of the chief of Lagos. 
The proviso was, however, added that the value of these supplies should not 
exceed two hundred pounds 146. 
142 CMSA CA2/043/113 25 December 1851 Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
14,3 CM December 1852, p. 175.1 December 1851, Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
144 CMSA CA2 / 043 /113 15 November 1851 Gollmer's journal, Badagry; PRO F084/ 858 26 November 
1851 Beecroft, off Lagos. 
145 PRO F084/863 27 September 1851 Palmerston, London. 
146 PRO F084/858 28 October 1851 Palmerston, London. 
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But the Consul had not waited to receive authorisation. On 15 November 
Beecroft and Akitoye landed at Badagry where they were greeted with excitement. 
According to Gollmer's journal of the period their intention was clear. The 
supposed 'friendly visit' to Kosoko was prepared for by gathering troops and 
arms with which they could retake Lagos. Leaving the troops ready at Badagry, 
Beecroft and Akitoye departed eastwards on 18 November 147. 
According to Gollmer's later published account, the arrival of Consul Beecroft 
had panicked Kosoko and forced him to recall all his troops and allies from their 
mission against Badagry. Gollmer noted that the Posu with his forces did appear 
at the appointed time and launched an assault on Badagry from the lagoon, but, 
unsupported by his allies, was forced to withdraw 148. Three weeks later, at the 
beginning of December the Posu again attempted to attack and 'much bloodshed 
ensued' 149. But by this time the theatre of war had shifted to Lagos and, finding 
his assault again unsupported the Posu retired to 'Adu' [Ado] 150. 
The Reduction of Lagos 
To explain events at Lagos at the end of 1851 wholly in the light of affairs at 
Badagry is clearly a distortion and succumbs to the missionary justification that it 
was Beecroft 'providentially' arriving off the coast which, above all, saved 
147 CMSA CA2/043/113 15-18 November 1851 Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
148 CMR December 1852, p. 275.1 December 1851 Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
149 PRO F084/921 CMS Report on the Yoruba Mission. 
150 Tracing the movement of the Posu subsequent to his exile in Ado has been confused by the actions 
of a Lagos chief or possibly chiefs called Pellu and/or Possu. Matheson has noted that in 1853, after 
the deposition of Kosoko, when the siege of Ado was brought to an end, the Badagry Posu then went 
to Lagos where he traded successfully and aroused the jealousy of restored king Akitoye and Madam 
Tinubu. But from a careful reading of contemporary documents it would appear that it was Pellu and 
Agineau, two Lagos Muslims who, despite allegiances to Kosoko, had returned to, and were 
prospering at, Lagos [PRO F084/920 28 July 1853 Akitoye, Lagos]. It was undoubtedly this Pellu who 
has been confused with the Badagry PosU. This is understandable when even Consul Campbell, 
when describing the two Lagos traders, called them'Possu and Agineau' [PRO F084/920 19 
September 1853 Campbell, Lagos]. However, it is evident that the Lagos Possu / Pellu was a distinct 
figure from his Badagry namesake. Interestingly enough, Matheson herself refers later in her 
narrative to Kosoko's 'Old chief Possu' who had evidently remained at Epe after his master had 
returned to Lagos in later years [J D Matheson, 'Lagoon Relations in the Era of Kosoko 1845-62' PhD 
Thesis, Boston 1974, pp. 118-119,125 & 1051. 
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Badagry from complete destruction. As Smith, in his detailed analysis has 
pointed out intervention at Lagos 'occurred at the point of intersection of several 
separate causal forces' 151. These forces include those of a purely Lagosian nature, 
notably the deep political divisions within the state itself, as symbolised by the 
kingship dispute between Kosoko and Akitoye. Smith also highlights the wider 
issues at stake, notably the humanitarian desire to suppress the slave trade and 
the commercial concerns, as stressed by Ajayi and Gavin, that saw intervention. 
at Lagos as the key to British commercial supremacy in the area 152.1 would 
suggest that a close examination of affairs at Badagry provides a new perspective 
on events at Lagos and further illuminates and supports the view of a 
combination of several causal factors. The role of local events in shaping British 
responses, which as Smith notes, must not be minimised, should be extended 
beyond Lagos itself. For the Badagry situation undoubtedly played an important 
role in guiding Beecroft's actions. Furthermore, merely as an observation point 
from which to view events, Badagry was influential. It was there that many of 
the arguments pressing for direct intervention by British forces, from Akitoye's 
supporters, from the Missionaries, traders and also the Egba, were formulated. 
Even Okaro K'Ojwang, in his overall examination of Anglo/African relations 
during this period, has failed to examine Badagry's role in the development of 
Beecroft's policy towards Lagos 153 
Beecroft attempted to land at Lagos on December 20. However, the ten boats 
which accompanied him to the negotiations were understandably viewed by 
Kosoko with suspicion. He threatened to fire on the party and demanded that 
Beecroft reduce the delegation to a single vessel. A compromise was eventually 
151 Smith, The Lagos Consulate... p. 33. 
152 Ibid, p. 33. 
153 Okaro K'Ojwang's examination notes the'increasing naval involvement in African politics at 
the time', but jumps from the provision of ammunition at Badagry to post-restoration Lagos. His 
analysis merely concludes that: 
after the annexation of Lagos at the end of 1851 the British started a more 
vigorous drive to extend their influence throughout the Bight of Benin 
[Okaro K'Ojwang, 'Society, Trade and Politics in Badagry... ' pp. 124-1251. 
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reached and Beecroft landed with two boats. Token gestures were made by the 
Consul to reach an agreement with the Lagos King. But Kosoko was more 
forthright. He 'would not enter into any Treaty with the English and did not 
wish their friendship' 154. 
The preliminaries satisfied, Beecroft could now embark upon the course he had 
intended all along. The opportunity was provided when a British flag of truce' 
was fired upon, and the bombardment of the town began. But far from 
experiencing 'no great difficulty... [in] expelling the present chief', as Captain 
Denham of HM Naval Forces, the missionary Crowther and also Consul Beecroft 
had suggested, the well organised Lagos forces proved to be a dangerous 
adversary 155. Kosoko's forces repulsed the initial invasion, killing two officers 
and wounding sixteen men. But a further attack beginning on 26 December blew 
up the royal arsenal and Kosoko fled 156. 
The military role of the Mewu's Badagry in the reduction of Lagos would appear 
to have been slight. According to Beecroft's own account of the assault Akitoye 
was only able to summon the support of six hundred and thirty men from the 
town157. This number is not inconsiderable when one considers that it was 
during this period that Bowen had assessed the total Badagry population to be 
only one thousand. But the impact of this force is dubious. There is no evidence 
to suggest that the forces from Badagry took any part in the actual conflict. But, 
always ready to take advantage of the situation, an eyewitness, Samuel Davies, a 
Sierra Leonian working aboard HMS Volcano did note that 'The people from 
Badagry arrived on the day of victory, and took away an immense spoil' 158. 
154 PRO F084/858 26 November 1851 Beecroft, off Lagos. 
155 PRO F084 / 863 27 September 1851 Palmerston, London. 
156 For details of the reduction of Lagos see Smith, The Lagos CQn5ulate.,. pp. 26-31. 
157 PRO F084/886 3 January 1852 Beecroft, off Lagos. 
158 CMI March 1852, p. 61. 
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The reduction of Lagos and the reinstatement of Akitoye by British forces raised 
high hopes among the British on the Coast. The removal of Kosoko was seen as 
striking right to the heart of the Slave Trade. Furthermore, not only was Lagos 
situated at the opening of the lagoon to the sea, but its water links into the 
interior with Abeokuta and beyond presented enormous potential for the 
development of both commerce and Christianity. Even the Foreign Office, which 
initially condemned Beecroft's actions, eventually became reconciled to events.. 
Lagos was seen as the key to Britain's moral and commercial coastal crusade. But 
by concentrating on generalities and neglecting more localised issues, British 
aspirations were bound to be disappointed. 
The Mewu Period 1851-1854 
On 1 January 1852 a treaty was signed at Lagos between the British Government 
and Akitoye, abolishing the slave trade and human sacrifice from his kingdom. 
But despite British support the monarchy was far from secure. Kosoko, in close 
exile, posed a dangerous threat and the area remained in a state of alarm and 
instability. However, taking advantage of the excitement and fear generated by 
the bombardment Commanders Wilmot and Forbes obtained a series of twelve 
similar treaties along the length of the coast in the early months of 1852. 
Abeokuta followed Lagos and then more surprisingly Dahomey and Porto-Novo 
also in January. Ijebu signed in February, followed by Badagiy in March 159. 
Yet, despite such apparent goodwill, the conclusion of so many treaties proved to 
be largely cosmetic. Britain's ambitious aims to abolish the slave trade and 
establish favourable terms for her own commercial network were evident. The 
willingness of the African states was due to a combination of fear combined with 
commercial and diplomatic hopes that Lagos would not become dominant. But 
both parties lacked commitment to the process. At Dahomey, the treaty did not, 
159 See Appendix A. 
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in reality, symbolise an alliance between the two powers. Indeed the increasingly 
difficult relations between Vice-Consul Fraser and his hosts led to his recall from 
Whydah160. Furthermore with Lagos at the centre of their policy, British interest 
in these other states was purely superficial, as demonstrated most notably at 
Badagry. Commodore Bruce instructed Commander Strange of HMS Archer to 
conclude a Treaty with the 'King and Chiefs of Badagry, 161. In his instructions, 
Bruce acknowledged the dispute between'two chiefs' over Badagry's 'sovereign 
power' but stated that 'it is sufficient that we negotiate with the person who is 
King de facto' and declined interfering in the 'political concerns of the natives. 
Bruce also went on to point out the importance of informing 'the King or Chief 
that'his signing the treaty will give him no claim to demand our support 1. On 
the other hand, if the Mewu refused to sign he would be viewed as 'an 
encourager of the slave trade', which would leave the British forces 'anxious for 
a better man' 162. The regime at Badagry was placed in an unenviable position. 
Having expelled Badagry's traditional ruling elite, it was the Mewu, who was 
'King de facto. The Alapa, the King of Apa, Badagry's original parent state, had 
removed permanently to Badagry immediately after the Mewu's victory. 
Subsequent to his arrival there is evidence to suggest that the Mewu 
acknowledged this chief as his superior. In answer to a suggestion about road 
improvement by Gollmer, the Mewu replied that 'I am a stranger you had better 
mention it to Alapal 163. Without further evidence it is difficult to ascertain 
whether this was perhaps merely an attempt to quiet the missionary on a 
relatively minor matter. But it could also suggest that Mewu may have used the 
Alapa as nominal head to legitimise his regime. It is evident however, that even 
if the Alapa was being used as an acceptable figurehead at Badagry, it was the 
160 PRO F084/886 22 January 1852 Fraser, Whydah; PRO F084/886 19 April 1852 Palmerston, 
London. 
161 PRO F084/893 10 April 1852 Hamilton, London. 
162 PRO F084/893 17 February 1852 Bruce, off Lagos in 10 April 1852 Hamilton, London. 
163 CMSA CA2 / 043 /119 11 August 1851 Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
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Mewu who was in control. 
The Mewu's Badagry faced pressure from all sides. The exiled chiefs continued to 
wage a war of attrition. Most notable was the Posu who with the support of Ado 
continued to harass the town with occasional raids 164. But more serious were 
the difficulties posed by much greater powers. Throughout the first half of 1852 
rumours of Dahomean attack kept Badagry 'in continued alarm' 165. But more 
pressing still was the hostility of Porto-Novo which the Mewu's assumption of 
power had stimulated. Despite Commodore Bruce's assertions that the exile's 
presence had given rise to 'angry feeling' between Badagry and Porto-Novo 'for 
many years past', there is no evidence to suggest that whilst he remained quietly 
at Mowo, Porto-Novo took any direct steps towards his return 166. But it would 
appear that the Mewu's assumption of political power at Badagry gave rise to 
immense antagonism. According to the Mewu himself, the King of Porto-Novo 
desired nothing less than his head. The King himself denied this, stating that he 
only required his minister's return so that 'he may have the benefit of his 
counsel' 167. Despite Porto-Novo's moderate aim, however, it was prepared to 
impose a complete blockade on Badagry to achieve it. As one of Badagry's most 
important palm oil suppliers, Sandeman estimating that three fourths of 
Badagry's oil came from that source, the effect on the town's commerce were 
immense 168. Furthermore the rapid transfer of more westerly supplies to Lagos 
during this period made the imposition of the eastern blockade even more 
serious. 
The obstruction of trade which his presence caused rapidly stimulated opposition 
to the Mewu from within Badagry itself. The British traders in the town, 
164 Heath reported in February 1852 that the Posu kept Badagry 'in a state of continual excitement' 
fPRO F084/893 20 February 1852 Heath, off Appi in 19 April 1852 Hamilton, London]. 
165 CMR June 1853, p. 121,8 March 1852 Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
166 PRO F084/893 18 February 1852 Bruce, off Lagos in 19 April 1852 Hamilton, London. 
167 PRO F084/893 18 February 1852 Bruce, off Lagos in 19 April 1852 Hamilton, London. 
168 PRO F084/893 28 January 1852 Sandeman and Co., Badagry in 19 April 1852 Hamilton, London. 
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understandably concerned that their livelihood was endangered, initially 
appealed to the naval forces for intervention or at least mediation. Sandeman 
stated that any treaty signed between the Mewu and the British would be taken as 
a sign of British support for his leadership. Claiming that the Mewu could 
muster no more than one hundred troops, Sandeman warned that, having 
signed such a treaty, the British Government should be prepared to despatch a 
force to protect the town and the lagoon from any subsequent opposition to the. 
regime 169. But Bruce declined any interest in the affair whatsoever and relations 
continued to deteriorate. Despite stern warnings from Bruce not to become 
'amateur politicians', Sandeman and Co became increasingly dissatisfied with 
the Mewu's leadership 170. Furthermore Revd Gollmer's natural support for the 
Mewu/Egba alliance led to a bitter split between the English inhabitants of the 
town. By February 1852 Gollmer was no longer on speaking terms with traders 
Sandeman, McCoskry and Drake (Mr Batten's replacement at the Hutton Factory) 
and possibly also the Methodist missionary Martinl7l. 
Determined to maintain their distance, Commander Strange landed at Badagry 
on 17 March where he met with the 'chiefs and Headmen' of the town. 
According to Strange's account some hesitancy was shown by the Mewu who was 
fearful of British intervention in favour of the Wawu and the exiled Badagry 
chiefs. However, having set his mind at rest, a treaty was signed on the following 
day by Strange and the Mewu and Alapa. According to Strange's account, he had 
hoped to conclude a treaty quickly, especially in the light of the instability of the 
town. Thanks to the exertions of Gollmer a meeting was procured that evening 
and the treaty was read to the assembly. The gathering then dispersed until the 
169 PRO F084/893 28 January 1852 Sandeman and Co., Badagry in 19 April 1852 Hamilton, London. 
170 PRO F084/893 18 February 1852 Bruce, off Lagos in 19 April 1852 Hamilton, London. 
171According to Gollmer, Drake replaced Batten either at the end of 1851 or the beginning of 1852 
[CMSA CA2/043/23 2 January 1852 Gollmer, Badagryl. Heath certainly noted that Martin was an 
advocate for the Wawu's cause, although there is no evidence to suggest 
how this affected relations 
between himself and Gollmer [PRO F084/893 20 February 1852 Heath, off Appi in 19 April 1852 
Hamilton, London]. 
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following day while the terms were considered. Strange remarked that there was 
a 'reluctance to proceed' due to 'an apprehension that we intended to interfere in 
favour of chief Wawu'. However, the naval officer was able to set their minds at 
rest on this point, and after 'some discussion' the following morning, the treaty 
was signed by Strange, the Mewu and the Alapa 172. Commercially the treaty 
abolished the export of slaves to foreign countries from the territories of Badagry 
and agreed that punishment should befall anyone who disobeyed. All slaves 
currently held for exportation were to be given up and the barracoons, were to be 
destroyed. No European was permitted to reside in the area for the purposes of 
slave trading and any who did were to be expelled. Furthermore, Britain was to 
be able to trade freely with the state. The Treaty also abolished all human sacrifice 
on account of religious or other ceremonies, including the 'murder' of prisoners 
of war. Lastly an undertaking was made to protect and encourage the Christian 
missionaries at work in the town. Persecution of their followers was forbidden 
and an allocation of land was made for a Christian burial ground 173. Having 
secured his treaty with the Mewu, Commander Strange attempted to preserve 
British neutrality by writing to the Wawu in exile at Okobo. In his letter, the 
naval officer assured the chief that despite the treaty, the British Government 
had 'no intention of interfering in the dispute between you and Mewu' and that 
if you act well and friendly to the white men, the English Government will be 
friendly with yOU'174. 
Not surprisingly the treaty did nothing to stabilise the situation at Badagry. The 
Porto-Novo blockade remained firmly in place and rumours of attack by both the 
Posu and Dahomey continued to circulate 175. According to Gollmer's Journal for 
March, the fear of attack became so acute that he decided to withdraw temporarily 
172 PRO F084/893 14 April 1852 Strange, Sierra Leone in 8 May 1852 Stafford, London. 
173 See Appendix A. 
174 PRO F084/893 18 March 1852 Strange, Badagry in 8 May 1852 Stafford, London. 
175 CMSA CA2/043/114 25 March 1852 Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
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to Lagos where he remained until late April 176. It is evident however that 
Gollmer's sojourn at Lagos was merely a preliminary to his total abandonment 
of Badagry. The missionaries had become increasingly disheartened with the 
town. Despite his outward support for Mewu, Gollmer complained that due to 
the unsettled nature of the country Badagry had dwindled to a small and 
unimportant place with many of the inhabitants removing to Lagos 177. 
At the forefront of the exodus to Lagos were the European traders. Having 
embroiled himself so deeply in local opposition politics, Mr Sandeman found his 
position at Badagry under the Mewu untenable. He was one of the first to leave, 
although evidently he did continue to maintain some property in the town178. 
The other traders obviously followed his example so that by early May Thomas 
Hutton was unable to land on Badagry beach as the one remaining sea-going 
canoe was occupied179. 
Migration from the already much depleted town obviously effected the strength 
of the mission. According to Gollmer just over sixty people were attending 
Anglican Sunday service and their school had twenty four pupils 180. He 
concluded that 'God has clearly marked out our path to depart from those who so 
long have despised Him and His word' 181. Gollmer finalised his affairs at 
Badagry and, following the herd, departed permanently for Lagos in July, leaving 
the Badagry mission in the charge of ill-matched Catechists Willo ughby and 
Wright 182. The Methodist mission, evidently equally disheartened by the 'spirit 
of indifference', also withdrew, leaving only a skeleton staff at their premises 183. 
176 CMSA CA2 / 043 /114 25 March 1852, Gollmer's journal, Badagry; CMSA CA2 / 043 /115 30 April 
1852 Gollmer's Journal, Badagry. 
177 CMR June 1853, p. 124. 
178 PRO F02 / 30 14 June 1859 Forster and Smith, London. 
179 CMSA CA2 043 /114 25 March 1852 Gollmer's journal, Badagry. 
180 CMSA CA2 043 / 118 26 February 1853 Gollmer's journal, B adagry. 
181 CMR June 1853, p. 124. 
182 CMSA CA2 / 043 / 118 26 February 1853 Gollmer's Journal, Lagos. 
183 WMMSA 10 June 1853 J Thompson, Badagry. 
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Ajayi has concluded that it was at this point that Badagry passed out of the 
missionary story of Nigeria184 -I would, however, suggest that despite the 
establishment of Lagos as the main coastal mission station from 1852 onwards, it 
is important to note that Christian missions at Badagry continued to function in 
a limited form. Obviously, due to the much reduced circumstances of the town, 
the numbers were small but it is interesting that throughout 1853 the figures for 
those attending church services, the Sunday school and the day school continued 
to rise. The number of communicants was maintained at ten throughout the 
period and the nine candidates for baptism were joined by a tenth at the 
beginning of 1854 185. Furthermore, although Badagry may to a greater extent 
have passed out of the missionary story, the Badagry mission continued to play a 
part in the town's affairs and indeed coastal affairs as a whole 186. 
Fraser at Lagos 
Despite his withdrawal from Whydah and subsequent criticism levelled at him 
by the Foreign Office over his dealings with Dahomey as Vice-Consul, Louis 
Fraser did not settle quietly at Lagos. Indeed he rapidly became involved in the 
affairs of the locality, particularly those of Badagry. In a series of letters at the end 
of 1852 and beginning of 1853 Fraser voiced his doubts over the situation there. 
He complained that it was unjust that the very chiefs who had given shelter and 
refuge to the exiled Mewu and Akitoye had been expelled 187. He accused the 
'Anlankpan' [Alapa] of being an impostor, the genuine king, he claimed, was at 
Porto-Novo 188. He described how, under the Mewu, Badagry had been reduced 
184 Ajayi, Christian Missions., pp. 77-78. 
185 CMSA CA2/043/120 25 September 1853 Gollmer's Journal, Lagos; CMSA CA2/043/12125 
December 1853 Gollmer's Journal, Lagos; CMSA CA2 / 043 /123 25 June 1854 Gollmer's Journal, Lagos. 
186 Even Townsend noted that due to Badagry's position on the lagoon: 
persons proceed by canoe from Badagry to Ado, Okeodan and some distance 
beyond, to within a convenient distance of Ketu.. It will be well to bear this 
in mind before giving up Badagry as a station 
KM[j December 1853, p. 2781. 
187 PRO F084/920 27 December 1852 Fraser, Lagos. 
188 The establishment of one claimant to the title of Alapa. at Porto-Novo would comply with a 
later statement by Governor Glover that after the destruction of Badagry at the end of the 
eighteenth century, Apa once more fell under the sway of Porto-Novo. Therefore, Glover noted, in 
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to a population of between four and five hundred 189. Lastly, he lamented the 
town's decline as an Atlantic port. Now he claimed Badagry could no longer ship 
a single ton of oil, whereas in past years Hutton alone had shipped one thousand 
tons 190. Fraser concluded that to settle the matter at Badagry the 'true Anlakbar' 
should be summoned from Porto-Novo to choose his own chiefs. The only 
difficulty Fraser envisaged was that it was likely that the King would choose the 
Posu. This, however, he added would be unacceptable to the British, that chief 
having 'attacked a white man's [Hutton's] factory' during the civil war. 
However, Fraser felt that this 'may be easily over-ruled, by our objecting to 
him'191. 
Despite Fraser's unfavourable reputation it would appear that he did find an ally 
in Commander Heseltine. The naval officer, having corresponded with the Vice- 
Consul, proceeded to visit Porto-Novo, calling at the Wawu's base ofOkobo and 
Badagry on the way. Heseltine's account of his meeting with the Wawu is 
limited but he was persuaded that the rift between Porto-Novo and its 
recalcitrant minister was caused by the Mewu's murder of King Soji's son. From 
his writings it is obvious that it was not merely the accusation of murder which 
persuaded Heseltine that the chief was unsuitable. Apart from any advantages for 
Badagry which he envisaged from the chief's removal, Heseltine also assumed 
that such a measure would not only re-open the lagoon, but could also lead to a 
treaty between Porto-Novo and Abeokuta. The Posu's enforced ex ile at Ado, a 
tributary to Porto-Novo, had given the Egba an excuse to continue their siege of 
that place. Heseltine clearly intended that, with the Badagry chiefs restored, a 
settlement would be reached at Ado. With these high hopes the naval officer, 
1851, King Soji of Porto-Novo continued to assert his authority and imposed his choice of Alapa on 
the inhabitants. This was presumably the result of a breach between himself and the, other 
claimant to the title, over the alliance with the Mewu. Fraser's assertion then that the 'true 
Anlakbar'was at Porto-Novo was clearly referring to this disputed claim [PRO F084/920 29 
December 1852 Fraser, Lagos; NNAI CS01 /I Vol II, 10 July 1863 Glover, Lagos]. 
189 PRO F084/920 11 January 1853 Fraser's History of Badagry. 
190 PRO F084/920 3 March 1853 Fraser, Lagos. 
191 PRO F084/920 29 December 1852 Fraser, Lagos. 
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arriving at Badagry for a brief meeting on the last day of 1852, urged the Mewu to 
join Akitoye at Lagos. The chief, in turn, outwardly agreed to comply with British 
wishes, although Heseltine correctly concluded that he really had 'no intention 
of acting up to this' 192. 
Leaving for Porto-Novo Heseltine then appears to have entered into a series of 
negotiations with the King to achieve his aims. Interestingly Heseltine saw one 
of the main obstacles to the Mewu's removal as being that having signed a Treaty 
with the British he was 'to a certain extent under our protection'. This was 
exactly the point which Commodore Bruce had vehemently denied the previous 
year. After a couple of days' negotiation it was agreed that should the Mewu 
leave Badagry the Posu would be recalled from Ado, thus bringing an end to the 
siege. Returning to Badagry on 3 January the Mewu readily agreed to leave 
Badagry should his allies the Egba agree. Evidently feeling that he had solved the 
lagoon problem, Heseltine departed for the Egba encampment around Ado, 
sending orders to the Wawu and the other Badagry chiefs to ready themselves for 
their return home. But Heseltine's optimism was misplaced. On arriving at the 
encampment the officer informed the Egba troops that, as the Posu was about to 
be recalled from Ado, they no longer had reason to besiege the place. 
Furthermore he instructed them that the Mewu was to leave Badagry. Heseltine 
was seemingly astonished that this information was received with hostility. The 
Egba chiefs informed the officer that'losing the friendship of the English was 
nothing to them compared with taking Adu' and that the Mewu should remain 
at Badagry. If the Wawu was returned, Heseltine was warned, 'they would turn 
him out' 193. 
192 PRO F084/925 Heseltine's 'Report of the Proceedings of an Expedition to Porto Novo ... 
between 
28 December 1852 and 7 January 1853' in 14 April 1853 Hamilton, London. 
193 PRO F084/925 Heseltine's 'Report of the Proceedings of an Expedition to Porto Novo.... 'in 14 
April 1853 Hamilton, London. 
326 
Having totally misread the situation Heseltine withdrew rapidly from the area, 
greatly offended. He was accompanied by the remaining European merchants 
from Badagry and also the Methodist missionary Martin, who feared that 
Heseltine's intervention might bring about an Egba attack despite the continued 
residence of the Mewu. Stopping on the way to Lagos at Okobo, Heseltine was 
received with remarkable forbearance by the Wawu, who suggested it would be 
safer for him to remain where he was 194. 
Having been frustrated in his immediate aims, Heseltine, supported by Fraser, 
continued the campaign by letter. Initially complaining to Abeokuta about the 
behaviour of their army at Ado, they also attempted to convince the Foreign 
Office and Commodore Bruce of their cause 195. Whitehall was too distant to 
respond immediately but Bruce, having received the information in February, 
proceeded immediately to the Bight. His reaction, however, was not what Fraser 
and Heseltine had hoped. Chastising both for their embroilment in local affairs 
he emphasised that he could sanction no further involvement of a naval officer 
in 'native quarrels'. Furthermore, although emphasising that the Mewu had no 
recourse to look to the British for protection, he refuted the claim that the chief 
had broken his Treaty and added that the decline of trade at Badagry was due not 
to the Mewu's presence but rather the migration to Lagos and the tendency of the 
traders to make themselves 'political partisans' 196. It would appear that Bruce's 
unequivocal tone abruptly ended the Fraser/ Heseltine campaign. Shortly 
afterwards Fraser, who had also become the focus of King Akitoye's antagonism, 
was removed from Government employment 197. 
194 PRO F084 / 925 Heseltine's 'Report of the Proceedings of an Expedition to Porto Novo... 'in 14 
A ril 1853 Hamilton, London. 
19ý PRO F084/920 27 February 1853 Fraser, Lagos. 
196 PRO F084/925 3 March 1853 Bruce, Whydah in 14 April 1853 Hamilton, London. 
197 PRO F084/922 27 April 1853 Clarendon, London. 
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Consul Campbell 
After Fraser's departure from Whydah it had been decided to discontinue the 
post of Vice-Consul there and establish the position at Lagos. Furthermore, it was. 
decided that while Beecroft was to remain Consul for the Bight of Biafra, the 
Bight of Benin should become the jurisdiction of a second Consul based again at 
Lagos. This decision was made, it was claimed, not because of any inability on the 
part of Beecroft, but because of the changes at Lagos 198. Benjamin Campbell was 
chosen to fill the post. 
Campbell was evidently a pragmatist and a realist, qualities which were useful 
faced with the complex pattern of coastal politics and the often petty squabbles of 
Lagos life. But, often through mere force of personality, Campbell was also adept 
at making enemies, particularly amongst the bickering European coastal 
community, a factor which was to be a recurrent theme throughout his period of 
office. Unperturbed by criticism and opposition to his methods, Campbell, in his 
consular capacity, made strenuous efforts to suppress the slave trade. Smith has 
noted that through his genuine exertions he did actually meet with some 
success. After the town's bombardment by the British, slave trading had been 
almost eradicated from Lagos, but at times it looked like reviving and Campbell 
instigated expulsions and fines to keep it in check 199. 
But when Campbell took up his post at the beginning of 1853 Lagos remained in 
a state of extreme insecurity. From his base at Epe, Kosoko continued to harass 
the port with threats of attack and occasional disruptive raids throughout 1853200. 
198 F02/9 19 February 1853 Clarendon, London. 
199 Smith, The Lagos Consulate... pp. 49-65. 
200 An attack was made by Kosoko's forces in early August 1853 [PRO F084 / 920 1 September 1853 
Campbell, Lagos]. This assault occurred at the same time as internal commercial dissatisfaction 
was rising over the dominance of the trader Madam Tinubu at Lagos. Tinubu was ultimately 
expelled and evidently sought refuge temporarily at Badagry. On her way to the town she 
reportedly met with a force of two 
hundred and fifty Badagry people going to Lagos to help 
Akitoye against Kosoko's forces. They only arrived however once the fighting was over [PRO 
F084/920 1 September 1853 Campbell, Lagos]. 
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Furthermore, the death of Akitoye in September of that year placed his son, 
Dosunmu on the throne. The new King, easily influenced by the various factions 
at Lagos, failed to provide the strength of leadership which the state required. 
Increasingly it was the new Consul who not only sought to mediate between 
British subjects and their hosts, but also took on the role almost of an unofficial 
governor. 
Although initially hostile to Kosoko, by the end of the year, perhaps due to the 
realisation that continued insecurity would disrupt trade, Campbell himself 
arranged a series of negotiations with the exiled King. The talks at the 'Palaver 
Islands' resulted in the Treaty of Epe being signed in January 1854201. The 
agreement was designed to bring an end to hostilities between Kosoko and the 
Dosunmu regime, and open trade between Epe and Lagos. In return for monetary 
compensation from the British, Kosoko gave up his claims to the Lagos throne, 
but established his rights over the port of Palma. Smith has noted that the Treaty 
of Epe did not herald the complete conclusion of difficulties between Kosoko and 
Lagos. Kosoko, it emerged, was more willing than Dosunmu to open 
commercial links, while the exiled king himself was only temporarily satisfied. 
Smith concludes that Campbell's agreement was a positive step towards pacifying 
the lagoon, while at the same time extending British influence further east 202. 
Campbell also sought to influence affairs to the west. Despite continued warnings 
of imminent Porto-Novan assaults and stories of the Mewu's slave-dealing 
activities from Fraser, it would appear that during his first months in office, 
7 Campbell paid little attention to the now minor port of Badagry 203. However, 
towards the end of 1853 Campbell began to show an increasing interest in the 
201 See R Smith, 'To the Palaver Islands: War and Diplomacy on the Lagos Lagoon in 1852-54', 
_THSN 
Vol V, No. 1 December 1969, pp. 3-25. 
202 Smith, The Lagos Consulate... pp. 62-65. 
203 Even as late as the beginning of October 1853, Campbell mentioned in despatches the case of 
twenty two runaway slaves who had been sent to Badagry for sale. However, he passed no comment 
on the case or the town at this time 
[PRO F084/920 1 October 1853 Campbell, Lagos]. 
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situation there. In a long despatch to Lord Clarendon at the end of October, the 
Consul questioned the position of the Mewu. Referring to him as a 'revolted 
chief from Porto-Novo', he pointed out that he 'can never be regarded by other 
chiefs as the legitimate chief of Badagry', a factor which, he claimed, continued to 
be 'an insurmountable obstacle to the pacification of that part of the country, 204. 
Campbell supported his argument with a Methodist missionary account of the 
Mewu's slave-dealing associations with Domingo Martinez. According to thiý 
account, the factory at Ajido, under the Mewu's protection, for-warded slaves 
kidnapped at Lagos to the slave-trader's factory at Porto-Novo beach. For his part, 
the Mewu was reportedly receiving one head of cowries for every slave passing 
up and twenty five strings of cowries for every roll of tobacco passing down the 
beaCh205. Campbell's response to these accusations of slave dealing was to order 
the Mewu to destroy his own toll house at Badagry beach and the factory at 
Ajid0206. But it was at this stage that Campbell became increasingly distracted not 
only by Kosoko but the increasingly bitter disputes amongst the European 
community at Lagos. Initially rooted in old rivalries from Badagry days and 
territorial disputes in their new Lagos home, the internal squabbling of the 
European residents became increasingly linked with wider political issues. Revd 
Gollmer, 'who entertains towards Kosoko and his adherents a hatred almost 
demoniacal', became increasingly opposed to Campbell's negotiations. Campbell 
dismissed Gollmer facetiously in despatches as a man who had 'the singular 
misfortune of quarrelling with every person particularly Englishmen'. But he 
was evidently perturbed by the influence which the missionary held over the 
pliable DosunMU 207. The quarrel spread as far as London, where the Foreign 
Office remonstrated with the CMS over their missionary's obstruction of 
204 PRO F084/920 28 October 1853 Campbell, Lagos. 
205 PRO F084/920 Confidential Communication: Notes Respecting Wawu and Mayeu at Badagry in 
28 October 1853 Campbell, Lagos. 
206 PRO F084/920 20 October 1853 Campbell, Lagos. 
207 PRO F084/950 1 May 1854 Campbell, Lagos. 
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Consular 'affairs not immediately connected with the objects of the ... Society' 
208. 
In return the CMS supported the actions of their agent in defending British 
friends at Abeokuta and Badagry, and accused Campbell of being unduly 
influenced by the intrigues of the trader Sandeman209. 
It seems unlikely that Campbell would have been so easily swayed by the 
arguments of Sandeman, although his growing aversion to Gollmer may have". 
pushed him more happily towards the opposing view. More likely it was the 
acknowledgment that despite the settlement with Kosoko and tinkering with the 
town's duty system Lagos would be unable to perform effectively as a 
commercial centre if the lagoon trade to the west continued to misfunction210. 
In order to settle the lagoon dispute Campbell visited both Badagry and Porto- 
Novo during the early part of 1854. From a later report of his activities it would 
appear that before meeting the Mewu, the Consul had already decided that this 
chief had 'grossly violated' his treaty with Britain and had thus 'incurred the 
severe displeasure of Her Majesty's Government' and provoked 'the complete 
stoppage of the trade' at Badagry. On arriving at Badagry he called a meeting of 
the 'principal inhabitants', informed them of his dissatisfaction with affairs and 
concluded unequivocally that after visiting Porto-Novo and the expelled chiefs 
he should 'call upon Mayu to retire'. Should the Mewu refuse to go, Campbell 
warned, he would call for the assistance of the Senior Officer of the Bights 
Division and 'compel him to remove, 211. 
The reaction of Mewu's followers to this rejection of their chief, appears to have 
been remarkably subdued. However, Campbell's report did number Mewu's 
immediate supporters by this time at just one hundred and fifty. This'group, 
208 PRO F084/951 25 August 1854. Clarendon, London. 
209 PRO F084/951 30 May 1854 1 August 1854 Chichester, London. 
210 PRO F084/950 1 June 1854 Campbell, Lagos. 
211 PRO F084/950 1 June 1854 Campbell, Lagos. 
331 
moreover, he presented as being made up largely of lazy, feckless, slave-owning 
foreigners 212. He did not mention, that as well as consisting of the remaining 
Sierra Leonian inhabitants, this group of supporters also evidently contained the 
well established inhabitants 'Assagbe [Ajagbel and 'Onpati' [Honbati] 213. 
Having left Badagry in no doubt as to his purpose, Campbell then embarked for 
Porto-Novo, where he was happily struck by the- favourable disposition of the 
King. Both men were immediately in sympathy with one another. The King 
reassured Campbell that, as soon as the Mewu was welcomed back to Porto- 
Novo, the lagoon would be re-opened to a trade of which, at present, only 
Domingo Martinez was reaping the benefit. Campbell's visit was concluded by a 
touching meeting between himself and the exiled Badagry chiefs who had been 
recalled from the bush 'where they were compelled to wander about seeking a 
livelihood'. They impressed upon Campbell their betrayal by the Mewu and their 
current miserable circumstances away from their homes and children of whom 
many 'were receiving instruction at the missionary schools, when their 
expulsion took place'. The Consul left Porto-Novo 'assuring them I would do all 
in my power to procure their restoration to Badagry' 214. 
In a much later account of these proceedings, and in answer to Foreign Office 
questions over his allegiances in this matter, Campbell suggested that there were 
three main reasons why he was so vehement in his support for Porto-Novo 
during this period. Firstly he suggested that it was the Egba who were the 
aggressors in the area and continued to threaten Porto-Novo and the other states 
with attack. He also suggested that it was Domingo Martinez, the notorious slave 
dealer, and his Dahomean patrons who derived immense benefit from the 
closure of the lagoon. Thus the commerce of Porto-Novo itself, valued at about a 
212 PRO F084/950 1 June 1854 Campbell, Lagos. 
213 CMSA CA2/043/7 12 April 1854 Wright, Badagry. 
214 PRO F084/950 1 June 1854 Campbell, Badagry. 
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quarter of a million pounds sterling, remained untapped due to the closure of its 
'shipping port' Badagry215. Lastly Campbell went on to praise the regime and 
person of the King himself, who, he noted, had not hesitated in signing an anti- 
slave trading treaty with Britain216. 
Having returned to Lagos, it would appear that Campbell acquired some 
surprising allies. According to his account, Revds Townsend and Crowther, on 
visit to Lagos, offered to try and persuade the Egba to urge the Mewu's 
withdrawal, or perhaps more accurately mediate in the matter 217. Unfortunately 
it would appear that this peculiar alliance was short-lived. Having returned to 
Abeokuta, Townsend was seemingly convinced by the chiefs that the Mewu was 
a friend of the British, that he was prepared to live in peace with the Gun. 
Furthermore, the Egba would see his removal as an aggressive measure, contrary 
to their interests 218. The consequent correspondence between missionary and 
Consul not only illustrates the dangerous, unreconcilable differences between the 
African states over the Badagry issue but also chronicles the increasingly bitter 
polarisation of the British factions involved. As the dispute became ever more 
personalised in its style, both parties became dangerously extreme in their 
language. Campbell continued to emphasise the potential use of force which 
would ensure the Mewu's removal, whilst Townsend, having re-visited the 
coast, seemingly left Badagry in such a temper that, it was claimed, he succeeded 
in terrifying all the towns along his route back to Abeokuta with rumours of 
imminent Egba attack should the Mewu be removed 219. Campbell took great 
pains to point out that it had to be Townsend and Gollmer who sought to 
encourage these assaults 220. 
215 PRO F084/950 1 June 18,54 Campbell, Lagos. 
216 PRO F084 / 950 1 November 1854 Campbell, Lagos. 
217 PRO F084/950 1 June 1854 Campbell, Lagos. 
218 PRO F084/950 9 May 1854 Townsend, Abeokuta in I June 1854 Campbell, Lagos. 
219 PRO F084 / 950 13 May 1854 Campbell to Moses in 1 June 1854 Campbell, Lagos; PRO F084 / 950 
June 1854 Campbell, Lagos. 
220 Campbell feared that the 'plotting mischief' of Mr Gollmer could lead to another civil war 
f PRO F084 / 950 13 May 1854 Campbell to Moses in 1 June 1854 Campbell, Lagos 1. 
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Any further commercial pressure from Porto-Novo was unnecessary 221. But 
initially it would appear that both sides proceeded with some caution. On 1 June 
the Consul wrote to the Mewu informing him that he must readmit the exiled 
chiefs to the town. The Mewu's reply, nine days later, was that, with the advice of 
the Egba, he would be prepared to receive the chiefs, and, to prevent future 
confusion, a written agreement should be drawn Up 222. But evidently the spirit 
of compromise was short-lived. 
Presumably suspecting that his actions would be condemned by the Foreign 
Office, Campbell failed to mention events at Badagry until towards the middle of 
August223. Only then did the Consul feel it appropriate to mention that on 30 
June he had instructed the Wawu 'to follow me to Badagry'. The Wawu 
however arrived before the Consul and was evidently informed by the Mewu 
that should he land he would be shot. On being told of this 'extraordinary 
conduct', on his subsequent arrival, Campbell alone met with the Mewu. 
According to his account the besieged chief was uncompromising. He reiterated 
his threat to the Wawu and refused to negotiate. The Consul, offended and 
rather humiliated, was forced quit the town224. 
According to Campbell's account, on returning to Wawu's encampment he 
urged caution, suggesting that the chief returned to his place of exile temporarily. 
But the Wawu refused, informing him courageously that he would rather die in 
sight of his home. Furthermore it would appear that having determined the 
221 The king of Porto-Novo did continue to press his case with the Consul through letters which, for 
example, raised his fears over the plotting missionaries at Abeokuta and the Mewu's remaining at 
Badagry after the Gun chiefs had returned [PRO F084/950 Letter from the King of Porto-Novo in 11 
June 1854 Campbell, Lagos]. 
222 PRO F084/950 10 June 1854 the Mewul, Badagry in 11 June 1854 Campbell, Lagos. 
223 Campbell did send despatches during the interim covering subjects such as the ships on the 
coast. But only on 10 August did 
he return to the subject of Badagry [PRO F084/950 10 August 1854 
Campbell, Lagos]. 
224 PRO F084/950 10 August 1854 Campbell, Lagos. 
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Mewu's hostile reaction, the Wawu had sent a message to the exiled Posu who 
was now 'in a town a few miles above Badagry', and who subsequently sent 
thirty small war canoes to support his fellow chief 225. 
With both sides in position, Campbell wrote to Abeokuta requesting an Egba 
presence so that the episode could be settled 'amicably'. After the event, the 
Consul declared that he had known that no such intervention would occur, but 
merely hoped to ensure a few days for the missionaries, their families and the 
Sierra Leone people to leave the area, although in actual fact very few took the 
opportunity to do so. The reasonable attitude taken by Campbell, according to his 
own account, was different to those reports by Badagry missionaries Coker and 
Wright. According to them, Campbell's arrival in the area on 31 June, along with 
various merchants and the Wawu's people, sent Badagry into fear and 
confusion. The Mewu, on meeting Consul Campbell, seemingly declined to agree 
to the Wawu's landing without the advice of the King of Lagos and the Egba. 
However, the Consul's refusal to instruct the Wawu to withdraw temporarily 
led to dispute 'till both of them got into a passion, 226. According to the 
missionaries, tensions were increased by reports of the Posu's fighting canoes 
arriving in the area, whilst the Mewu 'being a man of honour', waited for word 
from Abeokuta despite taunts from the surrounding forces. 
His ten day deadline having passed with no signal from Abeokuta, Campbell, 
according to his own account, cautioned the Wawu that, on hostilities 
commencing, the missionary establishments and those of the merchants were 
not to be molested. Then he left for Lagos declaring that 'it was evident to every 
one, that on my leaving Badagry, hostilities would ensue, 227. 
225 PRO F084/950 10 August 1854 Campbell, Lagos. 
226 CMSA CA2/043/74 17 July 1854 Coker and Wright, Badagry. 
227 PRO F084/950 10 August 1854 Campbell, Lagos. 
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On arriving back at Lagos on 12 July Campbell received word that the Wawu and 
Posu had landed, attacked the town, burnt a portion of it and initially gained the 
upper hand. But, having driven the Mewu's forces to the outskirts, their 
ammunition fell short and they were compelled to retreat. The Mewu's men 
pursued them and apparently 'committed some slaughter on them'. Timely 
reinforcements from Porto-Novan controlled Iso and Ado, however, crushed the 
Mewu's defence and he was forced out to Ajido. Some token resistance 
continued to be offered by the expelled chief, but, having sent a message to 
Dosunmu, Campbell despatched the Consular boat to carry the Mewu and his 
family to exile in Lagos 228. The Church Missionary Society report of the Mewu's 
deposition, although similar, presented that chief's actions in a rather more 
heroic light. Using the account of catechist James White, the CMR reported that 
having 'gloriously won the day' after the attack by the Posu and the Wawu, the 
Mewu was forced to leave for Ajido due to the desertion of the greater part of his 
people. Here he was followed by his enemies. But having 'displayed his bravery 
by routing them in two successive battles' he was forced to withdraw to Lagos 
'fearing his people would famish, 229. The Mewu's period of exile at Lagos was 
short-lived. He died in obscurity under a year later. Even his missionary friends 
could only muse that 'While we hope that he is safe in Christ, we do not venture 
to speak decidedly about him' 230. 
228 PRO F084/ 10 August 1854 Campbell, Lagos. 
229 CMSA CA2 / 087 / 44 10 August 1854 White's journal, Badagry. 
230 CMR March 1856, p. 59. 
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Chapter Ten 
The Aftermath Of Civil War 1854-1860 
The civil war was over. No counter-attacks were made on the town and the 
Badagry chiefs resettled and reconstructed their respective wards. Indeed, what is 
remarkable is the ease with which the old regime slipped back into place. The' 
four year break had not damaged or changed the ward structure of Badagry and 
surprisingly quickly the town was able to re-establish itself as a commercial 
centre. But this lack of change also meant that all the old anomalies remained. 
The competitive nature of the chieftaincies, which helped the town to adapt so 
successfully to market forces and sustain opposing outside pressures, ultimately 
maintained the total lack of political cohesion. But, as the war itself had 
demonstrated, this dangerous and unstable balance of authority was impossible 
to maintain in the face of an outside pressure which not only desired order along 
more conventional lines but was ultimately supported by immense military 
might. Through their efforts on the coast, the Christian missionaries operating at 
Badagry had identified a struggle between good and evil. The imposition of a 
two-sided dispute on a situation made up of so many different tensions not only 
misinterpreted events but ultimately did lead to the polarisation of various 
parties along slaver versus anti-slaver lines. But it was the introduction of agents 
with recourse to the British military machine, who similarly viewed events in 
such simplistic terms, which ultimately made the balance untenable. In 1851 
Beecroft's intervention was the final straw, just as Campbell in 1854 precipitated 
the restoration of the Badagry ward chiefs. Such piecemeal consular intervention 
would have been less effective in a more stable situation, as demonstrated by the 
somewhat greater effort required to affect affairs at Lagos. But Badagry in the 
1850s was unable to withstand the slightest imbalance. The unsupported Mewu 
regime proved equally unstable, but ultimately the restoration of the Badagry 
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ward chiefs left them similarly susceptible to the very forces that had returned 
them to power. 
Okaro K'Ojwang has identified 1854 as the 'beginning of direct British control' at 
Badagry 1. But this is too simplified a view of coastal affairs and the nature of 
'British control'. Throughout his analysis, Okaro K'Ojwang has traced the 
continuous development of a British policy which sought direct control over 
coastal West Africa and its resources. The nature of the British presence on the 
coast, made up as it was by so many different groups, individuals and aims, 
which were often in conflict with one another, makes the notion of an 
identifiable 'British' influence illusory at least until 1849. But I would suggest 
that the onset of a Consular presence in the area which was directly supported by 
the presence of British military power, although undoubtedly signifying a 
turning point in Britain's relationship with West Africa, still did not signify the 
beginnings of formal British control of the area. Neither did the reduction of 
Lagos or the restoration of the Badagry chiefs. Palmerston's 'New Policy' of 
intervention was rooted firmly in coastal influences and was shaped and 
ultimately decided by his agents on the coast. The Consular post was a very 
individual and personal a role. It relied almost wholly on the abilities and vision 
of a single man. There is no evidence to suggest that even the Consuls of the 
Bights of Benin and Biafra shared ideas of control. Both Beecroft and Campbell 
clearly sought to establish themselves as powerful and influential men on the 
coast, but this was a very personal desire. There is no evidence to suggest that 
either Beecroft or Campbell sought to extend formal British influence beyond 
protecting the well-being and commercial interests of their nationals. In 
hindsight it is evident that the ways in which they sought to do this ultimately 
embroiled themselves and their successors inextricably in coastal affairs. But the 
short-lived subsequent holders of that position were either not inclined, or 
1 Okaro K'Ojwang, 'Society, Trade and Politics in Badagri... ', p. 132. 
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merely did not have the time to establish their own stamp of authority on the 
coast. There was nothing inevitable about the development of Britain's 
relationship with the area, even at Lagos after 1851 and Badagry after 1854. 
Consul Campbell concluded his account of the Mewu's expulsion by pointing out 
the timeliness of events. He noted that Kosoko was, at this time, being pressured 
to leave Epe, and had apparently sent some of his wives and children to Ado and 
'evidently intended to gain a footing at Badagry'. Fortunately, Campbell could 
state that, the role of Britain in the expulsion had negated any part. that Kosoko 
had played2 . 
In fact Campbell's involvement evidently did nothing to ease tensions at Lagos, 
especially within the British community, and an increasingly bitter war of words 
between Anglican missionaries and the Consul threatened to spill over into 
violence. Revd Gollmer, while accusing the Consul of warmongering, tried to 
persuade King Dosunmu to order Campbell out of town. In return, Campbell not 
only accused the missionary of plotting his assassination, but suggested that 
Gollmer was provoking civil war by attempting to enlist the help of the powerful 
trader Madam Tinubu and her army of slaves in his cause. According to 
Campbell, it was only the arrival of a British and an American vessel off Lagos 
which prevented this force from acting 3. Relations between missionary groups 
appear also to have reached an all time low. The Methodist missionary Gardiner 
had retained friendly relations with the Wawu throughout the period of his exile 
and evidently retained high hopes of missionary progress for the period of 
restoration 4. This friendship evidently led him to harbour rather unchristian 
feelings towards Revd Gollmer who he accused of being 'a man whose character 
all along this lagoon ... is truly shocking and absolutely unenviable in any 
2 PRO F084/950 10 August 1854 Campbell, Lagos. 
3 PRO F084/950 10 August 1854 Campbell, Lagos. 
4 WMMSA 21 November 1854 the Wawu, Badagry in 8 March 1855 Gardiner, Lagos. 
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situation of life'. Furthermore, he identified his fellow missionary as being a 
'deeply guilty party' in the outbreak of war at both Badagry and Lagos 5. Although 
the squabbling of the British residents at Lagos did not culminate in violence, 
bitterness continued to distract attention away from far more serious issues. Even 
Archdeacon Graf, who accompanied Bishop Vidal on a goodwill visit to Lagos in 
October, noted, in unmistakable terms, that the Mewu had been expelled from 
Badagry 'by the friends of the slave trade, Kosoko and the King of Porto Novo, 6 
According to Campbell, so enraged were the Anglican missionaries at Lagos that 
they also attempted to urge their friends at Abeokuta to launch an attack on 
Badagry7 . But although initially the Egba made disapproving noises about the 
expulsion of their ally through their mouthpiece Townsend, they clearly did not 
wish to alienate the Consul and their secular British friends 8. The Egba 
ultimately concluded that they had no objection to the restoration of the Badagry 
chiefs, provided they kept their agreements with the British Government and 
their friendship with themselves 9. 
Despite clear hostility from an influential section of the Lagos community and 
belated reservations over his actions from London, Campbell was convinced that 
he had re-opened the lagoonIO. Furthermore, he advocated continued British 
involvement at Badagry to enable the restored chiefs to regulate dues, encourage 
5 PRO F084 / 950 7 August 1854 Gardiner, Lagos in December 1854 Campbell, Lagos. 
6 CMI November 1855, p. 248. 
7 PRO F084/976 17 October 1855 Campbell, Lagos. 
8 PRO F084/976 Undated enclosures from the Egba chiefs, Abeokuta in 17 October 1855 Campbell, 
Lagos. 
9 PRO F084/976 6 September 1854 the Egba Chiefs, Abeokuta in 17 October 1855 Campbell, Lagos]. 
10 Campbell noted that: 
Instead of the present peaceful state of things, with the lagoon, 
from Godomey near to Whydah to beyond Eppe, a distance of 150 
miles, bearing on its waters canoes laden with Palm Oil and other 
productions, these same canoes would have been filled with armed 
men, kidnapping and fighting, feeding the slave trade and rending 
the situation of Lagos critical and insecure 
f PRO F084 / 950 21 December 1854 Campbell, Lagos 1. 
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trade and squash any slave-trading activities. To ensure that the town was run 
along lines he approved, Campbell recommended the appointment of a Vice- 
Consul for Badagry and Porto-Novo. In his despatch explaining his actions, the 
Consul argued that the restoration of the Badagry chiefs would automatically 
lead to a considerable increase in 'legitimate' commerce and communication 
along the lagoon from Lagos almost as far as Whydah. The appointment of a 
Vice-Consul, to reside principally at Porto-Novo, would promote this peace aiio 
commerce and act as a check to any slave dealers who might hope to also take 
advantage of the open lagoon. Indeed Campbell concluded that such a man 
would be in a position to divert the palm oil trade away from the factory of 
Domingo Martinez at Porto-Novo beach towards Badagry, and thus induce that 
'notorious character .... to retire to Whydah. The subsequent increase in prosperity 
for Badagry would undoubtedly attract a new wave of emigrants not only from 
Sierra Leone but also from Brazil and Cuba. Thus the Vice Consul would be 
further required to protect this enlarged group and represent their interests 11. 
The man Campbell wanted for the post was William McCoskry. The trader had 
seven years' experience on the West Coast of Africa, notably in the employ of the 
Hutton Company. Furthermore, Campbell argued, his fellow Scot was known 
and respected by the King of Porto-Novo and the chiefs of Badagry. Indeed, he 
added that, 'from his mild temper, amiable and conciliatory disposition and his 
superior intelligence, is respected by all to whom he is known' 12. 
The Foreign Office received notification of Campbell's decision and concurred 
immediately with only the proviso that his appointment was made without 
salary 13. But the measure which was to have been the culmination of 
Campbell's pacification of the lagoon failed on all fronts. By September 1854, 
despite Campbell's assertions of imminent prosperity, it was clear that'the 
11 PRO F084/950 12 August 1854 Campbell, Lagos. 
12 PRO F084 / 950 12 August 1854 Campbell, Lagos. 
13 PRO F02 / 1115 December 1854 Clarendon, Lagos. 
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operation of the lagoon remained under constant threat as relations with Kosoko 
once again deteriorated14. At the same time constant fears of all-out warfare 
between Dahomey and Abeokuta continually threatened to disrupt the interior 
and threatened to spill over onto the coast15. Furthermore, any commercial 
benefits which may have arisen from the tense, but temporarily peaceful, area 
during 1854 were severely damaged by an emergent dispute between the 
Abeokuta and Lagos traders. By August 1855 trade between the two centres had' 
been halted16. The situation in Lagos itself also distracted Campbell as numbers 
of previously expelled 'slave traders'began to, once again, take up residence in 
the town, apparently with the sanction of King Dosunmu and his chiefs17. Lastly, 
Campbell's choice of appointment to the post of Vice-Consul proved unwise. 
Although 'honoured', William McCoskry was unable to take up his 
appointment immediately being on leave in Britain, from which he did not 
return until the beginning of 185518. On eventually returning to Lagos he 
suffered a bout of dysentery which continued to delay his installment 19. By the 
time McCoskry was ready to take up his post at the beginning of 1856 Campbell 
himself was having serious misgivings about his choice. The trader had 
evidently abandoned his intention of leaving his commercial headquarters at 
Lagos to base himself at Badagry. Instead he had delegated his affairs to the care of 
his assistant Thomas Tickel 20. He himself rarely set foot in the town. Even more 
damaging was the information that McCoskry had actively opposed the Consul 
14 PRO F084 / 950 28 September 1854 Campbell, Lagos. 
15 NNAI CS08 /1 /15 November 1855 Campbell to King of Dahomey, Lagos; PRO F084 / 10317 
March 1857 Campbell, Lagos; F084/1031 1 July 1857 Campbell, Lagos. 
16 PRO F084/976 30 August 1&55 Campbell, Lagos. 
17 PRO F084 / 950 21 December 1854 Campbell, Lagos. 
18 PRO F02 /12 30 November 1854 McCoskry, London; F02 /14 11 January 1855 McCoskry, London. 
19 PRO F084/976 17 October 1855 Campbell, Lagos. 
20 Thomas Tickel was a trader employed by Thomas Hutton and had been established on the West 
Coast throughout the 1840s. In 1853/54 Tickel moved first to Lagos and then Badagry when 
McCoskry, his immediate superior in the company, decided to establish his own business and asked 
Tickel to go with him. By the late 1850s Tickel was trading for himself and by the 1860s was said to 
be the only reputable British merchant on the coast. His subsequent appointment as Civil 
Commandant at Badagry by the Colonial Government gave him a vitally important role in shaping 
the Western District of the newly established Lagos Colony [K Folayan, 'The Career of Thomas 
Tickel in the Western District of Lagos 1854-1886', JHSN v/1 (1969), pp. 27-46 1. 
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in his dealings with the trader Madam TinubU 21. It was at this stage that the two 
openly quarrelled, purportedly over the collection of duties at Lagos 22 . Having 
conveyed his fears over McCoskry's suitability to London, it was agreed that the 
trader should not be confirmed in his appointment and his position as Vice- 
Consul was cancelled 23 . Over the following two years the rift between Campbell 
and McCoskry widened as the Consul dredged up further information accusing 
McCoskry of dishonest dealings both at Badagry, Lagos and previously on the, 
Gold Coast 24. 
The McCoskry incident was symptomatic of Campbell's failure to carry out any of 
the simple measures he had envisaged to ensure the pacification of the lagoon. 
The Consul was led to advocate further levels of intervention. In 1857 a further 
attempt at imposing order was made by the appearance of HM Steam Vessel 
Drake, shortly followed by the Brune on the inland waterway 25. By the 
beginning of 1858 Campbell was beginning to re-examine the question of 
occupying Whydah as a way of finally crushing the slave trade 26. 
Badagry under the restored chiefs 
Newbury has concluded that the reinstated chiefs were corrupt and inefficient, 
whilst Smith agrees that their return did nothing to arrest the decline of the 
town 27. A picture of continued hopelessness was certainly conveyed by the 
writings of missionary visitors to the town during the later 1850s. After the 
restoration both Methodists and Anglicans briefly held out hopes of a renewed 
mission at Badagry. The Methodist Gardiner, through his friendship with Chief 
21 PRO F02 /17 23 June 1856 Campbell, Lagos. 
22 PRO F084/1002 14 May 1856 Campbell, Lagos. 
23 PRO F02/17 22 August 1856 Clarendon, London. 
24 In 1856 McCoskry accused his assistant at Badagry, Mr Reynolds, of stealing from him. However, 
according to the far from impartial Consul, Reynolds was entirely innocent of the charges and it was 
McCoskry who had acted improperly [PRO F084/1002 25 September 1856 Campbell, Lagos; PRO 
F02 / 24 29 March 1858 Malmesbury, London]. 
25 PRO F084 / 103122 January 1857 Clarendon, London. 
26 PRO F084/1061 6 February 1858 Campbell, Lagos. 
27 Newbury, The Western Slave Coast... p. 63; Smith, The Lagos Consulate... p. 85. 
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Wawu, evidently had expectations of increased interest. At the end of 1854 the 
Wawu wrote to Gardiner thanking him for his continued friendship and support 
and acknowledged the role of God in restoring him to his chieftainCY28. But any 
hopes that this indicated a commitment towards Christianity were unfounded. 
Indeed by the end of 1856 Gardiner himself was recommending that conditions at 
Badagry were 'adverse to evangelical operations' and suggesting the station's 
complete abandonment 29. 
The Church Missionary Society also entertained hopes of renewed interest in 
Christianity immediately after the restoration of the chiefs, despite the downfall 
of their ally the Mewu. Revd Crowther visited Badagry in June 1855 along with 
Buko, the son of Chief Posu who was now a mission student at Lagos. During the 
course of this visit Crowther was well received by 'all the influential persons at 
Badagry'. The efforts of Messrs Lawson and John, the CMS catechists stationed in 
the town from early 1855 were praised 'although their abilities are small'. 
Furthermore Crowther reported that the Posu 'begged me once more to see that 
the mission premises be put in order, 30. On another visit in December of that 
year Crowther preached to a congregation of seventy people including the chiefs 
'Possu, Wawu, Balla, and Pootu [who may have been the Akran of this period, 
identified by Avoseh as Poton]'. He chastised them for their carelessness but the 
people 'begged not to be forsaken' 31 . 
But any missionary optimism over evangelical progress was quickly dispelled. By 
early 1858 Crowther's replacement at the Lagos station was complaining that on 
a visit to Badagry he found that although the chiefs and the people made 
promises, things were in 'a most discouraging state ... nor is there any desire to be 
28 WMMSA 21 November 1854 the Wawu, Badagry in 8 March 1855 Gardiner, Lagos. 
29 WMMSA 11 November 1856 Gardiner, Lagos. 
30 PRO F084/976 28 December 1854 Campbell to the Wawu in 2 August 1855 Campbell, Lagos; CMR 
March 1856, p. 60. 
31 
_CMR 
March 1856, p. 60; Avoseh, A Short HistoQL of BadagjZL, p. 24. 
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instructed in the way of everlasting salvation32. Even the establishment of the 
talented and committed Samuel Pearse in 1859 failed to make any difference to 
the spread of Christianity in the town, although the man himself was 
undoubtedly held in high esteem there33. Christianity also evidently faced 
competition from a restored and rejuvenated Muslim community at Badagry. 
Avoseh has suggested that the restoration period saw a revival of Islam in the 
town. Evidently a number of Muslims who had left as a result of the civil war' 
returned during this period. Moreover, it would also appear that at least some of 
the Gun chiefs, the Posu being one and later also the jengen, allowed the Islamic 
community to build new mosques in their quarters 34. Furthermore it is clear 
that the missionary's closest contacts only held their chieftaincies for a short 
period after restoration. By the middle of 1856 both the Wawu and the Posu were 
dead35. More importantly however I would suggest that the failure of 
Christianity despite obvious interest in the missionary presence, was the result of 
Badagry's diplomatic and political aims. Understandably Badagry was looking, 
more than ever before, for continued contact with Britain rather than 
Christianity, and the continued presence of the missionaries, who had often been 
active in local politics, was merely the most suitable way of preserving that link. 
The purported support for a Christian mission was clearly an attempt by the 
Badagry chiefs to ally themselves firmly with the spiritual aspect of what was 
clearly by now the dominant military power on the coast. 
The Badagry chiefs sought to take advantage of the economic potential of Lagos. 
But after the turmoil of the preceding years the town remained dangerously 
weak. Bowen, commenting on the coastal situation, noted that whilst Lagos and 
Abeokuta were increasing in population 'Badagry hardly exists' 36. As late as 
32 CMR January 1859, p. 23,12 February 1858, Revd Buhler, Lagos. 
33 CMR April 1860, p. 111; W0 Ajayi, 'A History of the Yoruba Mission-', pp. 165-166. 
34 Avoseh, 'Islam in Badagri' in Falola, 'The Minor Works... ', p. 242. 
35 PRO F084/1002 29 July 1856 Campbell, Lagos. 
36 Bowen, Adventures and Missionary Labours, p. 124. 
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1858, Consul Campbell reported that despite the presence of eight ruling chiefs 
the population of the town was now no more than six hundred37. But despite its 
much reduced circumstances Badagry was continuing to operate, at least in a 
limited way, as an Atlantic port. In 1856 a total of twenty thousand tons of palm 
oil was exported from the Bight of Benin. The Porto-Novo area alone handled 
four thousand tons, whilst Lagos exported three thousand eight hundred and 
eighty four tons that year. But surprisingly, Badagry was shipping some one 
thousand two hundred and fifty tons of oil from the beach. The following year, 
Badagry maintained that figure, although it is true to say that all other Bight 
Ports, except Whydah had increased the amount of oil they handled38. By 1855 
there were evidently a number of British merchants operating out of Badagry 
once more 39. Furthermore, despite its obvious limitations Badagry had, in some 
ways, succeeded in redefining its economic role through its position on the 
lagoon. Most clearly it would appear that the town's connections with Lagos had 
been strengthened. During the latter half of the 1850s Badagry was evidently 
being used in the collection and sale of palm oil for embarkation at Lagos itself. 
As early as May 1856 Campbell was including Badagry among the 'large markets' 
for Lagos and, from the accounts of dispute and disagreement between Consul 
and trader over the collection and payment of duties between the towns, it is 
evident that the Badagry oil market was an important source for Lagos 40. 
The Lagos market continued to have problems throughout the latter part of the 
1850s however. Kosoko and his Party remained an irritation to Dosunmu's 
administration whilst the Ijaye Wars between Abeokuta and Ibadan interrupted 
37 PRO F084/1061 20 April 1858 Campbell, Lagos. 
38 PRO F084/1061 2 February 1858 Campbell, Lagos. 
39 In early 1859 Campbell mentioned some English traders at Badagry who had travelled to 
Abomey for the annual customs [PRO F084/1088 7 February 1859 Campbell, Lagos]. Btit a gradual 
return had evidently begun well before this. In June 1856 Campbell had received petitions from the 
merchants engaged in trade at Badagry' and mentioned specifically Mr Hutton s establishment 
there [NNAI CS08/1/2 14 June 1856 Campbell to the Badagry chiefs, Lagos]. 
40 PRO F084 /1022 14 May 1856 Campbell, Lagos; NNAI CS08 /I /115 December 1855 Campbell, 
Lagos. 
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oil supplies from the interior. But Badagry's lagoon connections further to the 
west evidently maintained its own export trade. Indeed according to Campbell, 
all the palm oil shipped directly from Badagry beach came from Porto-Novo 
market 41 . The importance of that source was illustrated during 1859 when a 
dispute at Porto-Novo brought the market to a standstill for two months. 
Campbell complained that the dispute had led to great suffering and 
inconvenience for the traders at Badagry 42. 
It would seem then that despite its problems Badagry had adapted to its role as a 
minor Atlantic port, and was able to take advantage of its now dominant 
neighbours both to east and west by maintaining a position as a lagoon market. 
Its ability to sustain and expand this role evidently rested on the continued 
operation of the lagoon economy. But a further blow was dealt to coastal stability 
by the death of Campbell in April 1859. If nothing else Campbell's six year 
residence at the consulate had maintained a level of consistency. But 
furthermore, despite his faults, his strength of character combined with 
undoubtedly weak kingship at Lagos had enabled him to mould the post of 
Consul into one of immense influence, far beyond his official remit. After his 
death, the post, so dependent upon personality, was held by a succession of 
temporary and short-lived Consuls. 
Initially Lieutenant Lodder stepped into the breach until the new Consul could 
travel out from England 43. The naval officer was immediately faced with 
rumours of an imminent attack from Kosoko and embarked on negotiations 
with the chief at Epe 44. His permanent replacement George Brand, who had been 
Vice-Consul at Loanda, arrived at Lagos in November 1859 45. But his attention 
41 PRO F084/1088 5 April 1859 Campbell, Lagos. 
42 PRO F084/1088 5 April 1859 Campbell, Lagos. 
43 PRO F02 / 28 14 June 1859 Malmesbury, London; PRO F02 / 28 15 June 1859 Malmesbury, London. 
44 PRO F084/1088 2 November 1859 Lodder, Lagos. 
45 PRO F02 / 28 30 November 1859 Brand, Lagos. 
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was immediately attracted west by rumours of Dahomean aggression towards 
Abeokuta and the disturbed state of the Yoruba country 46. Brand evidently saw 
the only solution to the unstable coastal situation as a more formal British 
presence. As early as April 1860 he was pressing for the occupation of both 
Whydah and Lagos either as possessions or protectorates. This, he declared, was 
the only method by which the slave trade could finally be suppressed and the 
level of administration could be imposed which would enable legitimate 
commerce to expand47. But Brand lacked the conviction to press ahead himself 
and wrestled with official definitions of his 'magisterial powers' as Consul 48 
Brand's hesitancy was illustrated by his difficult relationship with Badagry. 
Relations between European residents and their Badagry hosts had once again 
become increasingly strained. In early 1860 a fire at the premises of the 
Manchester merchants Messrs Novelli and Co resulted in accusations of arson49. 
Brand reminded the chiefs of their Treaty obligations and despatched a naval 
representative, Commander Bowden, as mediator 50. An uneasy calm was once 
again restored 51. However, Brand found greater difficulty in defining his 
consular role when faced with further problems in May 1860. Reports from 
Samuel Pearse expressed concern over accusations and arrests for witchcraft in 
the town. Although Brand felt able to condemn the actions of the chiefs on a 
moral level, he was evidently unsure whether, under the terms of the 1852 
Treaty which forbade 'human sacrifice, he, as Consul, had the authority to act. 
Ultimately he concluded that he did not, and satisfied himself with a belated 
letter reminding the chiefs that it was through British intervention that they had 
gained their present positions. He concluded his outburst with the empty threat 
that, although they remained unpunished for their 'various acts of ingratitude 
46 PRO F084/1114 23 May & 21 June 1860 Russell, London. 
47 PRO F084/1115 9 April 1860 Brand, Lagos. 
48 PRO F084/1088 31 December 1859 Brand, Lagos. 
49 PRO F084/1115 January 1860 Badagry Merchants in 7 February 1860 Brand, Lagos. 
50 PRO F084/1115 Undated Brand to Badagry chiefs, Lagos in 7 February 1860 Brand, Lagos. 
51 PRO F084/1115 5 February 1860 Bowden, off Badagry in 7 February 1860 Brand, Lagos. 
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and willful violation of their engagements', none of these misdemeanors had 
been forgotten52- The Consul's scorn for the Badagry chiefs was immense. It is 
ironic then that at his death in June 1860 he was buried in the Christian 
graveyard of this 'colony of thieves, 53 . 
Brand's frustration with Badagry and yet his unwillingness to act, contrasted 
starkly with the degree of intervention Campbell had been willing to make. 
Indeed the actions of the two exposed the remarkable degree of personal 
interpretation and circumstance which governed 'British' actions along the coast 
during the Consular period. It was the period 1861-1863 which was, however, to 
see the role of the 'Man on the spot' achieve even greater heights. 
52 PRO F084/1115 3 May 1860 Brand to Badagry chiefs, Lagos in 14 May 1860 Brand, Lagos. 
53 Brand's grave can still be seen in the old Christian cemetery at Badagry. 
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Chapter 11 
The Annexation Of Badagry 1861-1863 
Nineteenth century British Imperialism has been the subject of great 
controversy. A large number of books and articles have been written by many 
very eminent historians, and the ideas they have expressed have been studied by 
an even greater number of students such as myself. A general analysis of 
imperialism is beyond both my scope and my desire. Suffice it to say here that the 
theories developed by Gallagher and Robinson, Fieldhouse, Hargreaves, 
MacIntyre, Cain and Hopkins, clearly take one far beyond an examination of one 
particular place 1. However, the examination of one particular area, in this case 
Badagry, does, I feel, raise some interesting questions and possibly has some 
wider implications for the subject of British activity on the West African coast in 
the mid- to late-nineteenth century, and the concept of 'imperialism' itself. 
Firstly, I would suggest that the Badagry case exposes the very real dangers for the 
historian of using hindsight. What now appears to be an obvious sequence of 
related events, may imply contemporary motives, aims or knowledge which 
simply did not exist. Commentators on the annexation of Badagry, of which 
there are notably few, have usually assigned a short section to the events of late 
1861-1863 after a detailed analysis of the period leading up to the cession of Lagos 
on 6 August 1861. They present these later events as a postscript to affairs further 
east, a mere tying up of loose ends along the coast which was inevitable once the 
British had raised their flag over Lagos. But a closer examination of the actual 
events of the period as a whole, from a less Lagosian perspective, demonstrates 
that the expansion of the Lagos colony appears inevitable only in hindsight, and 
1j Gallaher &R Robinson, 'The Imperialism of Free Trade', EHR Vol 6,2nd Series, no'l AugUst 
1953, pp. 1-15; DK Fieldhouse, Economics and Emi2irel830-1914, (Macmillan, London 1984); jD 
Hargreaves, Prelud-e-to the Partition of West Africa. (Macmillan, London 1963); WD MacIntyre, 
The Imperial Frontier in tho-, Tropics. A Study of British Colonial Policy in West Africa. Malaya 
and the South Pacific in th&: Age of 
Gladstone and Disraeli, (Macmillan, London 1967); PJ Cain &A 
G Hopkins, British Imperialism. Innovation and Expansion 1688-1914 (Longman 1993). 
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that Badagry had a set of individual and separate causes for its cession two years 
later. Thus its annexation provides an important case study on the notion of 
Icreeping imperialismi. 
What is more, this postscript ending suggests a consensus of purpose and view 
on the part of the 'British', that clearly did not exist, as demonstrated during the 
period up to 1860. The question of exactly who shaped events on the West 
African coast, has been examined by a number of historians. Whether policy was 
made in Whitehall, or by the 'man on the spot', or was the result of African's 
themselves provoking a reaction, or, indeed, a combination of all these factors, 
should be examined in the light of both overview and case study. It could be 
argued that such a study is too small and narrow an area from which to ascertain 
any pattern of motives or policy. But this, I would suggest, points to a third 
implication. As already suggested, theories attempting to explain the concept of 
imperialism take one far beyond an examination of a single place. But perhaps 
such an examination begins to reveal some of the dangers of more general 
concepts. An attempt to fit a particular theory over a number of disparate cases 
can result in events and circumstances being shaped by theory rather than vice 
versa. 
I would agree with Newbury that when the eight Badagry chiefs signed the Treaty 
of Cession on July 7 1863 they were already, to a certain extent in a 'state of 
dependence12. This was the last in a series of similar treaties signed in June and 
early July of that year, beginning with Ado then Ipokia and Okeodan. I would not 
agree, however, that this situation had existed since 1861. This state of 
dependence had in fact only existed, in some British eyes, since mid- to late- 1862, 
and that even then the outcome was by no means certain but was shaped by a 
series of causal factors. The events leading up to the annexation of Badagry can be 
Newbury, The Western Slave Coast... p. 70. 
351 
divided broadly into two groups. The first and most obvious group was made up 
of those which resulted from the situation on the Bight of Benin as a whole in 
the 1862-63 period. To some extent these motives seem purely reactive. The 
French factor, for example would seem to have been crucial in shaping events, 
and it could be argued perhaps that the town's cession became inevitable only in 
1863 when French encroachments along the coast from the Porto-Novo area 
became a threat to British interests. However, unlike Ado, Ipokia and Okeodan, 
Badagry's annexation, like that of Palma, was not purely the result of French 
expansion and part of a tit for tat series of annexations. Although the French 
factor was crucial in forcing the British ultimately to take formal possession of 
the town, other factors had preceded, pushing the British agents along the road to 
annexation even before the French had taken possession of Porto-Novo. 
Badagry's cession was also, to a great extent, a reaction to events centering on 
Lagos. The first half of 1862 saw a growing realisation by Governor Freeman and 
then Acting Lieutenant Governor Glover in early 1863 that to enable Lagos to 
become the trading centre that had been envisaged, the colony must be extended 
to stabilise and open the surrounding country. Lagos alone had failed to meet 
their expectations and they tried to realise their hopes by expanding the territory. 
The second set of causes and motives behind the annexation of Badagry, which 
should not be understated, arose from the local situation in the town itself. Both 
economic and humanitarian, they begin to show that in the early 1860s, the town 
of Badagry had not yet become the mere appendage to Lagos that it may now 
appear. 
The Coastal Situation in 1861 
it is without doubt convenient and understandable to view the cession of 
Badagry in 1863 as a foregone conclusion after the annexation of Lagos in August 
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1861. Hindsight presents a picture of a small state which had always been closely 
tied to the affairs of Lagos. During the period of the Lagos Consulate from 1851- 
1861, this relationship became so marked and indeed subordinate, due to the 
policies pursued by the British agents on the coast and Badagry's own inability to 
stand alone, that in reality, by 1861, Badagry was actually included in the 
annexation of Lagos. Dioka has seen the cession of the town as the result of a 
gradual but 'consistent process' of events beginning in 1852, which increasingly 
tied the town to the British at Lagos 3. Any examination of Badagry and its 
history will support this view in a number of respects. Firstly there is the 
geographical connection. Situated only about forty miles along the coast from 
Lagos Island, Badagry's history was clearly linked with that of its neighbour. 
Furthermore, the lagoon link forced the towns into even closer political and 
economic communion. It would appear that it was ultimately the dominance of 
Lagos which destroyed Badagry's role as a major West African port once and for 
all, or perhaps more accurately, destroyed any chances the town had of re- 
emerging as such in the mid-nineteenth century. But it was also Badagry's 
connections along the lagoon which enabled the town to retain a function as a 
middleman once its direct Atlantic trade had all but ceased. However, the mere 
geographical proximity of Lagos is not a conclusive argument to expose Badagry's 
dependence in the nineteenth century. The town was equally near to Porto- 
Novo, a place which provided connections and ties of its own. 
When examining the traditional political links between Lagos and Badagry, it is 
important to stress that much of the contemporary evidence arises from the 
British agents' view of events. This, in the face of increasing French pressure and 
a desire to justify their actions to their government, understandably came to 
present Badagry, along with Ado, Leke and Palma as traditionally belonging to 
the Lagos Kingdom. As Governor Freeman noted in a memorandum in June 
3LC Dioka, 'The Evolution of Nigeria's International Boundary 1861-1889' in A Adefuye, B Agiri 
&J Osuntokun, Histo1y of the Peoples of the Lagos State (Ikeja, Lagos 1987), pp. 216-228. 
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1863, one month before official cession: 
The establishment of our rule at Badagri ... cannot be regarded in the light of an annexation, but merely as bringing under our legislation a 
port belonging to Lagos 4 
He then explained that although originally a Dahomean settlement, Badagry had 
actually put itself, during the reign of Ologun Kutere of Lagos at the end of the 
eighteenth century, under Lagos' protection after Dahomey had threatened to 
destroy the town. A view which is a little different from that expressed by 
Freeman himself a year earlier. Then he had claimed that Badagry had been 
under Lagosian protection since its had establishment as a slave port, presumably 
meaning therefore since the first half of the eighteenth century. In Ologun 
Kutere's reign, he continued, this relationship had merely been formalised by the 
payment of a large sum to Dahomey 5. 
This explanation of affairs could be termed selective rather than inaccurate. 
Badagry did have a long history of political association with Lagos. The Lagosian 
prince Akinsemoyin's settlement at the Boeko Ward of the town in the mid- 
eighteenth century was one, whilst it was into Posuko Ward that the temporarily 
exiled King of Lagos, Adele, was welcomed in the first half of the next centUry6. 
In his local history of the town, Avoseh writes of a period of more formal 
influence, which he stresses was one of cordial relations which reached its height 
in the late eighteenth century whereby chiefs of Badagry went to Lagos for 
installation7. This period of extreme goodwill between the two places was, I have 
suggested, more realistically a period of subservience for Badagry, after the town's 
destruction in 1784. But although it would appear Badagry took time to recover 
from this, and at least two subsequent attacks by Dahomey in the early 1790s, by 
the Adele period of the 1820s at least a section of the town's society were clearly 
4 PRO F084 /120110 June 1863 Memorandum by Freeman, London. 
5pRO C0147/1 9 October 1862 Freeman, Lagos. 
6Avoseh, A Short Histoizý of BadagLy pp. 28 & 33. Also see chapters 5, p. 163 & 6, pp. 177-183. 
7 Ibid, p. 33. 
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in a position to launch raids on their eastern and western neighbours under the 
direction of the deposed King 8. 
But as I have demonstrated, Porto-Novo played an equally important part in the 
town's affairs. Badagry was sought as a haven by political refugees from the east, 
such as the Mewu in the mid-nineteenth century. These political links, along 
with commercial cooperation and competition, led to a series of hostilities and' 
alliances between Badagry and Porto-Novo throughout the pre-colonial period. 
From the port's very establishment Dahomean influence was also. crucial. The 
interior power plagued Badagry with attacks several times during the eighteenth 
century and the first half of the nineteenth century saw Badagry increasingly 
caught between the power politics of Dahomey and the Egba, based at Abeokuta. 
Indeed, although throughout the middle years of the nineteenth century 
Dahomean influence was noted at Badagry, it was the Egba influence, encouraged 
by the Christian missionaries working on the coast, which became increasingly 
prominent. 
Trade on the lagoons obviously linked together the states along its length. As 
noted, more often than not the states worked not only together in trade, but also 
in competition with one another. The 1851 blockade of Lagos, for example, 
allowed a short resurgence of Badagry's Atlantic trade, whilst the establishment 
of a consul on the island soon after, combined with Badagry's lapse into civil 
war, reversed the effect. The consular period ultimately saw renewed vigour in 
the pattern of trade along the lagoon between Lagos and Badagry. But one should 
not ignore the equally important links to the west with Porto-Novo, both in 
'legitimate' articles and slaves. McCoskry noted in 1861 that 'palm oil in 
considerable quantities is daily arriving at Badagry from Porto Novo' and also 
that slaves were sent up from both these places to Whydah 
9. Badagry's position 
8 See chapter 6, pp. 192-194 & 195-196. 
9 PRO F084/1141 27 May 1861 McCoskry, Lagos; PRO F084/1141 30 May 1861 McCoskry, Lagos. 
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laid it very much open to influences from both east and west and also from the 
interior. I would suggest that to highlight a single external political or economic 
influence over Badagry's history is to misunderstand the nature of both the 
fluctuating relationships in existence on the West African coast and also the 
nature of Badagry itself, which due to the fragmented style of its internal 
structure was susceptible to a multitude of such forces. 
One might then argue that regardless of traditional allegiances and loyalties it 
was the intervention of the British along the coast, from the 1840s onwards that 
imposed an entirely new layer of authority at Badagry; one which undermined 
any independence that the town had, and ultimately brought it, along with 
Lagos, under British control in 1861. Badagry, like many of the towns along the 
coast had a long tradition of trade with Europe 10. But it had been from the 1840s 
onwards that a 'special' relationship with Britain was formed, initially with 
traders such as the Hutton Company and then, soon after, with missionaries 
following in the footsteps of groups of Sierra Leone emigrants 11. This wave of 
British immigration prompted the establishment of the British Sergeant and the 
raising of the British flag over the town for a short period in 1843-1844. But 
evidently this was purely a reaction to missionary security fears during the early 
months of their establishment in the town, rather than an early indication of a 
colonial interest by the British Government and the sergeant had been removed 
as quickly as possible, much to the dismay of the missionary residents. It was 
during this period however, that Badagry became the main focal point of British 
activity on the coast. Until its reduction in 1851, Lagos, as the centre of slave 
trading activity and openly hostile to the free movement of immigrants between 
it and Abeokuta, emerged as the coast's bogeyman. Badagry offered the only 
secure route for both missionaries and Sierra Leonians to penetrate the interior. 
But the assault on Lagos by the British and the subsequent imposition of Akitoye 
10 Verger, Trade Relations... pp. 183-188. Also see chapter 2. 
11 See chapter 7. 
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on the throne, a king at least professing to be well disposed towards their aims, 
switched British attention towards the island state, it being better placed for both 
trading and 'civilising' the interior 12. 
Although in effect deserted by both missionary and trader, by 1852/1853, it is the 
following years that have been used to demonstrate a gradual shift towards 
complete dominance by the British over Badagry. Indeed historians such as 
Newbury have seen the reduction of Lagos as a symptom that the seeds of 
colonialism were sown early on. But I would suggest that a close analysis of 
events on the coast between 1851 and 1861, and then also during the neglected 
period 1861 and 1863, provides interesting evidence on whether such an 
identifiable strategy was developed and if so by whom. 
After the separation of consular jurisdiction between the Bights of Benin and 
Biafra in 1853, the new consular base at Lagos automatically emerged as the focal 
point in the Bight of Benin. Its reduction had raised expectations of increased 
security and political order and hopes for using it as a springboard from which 
finally to destroy the slave trade, expand legitimate trade and spread European 
ideas of civilisation. Such expectations and disappointment with Badagry led to a 
general movement of missionaries and traders alike to Lagos throughout the 
early 1850s. Whilst its centre had been at Fernando Po, the district had been too 
great to allow any but the most sporadic of contact with the consul. But the new 
centre at Lagos prompted a closer relationship between the Bight's African states 
and the British agents. Indeed a level of involvement was established which 
appeared to fly in the face of the official government policy of non- 
i nterventionl 
3. 
The question of 'colonial policy' in the mid-Victorian era has stimulated 
12 See chapter 9, pp. 333-336. 
13 See chapter 9, pp. 346-356. 
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vigorous debate. Earlier interpretations of a distinct anti-expansionist policy 
during the period followed by a break in the 1880s have been strenuously 
challenged, most obviously by Gallagher and Robinson, who have stressed a 
'fundamental continuity in British expansion throughout the nineteenth 
century?. This they claim was due to Britain's huge economic growth during the 
period, which resulted in the need for varying degrees of control over such 
regions, either of an informal or a more formal kind. They stress that the 
differences between these types of control 'has not been one of fundamental 
nature but of degree' and that it was changes in circumstances in the latter part of 
the period which altered the level of this control, but not the policy itself 14. 
Gallagher and Robinson's views have been challenged and refined on a number 
of levels. Martin Lynn for example, in the context of West Africa, has questioned 
their definition of 'informal empire', suggesting that merely the presence and 
involvement of Britain on the coast during the middle of the nineteenth century 
was not indicative of empire, formal or otherwise 15. Furthermore, the Gallagher 
and Robinson notion of policy being formulated in London, has emphatically 
been disputed, notably again by Lynn in his analysis of the role of 'Man on the 
Spot', and also carefully examined by MacIntyre in his detailed analysis of the 
British policy making process. Most recently Cain and Hopkins in their 
comprehensive study of British Imperialism have sought to examine events on 
the periphery in the light of 'the quickening beat of impulses transmitted from 
the metropole 16. 
Events in the Bight of Benin in the 1850s and 1860s have been examined in detail 
by several of these historians, but very much from a Lagosian perspective. I 
14 J Gallagher &R Robinson, 'The Imperialism of Free Trade' . 
15 M Lynn'The Imperialism of Free Trade and the Case of West Africa C. 1830-1870' TICH 15/1 
1986, pp. 22-40. 
16 R Robinson &J Gallagher, A Denny, Africa and the Victorians The Qfficial Mind of 
IM12 ýrLaLjaa, (Macmillan, London 1981); Lynn 'Consul and Kings... '; WD MacIntyre, 'Commander 
Glover and the Colony of Lagos 1861-73' TAH, iv / 11963, pp. 57-59; WD MacIntyre, The Imperial 
Frontier in the Tropics Cain & Hopkins, Innovation and Expansion-, p. 361. 
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suggest that there is some valuable information to be found in the period 1861-63 
when the colony was expanded, which gives further clues to the nature of British 
intervention in the area. Such an examination reveals that intervention during 
this period was, to a great extent, shaped by the British agents working on the 
coast. Whilst British ministerial policy remained officially non-interventionist, it 
being either unable to curb the actions of its representatives abroad or, as 
suggested by MacIntyre, great loopholes were left for those representatives to act 
at their own discretion17. When Lagos was annexed in August 1861, the Foreign 
Office and, much more reluctantly, the Colonial Office had resigned themselves 
to it. However, at that point neither department foresaw any further acquisitions 
along the coast, although the possibility of occupying Whydah, the port of 
Dahomey, had been bandied about for years 18. But if one follows the school of 
thought which claims that the formulation of policy was out of ministerial 
hands and in those of the British coastal agents, it is interesting to note that 
British actions were almost wholly determined by the reaction of these 
individuals to events, and that, for example, it was only in 1862 that the idea of 
extending the Lagos territory became desirable. 
The consular period in the Bight of Benin seems to be characterised by a gradual 
increase of intervention in affairs along the coast by these British agents. In 
Lagos, Akitoye, once restored to the throne,, proved too weak a monarch to 
control the diversely populated island of Lagos, as did his successor Dosunmu 
who took over the throne at his father's death in September 1853. In the light of 
almost unceasing pressure from the dethroned Kosoko, who sought to regain 
Lagos, the British consul in reality took over the reigns of authority before 1861. 
But it would also appear that the consul began to play an increasingly 
interventionist role further along the coast. The notable example at Badagry was 
17 MacIntyre, 'Commander Glover... ', p. 78. 
18 For example, from the early 1840s Governor Maclean at Cape Coast had advocated this measure. 
See chapter 7, p. 221. 
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in the early 1850s in the aftermath of the civil war. As it became increasingly clear 
that the Mewu's assumption of power in the town disrupted trade along the 
lagoon with his former master at Porto-Novo, he lost the support of both British 
traders and Consul Campbell. Although ultimately it was not a British force 
which deposed Mewu, it was Campbell shuttling along the lagoon between 
Porto-Novo, Badagry and the camps of the deposed Chiefs, who encouraged an 
attack to be made and the town to be retaken by the original chiefs. The censure. 
of the Foreign Office arrived far too late to affect events. 
Badagry was not the only place to come into contact with consular zeal. Robert 
Smith has argued that British intervention at Epe, resulting in the Treaty of 
Palma in 1854 which basically gave Kosoko rights over the port of Palma, was not 
only a step towards pacifying the lagoon, but was also a direct step towards 
extending British authority further east 19. Only in hindsight could this treaty be 
viewed in such a light. The reasoning behind it at the time was to assuage the 
very real threat of repeated attacks from Kosoko on an island which the British 
gunboats had had difficulty enough driving him from. Only with the aid of a 
crystal ball could one have foreseen that eleven years later Kosoko would return 
to Lagos, bringing the sovereignty of Palma with him. 
I have argued that the consular period did not show the gradual emergence of an 
identifiable policy of interventionism along the coast, but rather that it 
demonstrated the effect and impact of the personalities at work in the area and 
that the actions of these figures were almost wholly guided by events as they 
arose. They were reactive rather than proactive. Although both Consuls Foote 
and McCoskry saw the annexation of Lagos as desirable, they did not see the new 
colony extending much beyond the bounds of the island itself. The wider view of 
the new colony only emerged during 1862 under the Governorship of first 
19 SInith, The Lagos Consulate... pp. 62-65. 
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Freeman and more significantly Glover, who, although ultimately guided by 
similar motives to those of Foote and McCoskry, were in turn reacting to a 
completely new set of circumstances exclusive to the first years of the Lagos 
colony. 
Consul Foote, 1860-1861 
At the death of Brand, Henry Foote was appointed as Consul for the Bight of 
Benin. On taking up the post, his approach to the job did not appear to differ 
markedly from that of his predecessor. Although clearly showing exasperation 
with the Badagry chiefs in late 1860, he evidently saw it as his duty to protect 
British property in the town and no more. On the outbreak of a succession 
dispute there during the period, Foote ordered Lieutenant Stokes of HMS Brune 
to mediate, but warned him that action against the town could only be justified 
as a check 'upon the wholesale plunder of the trading establishments' 20. But by 
1861, Foote, although aware of the reluctance of London to involve British men 
in 'native' disputes, was clearly becoming increasingly willing to pursue a more 
intrusive policy in order to achieve the conditions condusive to what he saw as 
British interests along the coast 21. The appointment of Thomas Tickel on I 
March 1861 as Vice-Consul for both Badagry and Porto-Novo was clearly an 
attempt to further the mediatory role of Britain in local affairs. Tickel with his 
thorough knowledge of the area and its people, was an extremely well respected 
figure and therefore an excellent choice for the post. But, more impulsive than 
his predecessors, Foote was prepared to go much further, much faster to achieve 
his aims, leaving little room for mediation. 
Increasing tensions between Porto-Novo and Lagos, largely over trading matters, 
clearly rankled the Consul. Brief attempts at a peaceful settlement failed and 
Foote took an openly aggressive stance, culminating in two assaults and the 
20 PRO F084/1141 10 January 1861 Foote to Stokes, Lagos in 8 February 1861 Foote, Lagos. 
21 PRO F084/1141 10 January 1861 Foote to Stokes, Lagos in 8 February 1861 Foote, Lagos. 
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destruction of the town in early 1861, only a month after the appointment of 
Tickel. Seizing the opportunity of the robbery of a British merchant by the King 
of Porto-Novo, Foote saw a chance to eradicate the 'slave traders' grip on the 
town. The eventual submission of Porto-Novo led to the signing of a treaty 
which went much further than that of 1852. Not only did it bring the British 
merchants under the authority of the Consul, it also took a step toward 
recognising a consular right to involvement in Porto-Novo's own affairs, stating 
that no wars should be entered into without first aquainting that official 22. 
How events would have unfolded had Foote remained Consul is pure 
speculation. But on 17 May 1861 he died, bringing to an end a short period of 
vigorous and sometimes violent consular activity. Until a replacement could 
arrive, the seasoned and often controversial British trader William McCoskry 
took over the reigns. To suggest that the following period, which saw the 
annexation of Lagos, was a retrogressive period in the history of British influence 
would seem very strange and it might appear, from the fact that he oversaw the 
annexation of the island, that Acting Consul McCoskry pursued a similar policy 
to that of Foote. But I would argue that McCoskry once more changed the focus of 
British attention away from the expansionist intrusions of Foote. Attempting to 
consolidate the British trading position at Lagos, he did not foresee the colony 
extending any further than the island itself. Acting as the merchant 
he was, 
McCoskry's main priority was to strengthen trade routes, notably between the 
Egba capital in the interior and the coast. 
Acting Consul McCoskry, 1861 
The initial measures McCoskry took on gaining office were against Lagos' 
western neighbours. In June of 1861 
he signed further treaties with Porto-Novo 
and Badagry as a direct response to specific economic problems. 
The first with 
22 PRO F084/1141 8 March 1861, Foote, Lagos. 
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Porto-Novo on June 17 was a reaction to his perception that the promised free 
trade at the port had not been realised, whilst that with Badagry (undated, 
although only a few days later) ultimately brought the collection of the town's 
customs under the control of the Consul. It is these events which Newbury and 
MacIntyre have pointed to as the effective absorption of Badagry into the state of 
Lagos, a measure which therefore brought the town under British control in 
1861, which was merely formalised in 1863. But I would argue that McCoskry did 
not see it as an attempt to usurp the authority of the Badagry chiefs, for as he 
himself explained in his account to the Foreign Office it was purely a pragmatic 
measure to ease the process of trade at the town. Stating that although it may 
appear to be 
too great an assumption of authority... there is no other means of 
holding them [the chiefs] to their engagements and obtaining any 
protection for our merchants 23 
By the terms of the treaty, the Badagry chiefs were bound to recognise free trade 
in the town. In this way they were obliged to punish those found guilty of 
obstructing commerce, by acts such as theft or arson. Such actions were to be 
reported to the British Consul at Lagos. British merchants were also allowed to 
freely employ local labour. Most importantly however, the chiefs agreed to forgo 
their rights to dictate the prices of, and the duties on, trade goods. Prices were to 
be set by merchants themselves, whilst duties were to be collected and divided 
between the Consul and the chiefs 24. 
The response of the Foreign Office to the Mercantile Treaty accepted McCoskry's 
interpretation, and with classic understatement referred to it as a treaty to 
procure 'the removal of certain restrictions to trade arising out of old native 
CUStoMSI 25. Okaro K'Ojwang has pointed out however, that the agreement 
23 PRO F084/1141 2 July 1861 McCoskry, Lagos. 
24 See Appendix B. 
25 PRO F084/1141 20 August 1861 Russell, London. 
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placed Badagry's trade 'firmly in British hands' 26. Potentially this may have been 
the case, but it would appear from subsequent documentation that,, in practice, 
Badagry's commercial life remained far beyond the control of the British Consul 
and then Governor of Lagos. In a letter to the Foreign Office on August 5 1861, 
the day before the Lagos Treaty of Cession, McCoskry outlined the problems 
which might be faced when attempting to raise revenue in the new colony. He 
noted that if duties were put too high the town would face great competition' 
from its neighbours, Badagry and Palma, through which' goods may be imported 
and exported to and from the same countries to which Lagos is a seaport' 27. This 
clearly implies that both Badagry and Palma were commercial rivals to Lagos 
rather than mere appendages. The notable point about McCoskry's attitude 
towards these other areas was that his solution to this problem was not the 
destroy this competition by absorbing the territories, but was to keep the duties at 
Lagos as low as possible. 
If the Acting Consul and later Acting Governor at Lagos did not see Badagry, 
even commercially, as part of the new colony, how then only two years later did 
it occur that Badagry was ceded to the British crown along with several other 
territories ? Correspondence from the Colonial Office would seem to suggest that 
the extension of the colony further than Lagos Island itself was not considered 
during the 1861-62 period. Indeed the only political groups who did appear to 
foresee such expansion were the neighbouring African states 28. The 'policy' of 
expansion would seem to have evolved subsequently among individuals on the 
coast and was shaped very much by personalities and their reaction to subsequent 
events. Previous analyses which have attempted to examine these circumstances 
have pigeon-holed each particular area with a particular motive, MacIntyre, for 
example states that Badagry, Palma and Leke were claimed in order to raise 
26 Okaro K'Ojwang, 'Society, Trade and Politics in Badagri... ', p. 91. 
27 PRO F084/1141 5 August 1861 McCoskry, Lagos. 
28 PRO F084/1175 9 June 1862 Freeman to Russell. 
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further revenue. Thus shortly after the establishment of the colony these towns 
were included in the Lagos Customs Ordinance 29. Ikorodu on the other hand 
was granted 'protection' in order to secure the terminus of trade from lbadan 30. 
But it would seem more likely that at least the Badagry situation was not the 
result of a single factor, but that of a number of such factors which each played 
their part in the annexation. 
The most obvious stimulus to British expansion was increasing French activity. 
The background to the annexation of Lagos has been well documented, for 
example by Robert Smith. Suffice it to say here then that by August 1861, British 
agents on the coast had arrived at the view that for economic, humanitarian and 
security reasons, the annexation of Lagos Island was desirable, a view to which 
the ministers in London became increasingly resigned 31. But Smith, in his 
examination of events leading up to the annexation, argues that although Britain 
had numerous reasons for taking formal control of the territory, it was actually 
increasing rivalry with the French which in effect precipitated the action32. This 
opinion is clearly supported by Foote's correspondence with the Foreign Office in 
early 1861 when French attentions towards Epe, although apparently carried on 
with the utmost goodwill on both sides, clearly tilted the balance towards 
establishing British authority over the island of Lagos on a more formal footing. 
Lagos was annexed on 6 August 1861. 
29 MacIntyre, 'Commander Glover... ', p. 63; PRO C0147/1 9 July 1862 Freeman reporting that the 
Provincial Legislative Council of Lagos has passed an Ordinance for the collection of export and 
import duties 'at all ports within the territory of Lagos' including Leckie [Leke), Palma and 
Badagry. This now meant that the chiefs were granted a pension in lieu of the duties they had 
hitherto collected. It is interesting to note that the legality of this Ordinance was questioned by 
the Colonial Office in various attached memos, but was ultimately accepted. 
30 MacIntyre, 'Commander Glover... ', p 63. 
31 Smith, 
- 
pp. 120-124. 
32 rbid, p. 121. 
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The Lagos Colony, 1861-1863 
During the 1861-63 period the factor of possible French encroachment along the 
coast seemingly became even more pressing as the British came to fear that their 
European neighbours would react to the annexation of Lagos. In July 1862 
Governor Freeman wrote to Newcastle at the Colonial Office that 'France looks 
with jealousy on the British occupation of Lagos, 33. Meanwhile French 
antagonism grew after the duties were levied by the British both at Epe and 
Palma, two places which they argued belonged to independent chiefs, and with 
whom they had hoped themselves to establish a close relationship. 
Indeed the French response to this increase of British jurisdiction was to take 
Port-Novo under its protection in late February 1863. However, from the 
correspondence carried to and fro between London and the coast it becomes clear 
that although the measure was of deep concern to the Colony's first Governor, 
Henry Stanhope Freeman, it certainly did not provoke hostility towards the 
French. Indeed both Freeman and Baron Didelot, Commander-in-Chief of the 
French Naval Division on the West Coast of Africa, quickly came to an amicable 
arrangement on the matter, agreeing that neither party should interfere in the 
affairs of the other and that their respective governments should be the ones to 
decide the bounds of their territories. It would appear that it was only after the 
French officially extended their territory east as far as Apa in June of that year 
that British concerns were greatly heightened, leading to a rapid succession of 
annexations by Acting Lieutenant Governor Glover in the following month, as 
Ado (June 27), Ipokia Oune 29), Okeodan Ouly 4) were followed by Badagry on 
July 7. 
To suggest that Badagry's annexation was purely a part of this tit-for-tat policy is 
to present far too simplistic a picture. Firstly, I would suggest that the protectorate 
33 PRO F084/1175 3 July 1862 Freeman, Lagos. 
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of Porto-Novo, created four months earlier, had greater repercussions for 
Badagry than it may first appear; also that the action at Apa merely shaped the 
timing of its annexation rather than the actual event. This becomes increasingly 
apparent from reports of correspondence between the French authorities and 
Thomas Tickel which show that, having asserted their influence at Porto-Novo, 
the French went on to claim that Badagry was a part of their easternmost 
territory, a fact obviously disputed by Tickel. In Tickel's reported response to 
these French claims it is interesting to note that he continually stressed the fact 
that the British had always dealt with Badagry as an independent territory; he did 
not mention the claims of, for example, Freeman, during the same period, that 
Badagry was traditionally part of the Lagos territory, an obvious argument to use 
if this had indeed been the case. 
Only in hindsight would it appear that the British position at Badagry was 
relatively secure, and that therefore annexation was merely a formality. Indeed 
within the town there was pressure to ally with the French at Porto-Novo, a 
pressure which actually culminated in disturbances in 1863. Details of these riots 
are markedly difficult to gather. But from Acting Lieutenant Governor Glover, 
who took over from Freeman when on leave, it is clear that although a peace 
was quickly restored by his arrival with a cruiser, at least three chiefs remained 
defiant telling him 'plainly ... that Badagri did not belong to the English but the 
King of Porto-Novo' 34. The French factor was therefore, one major force in 
provoking British activity along the coast, but it was not the only one. Indeed, it 
is possible to argue that the annexation of Porto-Novo was not only a reaction by 
the French to the now unfavourable trading conditions along the coast but also 
occurred due to French fears that Britain was already pushing her influence 
further west during 1862. 
34 PRO C0147/4 I August 1863 Glover to Didelot in 8 August 1863 Glover, Lagos. 
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MacIntyre has comprehensively analysed the role of Glover on the coast during 
the early 1860S 35. Building on the more hesitant foundations of Freeman, Glover 
began to set British sights further westward once more as it became increasingly 
clear during the course of 1862 that Lagos alone was failing to meet the 
expectations that had been held in August 1861. It quickly became apparent that, 
alone, Lagos would not materialise as the centre of trade and civilisation. that had 
been envisaged. This was due to a number of reasons. Firstly it had been Lago's'. 
position on the crossroads between lagoon and sea which had initially attracted 
British attention to the island, yet in the post- annexation period it became 
increasingly obvious that, just as Lagos was in a position to dominate the lagoon 
via its access to the sea, the trade of Lagos was in turn dominated by that lagoon 
and therefore conditions right along its length. Furthermore, Lagos' trade was 
affected not only by conditions to the east and west, but also from the interior. 
1860 had seen the collapse of the interior into warfare due to the dispute over 
Ijaye by Abeokuta and Ibadan. As early as April 1860 Brand had complained of 
their detrimental affect on Lagos' trade36. The wars continued to rage after Lagos' 
annexation and, as McCoskry reported in that year, not only was the island's 
trade suffering, but also other towns along the coast, notably Porto-Novo, 
Badagry, and Palma, less directly connected with Abeokuta, were doing rather 
well from supplying arms 37. 
The extent to which an individual's personal likes and dislike affected British 
policy on the coast at this time could be enormous. Glover's suspicion and 
hostility towards Abeokuta brought a complete about turn in the British 
approach to the interior. As the Governor shifted support to lbadan, relations 
between the Egba and their 'natural port' worsened to the extent that all trade 
between the two places was blocked in early 1863 and a spiral of increa sing 
35 Maclntyre, 'Commander Glover... '. 
36 PRO F084/1114 9 April 1860 Brand, Lagos. 
37 PRO F084/1141 4 October 1861 McCoskry, Lagos. 
368 
hostility was begun which culminated in the expulsion of all Europeans from 
Abeokuta in 1867, severely damaging Lagos' position as a commercial centre. Not 
only did Lagos' legitimate commerce fail to develop as it had been hoped but it 
also became increasingly clear that without wider control the slave trade would 
not become extinct, as Whydah merely replaced Lagos as the centre of operations. 
Indeed in July 1862 Freeman noted that the frequency of slave exports form the 
Bight had apparently increased rather than decreased over the preceding few 
years as the demand for slaves revived after 185738. 
Finally there was also the factor of security at Lagos itself. Accounts of the 
annexation process present it almost as a non-event. However, the urgency with 
which McCoskry asked for the assistance of a force of men in the early days of the 
colony should not be ignored. Indeed in October 1861, fearing that the wavering 
Dosunmu was likely to turn to the anti-cession party, he stated that the only basis 
of their authority was the presence of HMS Prometheus in the area39. By January 
1862 McCoskry was reporting that, although Lagos was now quiet, it still had far 
too small a show of force, and indeed he implied that, if anything, they had been 
rather lucky to have avoided an outbreak of violence 40. In this way then, an 
extension of British authority along the coast could be seen as an attempt to 
stabilize the situation at Lagos by cushioning it from disturbing influences from 
Porto-Novo and Dahomey, as well as securing further routes into the war-torn 
interior. But the instability of the British position in the area shows that even by 
1862, nothing could be taken for granted. 
The preceding reasons for the annexation of Badagry in 1863 are clearly taken 
from a much wider perspective than from the town itself, and this is in many 
ways the correct view to take of a town that for much of its history had been 
38 PRO F084 / 1175 1 July 1862 Freeman, Lagos. 
39 PRO F084/1141 5 October 1861 McCoskry, Lagos. 
40 PRO F084/1175 6 January 1862 McCoskry, Lagos. 
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shaped by influences right along the coast and from the interior. However, there 
are also a group of reasons, more attributable to local affairs, which made 
Badagry's annexation desirable. 
As Robert Smith commented in relation to Lagos, the argument that internal 
instability was a key factory in provoking British reaction should not be 
minimised4l. In the Badagry case, as already demonstrated, British policy had 
emerged both from the actions of British officials but also from the missionaries 
and traders who had clearly played a part in both mediating in and also causing 
local quarrelS 42. 
Badagry's history of troubles not only frequently offended sensitive British 
morals, for example over the trials and executions for witchcraft, but also its 
continued resistance to missionary efforts, which made the town notorious. In 
addition, on a number of occasions local unrest threatened to, and did, spill over 
into violence which endangered not only British lives but also British economic 
interests. The civil war in the first half of the 1850s, although ultimately settled 
in 1854 with the restoration of the traditional chiefs, was only the most 
prominent in a series of internal disputes, often complicated by outside interests, 
which both preceded and followed it. For example, the dispute of 1860 which led 
to the burning of the Novelli Factory was followed by a further dispute in 
September of that year involving parties in Badagry, Porto-Novo and Ajido, 
whilst December 1860 saw a succession dispute between two rival chiefs 43. 
Although I would argue that the Mercantile Treaty of 1861 did not, in practice, 
place Badagry's trade 'firmly in British hands', I would suggest that it was both 
indicative of and a further causal factor in the instability of the Badagry ward 
41 Smith, The Lagos Cgnsulate... p. 31. 
42 See chapter 9, pp. 329-331. 
43 PRO F084/1114 10 September 1860 Hand, Lagos; F084/11.41 28 December 1860 Badagry 
Merchants in 8 January 1861 Foote, Lagos. 
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chiefs. With their authority so intrinsically bound up with trade, any restrictions 
on their commercial Performance must have led to political difficulties. 
Unfortunately lack of documentary evidence from within Badagry during this 
period does not allow for a closer examination of this phenomenon. However, 
restrictions on the trade with British merchants evidently stimulated these chiefs 
to look elsewhere for their commercial support and there is evidence to suggest 
that by 1862 Badagry's slave-trading activities had begun to revive once more: 
The correspondent for Badagry in the African Times of 23 May that year stated 
that 'no vessels sales now without a cargo of slaves, 44. It would appear then that 
perhaps, far from being the mere appendage to the Lagos colony that it has been 
presented, Badagry continued to act as a thorn in the side of the territory 
throughout the early part of its existence. 
But Badagry's commercial performance did not only possess a negative side for 
British consideration. As already stated, the Ijaye wars raging in the interior had 
severely damaged Lagos' trade and, although of course Badagry was also affected, 
the town also had access to more westerly routes. Although one must be careful 
not to exaggerate the extent and importance of Badagry's trade in the early 1860s 
it is interesting to note that in January 1863, Freeman was clearly putting the 
town's economic attractions at the forefront of his reasons for intervention there 
when he stated: 
unless our authority is properly asserted both at Badagry and 
Palma I cannot prevent the greater part of the trade passing by 
these places to the detriment of Lagos 45. 
In this way then it would appear that a further factor encouraging British 
attentions towards Badagry in the 1861-63 period was the realisation that heavier 
duties and more control over trade at Lagos would drive trade into the hands of 
its neighbouring competitors. The fear of driving trade away had first been 
44 A 23 May 1862. 
45 pRO C0147/3 6 January 1863 Freeman, Lagos. 
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expressed in 1861 by McCoskry, who had attempted to find a solution in low 
tariffs at Lagos and then regulated tariffs at Badagry. However, clearly by 1863 this 
approach had failed to calm fears over Lagos' vulnerable trading position and, 
under the direction of a more forceful administration, direct actions was taken to 
bring Badagry to heel. 
The annexation of Badagry on 7 July 1863 was then the result of a number of 
factors. The town's close relationship with Lagos certainly created strong links 
with the newly founded colony in 1861, but this did not irrevocably set Badagry 
on the path towards cession itself. It was a series of further factors in the 1861-63 
period which ultimately resulted in the town's annexation. The most obvious of 
these was the increasing competition between British and French interests on the 
coast which stimulated a series of territorial acquisitions. But the picture was 
further complicated by, most importantly, Lagos' failure to develop as the 
commercial centre that had been envisaged, and also by fears for British security 
in the area. There were also a number of reasons specific to Badagry, such as its 
economic potential and its internal instability which made its annexation 
ultimately desirable. 
On a wider scale, what makes the story of Badagry's annexation interesting is the 
subtle course steered throughout by the British agents at work on the coast. The 
extent to which individuals shaped the outcome, although usually reacting to 
events as they occurred rather than formulating a definitive 'policy', was 
immense. The annexation of Badagry can then be viewed as the culmination of a 
series of themes and threads which have run throughout its history. Firstly it 
was Badagry's position within the physical environment which allowed it to 
become not only an important independent economic and political power but 
also made it so integral a part of the coastal lagoonside system. As a result, 
various external infuences, both African and European, as states and individuals, 
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sought to control the port. The suseptibility of Badagry to such influences and yet 
its ability to accomodate them was largely the result of the fragmented and often 
contradictory nature of the community. The influences underlying its 
annexation in 1863 were similarly diverse and unpredictable. 
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Appendix A 
Engagement between Her Majesty the Queen of England and the Chiefs of 
Badagry for the Abolition of the Traffic in slaves, signed at Badagry March, 18th 
1852. 
James Newburgh Strange, Esquire, Commander of H. M. S Archer, on the. 
part of Her Majesty the Queen of England and the Chiefs of Badagry and of the 
neighbourhood, on the part of themselves and of their country, have agreed on 
the following articles and conditions: - 
The export of slaves to foreign countries is for ever abolished in the 
territories of the Chiefs of Badagry, and the Chiefs of Badagry engage to make and 
proclaim a law prohibiting any of their subjects or any person within their 
jurisdiction from selling or assisting in the sale of any slave for transportation to 
a foreign country and the Chiefs of Badagry promise to inflict a severe 
punishment on any person who shall break this law. 
No European or other person whatever shall be permitted to reside within 
the territory of the Chiefs of Badagry for the purpose of carrying on in any way 
the traffic in Slaves, and no houses, or stores, or buildings of any kind whatever 
shall be erected for the purpose of slave trade within the territories of the Chiefs 
of Badagry, and if any such houses, stores or buildings shall at any time be 
erected, and the Chiefs of Badagry shall fail or be unable to destroy them they 
may be destroyed by any British Officer employed for the suppression of slave 
trade. 
If at any time it shall appear that slave trade has been carried on through 
or from the territory of the Chiefs of Badagry, the slave trade may be put down by 
Great Britain by force upon territory and British Officers may seize the boats of 
Badagry found anywhere carrying on the slave trade; and the Chiefs of Badagry 
will be subject to a severe act of displeasure on the part of the Queen of England. 
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The Subjects of the Queen of England may always trade freely with the 
people of Badagry in every article they may wish to buy and sell in all the places 
and ports and rivers within the territories of the Chiefs of Badagry, and 
throughout the whole of their dominions; and the Chiefs of Badagry pledge 
themselves to show no favour and give no priviledge to the ships and traders of 
other countries which they do not show to those of England. 
The slaves now held for exportation shall be delivered up to any British 
Officer duly authorised to receive them; for the purpose of being carried to a 
British Colony and there liberated; and all the implements of the slave trade, and 
the barracoons, or buildings exclusively used in the slave trade, shall be 
forthwith destroyed. 
Europeans or other persons now engaged in the slave trade are to be 
expelled the country: the houses, stores, or buildings hitherto employed as slave 
factories, if not converted to lawful purposes within three months of the 
conclusion of this engagement, are to be destroyed. 
The Chiefs of Badagry declare that no human beings shall at any time be 
sacrificed within their territories on account of religious or other ceremonies and 
that they will prevent the barbarous Practice of murdering prisoners captured in 
war. 
Complete protection shall be afforded to missionaries or ministers of the 
Gospel; of whatever nation or country, following their vocation of spreading the 
knowledge and doctrines of Christianity, and extending the benefits of 
civilisation, within the territory of the Chiefs of Badagry. Encouragement shall be 
given to such missionaries or ministers in the pursuits of industry, in building 
houses for their residence, and schools and chapels. They shall not be hindered 
or molested in their endeavours to teach the doctrines of Christianity to all 
persons willing and desirous to be taught no shall any subject of the 
Chiefs of 
Badagry who may embrace the Christian faith be on that account or on account of 
their teachings or exercise thereof, molested or troubled in any manner 
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whatsoever. The Chiefs of Badagry further agree to set apart a piece of land, 
within a convenient distance of the principal towns, to be used as a burial- 
ground for Christian persons; and the funerals and sepulchres of the dead shall 
not be disturbed in any way or upon any account. 
Power is hereby expressly reserved to the Government of France to become 
a partner to this Treaty, if it should think fit agreeably with the provisions 
contained in article 5 of the Convention between Her Majesty and the King of the 
French for the suppression of the traffic in slaves, signed in London, May 29th 
1845. 
In faith of which we have hereunto set our hands and seals, at Badagry, 
this 18th day of March, 1852. 
(signed) 
J. N. Strange, Commander of H. M. S. Archer 
x Mewu 
x Alapa 
(witnesses) 
CA Gollmer, Church Missionary 
J. Martin, Wesleyan Missionary 
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Appendix B 
Whereas the legitimate trade of Badagry has hitherto been greatly 
obstructed by certain native regulations. 
William McCoskry, Her Britannic Majesty's Acting Consul, on behalf of 
British subjects, others under British protection, and all legal traders, subjects of 
countries in amity with Great Britain and the Chiefs of Badagry, on behalf of , 
themselves and their people. 
Art. 1. The people of Badagry and others, natives of the neighbouring 
countries, trading in or to Badagry, shall be allowed to trade freely and directly 
with the merchants trading at Badagry in their own establishments, and now 
shall, on that account, be subject to any impost more than when trading one with 
another. 
Art. H. No native nor Chief of Badagry shall control in any way the trading 
transactions of any merchant by fixing the price at which any article is to be sold, 
but shall leave that to be settled between the buyer and the seller themselves. 
Art. Ell. The Chiefs of Badagry shall cause their subjects t pay their just 
debts to traders within reasonable time, and, if not paid within the time fixed, 
shall cause the property of the person so owing, to be sold to liquidate the debt. 
Art. IV. Any person subject to the Chiefs of Badagry that may be convicted 
of theft, robbery, incendiarism, or any other offence, shall be punished by the 
Chiefs, and they shall use proper means to bring any person accused of any 
offence to justice. 
Art. V. Traders at Badagry shall be allowed to employ in any legal work 
any person hey may choose, whether native of Badagry or not, and no native nor 
Chief of Badagry shall obstruct persons so employed, in the performance of their 
work. 
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Art. VI. In consideration of the due fulfilment of the forgoing Articles, the 
traders at Badagry shall pay a duty Of 11 /2 heads of cowries on every 150 gallons of 
palm oil, or nut oil, and 2 strings of cowries on every pound of ivory exported 
from Badagry, the amounts arising from such duty shall be divided quarterly, by 
Her Britannic Majesty's Consul amongst the Chiefs of Badagry, according to their 
conduct and capabilities in furthering the interests of commerce and civilisation. 
It is clearly understood that the payment of one head per 30 gallons 
hitherto charged by Badagry people on palm oil coming from Porto Novo, and all 
other such charges and imposts on produce, cease when this agreement comes in 
force 
(signed) "THOMAS TICKEL, Acting Vice-Consul 
his 
"LOE x WAUR 
mark 
his 
"AKEO x NH 
mark 
his 
MO x BE 
mark 
his 
"LUI x GE 
mark 
his 
THEO x WH 
mark 
his 
TOSS xU 
mark 
Witnesses to signatures 
J. E. Moffat 
j. W. Johns 
J. Tickell 
H. Alexander 
W. Roberts 
his 
AGO x ITOE 
mark 
his 
BALL xA 
mark 
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Appendix C 
His Excellency John Hawley Glover, Lieutenant Governor, Commander in 
Chief, and Vice Admiral of Her Britannic Majesty's Settlement of Lagos, and 
Acting Consul for the Bight of Benin, on the part of Her Majesty the Queen of 
Great Britain, and the Chiefs of Badagry on the part of themselves and their 
people have agreed as follows - 
Article 1. in order for the better keeping of the peace and quiet of all well 
disposed persons living in Badagry and for the better security of their lives and 
properties, as also for the purpose of setting aside all pretensions on the part of 
the King of Porto Novo and others to the right and royalty of the District of 
Badagry. 
We whose names are hereunto subscribed, being Chiefs of Badagry have 
freely and willingly ceded to Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain, Her Heirs 
and Successors for ever, the town of Badagry and all the rights and territories and 
appurtenances whatsoever thereunto belonging as well as all profits and 
revenues, absolute dominion and sovereignty of the said town and territory of 
Badagry freely fully, entirely, and absolutely. 
Article 11. In consideration of which cession as before herein set forth I 
John Hawley Glover, Commander in Her Majesty's Royal Navy, Lieutenant 
Governor, Commander of the Settlement of Lagos aforesaid, and Acting Consul 
for the Bight of Benin, on behalf of Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain 
promise that the Chiefs who have hereunto set their hands, shall receive from 
the first day of the present month of July in the year of our Lord One thousand 
eight hundred and sixty three, the further yearly sum of two hundred and forty 
pounds and sixteen shillings (E240.16.0) in addition to the yearly pension of two 
hundred and fifty nine pounds four shillings (059.4.0) which they have hitherto 
received; that is to say, the sum of five hundred pounds (E500.0-0 per annum as 
long as they shall live or reside peaceably and quietly in Badagry or within the 
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territories of Her Majesty as good and loyal subjects of Her Majesty the Queen of 
Great Britain (that is to say) each Chief shall receive so long as he lives, the sum 
of sixty two pounds ten shillings (E62.10.0) per annum. 
and we further declare that our right and property in the District of 
Badagry has always and does extend Westward to the village Witcheree on the 
sea shore, the half of the town of Quameh, and the Eastern side or shore of the - 
Quameh Creek on the lagoon. 
Done at Badagry, under Great Seal of the Settlement of Lagos this Seventh 
Day of July in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty three. 
(signed) John H. Glover Head Chief 
Lt. Govr. Akrah 
his X mark 
Chief 
Agrolo 
his X mark 
Chief Head Chief 
Posso Wowo 
his X mark his X mark 
Paucu for Chief 
Chief Pheortoh Bala 
his X mark his X mark 
Chief Chief 
Mobi Jingi 
his X mark his X mark 
witnesses 
(signed) W. MCoskry 
Acting Chief Magistrate 
B. L Lefroy 
Commander R. N 
( 11 ) Thomas Tickel 
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